* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO
&
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
+ WRIT PETITION No.3493 of 2010
% 20.03.2023
# M/s. Sem India Fab (P) Ltd.,
H.No.1-8-215/30/C/III Floor,
Park Avenue Colony, P.G.Road,
Secunderabad, rep.by its
Chairman & Managing Director.
.....Petitioner
And
$ Government of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep.by its Principal Secretary,
Industries & Commerce (INF) Department,
Secretariat Building, Saifabad,
Hyderabad and another.
.....Respondents
! Counsel for the petitioner : Sri Duvva Pavan Kumar
Counsel for the Respondents: Sri Harender Pershad,
Special Government Pleader
<Gist :
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
(2006) 2 SCC 1
AIR 1964 SC 72
(2003) 4 SCC 579
(2016) 2 SCC 653
PNRJ & NBKJ
WP No. 3493 OF 2010
2
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
********
WRIT PETITION NO. 3493 of 2010 Date:20.03.2023 Between:
M/s. Sem India Fab (P) Ltd., H.No.1-8-215/30/C/III Floor, Park Avenue Colony, P.G.Road, Secunderabad, rep.by its Chairman & Managing Director.
....Petitioner And Government of Andhra Pradesh, Rep.by its Principal Secretary, Industries & Commerce (INF) Department, Secretariat Building, Saifabad, Hyderabad and another.
....Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 20.03.2023
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO
&
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may : YES
be allowed to see the judgments ? :
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked : YES
to Law Reporters/Journals :
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to : NO
See fair Copy of the Judgment ?
PNRJ & NBKJ
WP No. 3493 OF 2010
3
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO
&
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 3493 of 2010
Date : 20.03.2023
Between:
M/s. Sem India Fab (P) Ltd.,
H.No.1-8-215/30/C/III Floor,
Park Avenue Colony, P.G.Road,
Secunderabad, rep.by its
Chairman & Managing Director.
....Petitioner
And
Government of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep.by its Principal Secretary,
Industries & Commerce (INF) Department,
Secretariat Building, Saifabad,
Hyderabad and another.
....Respondents
The Court made the following:
PNRJ & NBKJ
WP No. 3493 OF 2010
4
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO
&
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION NO.3493 OF 2010
ORDER: ( Per Hon'ble Sri Justice P Naveen Rao) Heard learned counsel Sri Duvva Pavan Kumar for petitioner, learned Special Government Pleader attached to the Office of learned Advocate General for respondents.
2. The Government of Andhra Pradesh when it was a combined State, envisaged establishment of 'Fabcity'. It was a unique concept for the first time ever in the country. For this purpose, it has identified Acs.1200 of land in Srinagar and Raviryala villages. With keen interest to establish semi conductor industry in India, Government has entered into Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 16.2.2006 with M/s.SemIndia, a company incorporated in USA for establishment of assembling, testing, marking and packing (ATMP) semiconductor manufacturing unit and semiconductor plant in 'Fabcity', Hyderabad.
3. G.O.Ms.No.94 Industries & Commerce (INF) Department dated 28.4.2007 was issued for establishment of semi conductor unit by M/s. SemIndia Fab Pvt. Ltd., extending certain incentives/concessions subject to compliance of specified terms and conditions by the company. In terms of the said Government Order, Acs.100 of land was allotted to petitioner-M/s. SemIndia Fab Pvt. Ltd., on lease basis for a period of 66 years at the rate of 1/- per acre per year. The lease deed PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 5 was executed on 25.6.2007 and possession of Acs.100 land was handed over the petitioner. As per the instructions of the Government, the then A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited-second respondent has incorporated 'Fabcity' SPV (India) Pvt. Ltd. As per the understanding, petitioner was required to make investments in the project in three phases. In Phase-I, within 18 months from the date of allotment of land, US $ 75 million was to be invested for ATMP which would have an employment potential of 2000; in Phase II, within 3 years from the date of allotment, petitioner was required to invest US $ 750 Million for setting up a semiconductor chip manufacturing unit with an employment potential of 1000; in Phase III, within 5-7 years from the date of allotment of land, petitioner was required to invest US $ 2.25 billion for advanced semi conductor plant with an employment potential of 5000. MoU also requires, the petitioner to participate with APIIC in the 'Fabcity' SPV which would develop State- of-the-Art-Infrastructure to house Fabs, fab related ecosystem. Petitioner was required to utilize the land for the purpose for which it was allotted only and not for other purposes.
