Telangana High Court
G.D. Babu Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 7 June, 2024
Author: T. Vinod Kumar
Bench: T. Vinod Kumar
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T. VINOD KUMAR
WRIT PETITION No.10086 OF 2024
ORDER:
Heard Learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Government Pleader for Housing appearing for the1st respondent and Sri K. Buchi Babu, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 2nd& 3rdrespondents and with the consent of counsel appearing for the parties the writ petition is taken up for hearing and disposal at admission stage.
2. Having regard to the manner of disposal and the lis involved, notice to unofficial respondents is not necessary.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the petitioner in brief is that the 2ndrespondent Board by its proceedings dt. 09.02.1974 had allotted a 'C' type house bearing No. 43 at Sanjeeva Reddy Nagar Colony, to Smt. G.D. Ratnamma, who is his mother, on hire purchase basis; that the 2ndrespondent thereafter had entered into a deed of lease-cum-agreement for sale with Smt. G.D. Ratnamma on 12.01.1977; that the 2ndrespondent thereafter delivered the possession of the house / quarter to the allottee, who 2 had occupied the same; and that the said allottee viz., the petitioner's mother had deceased on 09.12.2001 even before getting the house registered on her name.
4. It is the further case of the petitioner that Smt. G.D. Ratnamma, at the time of allotment of the quarter, has executed a nomination in favour of her elder son viz., the petitioner herein in Form - 10 as the person to whom the said house shall be transferred in the event of her death; and that on the death of his mother, the subject property is required to be registered in his name as per the Regulation No. 27, of G.O. Ms. No. 67 Housing (HB.II) Department, dated 08.09.2001, being the nominee so nominated by the original allottee Smt. G.D. Ratnamma.
5. The petitioner further contends that his brothers i.e., the unofficial respondents in this Writ Petition had hatched a plan to grab his mother's house by creating a purported unregistered Will Deed stated to have been executed by his mother on 15.07.1992; and that through the said Will Deed dated 15.07.1992, the unofficial respondents have laid their claim to the subject quarter; that the respondent authorities despite acknowledging that the petitioner's 3 name is shown as 'nominee' in the records are not registering the house / quarter allotted to his mother in his name by considering his letter dt. 04.01.2010; and that the respondent authorities are not competent authorities to go into rival claims and are required to act as per the nomination made by considering the subsequent representations made by the petitioner.
6. The petitioner further contends that mere pendency of a suit filed by the unofficial respondents cannot be used a ruse by the respondents to deny his right to seek registration of the subject house in his name by virtue of being a nominee of Smt. G.D. Ratnamma; and that the reasons indicated by the respondents by the communication dt. 25.09.2018 are not valid in the eye of law.
7. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondents on the other hand submits, though the original allotee i.e., the Smt. G.D. Ratnamma, while submitting her application for allotment of quarter under the 'Low Income Group Housing Scheme' in the year 1974 on payment of 20% had mentioned the name of the petitioner as nominee, the unofficial respondents also made a claim on the basis of the Will Deed dt. 15.07.1992; that the 4 said Will Deed has been executed subsequent to the nomination; and that as petitioner himself had executed "No Objection Affidavit" in favour of the unofficial respondent and withdrawing the same thereafter and accepting later more than once, the respondent authorities have called upon the petitioner and unofficial respondents to obtain Succession Certificate from the Court.
8. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that since the unofficial respondents have already filed a suit vide O.S. No. 46 of 2017 on the file of XX Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, to declare the said Will Deed as the last Will and testament and as true; and since the issue is sub-judice, the authorities have issued letter dated 25.09.2018 informing the petitioner of the same.
9. Learned Standing counsel further submits that the petitioner having received the above letter had remained silent for six long years and filed the present writ petition now; and that the reasons mentioned for delay in approaching this court against the aforesaid communication are not valid reasons for entertaining the present writ petition after such long lapse of time.
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10. I have taken note of the respective submissions.
11. Firstly, though the petitioner admits to the fact of the respondent authorities issuing him the letter dated 25.09.2018, the explanation offered for the delay in impugning the same by filing present Writ Petition after a lapse of over 5 years, does not impress this Court for accepting the same as a valid reason for not approaching this court at the earliest point of time.
12. Further, the ground of petitioner having to undergo medical treatment, it is to be noted that the treatment which the petitioner has undergone was in the year 2010 and thereafter petitioner, who was in Government employment working as Administrative officer had discharged his duties and was superannuated in July, 2016. In so far as the explanation offered by the petitioner for not calling in question the letter dated 25.09.2018 post September, 2018 of him requiring to travel to United States of America to attend certain events of his three daughters and on his return having affected with Corona, are not reasons valid enough for the petitioner to file the writ petition after a lapse of five (5) years of the impugned proceeding having been issued. It is trite law that the Courts would 6 come to the rescue of the diligent and not indolent litigant. In a recent judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court had echoed that delay defeats equity and the High Courts ought not to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is laxity on the part of the applicant. [See :MrinMaity v. ChhandaKoley1].
