Maharana Shri Jayvantsinghji Ranmalsinghji Vs. The State of Gujrat [1961] INSC 365 (22 December 1961)
DAS, S.K.
DAS, S.K.
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SARKAR, A.K.
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.
CITATION: 1962 AIR 821 1962 SCR Supl. (2) 411
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1963 SC 864 (30) RF 1970 SC 564 (43) F 1971 SC1992 (14) RF 1977 SC2121 (1) R 1979 SC1550 (14)
ACT:
Land Tenure, Abolition of-Amendment of enactment-If creates a new class of permanent tenants-Constitutional validity-If infringes fundamental rights of erstwhile tenure-holders- Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Bom. LVII of 1958), ss. 3, 4, 6-Constitution of India, Art. 14, 19 (1)(f), 31, 31-A.
HEADNOTE:
The petitioners, who were tenure-holders, challenged the constitutional validity of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 and in particular ss. 3 and 4 read with s. 6 of that Act, as infringing their fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. Their case in brief was that those provisions by making certain non-permanent tenants permanent as from the commencement of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, enabled them to acquire occupancy right by payment of six times the assessment or the rent under s. 5A of that Act instead of 20 times to 200 times the assessment under s. 32H of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, 412 as amended in 1956, and thereby substantially deprived the petitioners of the rights acquired by them on the 'tillers' day, April 1, 1957, when they ceased to be tenure-holders. It was urged that the impugned Act was a piece of colourable legislation in that it had confiscated, under the guise of defining a permanent tenant or changing a rule of evidence, a large part of the purchase price the petitioners were entitled to from their tenants, and that the State Legislature had not the competence to enact it as it was not saved by Art. 31A of the Constitution.
^ Held, (Sarkar and Mudholkar, JJ., dissenting), that ss.3, 4 and 6 of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958, in so far as they deemed some tenants as permanent tenants in possession of Taluqudari land, were unconstitutional and void. Under the guise of changing the definition of a permanent tenant and changing a rule of evidence, they really reduced the purchase price that the petitioners were entitled to receive under s. 32H of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended in 1956, from some of their tenants on the "tillers' day." Per Sinha, C.J., and Das, J.-There can be no doubt that s. 4 of the impugned Act, properly construed, created a new class of permanent tenants not contemplated by s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and not in existence on the 'tillers' day", and the combined effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act was that if the tenure holder did not make an application under s. 6 within six months from the commencement of the impugned Act for a declaration that a tenant under him was not a permanent tenant, the name of the tenant would be recorded as a permanent tenant if he fulfilled the conditions laid down by s. 4 and thereafter he would be deemed under s. 3 to be a permanent tenant and under s. 4 all the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act 1949, would apply to him. The result of this combined effect would be to deprive the tenure-holder of any real opportunity of contesting the claims of the tenant and deprive him of the purchase price prescribed by s. 32H of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.
The right of the petitioners to the said purchase price from those of their tenants who were non-permanent on April 1, 1957, was a right of property guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f) and the impugned sections adversely affected that right with retrospective effect Section 6, tested in the light of Art. 19(5), could not be said to impose a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public.
413 Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, [1958] S.C.R. 1122, applied.
Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay. [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 489, referred to.
Article 31A of the Constitution had no application. The relation between the tenure- holders and the tenants had changed from that of landlord and tenant to that of creditor and debtor on April 1, 1957, and the impugned Act which affected such rights, did not come within the protection of that Article. In view of the true scope and effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6, the impugned Act could not fall within any entry of List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and was a piece of colourable legislation.
K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa [1954] S.C.R. 1, referred to.
Per Sarkar and Mudholkar, JJ.-Section 4 of the impugned Act did not expand the definition of a permanent tenant and did not take away any property that was vested in the landlord on the "tillers day". Nor did it confer any new property on the tenant. It only applied to and rescued a permanent tenant faced with the task of proving the nature of his tenancy, by raising a presumption of permanency in his favour. If in fact his tenancy was not permanent and had been extinguished by law but he was tentatively recorded as permanent, the landlord could rebut the presumption in a proceeding under s. 6 (1) by producing the documents in his possession or otherwise by showing that the tenancy was not in fact permanent and, therefore, had been extinguished by s. 32(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and claim compensation or the purchase money under s. 32H(1)(II) of the Act, that right of his not having been affected in any way by the impugned Act. If he failed, he would get the purchase price according to s. 5A of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949, which would not be and was not challenged.
Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. State of Bombay, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 691, referred to.
The impugned Act dealt with matters arising out of the relationship between landlord and tenant. Its provisions were not intended to apply where such relationship did not subsist. The Act was, therefore, within the competence of the Legislature under entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and was thus not a piece of colourable legislation.
414 There was, therefore, no infringement of Art.
31(1) and the Act was within the protection of Art. 31A of the Constitution and its Constitutional Validity could not be challenged under Art. 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.
Held, further, that the distinction made between tenure villages and non-tenure ones was a classification based on the extent of availability of the material for raising the inference or the presumption and such classification had a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
Per Ayyangar, J.-There was no basis for the argument that s. 4 of the impugned Act merely intended to provide a rule of evidence for determining who was a permanent tenant under s. 83 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, and did not extend the category of such tenants. It enacts a positive rule of law by which a person in possession of holding of a tenure-land must be "deemed" to be a permanent tenant on fulfilment of the three specified conditions. This is evident from the provisions of s. 6(1) under which every person who satisfied the definition of a permanent tenant under s. 4 was entitled automatically and without applying for to be entered as a permanent tenant in the record of rights by the Mamlatdar unless the tenure-holder filed an objection in writing. Obviously such objection could only be on grounds open to him under s. 4. Section 4(b) and s.6(1) of the impugned Act had to be read together as forming an integrated whole. The entire object and purpose of the impugned enactment was not, therefore, to enact a rule of evidence for determining who were permanent tenants under the pre-existing law but to define and create a new class of permanent tenants who satisfied s. 4 of the Act.
