Telangana High Court
The State vs Subramani Gopalakrishnan on 9 July, 2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE E.V.VENUGOPAL
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE Nos.3044, 3048, 3053, 3055,
3089, 3092, 3218, 3221, 3222 and 3223 of 2017
COMMON ORDER :
These Criminal Revision Cases are preferred by the petitioner/complainant/Central Bureau of Investigation (for short 'CBI') under Sections 397 and 401 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short 'Cr.P.C.') aggrieved by the orders as tabulated hereunder :
Preferred against the order dated 03.10.2017 Sl.
Crl.RC No. on the file of the learned Metropolitan No. Sessions Judge, Hyderabad passed in Crl.MP No.2619 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 1 3044/2017 No.11427 of 2015.
Crl.MP No.2628 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 2 3048/2017 No.11431 of 2015.
Crl.MP No.2623 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 3 3053/2017 No.11432 of 2015.
Crl.MP No.2625 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 4 3055/2017 No.11428 of 2015.
Crl.MP No.2627 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 5 3089/2017 No.11424 of 2015.
Crl.MP No.2620 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 6 3092/2017 No.11426 of 2015.
Crl.MP No.2622 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 7 3218/2017 No.11430 of 2015.
Crl.MP No.2621 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 8 3221/2017 No.11425 of 2015.
Crl.MP No.2626 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 9 3222/2017 No.11423 of 2015.
Crl.MP No.2624 of 2015 in Crl.Appeal SR 10 3223/2017 No.11429 of 2015.
The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad vide the orders impugned, dismissed the above criminal miscellaneous petitions filed by the petitioner/CBI seeking to condone the delay of 215 days in preferring Page 2 of 12 appeals against the common judgment dated 09.04.2015, passed in CC Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2010 on the file of the learned XXI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-cum-Special Sessions Judge, Hyderabad holding that the petitioner failed to explain the delay in preferring the said criminal appeals in a convincing manner.
2. Heard Sri Srinivas Kapatia, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the petitioner/CBI, Sri P.Subhash learned counsel for the respondents in Crl.RC Nos.3044, 3089, 3092, 3222 and 3223 of 2017, Sri K.Mahesh, learned counsel representing Sri Monohar, learned counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC No.3048 of 2017, Sri Vishal Gandhi, learned counsel representing Sri V.Surender Rao, learned counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC No.3053 of 2017, Sri A.Sanjay Kishore, learned counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC No.3055 of 2017, Sri MS Srinivas Iyengar, learned senior counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC No.3218 of 2017 and Sri B.Nalin Kumar, learned senior counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC No.3221 of 2017.
3. CC Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2010 are the cases registered on the strength of FIR in Crime No.2 of 2009, registered against the accused for the offences under Sections 120-B, 201, 406, 409, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 477-A of Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC') and under Sections 90 and 91 of Income Tax Act, 1961 alleging certain misdeeds like fudging of company accounts and manipulation of records with the help of auditors showing incorrect balance sheets resulting in causing loss to the Page 3 of 12 public/investors and gain to the accused. The learned Judge of the trial Court, vide judgment dated 09.04.2015, found the accused guilty and sentenced them as under :
" (a) The accused Al to A10 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees one lakh each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A 10 shall suffer SI for a period of 3 (three) months each for the offence punishable under section 120-B of Indian Penal Code (charge under First Head).
(b) The accused Al to A10 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 7 (seven) years each and the accused Al and A2 to pay a fine of rupees five crore each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al and A2 shall suffer SI for a period of 1 (one) year each and further the accused A3 to A 10 to pay a fine of rupees 25 (twenty five) lakh each and in default of payment of fine the accused A3 to A10 shall suffer SI for a period of 6 (six) months each for the offence punishable under section 420 read with 120-B of Indian Penal Code (charge (i) of Fourth Head).
(c) The accused Al and A2 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 7 (seven) years each for each count and to pay a fine of rupees 10 (ten) lakh each for each count and in default of payment of fine the accused Al and A2 shall suffer SI for 6 (six) months each for each count for the offence punishable under section 409 of Indian Penal Code (total two counts)(charge (ii) and (iii) under Second Head).
(d) The accused Al and A2 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 7 (seven) years each for each count and to pay a fine of rupees 10 (ten) lakh each for each count and in default of payment of fine the accused Al and A2 shall suffer SI for 6 (six) months each for each count for the offence punishable under section 409 of Indian Penal Code (total five counts) (charge (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) under Second Head).
