Telangana High Court
Raghavender Rao, vs Damodhara Chary, on 3 June, 2024
Author: G. Radha Rani
Bench: G. Radha Rani
HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G. RADHA RANI
SECOND APPEAL Nos.1197 and 1188 of 2006
COMMON JUDGMENT:
S.A.No.1197 of 2006 is filed by the appellant - appellant - plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 14.07.2006 passed in A.S.No.13 of 2005 by the Senior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District, confirming the judgment and decree dated 19.04.2005 passed in O.S.No.43 of 1997 by the Junior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District.
2. The appellant died during the pendency of the appeal and his legal representatives were brought on record as appellants 2 to 9.
3. S.A.No.1188 of 2006 is filed by the appellant - appellant - plaintiff (appellant No.3 in S.A.No.1197 of 2006 - one of the sons of appellant) aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 14.07.2006 passed in A.S.No.12 of 2005 by the Senior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District, confirming the judgment and decree dated 19.04.2005 passed in O.S.No.41 of 1997 by the Junior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District.
4. The parties are hereinafter referred as arrayed before the trial court as plaintiff and defendants.
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5. The plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997 (pertaining to S.A.No.1197 of 2006) filed the suit for declaration of his title and confirmation of possession in respect of suit lands bearing Sy.Nos.216/paiki, 262, 262/paiki in all measuring Acs.8-22 gts. situated at Mudumal village.
6. The plaintiff in O.S.No.41 of 1997 (pertaining to S.A.No.1188 of 2006), the son of the plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997 filed the suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession and perpetual injunction in respect of suit lands bearing Sy.No.216 measuring Acs.9-10 gts. situated at Mudumal village.
7. The contention of both the plaintiffs was that originally one Smt. Narsmma Pujari was the owner of the above suit schedule properties. After her demise, her adopted son, one Jaya Rao succeeded to the same. The said Jaya Rao, to meet his family requirements sold the suit lands to plaintiffs for valuable sale consideration under registered sale deeds dated 22.07.1993 and since then, the plaintiffs were enjoying the lands as pattedars and possessors. Earlier to it, the plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997 was enjoying both the suit lands as bataidar for several years. The defendants having no claim or right over the said lands tried to cause interference in their possession and enjoyment. As such, Sri Kishan Rao (the plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997) filed the suit for perpetual injunction vide O.S.No.31 of 1993 and the said suit was decreed in his favour. Thereafter, the defendants filed a land grabbing case vide O.P.No.247 of 1994 3 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 alleging that Jaya Rao and Kishan Rao illegally encroached the land and sought for recovery of possession. However, the said case was dismissed as withdrawn. Later, Kishan Rao filed execution petition vide E.P.No.6 of 1995 for punishment of defendants for committing contempt of court. The defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs necessitating the plaintiffs to file the above suits for declaration of title and confirmation of possession.
8. The defendants filed written statement contending that late Narsamma Pujari was the mother of defendant No.3 and she gifted the suit schedule properties to defendant No.3 at the time of her marriage towards pasupu- kumkuma. The husband of defendant No.3 by name, Kamalanabha Chary cultivated the suit land. After the death of husband of defendant No.3, all the defendants 1 to 3 were in possession of the suit schedule properties and they being absolute owners, sold the suit schedule properties to Makala Anjaneyulu and Makala Laxmanna (sons of defendant No.4) vide registered sale deed dated 18.05.1993.
8.1. They further contended that suit lands were Inam lands. The defendants applied to Revenue Divisional Officer, Narayanpet for issuance of Occupancy Rights Certificate in their favour. The civil courts had no jurisdiction to issue perpetual injunction in respect of Inam lands. Late Jaya Rao had no right, title or interest in the suit schedule properties. The name of Jaya Rao was recorded 4 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 in revenue records with a dishonest intention without following due course of law by the Revenue Authorities. The alienations made by Jaya Rao to the plaintiffs would not transfer any rights. The said instruments were null and void and not binding on them. The payment of land revenue by the plaintiffs or Jaya Rao would not create any right over the properties. The entries in revenue records not supported by valid source of title would not create any interest or title and denied that Jaya Rao was the adopted son of late Narsamma Pujari Malkeid or that he was owner of the suit schedule properties. 8.2. They further contended that O.P.No.247 of 1994 filed under A.P. Land Grabbing Act was withdrawn by them as during the year 1993-1994 the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit lands and on filing the land grabbing case by defendants 1 to 3, they left the land and allowed the defendnats to occupy the same. Their possession was only for a short period of few months and contended that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit schedule properties as on the date of filing the suits. They contended that the payment of court fee under Section 24(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 (for short, 'APCF and SV Act') was improper.
