Telangana High Court
Dr. D. Karunakar Reddy, vs Sri G. Sandeep on 5 June, 2024
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI
CONTEMPT CASE No.1154 of 2023
ORDER:
This Contempt Case is filed alleging wilful disobedience and violation of orders of this Court dated 25.04.2023 in W.P.No.10763 of 2023 by the respondents and in causing serious loss and damage to the petitioners herein and therefore, to punish the contemnors under the Section 10 and 12 of Contempt of Courts Act and to pass such other order or orders in the interest of justice.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the Contempt Case are that the petitioners herein are the petitioners in the writ petition and vide Interim Order dated 25.04.2023, this Court has directed the respondents No.1 to 8 therein as under:
"After hearing both the parties at length, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioners, being the owners of the property cannot be denied their right to enter into the property. Similarly, even though the development agreement cum GPA is not registered, the respondents No.9 and 10 have acted upon it and have invested certain money by laying roads and other developmental activities. Therefore, their entry into the property also cannot be restricted. The respondents No.9 and 10 have already invoked Arbitration Clause of the development agreement cum GPA and under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the Application is pending before the Civil Court.
In view of the above, this Court deems if fit and proper to direct the respondents No.1 to I not to interfere with the TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 2 subject property until it is warranted due to any further physical scuffle between the parties. The writ petitioners shall continue to enjoy the possession of the property to protect their farm house and also the mango trees and the crop therein and the respondents No.9 and 10 shall be permitted to enter the property to take care of the development work carried on by them till date.
The petitioners and respondent No.9 and 10 are accordingly directed to maintain distance from each other and to maintain law and order. lf the parties do not follow the above directions and involve themselves in physical scuffles, the Police are at liberty to take action and seal the premises, if necessary.
With respect to all other works, status quo as on today shall be maintained by both the parties till a decision is taken by the Arbitrator in respect of the dispute between the parties. The direction to the petitioners to maintain mango trees is only to safeguard the same and is not a declaration of their right over the said property and is left open to be decided in appropriate proceedings.
3. The petitioners were thus given permission to enjoy the possession of the property not only to protect the farm house but also to protect the mango trees and crop therein and the respondents No.9 & 10 were permitted to enter into the property only to take care of developmental work carried on by them till the date of the order and till a decision is taken by the arbitrator in respect of the dispute between the parties. It is alleged that in spite of the order being passed on 25.04.2023 in the presence of the parties and their counsels in the Open Court, the respondents have violated the order of this Court and respondents No.1 and 2 have not only taken away the entire mango crop but the TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 3 respondents No.3 and 4 have supported their acts. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the respondents No.1 and 2 have acted in clear violation of order of this Court and therefore, are liable for punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act. It is further submitted that when the petitioners have given police complaint against the illegal actions of the respondents No.1 and 2, the respondents No.3 and 4 have not registered any case and it was only when the petitioners have submitted another complaint to the Superintendent of Police and explained about the order of the Court, that on instructions of Superintendent of Police, a crime vide FIR No.99/2023, dated 10.05.2023 was registered against the respondents No.1 and 2. It is submitted that the respondents No.3 and 4 have shown scant respect for the order of this Court and have in fact, supported the respondents No.1 and 2 and have warned the petitioners with dire consequences if they complained about the respondent No.4 to the higher authorities. Thus stating this contempt case has been filed.
TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 4
4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, relied upon the following judgments in support of his contentions:
i. Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari Vs. Hiralal Somabhai Contractor (Deceased) rep. by Lrs. And Others 1;
ii. M/s.Ista Builders and Developers LLP and Others Vs. The State of Telangana and Others 2;
iii. European Investment Ltd., Mumbai Vs. Triumph International Finance India Ltd., and Others 3;
iv. Tayabbhai M.Bagasarwalla and Another Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., and Others 4;
v. Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand and others 5;
vi. Patten Suryaprakash Rao v. Amarender Rao 6;
vii. M/s.Mile Stone Soft. Tech. Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Nidhi Chibber 7;
viii. Tapan Kumar Hazra and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and Others 8;1
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1139 2 W.P.Nos.8764 & 10763 of 2023, dt.13.10.202 3 2004(3) Mh.L.J. 59 4 (1997) 3 SCC 443 5 (2004) 7 SCC 261 6 2007 SCC OnLine AP 662 7 2015 SCC OnLine Chh 39 8 2014 SCC OnLine Cal 18852 TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 5 ix. M/s.G.L.K.Grants Vs. Smt.Ranjeev R. Acharya and Others 9.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2, on the other hand, submitted that the respondents have entered into a development agreement with the petitioners and have also developed part of the property and the disputes relating to the agreement have arisen which have been referred to an arbitrator.
6. It is submitted that the respondents have not violated any directions of this Court. He submitted that the interim order dated 25.04.2023 was dispatched by this Court on 08.05.2023 and as the petitioners were not aware of detailed order and since they were in possession and enjoyment of the property along with the mango trees and its crop in terms of the development agreement dated 19.08.2021, the respondents, however, denied all the allegations of the writ petitioners in contempt petition. It is submitted that after receipt of the copy of the interim order of this Court dated 25.04.2023 on 08.05.2023, the respondents have not dealt with any mango trees and its crop and therefore, there is no violation of any orders of this 9 Copy of order in C.C.No.1736 of 2010, dt.13.07.2012.
TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 6 Court. It is further submitted that the writ petition filed by the petitioners herein and also by the respondents therein have both been disposed of by this Court and hence the interim orders of this Court got merged with the final orders and there is no interim order in force and therefore, there cannot be any Contempt of Court against the respondents herein. Learned counsel for the respondents also filed a synopsis of submissions along with the list of dates and events and submitted that since the scope of the writ petition is limited to the alleged illegal actions of the respondents No.1 to 8 therein in interfering with the possession and have had not sought any relief against the respondents No.1 and 2 herein either in the main prayer or interim prayer, the interim order passed by the Court was beyond the scope of writ petition and therefore the respondents No.1 and 2 have filed stay vacate petition and both the parties have already initiated the arbitration proceedings for resolving the dispute between them. It is further submitted that since the main writ petition has already been disposed of, the interim order has merged with the final order dated 13.10.2023 and therefore, there cannot be any cognizance of any contempt proceedings. It is further TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 7 submitted that the petitioners have already availed the alternative remedy of approaching the arbitrator and therefore, any claim whatsoever can be made before the arbitrator and not before this Court.
7. Learned counsel for the respondents No.1 and 2 have placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of his contentions:
i. State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs.
Mohd.Yaqoob Khan and Others ;
10
ii. Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd., and
Another Vs. Sachidanand Dass and Another 11; iii. Kanwar Singh Saini Vs. High Court of Delhi 12; iv. Steel Authority of India Limited and Another Vs. R.K.Enterprises 13;
v. U.C.Surendranath Vs. Mambally's Bakery 14.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents No.3 and 4 also has filed a counter affidavit and submitted that they have not violated any directions of this Court. It is also 10 (1992) 4 SCC 167 11 1995 Supp (4) SCC 465 12 (2012) 4 SCC 307 13 (2010) 15 SCC 605 14 (2019) 20 SCC 666 TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 8 denied that they have not taken any action on the complaints given by the writ petitioners.
9. Having regard to the rival contentions and the material on record, this Court finds that this Court had passed the interim order dated 25.04.2023 in order to protect the interest of both the parties. This Court had clearly held that the mango crop shall be enjoyed by the writ petitioners and the respondents No.1 and 2 shall be entitled to enter into the property only to look after the developmental activity carried on by them. The respondents No.1 and 2 were represented by their counsel and the order was passed in the Open Court in the presence of all the parties. Therefore, it cannot be said that the interim order was not communicated to the parties. When it was clear that the mango crop was to be enjoyed by the writ petitioners, the respondents No.1 and 2 could not have entered the premises and taken away the entire crop. The ground taken by the respondents that they were not aware of the detailed order till 08.05.2023 until it was dispatched by the Court, is not acceptable. In the case of Balwantbhai Somabhai Bhandari (cited supra), relied upon by the TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 9 learned counsel for the petitioners, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has culled out the principles as under:
"40. The object of the discipline enforced by the court in case of contempt of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the Judge, but to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice.