ORIGINAL, JURISDICTION: Petition Nos. 120 of 58 etc.
Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.
G. S. Pathak, J.B. Dadachanji, S.N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. Vohra, for the petitioners (in Petns. 120 and 147 of 1958).
S. B. Dadachanji, S.N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. Vohra, for the petitioner (in Petn. No.
149/58).
J.B. Dadachanji, S.N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P.L. Vohra, for the petitioners (in Petns.
Nos. 148 and 150/58).
415 C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, N.P. Nathwani, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.
N.P. Nathwani and I. N. Shroff for respondents Nos. 5 and 6 (in Petns. Nos. 120, 148 and 156 of 1958).
1961. December 22.-The Judgment of Sinha, C. J., and Das, J., was delivered by Das, J., the judgment of Sarkar and Mudholkar JJ., was delivered by Mudholkar, J., and Ayyangar, J., delivered a separate judgment.
S. K. Das, J.-In these 13 writ petitions arises a common question of law, namely, the constitutional validity of some of the provisions of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act, 1958 (Bombay Act LVII of 1958) and in particular, of the provisions contained in ss. 3 and 4 read with s. 6 thereof. We shall hereinafter refer to this Act as the impugned Act, 1958.
Put very briefly, the case of the petitioners is that as a result of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958, certain non-permanent tenants were deemed to be permanent tenants as from the commencement of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 (Bombay Act LXII of 1949), hereinafter referred to as the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 and thereby became entitled to acquire on payment of six times the assessment or six times the rent instead of at least the minimum of twenty times the assessment, the rights of an "occupant" within the meaning of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. This result, it is contended, has substantially deprived the petitioners of the rights which they acquired on tillers' day (April 1, 1957) by reason of the provisions contained in s. 32 and other relevant sections of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948) as amended from time to time. It is 416 stated that this deprivation has resulted in the violation of certain fundamental rights of the petitioners, such as those guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. On behalf of the petitioners it has also been contended that apart from the question of violation of their fundamental rights, the impugned Act, 1958 is a piece of colourable legislation in the sense that under the guise of changing a rule of evidence, it has in effect taken away the petitioners' property without payment of compensation and given it to another; it is, therefore, a piece of legislation which does not come within any entry of the two legislative lists under which the State Legislature was competent to make laws.
To appreciate the points urged in support of the petitions which have all been heard together, it will be necessary to consider the effect and inter-; action of some of the provisions of four principal Acts, namely, (1) the Bombay Land Revenue code 1879 (Bombay Act V of 1879), hereinafter referred to as the Revenue Code; (2) the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended from time to time, hereinafter called the Tenancy Act, 1948; (3) the Taluqdari Abolition Act 1979; and (4) the impugned Act, 1958. We shall presently read the relevant provisions of these Acts. But before we do so, it is necessary to state some facts. The facts are similar, though not the same, in all the petitions. It will be sufficient to state the facts of one of the petitions (Petition no. 120 of 1958) in detail in order to focus attention on the main question of law which is the same in all these petitions and which we have indicated briefly in the preceding paragraph.
The petitioners are all ex-Taluqdars. In Petition No. 120 of 1958 the petitioner was a Taluqdar of two estates known as Sanand and Koth in the Ahmedabad district of the then State of 417 Bombay and now of the State of Gujarat. These two estates comprised 24 Taluqdari villages. The petitioner was the absolute proprietor of all the lands comprised in the two estates, subject to payment of land revenue to the State (Government under the petitioner there were tenants-it is stated, some permanent and some non-permanent. In the year 1949, the Bombay Provincial Legislature enacted the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 which came into force on August 15, 1950. As a result of the provisions of that Act, the Taluqdari tenure as such was abolished and certain properties, such as, wells, tanks, waste lands, uncultivated lands, etc., were acquired by the State; and the Taluqdar was converted into mere "occupant" as defined in the Revenue Code and was to pay land revenue in accordance with the provisions of that Code.
Section 3 (16) of the Revenue code defined an "occupant" as meaning "a holder in actual possession of unalienated land, other than a tenant; provided that where the holder in actual possession is a tenant, the landlord or superior landlord, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the occupant." In 1955 the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 was amended and s. 5A was inserted. This section, in effect, gave a permanent tenant in possession of Taluqdari land the right to become an occupant if he paid six times the assessment for acquiring the right of occupancy. In other words, if a permanent tenant of an ex-Taluqdar paid the required amount as stated in s. 5A, he became an occupant. himself in place of the ex- Taluqdar and came into direct relation with the State in the matter of payment of land revenue, and acquired all the rights of an occupant under the Revenue Code. The right which was conferred by s. 5A was available at first for a limited period only, but it was extended till 1962 as stated at the Bar. It is necessary to state now what is meant by "permanent tenant". Section 16 of the Taluqdari Abolition 418 Act, 1949 made the provisions of the Revenue Code applicable thereto and an attempt was made to harmonize the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 with the provisions of the Revenue Code; therefore, for understanding what is a "permanent tenant" we have to go to the Revenue Code, s. 83 whereof, so far as it is relevant, reads as follows:
"83 x x x x x And where by reason of the antiquity of a tenancy, no satisfactory evidence of its commencement is forthcoming, and there is not any such evidence of the period of its intended duration, if any, agreed upon between the landlord and tenant, or those under whom they respectively claim title, or any usage of the locality as to duration of such tenants, it shall, as against the immediate landlord of the tenant, be presumed to be co-extensive with the duration of the tenure of such landlord and of those who derive title under him.