(e) The accused A3, A4 and A7 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years each for each count and to pay a fine of rupees 1 (one) lakh each for each count and in Page 4 of 12 default of payment of fine the accused A3, A4 and A7 shall suffer Sl for 3 (three) months each for each count for the offence punishable under section 406 Indian Penal Code (total four counts) (charge (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) under the Second Head) and further the accused A3, A5 and A7 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years each and to pay a fine of rupees I (one) lakh each and in default of payment of fine the accused A3, A5 and A7 shall suffer Sl for 3 (three) months each for the offence punishable under section 406 of Indian Penal Code (charge (viii) under the Second Head).
(f) The accused Al to A5 and A7 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 1 (one) lakh each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A5 and A7 shall suffer SI for 3 (three) months each for the offence punishable under section 420 read with 120-B of Indian Penal Code (charge (ii) under Fourth Head).
(g) The accused A4 and A5 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/- (fifty thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused A4 and A5 shall suffer Sl for 2 (two) months each for the offence punishable under section 419 of Indian Penal Code (charge (i) under Third Head).
(h) The accused A7 is sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/-
(fifty thousand rupees) and in default of payment of fine the accused A7 shall suffer St for 2 (two) months for the offence punishable under section 419 of Indian Penal Code (charge (ii) under Third Head)
(i) The accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/- (fifty thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused A1 to A5 and A7 to A9 shall suffer Sl for 2 (two) months each for the offence punishable under section 467 of Indian Penal Code (charge under Fifth Head).
(j) The accused to A1 to A5 and A7 to A9 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/- (fifty thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 shall suffer SI for 2 (two) months each for the offence Page 5 of 12 punishable under section 468 of Indian Penal Code (charge under Sixth Head).
(k) The accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 1 (one) year each and to pay a fine of rupees 25,000/- (twenty five thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 shall suffer SI for 1 (one) month each for the offence punishable under section 471 of Indian Penal Code (charge under Seventh Head).
(l) The accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 are sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 3 (three) years each and to pay a fine of rupees 50,000/- (fifty thousand rupees) each and in default of payment of fine the accused Al to A5 and A7 to A9 shall suffer SI for 2 (two) months each for the offence punishable under section 477-A of Indian Penal Code (charge under Eighth Head).
(m) The accused Al is sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years and to pay a fine of rupees 25,000/- (twenty five thousand rupees) and in default of payment of fine the accused Al shall suffer SI for I (one) month for the offence punishable under section 201 of Indian Penal Code (charge (i) under Ninth Head).
(n) The accused A7 is sentenced to suffer RI for a period of 2 (two) years and to pay a fine of rupees 25,000/- (twenty five thousand rupees) and in default of payment of fine the accused A7 shall suffer SI for 1 (one) month for the offence punishable under section 201 of Indian Penal Code (charge (ii) under Ninth Head)."
4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the quantum of imprisonment imposed against the accused persons, the petitioner/CBI preferred criminal appeals seeking enhancement of the imprisonment awarded to the accused in CC Nos.1, 2 and 3 of 2010. Since 215 days of delay was occurred in preferring the said appeals, the petitioner/CBI filed criminal miscellaneous petitions, as detailed in the above table, requesting Page 6 of 12 the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad to condone the said delay contending that due to the procedural aspects in getting permission from the Government and other allied things, beyond their control, the said delay was occurred. The accused resisted the said applications contending that the petitioner without giving proper explanation for the inordinate delay, approached the Court to condone the delay. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad holding that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government Departments and usual explanations cannot be accepted for condoning the delay.
5. Aggrieved by the said dismissal orders, the petitioner/CBI preferred the present criminal revision cases mainly contending that the Court below failed to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the case since for the purpose of thoroughly scrutinizing the quantum of punishment awarded against the accused and arriving at an opinion for preferring appeal upon perusing the voluminous documents as well as copy of judgment considerable time had taken for the officials at various stages and that when the public exchequer is subjected to a fraud and the Government agencies are trying to unearth the truth and punish the culprits, mere technicalities cannot be given much importance in condoning the delay in filing the appeal. Further, the Court below failed to follow the settled principle that Page 7 of 12 while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
6. In support of their contentions, the petitioner/CBI relied upon the following decisions :
(i) Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through legal representatives and others Vs.Union of India and another 1.
(ii) Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Binod Kumar Maheswari and others 2.