41. Any interference with the course of justice is an affront to the majesty of law and the conduct of interference is punishable as contempt of court. Public interest demands that there should be no interference with the judicial process, and the effect of the judicial decision should not be pre- empted or circumvented. (Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers Bombay Pvt. Ltd. and Others reported in (1988) 4 SCC 592).
42. If a party, who is fully in the know of the judgment/order of the Court, is conscious and aware of the consequences and implications of the order of the Court, acts in violation thereof, it must be held that disobedience is wilful. To establish contempt of court, it is sufficient to prove that the conduct was wilful, and that the contemnor knew of all the facts which made it a breach of the undertaking.
43. The following conditions must be satisfied before a person can be held to have committed civil contempt: (i) there must be a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court; (ii) there must be disobedience to such judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court; and (iii) such disobedience of the judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court must be wilful. [Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai and Another v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai and Others, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 561].
44. It behoves the court to act with as great circumspection as possible, making all allowances for errors of judgment. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct, not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be punished. Punishment under the law of contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one's duty and in defiance of authority. Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and the standard of proof is the same as in other criminal cases. The alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 10 safeguards/rights, including benefit of doubt. [Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi reported in (2012) 4 SCC 307].
45. The sanctity to judicial proceedings is paramount to a society governed by law. Otherwise, the very edifice of democracy breaks and anarchy reigns. The Act, 1971 is intended to correct a person deviating from the norm and trying to breach the law/assuming law on to himself. It intends to secure confidence of the people in the administration of justice by disciplining those erring in disobeying the orders of the Court/undertaking given to court.
53. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha and Others reported in (2003) 11 SCC 1, the expression 'wilful disobedience' in the context of Section 2(b) of the Act was read to mean an act or omission done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent to do something, which the law forbids or with the specific intention to fail to do something which the law requires to be done. Wilfulness signifies deliberate action done with evil intent and bad motive and purpose. It should not be an act, which requires and is dependent upon, either wholly or partly, any act or omission by a third party for compliance."
10. Thus, it can be seen that any wilful act done voluntarily and intentionally would amount to Contempt of Court. Even if the contention of the respondents No.1 and 2 was to be accepted that they were not aware of the detailed order of the Court until it was dispatched on 08.05.2023, the respondents No.1 and 2 were aware of the Status-quo order passed by this Court and ought to have waited till receipt of the copy of the order before taking any action. It was not as though, the season was coming to an end and the crop would perish if not harvested. It was in fact the TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 11 beginning of the crop season and from the photographs filed along with the contempt petition, the mangoes were quite raw. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the respondents No.1 and 2 were very much aware of the directions of this Court and only in order to circumvent the order and appropriate the crop before they receive the copy of the order, it is clear that they have proceeded to take away the mango crop.
11. In respect of the contention of the respondents Nos.1 and 2 that since the interim order has already merged with the final order, there is no cause for initiation of any contempt case proceedings in this case, this Court finds that the Bombay High Court has held that the Contempt Case proceedings are independent of the execution proceedings and are primarily made to ensure the compliance of the Court's order rather than giving a relief to the parties and therefore, mere availability of the execution proceedings cannot be a substitute for contempt proceedings, as the remedies are not the alternate remedies and can be invoked simultaneously.
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12. Further, in the case of Tayabbhai M.Bagasarwalla and Another (cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the case of violation of interim orders and whether such violation is punishable even if later, the Court order is held to be without jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus:
"8. The learned Judge then referred in extenso to the elaborate material placed before him and recorded the finding that all these reports clearly indicate that there is wilful and blatant breach of order of injunction passed by the City Civil Court.