And where there is no satisfactory evidence of the capacity in which a person in possession of land in respect of which he renders service or pays rent to the landlord received, holds or retains possession of the same it shall be presumed that he is in possession as tenant.
x x x x It will be noticed that the expression "permanent tenant" does not occur in the section. What is stated therein is that in certain circumstances the duration of the tenancy of a tenant as against his immediate landlord shall be presumed to be co- extensive with the duration of the tenure of such landlord. The two circumstances mentioned are, (1) where by reason of the antiquity of the tenancy no satisfactory evidence of its commencement is forthcoming, and (2) where there is no such evidence 419 of the period of its intended duration, if any, agreed upon between the landlord and tenant, or any usage of the locality as to duration of the tenancy. Sometime later, by Bombay Act, XIII of 1956, the definition of a "permanent tenant" was inserted in s. 2(10A) of the Tenancy Act, 1948.
That definition was in these terms:
"`permanent tenant' means a person- (a) who immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955 (hereinafter called `the Amending Act, 1955')- (i) holds land as mulgenidar or mirasdar; or (ii) by custom, agreement, or the decree or order of a Court holds the land on lease permanently; or (b) the commencement or duration of whose tenancy cannot satisfactorily be proved by reason of antiquity;
and includes a tenant whose name or the name of whose predecessor-in-title has been entered in the record of rights or in any public record or in any other revenue record as a permanent tenant immediately before the commencement of the Amending Act, 1955." Section 87A of the Tenancy Act, shall, which was also inserted by Bombay Act XII of 1956 by s. 47 thereof, said:
"Nothing in this Act, shall affect the provisions of any of the Land Tenures Abolition Acts, specified in Schedule III to this Act, in so far as such provisions relate to the conferment of right of An occupant in favour of any inferior holder or tenant in respect of any land held by him." 420 In Schedule III to the Tenancy Act, 1948, was given a list of Land Tenures Abolition Act, including the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949.
Therefore, the effect of s. 87A aforesaid was that nothing in the Tenancy Act, 1948, affected the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, in so far as the provisions in s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act 1949, conferred the right of an occupant in favour of a permanent tenant in possession of any taluqdari land on payment of the sums mentioned therein. The arguments before us have proceeded on the footing that before the coming into force of the impugned Act, 1958, the status of a permanent tenant in possession of any taluqdari land was to be determined by the provisions in s. 83 of the Revenue Code; in other words by the two circumstances mentioned in that section.
What was the position with regard to tenants who were not permanent ? No right was conferred on them by s. 5A of the Taluqrlari Abolition Act, 1949, which section was inserted in that Act in 1955 by Bombay Act I of 1955. The rights of these non-permanent tenants were governed by the Tenancy Act, 1948, which underwent some fundamental changes in 1956 (see Bombay Act XIII of 1956). The changes relevant for our purpose were contained in s. 32 and some of the succeeding sections. The effect of these sections was considered by this court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay (1). After summarising the provisions contained in ss. 32 to 32R, this Court said:
"The title of the landlord to the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tillers' day and there is a completed purchase or sale thereof as between the landlord and the tenant. The tenant is no doubt given a locus penitentiae and an option of declaring whether 421 he is or is not willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes ineffective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand as statutorily effected on the tillers' day and will continue to be operative, the only obligation on the tenant then being the payment of price in the mode determined by the Tribunal. If the tenant commits default in the payment of such price either in lump or by instalments as determined by the Tribunal, s. 32M declares the purchase to be ineffective but in that event the land shall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by him in the manner provided therein. Here also the purchase continues to be effective as from the tillers' day until such default is committed and, there is no question of a conditional purchase or sale taking place between the landlord and tenant. The title to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tillers' day or the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined by the Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested interest in the land defeasible only in either of those cases and it cannot therefore be said that the title of landlord to the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite." 422 The tillers' day referred to above was the first day of April, 1957. The argument on behalf of the petitioners is that according to the decision of this Court, the title of the petitioners to lands held by tenants who were entitled to the benefit of ss. 32 to 32R passed immediately to the tenants on the tillers' day and there was a completed purchase or sale thereof as between the petitioners and the tenants. So far as permanent tenants in possession of taluqdari lands were concerned, they were governed by s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, and nothing in the Tenancy Act, 1948, affected their right under that section. But non-permanent tenants in possession of taluqdari lands became purchasers of their lands on the tillers' day with an obligation to pay the purchase price mentioned in s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948. Section 32H, in so far as it bears upon non-permanent tenants, says:
"32H. (1) Subject to the additions and deductions as provided in sub-sections (1A) and (1B), the purchase price shall be reckoned as follows, namely:- (i) in the case of a permanent tenant X X X (ii) in the case of other tenants, the purchase price shall be the aggregate of the following amounts, that is to say,- (a) such amounts as the Tribunal may determine not being less than 20 times the assessment and not more than 200 times the assessment;
(b) the value of any structures, wells, and embankment constructed and other permanent fixtures made and trees planted by the landlord on the land;
(c) the amount of the arrears of rent, if any lawfully due on the tillers' day or the postponed date;
423 (d) the amounts, if any, paid by or recovered from the landlord as land revenue and other cesses referred to in clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of section 10A, in the event of the failure on the part of the tenant to pay the same.
Explanation 1.- * * * Explanation 2.- * * * (1A) Where a tenant to whom subsections (1) and (2) of section 10A do not apply, has, after the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955, paid in respect of the land held by him as tenant land revenue and other cesses referred to in sub-section (1) of that section, on account of the failure of the landlord to pay the same, a sum equal to the total amount so paid by the tenant until the date of the determination of the purchase price shall be deducted from the aggregate of the amounts determined under sub-section (1).
(1B) (a) On the amount arrived at in accordance with the provisions of sub- sections (1) and (lA) there shall be calculated interest at 4-1/2, per cent, per annum for the period between the date on which the tenant is deemed to have purchased the land under section 32 and the date of the determination of the purchase price.
