THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.LAXMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE M.G.PRIYADARSINI
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.976 OF 2013
JUDGMENT: (per Hon'ble Sri Justice M.Laxman)
1.
This criminal appeal is filed against the judgment dated 24.10.2013 in Sessions Case No.181 of 2012 on the file of the IV Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) at Siddipet, whereunder the appellant herein/accused No.1 was convicted for the offences under Sections 304B, 302, 498-A and 201 read with 34 of IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 302 of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 498-A of IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 201 of IPC and accused Nos.2 and 3 were acquitted for the said offences.
2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the deceased and accused No.1 got married on 11.05.2011. Accused No.2 is 2 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 the father and accused No.3 is the mother of accused No.1. By the time of marriage, the parents of the deceased agreed to pay a sum of Rs.2,10,000/- towards dowry to accused No.1. Out of the said amount, Rs.1,60,000/- was paid to accused No.1 and the parents of the deceased promised to pay balance amount after one month of marriage. After 15 days of marriage, accused Nos.1 to 3 started harassing the deceased physically and mentally to bring balance dowry of Rs.50,000/-. Upon knowing the same, P.Ws.1 and 2 went to the house of the accused and promised to pay the balance dowry by lifting the chit and requested the accused not to harass the deceased. On 14.06.2011, the accused, the deceased and her parents went to Chepyal Village in an auto to attend the funeral of the relative of the deceased. After completion of the funeral, P.Ws.1 and 2 dropped the deceased and the accused at their village i.e., Thimmakkapally at about 8.30 pm., and they went to their village Pathur. Accused No.1 and the deceased slept in their room and accused Nos.2 and 3 slept in Waranda. Accused No.1 when expressed his desire to have intercourse, the deceased refused for the same. In that regard, there was a petty quarrel between accused No.1 and the deceased. Then, accused No.1 slapped the deceased forcedly over her cheek; as a result, the deceased came into contact with one of the walls and collapsed. 3
ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 Immediately, accused No.1 felt that the deceased died and immediately approached accused Nos.2 and 3 and they also felt that the deceased died. The accused feared that the deceased would inform her parents about the incident, if accidentally she survives, and they decided to kill the deceased by smothering. Accordingly, the accused closed the mouth and nose of the deceased firmly, and after confirming that the deceased died, accused Nos.1 and 2 shifted the dead body to nearby lake while accused No.3 was watching at house. They dumped the body of the deceased in JCB pit existing in the lake situated at on the outskirts of Thimmakkapally Village and caused disappearance of the evidence.
3. On the basis of the said allegations, the FIR was initially issued and subsequently, charge sheet was laid against the accused for the offences under Sections 304B, 302, 498-A and 201 read with 34 of IPC.
4. The trial Court framed charges under Sections 304B, 302, 498-A and 201 read with 34 of IPC against the accused. The accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried.
5. The prosecution, to support its case, examined P.Ws.1 to 12 and got marked Exs.P.1 to P.7. The accused have not produced any evidence and denied the incriminating material. 4
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6. The trial Court, on appreciation of evidence, found that accused No.1 is guilty for all the charges framed against him and benefit of doubt is given to accused Nos.2 and 3 and consequently, acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3. Accordingly, the trial Court convicted and sentenced accused No.1 for the aforesaid charges.
7. Heard both sides.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused No.1 has contended that entire case of the prosecution rests upon the circumstantial evidence and there is no direct witness to the incident. The circumstantial evidence is also not convincingly proved to rule out the innocence of the accused. The trial Court wrongly appreciated the evidence in convicting the accused for the charges framed against him.
9. It is also his contention that though medical evidence shows that it is a homicidal death by smothering, there were no injuries on the body of the deceased. When smothering was done, definitely there must have been some resistance from the deceased and some injuries must have been caused. Absence of such injuries on the body of the deceased, rules out the case of smothering. According to the learned counsel, death is result of drowning, but not homicidal asphyxia.
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10. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has contended that the incident occurred within a short time of marriage i.e., 35 days. On the date of incident, the deceased and accused Nos.1 to 3 were dropped at their house at 8.30 pm., by the parents of the deceased. At 11.00 pm., the parents of the deceased received a phone call about missing of the deceased. Accused No.1 and the deceased were living together and he is the best person to explain how the deceased was missing and the explanation offered by accused No.1 that she went to attend nature call is found to be unbelievable on account of odd time she went missing and the location where the body is found. It is her further contention that the JCB pit in which the body of the deceased was found is 3½ feet and the water in the lake also rules out suicide as well as accidental fall resulting drowning. Further, no woman at such odd time goes alone to such a long distance for attending nature call, as the lake is situated at the outskirts of the village.
11. The learned Public Prosecutor has further contended that all these circumstances rule out that it is not a case of suicide or accidental fall. The medical evidence shows that there was a contusion on the left temporal area, which suggests that the deceased was beaten prior to the incident, and when she became unconscious, she was smothered and later the dead body was 6 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 thrown into the lake. Explanation from accused No.1 with regard to missing of the deceased in such odd time from his company is unbelievable and hence, the trial Court rightly convicted accused No.1.
