In a recent ruling, the NCLAT addressed a substantial issue related to the extension of the moratorium period under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The Tribunal, quoting directly from the Adjudicating Authority’s earlier order, emphasized, “A fresh moratorium in terms of Section 101 of the Code shall commence as applicable… The moratorium shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of 180 days.”
The case arose when the Personal Guarantor's resolution process saw the expiration of the initial 180-day moratorium, prompting the Resolution Professional to seek an extension. The central question before the Tribunal was whether the moratorium, once expired, could be extended beyond the statutory limit under Section 101 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter referred to as “IBC”).
Brief Facts:
The Personal Guarantor (Respondent) filed an application under Section 94(1) of the IBC, leading to an Interim Moratorium and the appointment of the Appellant as Resolution Professional (hereinafter referred to as “RP”) on 08.04.2021. On 30.04.2024, the Adjudicating Authority initiated the Personal Insolvency Resolution Process (hereinafter referred to as “PIRP”) for 180 days. A public announcement was made on 03.05.2024, and the Personal Guarantor submitted a Draft Repayment Plan. During the first creditors' meeting on 23.10.2024, creditors requested changes to the plan. On 28.10.2024, the RP was authorized to seek a 90-day extension, which was filed as I.A. 5719/2024. However, the Adjudicating Authority granted only a 90-day extension on 04.12.2024, without addressing the moratorium. The Appellant filed this appeal against that order.
Contentions of the Petitioner:
The Appellant argued that the Insolvency Resolution Process without a Moratorium would render the entire personal resolution process ineffective. The Adjudicating Authority erred by not extending the Moratorium beyond 180 days, which expired on 28.10.2024. Without the Moratorium, creditors could initiate recovery actions or enforce security interests, undermining the PIRP. The Appellant contended that the 180-day period under Section 101 is directory, and the Adjudicating Authority has the jurisdiction to extend it.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The Respondent supported the Appellant’s submission, arguing that the 180-day period under Section 101 is directory, not mandatory. The Respondent emphasized that in appropriate cases, the Adjudicating Authority has full jurisdiction to extend the 180-day period. They further argued that without an extension of the Moratorium, the proceedings under the Personal Guarantor will not yield favorable results.
Observation of the Tribunal:
The Adjudicating Authority admitted the Personal Insolvency Resolution Process (PIRP) on 30.04.2024 and imposed a 180-day moratorium under Section 101 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). The order stated, “A fresh moratorium in terms of Section 101 of the Code shall commence as applicable… The moratorium shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of 180 days.” Upon the expiration of the moratorium on 28.10.2024, the Resolution Professional (RP) filed an application for a 90-day extension. The Adjudicating Authority granted the extension, stating, “In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be appropriate to give a reasonable period to the RP for completion of the process… However, we have not expressed any views on the moratorium.”
In the appeal, the appellants sought an extension of the moratorium and the Tribunal to address the issue. The key issue before the Tribunal was whether the statutory 180-day moratorium under Section 101 could be extended. The Tribunal emphasized that Section 101 explicitly states, “When the application is admitted… a moratorium shall commence… and shall cease to have effect at the end of the period of one hundred and eighty days.”
The appellants argued that the 180-day period was directory and could be extended by the Adjudicating Authority in exceptional cases. The Tribunal referred to the Supreme Court’s interpretation in State of UP v. Babu Ram Upadhyay and Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. v. A. Balakrishnan, emphasizing that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it cannot be altered. The Tribunal reiterated that “when the statutory scheme is clear and unambiguous, there is no role of any interpretive process to extend the period of Moratorium.”
The Tribunal further distinguished this case from Vikas Gautamchand Jain, where Section 54D allowed discretion in extending time, while Section 101(1) mandates the automatic cessation of the moratorium after 180 days. Thus, the Tribunal concluded that an extension of the moratorium was not permissible under the current statutory framework of Section 101.
The decision of the Tribunal:
The Tribunal dismissed the Appeal, ruling that no extension of the moratorium could be granted, as Section 101(1) of the IBC limits the moratorium to 180 days. Since the period ended on 28.10.2024, the moratorium had statutorily expired, and the Appeal lacked merit.
Case Title: Anil Kumar v. Mukund Choudhary
Case no: Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 38 of 2025
Coram: Justice Ashok Bhushan [Chairperson], Barun Mitra [Member (Technical)] and Arun Baroka [Member (Technical)]
Advocate for Petitioner: Adv. Mr. Milan Singh Negi, Adv. Mr. Nikhil Kumar Jha and Adv. Ms. Aakriti Gupta
Advocate for Respondent: Adv. Ms. Purti Gupta, Adv. Ms. Henna George and Adv. Ms. Harshita Kakkar
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