4. Not satisfied with the progress of work, 'Fabcity' SPV (India) Pvt. Ltd., (herein after called 'Fabcity' SPV) on 19.6.2008 issued letter to the petitioner informing the petitioner that in spite of requests made from time to time to expedite the works and to adhere to the time line indicated in the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 12.2.2008 PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 6 and 16.5.2008 in addition to letters issued on 11.4.2008, there was no proper response to implement the project and called upon the petitioner to show cause within 15 days why the allotment of land should not be cancelled for non implementation of the project within the time stipulated. On 23.6.2008 petitioner replied informing 'Fabcity' SPV that the project is being implemented. On 17.11.2008 another letter was issued by 'Fabcity' SPV to petitioner stating that though on 23.6.2008 petitioner informed that the project implementation has started and confirmed that the construction work would be completed by January, 2009 with a request not to cancel allotment of land, but failed to furnish the details of financial closure for implementation of the project as contemplated in the Government order and has not completed construction of the building and again called upon the petitioner to show-cause within 15 days why allotment of the land should not be cancelled. Letter also refers to photographs shown on 10.11.2008 in the Board Meeting, which disclose very limited progress in the work.
5. On 21.3.2009 meeting of the Board of Directors of 'Fabcity' SPV was held to take stock of the situation including matters related to implementation of project by the petitioner. Dr Vinod Kumar Agarwal one of the Directors was also invited to attend the meeting to represent the petitioner company but he did not attend the said Board meeting. On 2.7.2009 'Fabcity' SPV issued another notice pointing out terms and conditions of Government Order, allotment letter and lease deed and PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 7 called upon the petitioner to furnish the valid reasons in writing within 15 days from the date of receipt of copy of the notice as to why allotment of land should not be cancelled for non implementation of the project. Petitioner responded to said notice vide reply dated 18.7.2009.
6. Holding that petitioner miserably failed to implement the project as originally envisaged even though sufficient time and opportunity was afforded, the first respondent issued G.O.Ms.No.9 dated 9.2.2010 canceling the allotment of Acs.78 of land out of Acs.100 land and decided to retain Acs.22 land with the petitioner which was actually occupied by the petitioner at the lease premium of 20.00 lakhs per acre payable to APIIC; fix up lease rentals at 2 % per acre per annum on the land cost on condition that petitioner should implement the project by the end of December, 2010.
7. This Writ Petition is file challenging the said Government Order.
8. According to learned counsel for petitioner, the impugned order is not sustainable in law as there was no opportunity of hearing before taking the decision to cancel the allotment. According to learned counsel, a decision was already taken and post facto notice was issued; once a decision was already taken issuing notice calling for explanation is only an empty formality and entire process is vitiated on that ground. It is further case that petitioner secured credit facilities which fact was intimated to the respondents and respondents were aware of reasons PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 8 for slow progress of work; that decision to cancel the allotment of land is not bona fide and is intended to harass and victimize the petitioner.
9. On account of understanding reached between the petitioner and respondents and assurance given by the respondents there was legitimate expectation in the petitioner that he would be allowed to execute the work. Thus, when respondents sought to deprive him his entitlement to develop the project, minimum that it expected from the respondents was to afford due opportunity to make a presentation of his version.