"It is clear that in breach of the injunction order, there has been construction. The breach is wilful and blatant. The extent to which the Appellants have gone is also indicated by the fact that, as stated above, inspite of knowledge of order of this Court, the Commissioner appointed by this Court was initially obstructed. To the Court it is very clear that here is a party who has absolutely no regard for the orders of the Court. Such a party must be made to bear the consequences of their own action...... To the Court it is clear that the applicants have chosen to wilfully and blatantly flout the order of injunction. It may be that the applicants have a very good case. However, no matter how good a case a party has, in my view, it is not open to a party to flout orders of courts. If a party wilfully flouts an order of the court then such party can expect no equitable relief from the court. Such a party must be made to bear the consequences of his action. Otherwise all parties will ignore or flout orders of courts. When caught out they would then throw themselves at the mercy of the court. In my view, in cases like this, the party in default must not be allowed to enjoy the benefits of action. To appoint the applicants as the Agent of the Court Receiver would amount to giving them benefit of their wrong. In my view, the order dated 28.7.1991 must be and is sustained. The application to TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 13 appoint the Applicants as the agents of the Court Receiver is rejected."
12. Pursuant to the request of this Court aforementioned, the Bombay High Court has disposed of the aforementioned appeal (Appeal from Order No.1407 of 1991) on November 1, 1996. The High Court has allowed the appeal holding that inasmuch as the Bombay City Civil Court is found to have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, Defendant 1 and 2 cannot be punished for disobeying the interim orders made in such a suit, for the reason that the said interim order must equally be held to be without jurisdiction. This appeal is preferred against the said order of the High Court.
14. The first and foremost question in this appeal is whether the High Court was right in holding that since it has been found ultimately that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the interim orders made therein are non- est and hence Defendants 1 and 2 cannot be punished for their violation even if they had flouted and disobeyed the said interim orders when they were in force. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not right in saying so. The landlord-plaintiff came forward with the suit alleging that by virtue of the fire resulting in the destruction of the suit house, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties has come to an end and, therefore, he requested the court to injunct the defendants from carrying on any construction on the suit premises without their permission and without obtaining sanction from the Municipal Corporation. The defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit. According to them, the building was not totally destroyed and that, in any event, the relationship of landlord and tenant has not come to an end on that account. The defendants' plea was rejected by the Civil Court. It held that it did have the jurisdiction to try the said suit. On appeal, however, the High Court, disagreeing with the decision of another High Court, held that relationship of landlord and tenant has not come to an end for the reason suggested by the plaintiff and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of Section 28 of Bombay Rent Act. All this took about six years, i.e., from 1991 to 1996. It is not suggested nor can it be suggested that the suit was filed by the plaintiff in the City Civil Court only with a view to avoid the Rent Control Court nor can it be suggested that they approached the Civil Court knowing full well that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try that suit. It TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 14 is evident that they approached the Civil Court bona fide, thinking that it had jurisdiction to try their suit. They were confirmed in their view by the Civil Court. It is true that ultimately the High Court found against them but even there, it must be noticed, they did so disagreeing with a decision of the Kerala High Court. It, therefore, cannot be said that the plaintiffs did not approach the Civil Court bona fide.