Basing on the above decisions it is contended on behalf of the petitioner/CBI that the Courts have to exercise discretion for taking a liberal and justice-oriented approach by granting leeway when the State is the petitioner. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests. Further, the intent of Section 5 of Limitation Act is to help the Courts in providing substantial justice to the parties.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents/accused vehemently opposed the present criminal revision cases mainly contending that there is no illegality in the impugned order since the Court below, after careful scrutiny of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the record, has rightly dismissed the applications filed 1 (2023) 10 Supreme Court Cases 531 2 2024 LawSuit (Cal) 182 Page 8 of 12 by the petitioner/CBI. It is further contended that though the petitioner is the State, it cannot be given leverage by condoning the inordinate delay without there being any cogent and convincing explanation. Sri B.Nalin Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent in Crl.RC No.3221 of 2017 relied upon the following decisions :
(i) Postmaster General and others Vs.Living Media India Limited and another 3.
(ii) Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and others 4.
(iii) Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Nirmal Pradhan 5.
Basing on the above decisions, it is contended that sufficient cause must be given for condonation of delay and that there is no straightjacket formula uniformly applicable to all the cases. It is also contended that condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government Departments on offering usual explanation.
8. This Court perused the entire material available on record, heard the rival contentions advanced on either side and gave utmost consideration to the same. In the case between Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project 6 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as "statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates 3 (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 4 (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 685 5 2013 SCC OnLine Sikk 129 6 (2008) 17 SCC 448 Page 9 of 12 insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be an end to the litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing timelimit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.
9. Learned Special Public Prosecutor relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court arising out of the judgment passed by the Kolkata High Court in Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Binod Kumar Maheswari and others (2 supra). The facts of the case are that CBI filed an appeal under Section 378(4) of Cr.P.C. along with an application for condonation of delay of 1452 days in filing an appeal against the acquittal. But the case on hand is a revision filed seeking to set aside the order of dismissal of an application filed to condone the delay. Hence, the facts of the said case are quite distinguishable to the facts of the cases on hand since the trial Court observed that the explanation offered by the CBI for Page 10 of 12 condoning the inordinate delay was not convincing and it has placed heavy reliance on the administrative lapses.
10. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for the petitioner/CBI relied on the decision of Sheo Raj Singh case (1 supra), which has already been referred in the decision of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Binod Kumar Maheswari and others (2 supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision categorically held that consideration to condone delay could only be made on presentation of a reasonable explanation, and the same could not be done simply because the appellant therein was a public body. Therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a Court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the Courts below. Reliance placed by the petitioner/CBI on the orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not applicable to the case on hand as the said order was passed against the orders passed by the High Court of Delhi arising out of a matter pertaining to Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which is purely in civil in nature. The present case on hand is filed to exercise revisional jurisdiction of this Court, which is quite distinguishable. Moreover, this Court does not see any sufficient cause or explanation offered by the petitioner before the trial Court and it has placed reliance only on the administrative procedural lapses.
Page 11 of 12
11. While deciding the present applications, on the aspect of limitation, it is pertinent to mention the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a case between The State of Madhya Pradesh and others Vs. Bherulal (Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No.9217 of 2020 dated 15.10.2020 in IA No.62372 of 2020) wherein it was held as under :
"6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible."
12. When the facts of the case on hand are tested on the touchstone of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision cited supra, this Court finds nothing convincing in the explanation offered by the CBI requesting to condone the delay by way of filing an affidavit before the trial Court. The grounds urged by the CBI before the Page 12 of 12 trial Court requesting to condone the delay appear to be casual. Assailing the said orders, filing a revision with some other reasoning or grounds before this Court without pointing the apparent errors, if any, on the face of the impugned order is impermissible. The trial Court, after carefully perusing the material before it and the explanations offered by the CBI, has rightly dismissed the application filed for condoning the delay and hence, the interference of this Court is unwarranted in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
13. The revisional jurisdiction of the Court under Section 397 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised only where there is palpable error, non-compliance with the provisions of law and that the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily. When the impugned order is scrutinized under the guidelines stipulated under revisional jurisdiction, this Court finds no error apparent on the part of the trial Court warranting interference of this Court and hence, this Court is of the considered view that the present applications are devoid of merits and are liable to be dismissed.
14. In the result, these criminal revision cases are dismissed. Miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand dismissed.
____________________ E.V.VENUGOPAL, J Dated :09-07-2024 abb