(b) (i) The amount of interest so calculated shall be added to, and (ii) the amount of rent, if any, paid by the tenant to the landlord and the value of any products of trees planted by the landlord if such products are removed by the landlord during the said period shall be deducted from, the amount so arrived at.
424 (2) The State Government may by general or special order, fix different minima and maxima for the purpose of sub-clause (a) of clause (ii) of sub-section (1) in respect of any kind of land held by tenants in any backward area. In fixing such minima and maxima, the State Government shall have regard to the rent payable for the land and the factors specified in sub-section (3) of section 63A." The difference in the purchase price mentioned in s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, and the purchase price mentioned in s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948, is noticeable. Under s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, the purchase price for the right of occupancy is approximately six times the assessment fixed for the land. Under s. 32H, however, the minimum is 20 times the assessment and the maximum 200 times the assessment. These minima and maxima are liable to reduction in the case of land held by tenants in any backward area.
Now, the main grievance of the petitioners is this. So far as non-permanent tenants were concerned, the title of the petitioners to their lands passed on April 1, 1957, to the tenants and the petitioners ceased to be landlords. All that they became entitled to on that day was the purchase price mentioned in s. 32H. By one stroke of the pen as it were, the impugned Act, 1958, made almost all non-permanent tenants into permanent tenants and thereby deprived the petitioners of the higher purchase price which they were entitled to get under s. 32H and the succeeding sections of the Tenancy Act, 1948. In petition No. 120 of 1958 the petitioners has stated that he would lose about Rs. 14 lacs as a result of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958.
We may now read some of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958. The Act is entitled "an Act 425 further to define permanent tenants, inferior holders and permanent holders for the purposes of certain Land Tenure Abolition laws and to provide for certain other matters." In view of the argument advanced before us on behalf of the respondents that the impugned Act, 1958 merely changes a rule of evidence, it is worthly of note that the long title itself states that the Act is an Act further to define permanent tenants.
Section 2 of the Act is the interpretation section and the expression 'Land Tenure Abolition law' means in relation to a permanent tenant, Acts specified in Part I of the Schedule. The Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 is one of the Acts mentioned in Part I of the Schedule. The expression 'tenure- holder' means inter alia a taluqdar and 'tenure- land' means inter alia taluqdari land. Sections 3, 4 are 6 and important for our purpose and should be read in full.
"3. A person shall, within the meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law, be deemed to be an inferior holder, a permanent holder or, as the case may be, a permanent tenant, on the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, if his name has been recorded in the record of rights or other public or revenue record as an inferior holder, permanent holder or permanent tenant in respect of any tenure-land- (a) on the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, or (b) in pursuance of orders issued during the course of any proceedings under the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law or, as the case may be, the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879- (i) before the commencement of this Act, or 426 (ii) after the commence of this Act in cases in which inquiries were pending at the commencement of this Act, or (c) in pursuance of an order issued by the Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under section 6 of this Act.
4. For the purposes of the relevant Act specified in Part I of the Schedule, a person- (a) who on the date of the commencement of that Act was holding any tenure-land and (b) who and whose predecessors in title, if any, were, immediately before that date for such continuous period of twelve years or more, holding the same tenure-land, or any other tenure-land, as a tenant or inferior holder under the tenure-holder for the time being on payment of an amount exceeding the assessment of the land, shall unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under clause (b), be deemed to be a permanent tenant of the land under clause (a) and all the provisions of that Act shall apply to him as they apply to a permanent tenant.
Explanation.-The assessment for the purpose of this section shall be reckoned as provided in clauses (a) and (b) of section 5. 6. (1) The rights of an inferior holder, permanent holder or permanent tenant under sections 4 and 5 shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure holder applies in writing to the Mamlatdar within six months from the date of the commencement of this Act for a declaration that any holder, or tenant under him is not an inferior holder, a 427 permanent holder or, as the case may be, a permanent tenant.
(2) Any such application shall be disposed of as if it were an application in respect of a disputed case under section 135D of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879." The constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions has been challenged before us on behalf of the petitioners on the following grounds.
(1) The Bombay State legislature was not competent to enact the impugned Act, which is a piece of colourable legislation inasmuch as under the guise of defining a permanent tenant, or changing a rule of evidence, it has really confiscated a large part of the purchase price which the petitioners were entitled to under s.
32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948 from some of their tenants;
(2) The impugned Act contravenes the rights of the petitioners guaranteed by the Constitution under Arts. 14, 19 (1) (f) and 31 there of; and (3) Article 31A does not save it.
On behalf of the respondents the main argument is that the impugned Act, 1958, merely changes a rule of evidence for determining who are permanent tenants in possession of taluqdari lands; it does nothing more than that and is not, therefore, bad on any of the grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners. It is clear that if the impugned Act merely changes a rule of evidence for determining who are permanent tenants in possession of taluqdari lands, then the points urged as to the violation of the petitioners' fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19 (l) (f) and 31 would not at all arise. If, on the contrary, it is found that the impugned Act is not a piece of legislation which changes a rule of evidence but is a device by which the petitioners have been deprived of their property 428 without payment of compensation, then it would be a piece of colourable legislation not within the competence of the State Legislature. The legislation would then fall on the main ground that it is a piece of colourable legislation, the subject matter of which is not covered by any entry in List II or List III.
Therefore, the crux of the matter is what is the true scope and effect of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958. To this question we now address ourselves.