13. Reverting to the merits of the matter, though petitioner claims that in the application submitted by the petitioner's mother in February, 1974 for allotment of LIG quarter, his name is shown as nominee and thus, the subject house allotted to his mother should be registered in his name on her demise in the year 2001, it is to be noted that the name of the petitioner was shown as Nominee in the application submitted for allotment of quarter. After allotment of Quarter No.43 LIGH, the allottee having entered into Lease-cum-Agreement of sale, the said agreement superseded the application made for allotment of quarter. Thus, the petitioner cannot seek to place reliance on the application made for allotment to claim that he being the nominee is entitled to get the subject property registered in his name. Atmost the nomination of the 1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 551 7 petitioner in the application submitted at the time of allotment would have effect till the allotment of quarter is made by the respondent authorities. Upon the allotment of quarter and the petitioner's mother entering into a separate Lease-cum- Agreement of Sale, the parties would be bound by the terms of the documents and the allottee i.e., the petitioner's mother being shown as Lessee, would include her legal heirs, successors in interest, which are the usual covenants of the deed. In absence of petitioner placing any material before this Court to show that even under the Lease-cum- Agreement of Sale, the petitioner is shown as nominee to succeed to the property to the exclusion of the legal heirs, the contention of the petitioner to the contrary is liable to be rejected.
14. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shakti Yezdani&Anr v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar&Ors 2, while dealing with similar issue had considered the concept of nomination under various legislations and held that a nominee would not get absolute title to a property in exclusion of the legal heirs. The relevant observations are as under:
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(2024) 4 SCC 642 8 " 26. A consistent view appears to have been taken by the courts, while interpreting the related provisions of nomination under different statutes.
It is clear from the referred judgments that the nomination so made would not lead to the nominee attaining absolute title over the subject property for which such nomination was made.In other words, the usual mode of succession is not to be impacted by such nomination. The legal heirs therefore have not been excluded by virtue of nomination.
27. The presence of the three elements i.e., the term 'vest', the provision excluding others as well as a non-obstante Clause Under Section 109A of the Companies Act, 1956 have not persuaded us in the interpretation to be accorded vis-�-vis nomination, in any different manner. Different legislations with provisions pertaining to nomination that have been a subject of adjudication earlier before courts, have little or no similarity with respect to the language used or the provisions contained therein. While the Government Savings Certificates Act, 1959, Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Public Debts Act, 1944 contain a non-obstante clause, the Insurance Act, 1939 and Cooperative Societies Act, 1912 do not.
28. Similarly, there are variations with respect to the word 'vest' being present in some legislations (the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952) and absent in others (the Insurance Act, 1939, the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912). Looking at the dissimilarities and the fact that uniform definition is not available relating to the rights of 'nominee' and/or whether such 'nomination' bestows absolute ownership over nominees, it is only appropriate that the terms are considered as ordinarily understood by a reasonable person making nominations, with respect to their movable or immovable properties. A reasonable individual arranging for the disposition of his property is expected to undertake any such nomination, bearing in mind the interpretation on the effect of nomination, as given by courts consistently, for a number of years. The concept of nomination if interpreted by departing from the well- established manner would, in our view, cause major ramifications and create significant impact on disposition of properties left behind by deceased nominators.
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43. Consistent interpretation is given by courts on the question of nomination, i.e., upon the holder's death, the nominee would not get an 9 absolute title to the subject matter of nomination, and those would apply to the Companies Act, 1956 (parimateria provisions in Companies Act, 2013) and the Depositories Act, 1996 as well.
44. An individual dealing with estate planning or succession laws understands nomination to take effect in a particular manner and expects the implication to be no different for devolution of securities per se. Therefore, an interpretation otherwise would inevitably lead to confusion and possibly complexities, in the succession process, something that ought to be eschewed. At this stage, it would be prudent to note the significance of a settled principle of law. In Shanker Raju v. Union of India MANU/SC/0009/2011 : (2011) 2 SCC 132, the Court held:
10. It is a settled principle of law that a judgment, which has held the field for a long time, should not be unsettled. The doctrine of stare decisis is expressed in the maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means "to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled". Lord Coke aptly described this in his classic English version as "those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace". The underlying logic of this doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view which has held the field for a long time should not be disturbed only because another view is possible."
(emphasis supplied)
15. Insofar as the application of the Regulation no. 27 as notified by G.O.Ms. no. 67 dated 08.09.2001 on which heavy reliance is placed by the petitioner is concerned, it is to be noted that the sub- regulation (iv) which mandates the respondents to execute registered sale deed in favour of the nominee is applicable in case of death of an applicant in harness. The term 'death of an applicant in harness' is normally associated with person in employment of the government and his/her deceasing while in service. Admittedly, the 10 applicant viz., the petitioner mother was not in any employment when she made an application for allotment of quarter to her in the quota reserved for persons in service or for that matter when she had deceased in the year 2001. Thus, the said regulation on which the petitioner is claiming that the subject property would have to be registered in his name is without any merit.
16. Thus, considered from any angle, be it the delay in approaching this court by impugning the proceeding dated 25.09.2018 or for that matter claiming right as nominee of the original allottee for the subject property to be registered in his name, in the considered view of this court is without any merit and is liable to be rejected.
17. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed as devoid of any merit. No Order as to costs.
18. It is made clear that this court has not expressed any opinion on the merit of the suit pending consideration before the court of civil jurisdiction. Therefore, the trial court shall adjudicate the said civil suit uninfluenced by the observations made herein above. 11
19. Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions if any, shall stand closed.
___________________ T. VINOD KUMAR, J Date: 07.06.2024.
MRKR/VSV