10. He would further submit that the impugned order is perverse. He would submit that as per MoU, it is bounden duty of the first respondent to continue the incentives and concessions for a period of 15 years, whatever may be the stage of development activity. Further, as per clause-3(i) party should not be made responsible for any failure which would be caused by or attributable to causes beyond the control. Though sincere efforts were made by the petitioner to create infrastructure and establish 'Fabcity', for reasons beyond its control, 'Fabcity' could not be established. However, good progress was made by the time impugned Government Order was issued and the same was not appreciated by the respondents.
11. Learned Special Government Pleader raised preliminary objection on maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that in a writ PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 9 petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner cannot seek to enforce the terms of non statutory contract in relation to a commercial transaction. Further, petitioner has been raising disputed questions of fact even touching upon the interpretation of terms and conditions of the lease deed, which aspects require leading evidence and writ Court cannot go into disputed question of fact. 11.1. Learned Special Government Pleader further submitted that in the facts of this case, doctrine of legitimate expectation has no application. As consistently held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court legitimate expectation is not an enforceable right. The development of 'Fabcity' was based on terms of contract. A party to a contract is bound by the terms. In matters governing contractual relationships principle of legitimate expectation has no role.
11.2. He would further submit that valuable Government land was allotted to petitioner, with a fond hope of establishment of 'Fabcity' in the State, whereas due to negligence of the petitioner the very object is defeated. The petitioner failed to honor the commitments for a long time and in spite of sufficient opportunity afforded no progress was made for more than 3 years. The land belonging to the State was allotted with an avowed object but petitioner did nothing to achieve what was aimed. As petitioner failed to fulfill the terms and conditions of MoU, the cancellation of allotment is in public interest.
PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 10 11.3. He would submit that Government envisaged establishment of semiconductor industry in India to attract huge investments and generation of employment that would result in improving standard of living. The very object of envisaging the project is defeated due to failure of the petitioner in implementation of terms of MoU and not seriously taking up the project. There are more eager entrepreneurs who want to invest and start new ventures which can generate employment. 11.4. According to learned Special Government Pleader, even assuming that petitioner was entitled to enforce terms and conditions of MoU for 15 years period, the period of 15 years is also over by year 2022 and absolutely no progress is made whatsoever in complying with the terms and conditions of MoU. Learned Special Government Pleader filed set of documents to show that even by now there is no progress, except construction of one unfinished shed and photographs clearly show that the land stands as a baron land. He further submitted that the photographs disclose that even after lapse of 12 years, there is no development made even in Acs.22 land retained with the petitioner after canceling allotment of Acs.78 land.
11.5. That the petitioner was given valuable Government land of Ac.100 almost free of cost as petitioner is required to pay only one rupee per acre per year and in addition, subsidies and concessions were provided but petitioner failed to utilize the incentives extended by the PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 11 Government and failed in implementation of project envisaged as a path breaker in the country for development of semiconductors.
12. In reply, learned counsel for petitioner contends that though MoU was for 15 years, because of cancellation of allotment of land to an extent of Acs.78 in the year 2010 resulting in institution of this writ petition, time lapsed in the litigation, therefore, petitioner could not develop even Acs.22 of land retained with the petitioner. He would submit that petitioner could not undertake development of 'Fabcity' as envisaged because of global recession which was not anticipated by the petitioner when MoU was executed. However, he was fair in submitting that there is no development so far and that the petitioner company is inactive.
13. State Government realized that there is lot of scope to produce semiconductors in India and to make Hyderabad as hub of semiconductor related activity in the country. It intended to establish most advanced ecosystem for electronics and semiconductor production and associated infrastructure, logistics and distribution system in India. It has proposed to establish a ''Fabcity''. For this purpose, it has earmarked Acs.1200 of land near International Airport.