15. The next thing to be noticed is that certain interim orders were asked for and were granted by the Civil Court during this period. Would it be right to say that violation of and disobedience to the said orders of injunction is not punishable because it has been found later that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Mr.Sorabjee suggests that saying so would be subversive of the Rule of Law and would seriously erode the majesty and dignity of the courts. It would mean, suggests the learned counsel, that it would be open to the defendants-respondents to decide for themselves whether the order was with or without jurisdiction and act upon that belief. This can never be, says the learned counsel. He further suggests that if any party thinks that an order made by the Civil Court is without jurisdiction or is contrary to law, the appropriate course open to him is to approach that court with the plea and ask for vacating the order. But it is not open to him to flout the said order assuming that the order is without jurisdiction. It is this principle which has been recognised and incorporation in Section 9-A of Civil Procedure Code (inserted by Maharashtra Amendment Act No. 65 of 1977), says Mr.Sorabjee. Section 9-A reads as follows:
"9-A. Where at the hearing of an application relating to interim relief is suit, objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue to be decided by the Court as preliminary issue. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other law for the time being in force, if, at the hearing of any application of granting or setting aside an order granted any interim relief, whether by way of stay injunction, appointment of a receiver or otherwise, made in any suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain such suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the order granting the interim relief. Any such application shall be heard and disposed of by the Court as TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 15 expeditiously as possible and shall not in any case be adjourned to the hearing of suit.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), at the hearing of any such application, the court may grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary, pending determination by it of the preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction."
16. According to this section, if an objection is raised to the jurisdiction of the court at the hearing of an application for grant of, or for vacating, interim relief, the court should determine that issue in the first instance as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the relief already granted. An application raising objection to the jurisdiction to the court is directed to be heard with all expedition. Sub-rule (2), however, says that the command in sub-rule (1) does not preclude the court from granting such interim relief as it may consider necessary pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction. In our opinion, the provision merely states the obvious. It makes explicit what is implicit in law. Just because an objection to the jurisdiction is raised, the court does not become helpless forthwith - nor does it become incompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. At the same time, it should also decide the objection to jurisdiction at the earliest possible moment. This is the general principle and this is what Section 9-A reiterates. Take this very case. The plaintiff asked for temporary injunction. An ad-interim injunction was granted. Then the defendants came forward objecting to the grant of injunction and also raising an objection to the jurisdiction of the court. The court over-ruled the objection as to jurisdiction and made the interim injunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal against the decision on the question of jurisdiction. While that appeal was pending, several other interim orders were passed both by the Civil Court as well as by the High Court. Ultimately, no doubt, High Court has found that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit but all this took about six years. Can it be said that orders passed by the Civil Court and the High court during this period of six years were all non-est and that it is open to the defendants to flout them merrily, without fear of any consequence. Admittedly, this could not be done until the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction. The question is whether the said decision of the High Court means that no person can be TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 16 punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e., for violations and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction. Holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High Court [on the question of jurisdiction], on one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be subversive of rule of law and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the courts. We must repeat that this is not even a case where a suit was filed in the wrong court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed out hereinabove, the suit was filed in the Civil Court bona fide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their disobedience and violation of the interim injunction committed by them prior to the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction.
23. In Hadkinson v. Hadkinson [1952 All. E.R.567] the Court of Appeal held:
"It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham, L.C. said in Chuck v. Cremer: (1) (1 Coop. Temp. Cott.342)(at p.342).
`A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it....It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid-whether it was regular or irregular. That they should come to the court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.' Such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will, in general follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court (and I am not now considering disobedience of orders relating merely to TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 17 matters of procedure) is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise. The second is that no application to the court by such a person will be entertained until he has purged himself of his contempt."
13. Further in the case of Prithawi Nath Ram (cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even if ultimately the interim order is vacated or relief in the main proceedings is not granted to a party, the other side cannot take that as a ground for disobedience of any interim order passed by the Court. The High Court of Chhattisgarh has also expressed similar view in the case of M/s.Mile Stone Soft. Tech. Pvt. Ltd., (cited supra).
14. The learned single judge of this Court in the case of M/s.G.L.K.Grants (cited supra) has also considered the case where the contemnor has taken the stand that he was not aware of the interim order and therefore, there was no compliance and the Court held that such contention cannot be accepted having regard to the fact that the status-quo order was passed in the presence of his counsel and that he came to know about the order only subsequently.
15. Thus, the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners support the case of the petitioners that even if an interim order has finally merged TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 18 with the final order of the Court or even if the interim order was subsequently vacated, the violation of interim order when it was in force is Contempt of Court and the contemnors are punishable for the same.