It may be stated at the very outset that the constitutional validity of the relevant provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 and the Tenancy Act, 1948 as amended by Bombay Act, XIII of 1956 has not been challenged before us. In Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The state of Bombay and Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The State of Bombay, it was held by this Court that the relevant provisions of those two Acts were Constitutionally valid. What has been challenged before us is the constitutional validity of the relevant provisions of the impugned Act 1958, particularly the provisions in ss. 3,4 and 6 which we have quoted earlier. What is the scope and effect of those provisions? Section 3 in effect states that a person shall, within the meaning of the relevant Land Tenure Abolition law, be deemed to be a permanent tenant on the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure, if his name has been recorded in the record of rights or other public or revenue record as a permanent tenant in respect of any tenure land in any of the three following circumstances- (a) on the date of the abolition of the relevant land-tenure; or (b) in pursuance of orders issued during the course of any proceeding under the relevant land tenure abolition law or the Revenue Code 429 either before or after the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958; or (c) in pursuance of an order issued by the Mamlatdar in respect of an entry under s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958. It is worthy of note that s. 3 does not create a mere presumption, as is referred to in s. 135J of the Revenue Code. Section 135J of the Revenue Code states inter alia that an entry in the record of rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. Section 3 of the impugned Act, 1958 states, however, that a person shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant on the date of the abolition of the relevant land tenure if his name has been recorded in the record of rights in respect of any tenure land in any of the three circumstances mentioned as (a), (b) and (c) therein. In other words, if any one of the three circumstances mentioned in the section exists, then by a fiction of law a person who fulfils that circumstance must be deemed to be a permanent tenant. Section 4 says in effect that a tenant(a) who on the date of the commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 was holding any tenure land, and (b) who and whose predecessors in title, if any, were immediately before that date for such continuous periods as aggregate to a total continuous period of 12 years or more, holding the same tenure land, or any other tenure land shall unless it is proved by the tenure- holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under (b) above, be deemed to be a permanent tenant of the land under (a), and all the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 shall apply to him as they apply to a permanent tenant. There is a third condition mentioned in s.
4, namely, the amount which the tenant pays must exceed the assessment of the land. This condition does not, however have any importance in the discussion which follows and no further reference to it is necessary.
430 There is no difficulty in understanding cl. (a) of s. 4 but cl. (b) is not so clear. The expression "continuous periods as aggregate to a total continuous period of twelve years or more" is neither very elegant nor very clear. Perhaps, the expression means that one particular continuous period may be of less than twelve years but there may be more than one such continuous period and in such a case the totality of such continuous periods must aggregate twelve years or more; if however, one continuous period extends over twelve years or more, there is no difficulty, and the question of the aggregate totalling twelve years does not arise. The question of the aggregate totalling twelve years will arise when there are more continuous periods than one, of less than twelve years duration each. The possessions for such continuous periods may be of the same tenure-land or of different tenure-lands.
If however, the aggregate of continuous periods of possession of the same tenure-land or of any other tenure-land comes to twelve years or more, then cl. (b) of s. 4 is fulfilled. It further appears that conditions mentioned in (a) and (b) are cumulative. In other words, for the application of s.4, a tenant must be in possession of tenure-land on the date of the commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949 (August 15, 1950) and further more must have been in possession of the same tenure-land or of any other tenure-land for continuous periods aggregating more than twelve years immediately before the said date. A person who fulfils the aforesaid two conditions shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant of the land unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been a permanent tenants of the basis of possession referred to in cl.(b). The expression "unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under clause (b)" has again given rise to some difficulty. Two views have been can- 431 vassed before us. One view is that the expression means that the tenure-holder can only contest the correctness of the claim of twelve years' possession and show that the tenant was not in possession of the land or lands concerned or that the continuous period or periods of possession did not aggregate twelve years. The other view is that the tenure-holder can show that the tenancy commenced on a particular date or that there is satisfactory evidence of the duration of the tenancy, and therefore, under s. 83 of the Revenue Code the tenant would not be a permanent tenant merely by reason of twelve years' possession.
Section 4 as worded is somewhat obscure and if one were to go merely by the words used, one would be inclined to accept the first view. On that view, the Section undoubtedly would go much further than merely introducing a rule of evidence; it would create a new class of permanent tenants not contemplated by s. 83 of the Revenue Code. The latter section talks of two circumstances which determine the status of a tenant: one relates to commencement of the tenancy and the other to its intended duration. Under s. 83 the onus will be on the person who claim a permanent status as a tenant to prove that either the commencement of the tenancy is not known or that its intended duration was not agreed upon between the landlord and tenant or was not governed by any usage of the locality. Section 4 of the impugned Act, 1958 gives a go-by to these circumstances. It brings in different considerations altogether. In effect it says that if a person was in possession of any tenure-land on August 15, 1950 (the date of commencement of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949) and was further more in possession of the same tenure-land or any other tenure-land for a continuous aggregate period of twelve years, he would be deemed to be a permanent tenant, unless the tenure-holder proved that he was not in possession for a continuous aggregate period of twelve years 432 as laid down in cl. (b) of the section. This means that instead of the two circumstances relating to commencement and duration a new consideration is brought in, namely, whether the tenant has been in possession for a continuous, aggregate period of twelve years. If he has been, then he is a permanent tenant. If he has not been in such possession, then he is not a permanent tenants. In other words, s. 4 of the impugned Act, 1958, completely changes the definition of a permanent tenant and creates a new class of permanent tenants who were not permanent tenants on April 1, 1957. If this view is correct, and we think that there is a good deal to be said in favour of this view, then s. 4 of the impugned Act, 1958 in spite of giving the tenure-holder an opportunity of proving that the tenant was not in possession for an aggregate continuous period of twelve years under s. 4 read with s. 6, undoubtedly changes the very definition of permanent tenant and by that change wipes out a large part of the purchase price which the petitioners were entitled to get on April 1, 1957 from some of their tenants. It is not disputed that on this view of s. 4, the impugned legislation would be unconstitutional inasmuch as it would bring within the category of permanent tenants persons who were non-permanent tenants under the previous law and there by deprive the tenure-holders of part of the purchase money which they were to get from them.