14. SemIndia is a company incorporated in the State of Delaware in the United States of America. Having come to know that SemIndia is working with the Government of India and other leading semiconductor PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 12 companies in the world, State Government showed eagerness to involve SemIndia to develop ''Fabcity''. State Government agreed to confer ''Fabcity'' a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) status and also to extend additional special benefits/ concessions. On 16.02.2006, the State Government and SemIndia entered into MoU for establishment of Assembling, Testing, Marking and Packing (ATMP), Semi conductor Manufacturing unit and Semi conductor plant in the ''Fabcity'' and to participate in the development of ''Fabcity'' as an anchor industry. The MOU lists out obligations of SemIndia and State Government and general provisions to give effect to the MoU, areas of cooperation, allotment of land, provision of electricity, water, sewerage etc.
15. State Government issued G.O.Ms.No.94 Industries and Commerce (INF) Department, dated 28.04.2007 to give effect to the terms of MOU. It lists out obligations of SemIndia and the State Government. By this G.O., Government allotted Acs.100 to SemIndia on lease at a nominal cost of 1/- per acre per year for a period of 66 years out of Acs.1200 earmarked for the purpose. The Government also floated special purpose vehicle called M/s. 'Fabcity' SPV (India) Private Limited.
16. On 25.06.2007 lease deed was executed between M/s. 'Fabcity' SPV (India) Private Limited (Lessor) and M/s.SemIndia Fab Private Limited (Lessee). By this lease deed, the Lessor grants and transfers Acs.100 to the lessee on lease for sixty six years on a nominal rent of PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 13 1/- per acre per annum. It clearly mentions that the land belongs to the then APIIC (now TSIIC) and is leased out to Lessee for the purpose of setting up 'Fabcity' SEZ. It also lists out the investment and development schedule divided into three phases.
17. While so, based on the report of the then APIIC and the decisions of the Board of 'Fabcity' SPV (India) Pvt. Ltd., Government issued orders in G.O.Ms.No.9 Industries and Commerce (INF) Department, dated 09.02.2010 canceling G.O.Ms.No.94 dated 28.04.2007 and G.O.Ms.No.231 dated 22.08.2007 and withdrew the incentives/ concessions and other benefits. It has accorded permission to APIIC to take action on the items mentioned in the G.O. They include resumption of Acs.78, to retain Acs.22 at a lease premium of 20 lakhs per acre and to fix lease rentals at 2% per acre per annum on the land cost. The G.O., also orders the SemIndia Fab Pvt. Ltd., to implement the project as envisaged in Acs.22 by December, 2010 positively.
18. The relevant clauses of lease deed are as under:
"Paragraph 1(e):
"If the LESSEE fails to implement the project, the LESSOR shall have the right to resume the un-utilized land".
Paragraphs 3-D, 3-H, and 6:
"3. The LESSEE with intent to bind all persons into whatsoever hands the demised land may come, doth hereby covenant with the LESSOR as follows:
(A) to (C) xxx PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 14 D. To use the Said Land for establishing and operating an ATMP Plant and an advanced semiconductor fabricating unit as permitted by the LESSOR and as specified in the Letter of Approval ("LOA") granted/to be granted by the DC for the AP SEZ. In case of default and consequent cancellation of LOA, this deed may be cancelled by the Lessee/Lessor in respect of such portion of the said Land that has not been utilized by the Lessee.
H. To commence production and/or operations within 12 months or such extended period as agreed to by the LESSOR from the date of completion of construction of the premises. The LESSOR understands that the LESSEE will implement the project in phases. Consequently, the obligations under this clause shall apply in relation to each phase separately.
6. The title and ownership of the said Land shall vest with the Lessor and the buildings/structures constructed on the said Land by the LESSEE shall remain the property of the LESSEE until the expiry of the said term and subsequent renewals, extensions and fresh leases, if any. Upon termination of the Lease and no fresh Lease is executed thereon, the said Land shall revert to the LESSOR."
19. These clauses make it clear that the title and ownership of land vests on the then APIIC (presently, 'TSIIC') and land vested in the petitioner only as a Lessee. The lease deed mandates lessee to implement the project in three phases. The lessee retains control over the structures/buildings during the original/ extended lease period and upon completion of lease or termination of lease the land reverts to Lessor. The land can be resumed by the Lessor if project is not implemented. Failure to comply the terms of MOU and the lease deed can result in cancellation of lease deed to the extent of un-utilized land.
PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 15
20. The MoU was entered with the petitioner with an avowed object of establishing a Semiconductor and Electronic Industry Hub in the State of Telangana that would have potential for large scale employment opportunities and create cluster of supporting industrial units which can add value in terms of employment and increase in per capita income to the citizens. The State Government has extended its long arm in making available premium land of 100 acres for almost free for 66 years, treated the project as SEZ and extended additional benefits in the form of creating infrastructure and incentives. All this was intended with avowed object of achieving over all economic development in the State.
21. The petitioner miserably failed in keeping up his assurances in securing foreign investments and developing the project to commence Semiconductor manufacturing and ancillary units. Though Phase-I was required to be completed within 18 months from date of handing over the land by investing about 310 crores, the petitioner could hardly invest less than 10% and made no progress on ground, even way beyond the scheduled time. By his actions, the very object behind envisaging the project is defeated.
22. From the reading of G.O.Ms.No.9, dated 09.02.2010, it is apparent that the petitioner has not complied with terms and conditions of MoU, lease deed and G.O.Ms.No.94 dated 28.04.2007. In terms of MoU and lease deed, Government exercised its right to cancel PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 16 the lease. Whether Government was justified in canceling the lease, whether terms of lease were not violated by the petitioner are all matters flowing out of agreements arrived at by parties. They cannot be gone into in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
23. Before taking the extreme step of canceling the lease on Acs.78, petitioner was advised to speed up work and was warned to execute the work expeditiously. All these requests and warnings fell in deaf ear. Petitioner continued to drag his feet.
24. It is appropriate to note that though the State ought to have resumed entire 100 acres, it chose to resume only 78 acres leaving 22 acres to the petitioner with fond hope of expecting development in that land. Petitioner was advised to implement the project in the remaining land by December, 2010. This has also not motivated the petitioner. The latest photographs of the site filed by the respondents show that except a small skeleton structure the entire land is barren. In other words, in the last 12 years also no activity was undertaken by the petitioner.
25. Having regard to the very object of entering into MoU, executing lease deed and extending incentives, to create a modern semiconductor complex when petitioner has done nothing, we do not see any error in PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 17 State taking extreme step of resuming 78 acres of land and imposing stringent conditions for utilizing balance 22 acres.
26. In exercise of power of judicial review of administrative action what is required to be considered is whether the decision is made objectively on due consideration of all aspects of an issue, whether the decision is preceded by opportunity of hearing, whether the decision is supported by reasons and whether the decision is arbitrary and shocks the judicial conscience. Legality of an administrative decision can be tested on three broad principles, viz., 'illegality', 'irrationality' and 'procedural impropriety'.
27. In Rameshwar Prasad and others (VI) v. Union of India and another1, Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
"232. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the decision."
27.1. In S.Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab2, Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
"9. Pausing here, we might summarise the position by stating that the Court is not an appellate forum where the correctness of an order of 1 (2006) 2 SCC 1 2 AIR 1964 SC 72 PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 18 Government could be canvassed and, indeed, it has no jurisdiction to substitute its own view as to the necessity or desirability of initiating disciplinary proceedings, for the entirety of the power, jurisdiction and discretion in that regard is vested by law in the Government. The only question which could be considered by the Court is whether the authority vested with the power has paid attention to or taken into account circumstances, events or matters wholly extraneous to the purpose for which the power was vested, or whether the proceedings have been initiated mala fide for satisfying a private or personal grudge of the authority against the officer. If the act is in excess of the power granted or is an abuse or misuse of power, the matter is capable of interference and rectification by the Court. In such an event the fact that the authority concerned denies the charge of mala fides, or asserts the absence of oblique motives or of its having taken into consideration improper or irrelevant matter does not preclude the Court from enquiring into the truth of the allegations made against the authority and affording appropriate reliefs to the party aggrieved by such illegality or abuse of power in the event of the allegations being made out."