9. Basing on the said pleadings, the trial court framed the issues in O.S.No.43 of 1997 as follows:
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Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 i. Whether Jaya Rao is the adopted son of Smt. Narsamma Pujari Malkaid?
ii. Whether the suit property is gifted to defendant No.3 towards "PasupuKumkuma"?
iii. Whether the defendants 1 to 3 sold away the suit property in favour of son of defendant No.4?
iv. Whether the plaintiff is in possession as on the date of filing of the suit?
v. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title over the suit schedule property and after perpetual injunction? vi. To what relief?
10. The plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and got examined another witness as PW.2 and got marked Exs.A1 to A29 on his behalf. The defendant No.2 was examined as DW.1 and they got examined two other witnesses as DWs.2 and 3 on their behalf and got marked Exs.B1 to B16.
11. The trial court framed the issues in O.S.No.41 of 1997 as follows:
i. Whether Jaya Rao is the adopted son of Smt. Narsamma Pujari Malkaid and succeeded to her property? ii. Whether the plaintiff was put into the possession of the suit property by his Vendor Jaya Rao?
iii. Whether the late Narsamma gifted the suit property to her daughter defendant No.3 towards PasupuKumkuma at the time of her marriage?6
Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 iv. Whether the suit property has been sold in favour of the sons of defendant No.4 and put them into the possession by defendants 1 to 3?
v. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of his right and for perpetual injunction over the suit property? vi. To what relief?
12. The plaintiff in O.S.No.41 of 1997 was examined as PW.1 and got examined the attestor of the sale deed as PW.2 and another witness as PW.3 and got marked Exs.A1 to A12 on his behalf. On behalf of defendants, DWs.1 to 3 were examined and got marked Exs.B1 to B16.
13. On considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial court dismissed both the suits on 19.04.2005 holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove the adoption of Jaya Rao by Smt. Narsamma Pujari and further held that Smt. Narsamma Pujari had given the suit schedule properties to her daughter, defendant No.3 towards Pusupu-Kumkuma by oral gift at the time of her marriage and the said oral gift was valid. The trial court further held that the entries in the revenue records showing the name of the plaintiff would not confer any title and the plaintiff would not acquire any title over the suit schedule properties as the sale deeds executed by Jaya Rao were not valid and he had no authority to sell the same and held that the plaintiffs were not in lawful possession over the suit lands and dismissed both the suits. 7
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14. Aggrieved by the said judgments and decrees passed by the learned Junior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District dated 19.04.2005, the plaintiffs in both the suits preferred the first appeals. The appeals were heard by the Senior Civil Judge, Narayanpet, Mahabubnagar District. Vide judgments and decrees in A.S.Nos.12 and 13 of 2005 dated 14.07.2006, the first appellate court dismissed both the appeals confirming the judgments and decrees passed by the trial court. The first appellate court reappreciated the evidence on record and held that as the plaintiffs were claiming their title through Jaya Rao as adopted son of Narsamma Pujari, they need to prove the factum of adoption of Jaya Rao by Late Narsamma Pujari but failed to prove the same. However, the defendants also failed to prove that the suit lands were gifted by Narsamma Pujari to defendant No.3. Oral gift was not valid under law. No document was filed by the defendants to show that defendants 1 to 3 had transferred the suit lands to the sons of defendant No.4. However, in a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiffs should succeed on the strength of their own case, but not on the weaknesses of the case of the defendants and were not entitled to seek the relief of declaration of title over the suit schedule properties.
15. Both the courts below also held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the relief of perpetual injunction as they were seeking the same as a consequential relief in a suit for declaration of title.
