The Delhi High Court, in one of its recent judgements, while disallowing a review petition has held that a Review Petition can be allowed only on the grounds stipulated in Order XLVII, read with Section 114 of CPC and not on grounds which the petitioner/counsel chose not to press during arguments in hearing of case.

The judgement came out in one case titled as Stg. Conference Of Public Enterprise v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors

The single-Judge bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar during the hearing of the review petition wasn't impressed with the unforeseen averments provided by the petitioner in the Review Petition, wherein the briefing Counsel had tried to attribute "fault" to the Senior Counsel who had argued the original case by stating that he missed pressing certain important changes.  

The Petitioner herein had sought review of the order passed in a writ petition by Justice Shankar himself.

He argued that the Senior Counsel on his own basis made the statement for confining the matter to the issue of appropriate government only, instead of arguing the case on all aspects.

It was submitted before the Court that the Senior Counsel didn't have instructions of the petitioner or of the briefing advocate to confine arguments and it would be unfair to make Petitioner suffer on account of Counsel's fault.

After hearing the submissions, the Court observed that for the Petitioner to blame a respected Senior Counsel is indecent, especially when the hearing of the case had been conducted in the presence of the briefing counsel.

The Court remarked:

"This Court expresses, with no equivocation whatsoever, its displeasure at the averments contained in the afore-extracted paragraphs of the Review Petition. In the opinion of this court, these averments border on impropriety, and amount to taking the Court for granted. They question not only the merit, but also the legitimacy of the arguments advanced by the Senior Counsel, whom the petitioner had engaged. On the face of it, these averments are untrue and do not merit even the slightest consideration, inter alia for the reason that the instructing counsel Mr. Inder Jit Singh was present in Court, and was instructing the learned Senior Counsel on 27th October 2017, when the matter was heard."

Observing this, the Court also questioned the briefing Counsel as to how he could be a signatory to an application averring that the Senior Counsel, instructed by him, hadn't argued all points and pressed all the charges that he desired should be argued and put forward. 

In response to this, the Court got some lame and shocking answers as the briefing Counsel blamed the Senior Counsel for not giving an ear to the suggestions and facts put up by him and dealing cases in way he may deem appropriate.

The next challenge before the Court after hearing this submission was to examine whether the review petition merited consideration.

The Court, on this, observed that the Petitioner hadn't sought to contend that the impugned judgement contained any error apparent on the face of the record, vis-à-vis the grounds that were pressed during the hearing.

Ther plead in the petition for review was premised on grounds that the Petitioner had chosen not to press.

Holding the above, the Court dismissed the review petition and said:

"The law does not permit this. Consent of counsel cannot empower a court to act in derogation of the law. The right to review is not absolute or inherent and has to be conferred by statute. Where it is so conferred, it has to be exercised within the prescribed statutory circumspection."

The Court went onto explain that the only circumstance in which a judgment can be reviewed, are set out in Order XLVII, read with Section 114 of CPC and not on any other ground.

What are the grounds under Order XLVII, read with Section 114 of CPC?

These are:
(i) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record,
(ii) discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking review or could not be produced by him at any time when the decree was passed or order made, or
(iii) any other sufficient reason.

The Court, placing reliance on Meera Bhanja v. Niramala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170. added that it is also trite law that the expression "any other sufficient reasons", has to be interpreted ejusdem generis to the expressions that precede it.

The Court was of the opinion that in the present matter, the grounds on which the review petition was based didn't conform to any of the requisite criteria and thus the review petition had been dismissed and a fine of ₹25,000 had been imposed on the Petitioner.

The judgement was passed by a single-Judge bench of Justice C. Hari Shankar on 29-01-2020:

Read Judgement Here: 

 

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