It has been contended that the second view with regard to the expression "unless it is proved by the tenure-holder that he would not have been a permanent tenant on the basis of continued possession of the land under clause (b)" is preferable on the ground that cl. (b) is one of the conditions which the tenant must fulfil before he can get the benefit of s. 4 and there would not be much sense in allowing the tenure-holder to disprove a condition which the tenant must fulfill before he can get 433 the benefit of s. 4. We find it difficult to accept this view. On a pure question of construction of the words used in s. 4, we see nothing wrong in allowing the tenure-holder to prove that the tenant was not in possession for continuous periods aggregating twelve years. Let us, however, assume that the second view as to the interpretation of s. 4 of the impugned Act, 1958, is preferable to the first view. What then is the position? The position then is that a tenant who fulfils the two conditions mentioned in cls. (a) and (b) must be deemed to be a permanent tenant unless the tenure-holder proves the commencement and/or duration of the tenancy. From this point of view it may be argued that s. 4 merely changes a rule of evidence and throws the onus on the tenure-holder to prove that in spite of twelve years' continuous possession mentioned in cl. (b), the tenant is not a permanent tenant by reason of the circumstance that the commencement of the tenancy or its intended duration is known. Under s. 6 the rights of a permanent tenant under s. 4 shall be entered in the record of rights unless the tenure-holder applies in writing to the Mamlatdar within six months from the date of the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, for the declaration that the tenant under him is not a permanent tenant. If any such application is filed by the tenure-holder, it shall be disposed of as if it were an application in respect of a disputed case under s. 135D of the Revenue Code. What is the effect of s. 6 ? It was conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent State and also the respondent tenants that the tenure- holder has only one opportunity of saying that a tenant under him is not a permanent tenant and the tenure-holder must avail himself of that opportunity within six months from June 10, 1958, the date on which the impugned Act, 1858, came into force. The combined effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6 appears to us to be this. If the tenure-holder has made no application 434 within six months from June 10, 1958, for a declaration that a tenant under him is not a permanent tenant, every tenant under him who fulfils the conditions mentioned in cls. (a) and (b) of s. 4 at once gets recorded in the record of rights as a permanent tenant. As soon as he is so recorded, he must be deemed under s. 3 to be a permanent tenant by a fiction of law and under s.
4 all the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, will apply to him as they apply to a permanent tenant. This combined effect of ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958 does in our opinion deprive the tenure-holder of any real opportunity of contesting the claims of his tenants and makes them permanent tenants once they are recorded in the record of rights, thereby depriving the tenure-holder of the purchase price which he was entitled to get from them under s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948.
On behalf of the respondents it was stated at the Bar that the petitioners had made applications for a declaration under s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, and that those applications are still pending. We have no materials in support of this statement. No affidavit has been made on behalf of the respondents to this effect; nor do we know if those applications related to all the non- permanent tenants of the petitioners. What we know is that in a stay application made by the petitioner in petition No. 120 of 1958 it was averred that the petitioner had filed several declaratory suits before the Mamlatdar under s. 70(b) of the Tenancy Act, 1948, for a declaration that the tenants concerned were not permanent tenants. Those suits were however, filed prior to the coming into force of the impugned Act, 1958.
The petitioner asked for a stay of those suits on two grounds: firstly, that after the coming into force of the impugned Act, 1958, the suits would become infructuous, and secondly, that the Mamlatdar concerned would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the constitutional 435 validity of the provisions of the impugned Act, 1958, and in view of those provisions would be bound to hold that the tenants had become permanent tenants. This Court passed no order on the application for stay. But the petitioner, it appears, moved the Mamlatdar to stay the hearing of the suits pending the disposal of the writ petition in this Court and the suits were stayed.
In a second petition filed on behalf of the petitioner it was stated that after the coming into force of the impugned Act, 1958, the petitioner received a notice to show cause why the non-permanent tenants under him should not be declared to be permanent tenants and the record of rights amended accordingly. The petitioner applied to the Revenue Officer concerned to stay the proceedings in view of the writ petition pending in this Court. This request was, however, turned down. The petitioner then came to this Court and it appears that an order was made to the effect that any investigation which might be necessary for the proceedings pending before the Revenue Officer might be continued, but no final order or entry should be made till the disposal of the writ petition. Such an order appears to have been made in respect of a number of villages and the petitioner stated that he had thousands of tenants in 24 villages, some of whom were permanent, some protected, and some ordinary. Nothing was stated in those petitions or in the replies thereto as to whether the tenure-holder had made an application for a declaration within the meaning of s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958. All that has been stated in the application is that in response to a notice received from the Revenue Officer, the petitioner, as a tenure-holder, had moved this Court for a stay of the proceedings. If the petitioner had filed no application for a declaration within the meaning of s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, and within the time allowed by that section, then it is obvious 436 that the Revenue Officer dealing with the suits under s. 70(b) of the Tenancy Act, 1948, pending before him, or the Revenue Officer dealing with other proceedings before him, must give effect to the provisions of ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958. It is, therefore difficult to see how the pendency of the suits or other proceedings before the Revenue Officers concerned can be of any assistance to the petitioners. The question, therefore, boils down to this. Section 6 of the impugned Act, 1958 does give one opportunity to the petitioners to make an application for a declaration that any tenant under him is not a permanent tenant, but that opportunity was to be availed of within six months from June 10, 1958.
Once that opportunity is lost, the tenure-holder cannot claim that a tenant who fulfils cls. (a) and (b) of s. 4 is not a permanent tenant. Our attention was drawn to sub-ss. (3), (4) and (5) of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. Those sub-sections say in effect that if any question arises whether any person is a permanent tenant, the State Government or an officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf shall decide the question; where such officer decides such question any person aggrieved by the decision may file an appeal to the State Government within 60 days from the date of the decision; and the decision of the State Government shall be final.