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16. Aggrieved further, the plaintiffs preferred these second appeals raising the following substantial questions of law:
1. Whether the appellate court having held that defendant No.3 did not acquire any title to the suit land on the strength of the alleged oral gift was justified in dismissing the suit of plaintiff who purchased the same from the adopted son of Late Smt. Narsamma Pujari.
2. Whether the courts below were justified in brushing aside the revenue records prepared under the ROR Act showing the plaintiff's vendor as pattedar for several years and the plaintiffs as cultivators for the last more than 20 years and thereafter the plaintiff as pattedar on the strength of sale deed without there being any rebuttal evidence denying the statutory presumption.
3. Whether the courts below were justified in holding that the plaintiff's possession were unlawful ignoring the fact that the plaintiff was found to be in possession of land for the last more than 20 years and enjoying the decree of perpetual injunction granted by a competent court.
4. Whether the court below was justified in negativing the adoption of Jaya Rao by Smt. Narsamma Pujari when the said fact had come for adjudication after more then 50 years and all the surrounding circumstances proved the said adoption.
17. This Court on 08.12.2006 admitted both the Second Appeals on the following substantial question of law:
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Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 Whether the courts below were justified in refusing to grant the relief of decree for perpetual injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining the defendants from causing interference in his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit land on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish his lawful title over the suit land though he was found to be in possession of land.
18. Heard Sri Vijay Kumar Heroor, the learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Gujjari Naveen Kumar, the learned counsel for the respondents.
19. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the courts below disbelieved the theory of adoption of Jaya Rao by Narsamma Pujari for not adducing satisfactory evidence and considered that there was no basis for granting the relief of declaration of title. But, however, committed an error in considering that the relief of perpetual injunction was sought as consequential to the relief of declaration. The relief of injunction was claimed as an independent relief and court fee was also paid separately. Even if the same was not paid, they were ready to pay the same within the time fixed by the Court. The respondents-defendants 1 to 3 admitted in their written statement itself that they sold the suit schedule properties to the sons of defendant No.4 and that they were not in possession of the schedule properties and that they had no interest in the same. The defendant No.4 had not contested the suit. The appellants were uninterruptedly in possession for the past 50 years. Injunction could be granted 10 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 against all the persons other than the true owner, the owners were not interest to contest the suit and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs. Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs. and Anr. 1. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tajender Singh Ghambhir and Anr. Vs. Gurpreet Singh and Ors.2 on the aspect that even if there was any deficiency in payment of court fee, the same could be made good during the appellate stage and of the judgment in Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Ors. Vs. Manjit Kaur and Ors.3on the aspect that there was no bar under Article 65 or any of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 as against the plaintiff who had perfected his title by virtue of adverse possession to sue or to evict a person or to protect his possession. He also relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Ramavath Hasala Naik Vs. Sabahavath Gomli Bai4.
20. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that both the courts below concurrently held that the plaintiffs were not entitled for declaration of title as they failed to prove the adoption of their vendor Jaya Rao by Narsamma Pujari. The only substantial question of law formulated by this Court was with regard to possession. The plaintiff in O.S.No.43 of 1997 being 1 (2004) 1 SCC 769 2 (2014) 10 SCC 702 3 (2019) 8 SCC 729 4 S.A.No.576 of 1999 decided on 09.09.2010 reported in MANU/AP/0783/2010 11 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 the Village Administrative Officer or Patwari and resident of Mudumal village since 1960, managed the revenue records. On the basis of an ex-parte decree obtained in his favour, the plaintiff got his name mutated in the revenue records. The said mutation also took place subsequent to the institution of the suit as observed by the courts below, but not as on the date of filing of the suit. Hence, the plaintiff was not entitled even for the relief of possession and prayed to dismiss the Second Appeals.
21. As a general rule, the High Court would not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below, except when,
(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence;
(ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or
(iii) the courts have wrongly casted the burden of proof.
22. The only substantial question of law, which was admitted for determination in these Second Appeals is:
Whether the courts below were justified in refusing to grant the relief of decree for perpetual injunction in favour of the plaintiff restraining the defendants from causing interference in his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit land on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish his lawful title over the suit land though he was found to be in possession of land.12
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23. On a perusal of the plaint and the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs sought the relief of (i) declaration that they were owners and possessors of the suit lands, (ii) to decree the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants, their men and servants from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit lands. Both the plaintiffs valued the suits under Section 24(b) of the APCF and SV Act.