27.2. In Indian Railway Construction Co.Ltd., v. Ajay Kumar3, Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
"13. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to the broad area of governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasi-legislative and quasi- judicial nature. .......
The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. ......
14. ..... One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is "illegality", the second "irrationality", and the third "procedural impropriety". ........
27.3. In D.N.Jeevaraj v. State of Karnataka4, Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
"41. This Court has repeatedly held that where discretion is required to be exercised by a statutory authority, it must be permitted to do so. It is not for the courts to take over the discretion available to a statutory authority and render a decision. In the present case, the High Court has virtually taken over the function of BDA by requiring it to take action against Sadananda Gowda and Jeevaraj. Clause 10 of the 3 (2003) 4 SCC 579 4 (2016) 2 SCC 653 PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 19 lease-cum-sale agreement gives discretion to BDA to take action against the lessee in the event of a default in payment of rent or committing breach of the conditions of the lease-cum-sale agreement or the provisions of law. [ In the event of the lessee/purchaser committing default in the payment of rent or committing breach of any conditions of this agreement or the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority (Allotment of Sites) Rules, the Lessor/Vendor may determine the tenancy at any time after giving the Lessee/Purchaser fifteen days notice ending with the month of the tenancy, and take possession of the property. The Lessor/Vendor may also forfeit twelve and a half per cent of the amounts treated as security deposit under clause of these presents.] This will, of course, require a notice being given to the alleged defaulter followed by a hearing and then a decision in the matter. By taking over the functions of BDA in this regard, the High Court has given a complete go-by to the procedural requirements and has mandated a particular course of action to be taken by BDA. It is quite possible that if BDA is allowed to exercise its discretion it may not necessarily direct forfeiture of the lease but that was sought to be pre- empted by the direction given by the High Court which, in our opinion, acted beyond its jurisdiction in this regard.
xxx
43. To this we may add that if a court is of the opinion that a statutory authority cannot take an independent or impartial decision due to some external or internal pressure, it must give its reasons for coming to that conclusion. The reasons given by the court for disabling the statutory authority from taking a decision can always be tested and if the reasons are found to be inadequate, the decision of the court to by- pass the statutory authority can always be set aside. If the reasons are cogent, then in an exceptional case, the court may take a decision without leaving it to the statutory authority to do so. However, we must caution that if the court were to take over the decision taking power of the statutory authority it must only be in exceptional circumstances and not as a routine. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has not given any reason why it virtually took over the decision taking function of the authorities and for this reason alone the mandamus issued by the High Court deserves to be set aside, apart from the merits of the case which we have already adverted to."
28. On going through the orders, documents placed on record and on due consideration of the submissions of learned counsel, we are of the opinion that none of the parameters to undertake judicial review of the impugned decision are attracted to vitiate the decision.
29. The conduct and actions of petitioner impaired in achieving objective of the State to create semiconductor manufacturing and testing hub in the State. A prime land is kept barren for almost 17 PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 20 years. Delay in implementation of such projects will have adverse impact on over all economic development and create unrest in the public, more particularly in the youth. But for allotment of Acs.100.00 of land to petitioner, the State Government could have utilized the land for any other economic activity. Ultimately, public interest suffered due to the attitude of petitioner. Thus, the decision to resume 78 acres of land and imposing stringent conditions for utilizing remaining 22 acres is in public interest.
30. No case is made out for our interference with the decision impugned in the writ petition. Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications if any shall stand closed.
___________________________ P.NAVEEN RAO, J ___________________________ NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J Date: 20.03.2023 Tvk/Kkm PNRJ & NBKJ WP No. 3493 OF 2010 21 HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. NAVEEN RAO & HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA WRIT PETITION No. 3493 of 2010 Date : 20.03.2023 Tvk/KKM