It was not suggested before us that the aforesaid sub-sections would give the tenure-holder a second opportunity of contesting the claim of the tenant, and it seems to us quite clear that the tenure- holder who had failed to make an application within the time mentioned in s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, would not be in a position to take advantage of sub-ss. (3), (4) and (5) of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949. If ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, are good and valid in law, then whichever be the authority that has to decide the claim of the tenant, it must decide it in accordance with those provisions.
437 In these circumstances, can it be said that the opportunity given by s. 6 is a real opportunity and does it amount to merely changing a rule of evidence ? We think that this question must be answered in the negative.
It is to be noted that on April 1, 1957 the petitioners ceased to be tenure-holders of the lands held by non-permanent tenants and as held by this Court, ss. 32 to 32R of the Tenancy Act, 1948, clearly contemplated the vesting of the title in the tenants on the tillers' day, defeasible only on certain specified contingencies. This Court held that those sections were designed to bring about an extinguishment, or in any event a modification of the landlord's rights in the estate within the meaning of Art.
31A (1) (a) of the Constitution. If that was the true effect of ss. 32 to 32R of the Tenancy Act, 1948, then on April 1, 1957 the petitioners were left only with the right to get the purchase price under s. 32H. That right of the petitioners was undoubtedly a right to property. In Bombay Dying and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bombay (1) this Court observed, with regard to unpaid wages of an employee, that when an employee had done his work, the amount of wages earned by him become a debt due to him from the employer and this was property which could be assigned under the law. The provisions of the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund Act (Bombay Act XL of 1953) were under consideration in that case. Section 3 of the Act transferred inter alia all unpaid accumulation of wages to a fund known as the Bombay Labour Welfare Fund. This Court held that s. 3 (1) of the Act in so far as it related to unpaid accumulation in s. 3(2) (b) was unconstitutional and void by reason of the right guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and was not saved by cl.(5) thereof. We think that the same principle must apply in the 438 present case. The right of the petitioners to the purchase price under s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948, from those of their tenants who were non- permanent on April 1, 1957, was a right of property in respect of which the petitioners have a guarantee under Art. 19 (1)(f). The provisions in ss. 3,4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, in so far as they laid down that in certain circumstances a tenant shall be deemed to be a permanent tenant from the date of the Taluqdari abolition Act, 1949, adversely affected the right of the petitioners with retrospective effect; it practically wiped off a large part of the purchase price which the petitioners were entitled to get.
If s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, is to be tested on the touchstone of reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public as laid down in cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution, it must be held that it does not impose a reasonable restriction. We have found it very difficult to understand why and how it is reasonable that the tenure-holder must make an application within six months from the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, for a declaration that his tenants are not permanent tenants. The petitioners have three kinds of tenants-permanent tenants, protected tenants, and ordinary tenants. On April 1, 1957 the petitioners ceased to be tenure holders in respect of all tenants other than permanent tenants and became entitled only to the purchase price under s. 32H. If any tenant claimed on that date that he was a permanent tenant, he had to establish his claim in accordance with s. 83 of the Revenue Code. Such a claim could be contested by the tenure-holder whenever made by the tenant.
But by the impugned Act, 1958, all this was changed, and unless the tenure holder made an application within six months of the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, he was not in a position to say that a particular tenant who was in possession of tenure-land for continuous period aggregating twelve years on and before August 15, 439 1950, was not a permanent tenant. We are unable to hold that the six months' limit imposed by s. 6 of the impugned Act, 1958, is in the circumstances, a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Art.
19(5) of the Constitution. It is a little difficult to understand how the tenure-holder could know which of his non-permanent tenants would claim to be permanent on the coming into force of the impugned Act, 1958. Obviously, the tenure-holder had to anticipate that all his non- permanent tenants might claim to be permanent, and therefore it was incumbent on him to make an application for a determination that none of his non-permanent tenants were permanent, and unless he did so he would lose his right to get the purchase price under s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948. We are clearly of the view that the time limit imposed by s. 16 of the impugned Act, 1958, is, in these circumstances, and unreasonable restriction and cannot be justified under Art.
19(5) of the Constitution.
In view of this finding it is unnecessary to consider the effect of Art. 31 of the Constitution. On behalf of the respondent State reliance was sought to be placed on Art. 31A of the Constitution. That Article, in our opinion, has no application to the present cases, inasmuch as there was no acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. On April 1, 1957, the tenure-holders had ceased to be tenure- holders in respect of lands held by non-permanent tenants. The relation between the tenure-holders and the tenants had changed from that of landlord and tenant to that of creditor and debtor. When, therefore, the impugned Act, 1958, affected the right of the petitioners as creditors to get a certain sum of money from the debtors, it did not provide for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein; nor did it provide for the extinguishment or modification of any such 440 rights. Therefore, Art. 31A has no application and cannot save the impugned Act, 1958.
It has been contended before us that while implementing the provisions of s. 5A of the Taluqdari Abolition Act, 1949, it was found that because of the failure or inability of the ex- Taluqdar to produce old records concerning the tenants it was difficult for the tenants to take the benefit of that provision; therefore, it became necessary for the Legislature to define permanent tenant in such a way that the tenure- holder might not defeat the provisions of s. 5A.
That it was stated, was the reason for enacting ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. If the reason was as stated above, then the tenure-holder should have been given a chance to contest the claim of the tenant whenever he made a claim of being a permanent tenant. It appears to us that the true scope and effect of the provisions in ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958 is to considerably reduce the purchase price payable to the petitioners and this has been secured by the device of defining permanent tenant in such a way that the tenure-holder has no real opportunity of contesting the claim of the tenants. In that view of the matter, the impugned Act, 1958, does not fall within any entry of List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and is a piece of colourable legislation. What is colourable legislation was explained by this Court in K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The State of Orissa (1). This Court said that the idea conveyed by the expression "colourable legislation" is that although apparently a legislature in passing a statute purported to within the limits of its powers, yet in substance and in reality it transgressed those powers, the transgression being veiled by what appears, on proper examination, to be a mere pretence or disguise. We are of the view that, that is what has happened in the present case. Under the guise of defining a 441 permanent tenant or changing a rule of evidence what has been done is to reduce the purchase price which became payable to the tenure-holders on April 1, 1957.