24. Section 24(b) of APCF and SV Act reads as follows:
"(b) where the prayer is for a declaration and for consequential injunction and the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher."
25. The plaintiffs valued the suit on one-half of the market value of the property. Though the plaintiffs had not used the word 'consequential' for seeking the relief of perpetual injunction, they paid the court fee for the relief under Section 24(b) of APCF and SV Act. This itself would disclose that they were seeking for the consequential relief of injunction, but not as an independent relief. They had not paid the court fee independently for the relief of perpetual injunction under Section 26(a) of the APCF and SV Act.
26. The judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court relied by the learned counsel for the appellants in Tajender Singh Ghambhir and Anr. Vs. Gurpreet 13 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 Singh and Ors.(2 supra) had no relevance to the facts of the presence case as the point involved in the said case is whether the appellate court can direct the party to make up deficit court fee in the plaint at the appellate stage and it was reiterated that the power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court and the appellate court in the interest of justice can do that which could be done by the trial court in the suit proceedings. It was held therein that it was the duty of the court to determine as to whether or not court fee paid on the plaint was deficient. On finding court fee to be deficient, court must first grant time to the plaintiff to pay the deficient court fee. If despite the said order of court, the deficient court fee is not paid, it is only then the consequence as provided in Sections 6, 2 and 3 of APCF and VS Act must follow.
27. The appellants-plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration and injunction and paid the court fee under Section 24(b) of APCF and SV Act. The respondents- defendants stated in their written statement that they need to pay the court fee under Section 24(a) of the APCF and SV Act, contending that the plaintiff was not in possession of the property. The trial court specifically held that the main relief sought by the plaintiff was for declaration of title for which the plaintiff was not entitled, therefore, he was not entitled for the consequential relief also. Even during the stage of first appeal, the plaintiffs had not sought for any amendment of the plaint and had not asked for the relief of perpetual injunction 14 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 independently nor paid any court fee on the said aspect. Their contention now, at the stage of second appeal that they had sought for perpetual injunction as an independent relief, without paying any court fee on the said aspect could not be taken into consideration. The citation relied by the learned counsel for the appellants has no application to the facts of the present case.
28. The other contention taken by the learned counsel for the appellants was that though the plaintiffs failed to establish their title over the suit schedule properties, as they were found to be in possession of the suit lands, as such, the courts committed an error in refusing to grant the relief of the decree for perpetual injunction and relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs. Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs. and Anr. (1 supra).
29. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs. Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs. and Anr. (1 supra) held that:
"8. It is thus clear that so far as the Indian law is concerned the person in peaceful possession is entitled to retain his possession and in order to protect such possession he may even use reasonable force to keep out a trespasser. A rightful owner who has been wrongfully dispossessed of land may retake possession if he can do so peacefully and without the use of unreasonable force. If the trespasser is in settled possession of the property belonging to the rightful 15 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 owner, the rightful owner shall have to take recourse to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession. The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful owner from using force or taking law in his own hands, and also by restoring him in possession even from the rightful owner (of course subject to the law of limitation), if the latter has dispossessed the prior possessor by use of force. In the absence of proof of better title, possession or prior peaceful settled possession is itself evidence of title. Law presumes the possession to go with the title unless rebutted. The owner of any property may prevent even by using reasonable force a trespasser from an attempted trespass, when it is in the process of being committed, or is of a flimsy character, or recurring, intermittent, stray or casual in nature, or has just been committed, while the rightful owner did not have enough time to have recourse to law. In the last of he cases, the possession of the trespasser, just entered into would not be called as one acquiesced to by the true owner.