16. The respondents No.1 and 2, on the other hand, have also relied upon the following judgments in support of their contentions:
17. In the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. Mohd.Yaqoob Khan and Others (cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where there is an allegation of violation of the interim orders and a stay vacate petition has already been filed, the Court ought to have taken the stay vacate petition on merits rather than proceed in the contempt case petition. However, this judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case as it is not only distinguishable on facts but also because the main case has already been disposed of by the Court. In the case of Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd., and Another (cited supra) also similar view is expressed and therefore, it is not applicable to the facts of the case.
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18. The case of Kanwar Singh Saini (cited supra), is that an interim order was granted in the suit and during the pendency of the said order, the final order has been passed and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if the case is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. However, this judgment is factually distinguishable to the case on hand as in the case before this Court, the allegations is of violation of interim order during its currency and not violation of the interim order after the final order is passed. Therefore, the said judgment is not applicable to the case on hand.
19. In the case of Steel Authority of India Limited and Another (cited supra), it is the case where the communication of the order was belated and hence it was held that there was no Contempt of Court, whereas in the case before this Court, the order was passed in Open Court in the presence of both the parties and therefore, the said judgment cannot be applied to the case on hand.
20. In the case of U.C.Surendranath (cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that for giving a finding holding person guilty of wilful disobedience of the order TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 20 under Order 39 Rule 2-A of CPC, there has to be not mere 'disobedience', but it should be a 'wilful disobedience' and the allegation of wilful disobedience being in the nature of criminal liability, the same has to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the disobedience was not mere 'disobedience' but was 'wilful disobedience'.
21. This Court is satisfied that the respondents No.1 and 2 were very much aware of the order of this Court and in order to circumvent the order of this Court only, they proceeded to appropriate/take away the mango crop in a hurry on the next day of the order and have taken the stand that they have received the copy of the order on 08.05.2023 and therefore, they were not aware of the directions of this Court. This is nothing but a wilful disobedience of the order of this Court and therefore, they are liable for punishment under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
22. The respondents No.3 and 4 being the police Officers are required to follow the law and the directions of the Courts and ensure that the orders are complied with. It is pertinent to mention here that the learned government pleader for home was also present when the interim order TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 21 was passed by this Court and it is presumed that the same was orally communicated to the respondents No.3 and 4. Therefore, they cannot now take the stand that they were not aware of the interim orders of this Court and instead of maintaining law and order, they seem to have not only permitted the respondents No1 and 2 to take away mangos from the site and not maintained the status-quo as directed by this Court, but some of the constables have also taken some of the mangoes with them. Therefore, they are also liable for punishment under Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act.
23. In the result, i. The respondents No.1 and 2/Contemnors herein are sentenced to individually undergo detention in civil prison for a period of One (1) month each and shall pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand) each and in default of payment of fine amount, the respondents No.1 and 2/Contemnors herein shall undergo detention in civil prison for a further period of Ten (10) days. They shall be entitled to TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 22 subsistence allowance at the rate of Rs.100/- (Rupees Hundred) per day each in accordance with Rule 32(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1980 framed by the High Court for the State of Telangana under the Act of 1971, during their period of detention which shall be borne by the petitioners.
ii. The respondents No.1 and 2/Contemnors herein shall also pay costs of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) in lumpsum to the petitioners within a period of Four (4) weeks. iii. The respondents No.3 & 4/Contemnors herein are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-
(Rupees Two Thousand) each within a period of Four (4) weeks from today and in default of payment of fine amount, the respondents No.3 and 4/Contemnors herein shall undergo detention in civil prison for a period of Ten (10) days each.
iv. Accordingly, the Contempt Case is allowed with costs as above.
TMD,J C.C.No.1154 of 2023 23 v. Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall also stand closed.
____________________________ JUSTICE T.MADHAVI DEVI Date: 05.06.2024 bak