For these reasons we must hold that ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the impugned Act, 1958 in so far as they deem some tenants as permanent tenants in possession of taluqdari land are unconstitutional and void. Under the guise of changing the definition of a permanent tenant, they really take away a large part of the right of the petitioners to get the purchase price under s. 32H of the Tenancy Act, 1948, from some of their tenants. The petitions must accordingly be allowed with costs.
As the petitions have been heard together there will be only one hearing fee.
MUDHOLKAR, J,-Writ petition No. 120 of 1958 was heard along with writ petitions Nos. 147 to 158 of 1958. But a common argument was advanced before us on behalf of the petitioner in each case by Mr. G.S. Pathak and by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State of Gujarat and by Mr. Nathwani on behalf of the tenants.
The petitioners in these cases were Talukdars of certain villages in that part of the former state of Bombay which is now the State of Gujarat.
The rights of Talukdars in different parts of Gujrat to Taluqdari villages were regulated by the Ahmedabad Taluqdars Act, 1862 (Bom. 6 of 1862) and the Broach and Kaira Incumbered Estates Act, 1881 (XXI of 1881) and the Gujarat Taluqdars Act, 1888.
The Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 (herein referred to as the Abolition Act) repealed the aforementioned Taluqdari Acts and s. 3 thereof abolished the Taluqdari tenure wherever it prevailed. That section further abolished all incidents of the said tenure attaching to any land comprised in a Taluqdari Estate. Section 5 of that Act made all the taluqdars "occupants" of the lands in their 442 possession, within the meaning of the expression "occupant" occurring in the Bombay Land Revenue Code (hereafter referred to as the Code). Like "Occupants" in other areas of the Bombay State these persons became liable to pay land revenue to the Government subject to the provisions of cl.(b) of sub-s.2 of s.5. Nothing, however, turns on these provisions. Section 16 of the aforesaid Act makes the provisions of the Code applicable to taluqdari villages subject to certain modifications with which we are not concerned. The validity of the Abolition Act was challenged before this Court but that challenge failed vide Dhisubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bombay(1).
Vast areas of lands in these villages were in the occupation of inferior holders, permanent tenants, protected tenants, ordinary tenants etc.
It is not disputed that the provisions of Ch. VII of the Code which deals with "superior holders and inferior holders" govern the relationship between the tenure holders and permanent tenants. In addition to these provisions there are those in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereafter referred to as the 'Tenancy Act') which deal with the relationship between landlord and tenant and till April 1, 1957, it is these provisions which exclusively governed the relationship between the tenure-holder and tenants other than permanent tenants and inferior holders.
It would be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of this Act while dealing with the arguments advanced before us.
By Bombay Taluqdari Abolition (Amendment) Act 1 of 1955 which came into force on March 1, 1955, the Abolition Act was amended and a new provision was added therein, viz: s. 5A the relevant portion of which reads thus:
"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 5 a permanent tenant in possession 443 of any taluqdari land, and also an inferior holder holding such land on payment of annual assessment only, shall be deemed to be occupants within the meaning of Code, in respect of such land in their possession and shall be primarily liable to the State Government for the payment of land revenue due in respect of such land, and shall be entitled to all the rights and shall be liable to all the obligations in respect of such land as occupants under the Code or any other law for time being in force:
Provided that- (a) such permanent tenant shall be entitled to the rights of an occupant in respect of such land on payment to the taluqdar or the cadet as the case may be :- (i) of the occupancy price equivalent to four multiples of the assessment fixed for such land, and (ii) for the extinguishment or modification of any rights of the taluqdar or cadet, as the case may be, including the right of reversion in the lands, of a further sum equivalent to two multiples of such assessment;
x x x (2) The right conferred under sub- section (1) shall not be exercisable after a period of (five) years from the date on which the Bombay Taluqdari Tenures Abolition (Amendment), Act 1954 comes into force.
x x x This section for the first time conferred upon a permanent tenant the right to acquire the status of an occupant in respect of the land held by him as a permanent tenant of the tenure-holder upon payment of a certain sum of money as the price of occupancy to the tenure-holder within five years of the commencement of the Amending Act of 1955.
444 It was accepted before us that the period fixed by s. 5A has been extended upto the year 1962.
Section 5A of the Act has never been challenged, and the argument before us proceeded upon the footing that it is a perfectly valid piece of law.
Though the Abolition Act by s. 5A thus conferred upon the permanent tenants in the taluqdari villages the right become occupants, it did not define what a permanent tenant was. By an amendment made by Bombay Act XVIII of 1958, it was provided that certain persons would be permanent tenants but that does not really define what a permanent tenant is. This absence of definition of a permanent tenant did not, however, create any difficulty because in Bombay that term has been understood to mean the tenant described in paragraph 2 of s. 83 of the Code. Indeed, in the petitions themselves it is stated that s.83 of the Code defines a permanent tenant. The second paragraph of that section is in these terms:
"And where by reason of the antiquity of a tenancy no satisfactory evidence of its commencement is forthcoming, and there is not any such evidence of the period of its intended duration, if any, agreed upon between the landlord and tenant, or those under whom they respectively' claim title or any usage of the locality as to duration of such tenancy, it shall, as against the immediate landlord of the tenant, be presumed to be co-extensive with the duration of the tenure of such landlord and of those who derive title under him." Under this section, therefore, a permanent tenant is one whose tenure is co-extensive with that of his landlord and a tenant is to be presumed to be such a tenant when by reason of antiquity, the commencement of the tenancy cannot be proved and there is no satisfactory evidence of the agreed duration of the tenancy or of any usage of the locality as 445 to such duration. The Bombay Tenancy and A