9. It is the settled possession or effective possession of a person without title which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. The concept of settled possession and the right of the possessor to protect his possession against the owner has come to be settled by a catena of decisions. Illustratively, we may refer to Munshi Ram and Ors. Vs. Delhi Administration [(1968) 2 SCR 455], Puran Singh and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab [(1975) 4 SCC 518] and Ram Rattan and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1977) 1 SCC 188]. The authorities need not be 16 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 multiplied. In Munshi Ram &Ors.'s case (supra), it was held that no one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. But merely stray or even intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and re- instate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never been lost. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. In Puran Singh and Ors.'s case (supra), the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The 'settled possession' must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. The phrase 'settled possession' does not carry any special charm or magic in it; nor is it a ritualistic formula which can be confined in a strait-jacket. An occupation of the property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual physical possession. The court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as a 17 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 working rule for determining the attributes of 'settled possession':
i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period;
ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi.
The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case;
iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced to by the true owner;and
iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner has no right to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession."
30. The plaintiff must be in settled possession over the suit schedule property to substantiate his entitlement seeking the relief of perpetual injunction, even if he failed to prove his title over the suit schedule property. But, both the courts below held that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit schedule properties by the date of filing of the suit. The trial court as well as the first appellate court observed that it was not safe to rely on the revenue records filed by the plaintiff in view of certain suspicious circumstances shrouding the truth 18 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 and genuineness of these entries as pointed out in Ex.B10 order of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Maganoor. The first appellate court also observed that PW.1 himself was Patwari of Murahari Doddi village for the last several decades and the possibility of creating a false record by using his office could not be ruled out. There was no evidence of any of the neighbouring ryots to the suit schedule lands placed by PW.1 to prove his continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule lands, more particularly, by the date of filing of the suits. The first appellate court observed that as per Ex.B16, summoned by the defendants from the office of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Maganoor, the Amendment Register of Murahari Doddi village at page No.47, there is an entry in serial No.95 with regard to sanction of succession in favour of the legal heir of late Narsamma Pujari. After making a local enquiry by the revenue authority following the death of late Narsamma Pujari, the endorsement reads as Smt. Late Narsamma Pujari died 15 days back by then and during the enquiry made by the revenue enquiries, it was found that she had a son by name Narayana and accordingly, the patta was transferred in the name of her son Narayana. As per the endorsement, Narayana was the son of Late Narsamma Pujari, which fact would disprove the statement of PW.1 that Narayana was the husband of Late Narsamma Pujari. Furthermore, it was held that the name of Late Jaya Rao appeared to have been written above the name of Narayana in the parallel column of that endorsement and he was described as the son of Narayana. In 19 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 the detailed order passed by the M.R.O., Maganoor under Ex.B10 proceedings dated 29.03.1997, he pointed out this glaring addition and suspected some foul play in introducing the name of Late Jaya Rao as against the endorsement at Sl.No.95 of Ex.B16 register. Even if it was taken that Narayana or Narayana Rao was the husband of late Narsamma Pujari, it was totally incomprehensible as to what was the necessity to adopt Jaya Rao, as he would become her natural son. The first appellate Court also observed that the endorsement appearing in Ex.B16 coupled with the observations in Ex.B10 order would tend to create a strong preponderance of probability against the case of the plaintiffs and more particularly, against the evidence of PW.1 that Narayana was the husband of Late Narsamma.
31. The first appellate Court further observed that:
"Then coming to the revenue records placed by both sides before the court, PW.1 himself categorically admitted in his evidence that in pursuance of an exparte decree passed in the suit on 30.6.1997, the mutation proceedings were passed under Ex.A.26 and consequently, Exs.A.27 and A.28 were issued in his favour. As could be seen from the record that the exparte decree earlier passed in the suit was set aside and subsequently the defendants 1 to 4 filed the written statement before the court. As per Ex.B.9 which is the Khasrapahani for the year 1954-55, late Narsamma Pujari was shown as the pattadar of the suit schedule lands. In Exs.B.1 and B.2 which are the pahanies for the year 1971-72 and 1972-73 respectively, late Narsamma Pujari was shown as 20 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 the pattadar in column No.11 and PW.1 was shown as the cultivator in column no. 16. The same was continued in Ex.B.3which is the pahani for the year 1973-74. In Ex.B.8 which is the pahani for the year 1982-83, the name of Late Jaya Rao appears as pattadar and the column meant for recording the name of the person in possession was kept blank.In the light of the discussion under Exs.B.16 and B.10 in the foregoing paras, the name of Late Jaya Rao seemed to have been inserted subsequently before the name of the Narayana who was recorded as the legal heir of Late Narsamma Pujari as per the endorsement in Ex.B.16. Ex. B.4 is the pahani for the year 1984-85 which shows the name of Late Jaya Rao in column no. 11 and column no. 16 was kept blank. In Ex.B.5 pahani for the year 1994-95 Ex.B.6 pahani for the year 1995-96 and Ex.B. 7 pahani for the year 1997-98 the name of Late Jaya Rao is shown as pattadar. In Ex.B.7, PW.1 is shown as person in possession. Exs.A.3 to A.6 revenue receipts show the payment of land revenue by PW.1 on behalf of Late Jaya Rao.Exs.A.7 to A.13 and Exs.A.17 to A.25 are the certified copies of the original pahani which are marked in 'B' series and already discussed above. Ex.A.21 which is the certified copy of the pahani for the year 1996-97 shows the name of Laxmaiah S/o Mallaiah in Column No.13 as the person in possession.PW.1 deposed in his evidence that said Laxmaiah cultivated the land on hisbehalf. However, there is no corresponding plea advanced by PW.1 that Laxmaiah cultivated his land prior to the filing of the suit. While dealing with the entries in the pahanies the fact that PW.1 worked as the village secretary for the said village should not be lost sight of. In Ex.B.10 order, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Maganoor pointed out that Late Jaya Rao was surprisingly recorded as the pattadar for more extent of land than the extent over which he was granted succession in Ex.B.16."21
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32. The first appellate court further observed that the recording of PW.1 as the owner of the property arose only after Ex.A26 mutation proceedings which were admittedly the outcome of the ex-parte decree in the present suit which was subsequently set aside. In so far as the entries of recording the name of late Jaya Rao as pattedar a strong suspicion and doubt shrouding the entries regarding the succession under Ex.B16 mutually lay an eclipse over the truth and genuineness of these entries and above all, the mere entries in the revenue records cannot confer title on anybody as per the settled law.
33. The first appellate court also observed that:
"... Another glaring fact is that PW.1 himself deposed that he sold a part of the suit schedule lands to Laxmanna S/o. Mallaiah in 1994 itself and the said Laxmanna has been in possession of that land. It is totally un-understandable as to how the plaintiff is entitled to seek a decree for perpetual injunction in respect of the land which is already sold by him to some other person."
34. Thus, the first appellate court on appreciating the evidence on record and also documents marked, held that the plaintiff was not entitled to seek the relief of perpetual injunction against the defendants.
35. Thus, both the courts below on appreciating the evidence on record held that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit land even as on the date of 22 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 filing the suit and the plaintiffs failed to establish that they were in possession/settled possession of the suit land as on the date of filing the suit for claiming the relief of injunction. This Court does not find that the courts below have ignored the material evidence or acted on no evidence or had drawn any wrong inferences from the proved facts or applied the law erroneously or wrongly casted the burden of proof to interfere with their concurrent findings in these Second Appeals.
36. During the pendency of the second appeals, the learned counsel for the appellants filed I.A.No.1 of 2023 to receive statement of Rythu Bandu amount, Pahanies, Dharani portal, new pass books as additional evidence for effective adjudication of matter. However, the documents filed vide I.A.No.1 of 2023 as additional evidence are not relevant to decide the facts of the present case even for deciding the aspect of injunction, as it was only required to consider whether the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit schedule properties as on the date of filing of the suit, but not subsequent to it. Hence, it is considered not necessary to refer to these documents.
37. The second appellate court is not a third court on appreciation of facts. This Court does not find any debatable legal issues involved in this matter or that the courts acted against the binding precedents or contrary to the legal principles. As such, this Court does not find any necessity to interfere with the 23 Dr.GRR, J sa_1197 & 1188_2006 judgments of the courts below in dismissing the suits filed by the plaintiffs seeking the relief of declaration of title and the relief of injunction.
38. In the result, the Second Appeals are dismissed confirming the judgments of the courts below.
As a sequel miscellaneous applications pending in this appeal, if any shall stand closed.
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Dr. G. RADHA RANI, J
Date: 03-06-2024.
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