12. It is the further contention of learned Public Prosecutor that when accused No.1 slapped the deceased, she was hit to the wall and became unconscious. When the deceased was unconscious, if smothering was done manually, there would be no resistance. In such a situation, injuries cannot be expected to be found on the body of the deceased. Absence of such injuries does not give an inference that it was not a case of smothering. She has further contended that floating of lungs in hydrostatic test would rule out that it is a case of wet drowning. This suggests that the deceased was killed and thrown into pit of the lake. It is also contended that presence of injuries and evidence of demand to dowry satisfy the proximity and live link test for the offence under Section 304B of IPC and this was also rightly considered by the trial Court. Hence, conviction requires no interference and sought to dismiss the appeal.
13. The evidence of P.W.8 shows that there was a contusion on the left temporal area of the face. The lungs were subjected to floating test in fresh water and found lungs were floating. Final 7 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 opinion was given that the death of the deceased was due to asphyxia result of smothering. Ex.P.5 is the post-mortem report. The evidence of P.W.7, the witness to the scene of offence panchanama under Ex.P.4, supports the scene of offence prepared by P.W.12. His evidence shows that deepness of the pit was measured and it was found to be 3½ feet only.
14. The above evidence shows that drowning as a result of accidental fall was not possible and it also rules out the suicidal drowning since the deepness of the pit was only 3½ feet. Further, fresh water floating test of lungs shows that they were floating. If it was a real case of wet drowning, the lungs would get wetted and they would not float. This is also an additional circumstance to establish that it was a homicidal smothering. Further, there is a contusion on the left ear temporal area. This also suggests that the deceased was subjected to physical abuse prior to the incident.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused No.1 has contended that in drowning cases also, there is dry drowning and floating test alone is not an indicator to say that the deceased was smothered prior to the body was thrown into water. In support of his above contention, he relied upon a 8 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 decision of the Apex Court in Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu1.
16. Seeing at the scene of offence, it rules out the case of accidental fall or suicidal fall. It may be true that in a drowning case, there may be wet drowning or dry drowning. In the process of drowning, sequence, laryngeal spasm occurs by water entering the upper airways. In most drowning cases, the spasm relaxes and water enters the lungs. This process is known as wet drowning. In 10 to 20 percent of drowning cases, the laryngeal spasm does not relax and no water enters. This is called dry drowning. Most of the cases are wet drowning and only in fragment cases, dry drowning occurs. The scene of offence itself rules out the drowning on account of 3½ feet water pit and it supports the case of homicidal smothering. Therefore, the said decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant does not help the appellant as the facts of the said case and the present case are different.
17. From the above evidence, it can be safely concluded that the death of the deceased was result of homicidal smothering and not result of any accidental or suicidal drowning in the water.
1 (2009) 14 SCC 415 9 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013
18. The evidence of P.W.1 also shows that on the date of accident, he along with his wife went to the village of the accused and pick up accused Nos.1 to 3 and the deceased to attend funeral of their relative at Chepyal Village. After attending the funeral, they dropped the deceased and accused Nos.1 to 3 at their house at 8.30 pm., and they went back to their village. At about 11.00 pm., the parents of the deceased received a phone call that the deceased was missing.
19. The accused did not inform from what time, the deceased was missing and the evidence shows that the deceased was naturally staying with accused No.1. The deceased has not informed her parents about any physical abuse by accused Nos.1 to 3 when they attended funeral at Chepyal Village. This circumstance rules out that the deceased has not suffered any injury on her left temporal area prior to her drop at the house of the accused. This means, the deceased received the said injury after she was dropped at the house of the accused. Accused No.1 did not explain proper reasons for sufferance of injury by the deceased and also her missing. The defence of accused No.1 is that the deceased went outside to attend nature calls, as they were not having any toilets. However, there are no details at what time the deceased went outside. The deceased was new bride and she was not fully acquainted with village area. If 10 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 really she went to attend nature calls, someone must have been accompanied with her which was not done. When the deceased went to attend nature calls in the night hours and did not return, accused No.1 ought to have informed the same to the parents of the deceased immediately, apart from putting efforts to trace the deceased. Accused No.1 did not put any efforts in that regard and he gave information regarding missing of the deceased was given at late night.
20. Learned counsel for the appellant/accused No.1 has contended that the circumstances of accused No.1 and deceased living together alone is not enough to establish the guilt of the accused in the absence of proper explanation. In support of such contention, he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Subramaniam's case (supra), whereunder the Apex Court held as under:
"23. So far as the circumstance that they had been living together is concerned, indisputably, the entirety of the situation should be taken into consideration. Ordinarily when the husband and wife remained within the four walls of a house and a death by homicide takes place it will be for the husband to explain the circumstances in which she might have died. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that although the same may be considered to be a strong circumstance but that by alone in absence of any evidence of violence on the deceased cannot be held to be conclusive. It may be difficult to arrive at a conclusion that the husband and husband alone was responsible therefor."
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21. A reading of the above judgment clearly indicates that the Apex Court found that such a circumstance is not enough in the absence of any evidence of violence on the deceased.
22. In the present case, the scene of offence rules out the case of accidental drowning as well as suicidal drowning. The injury found on the deceased was also not explained by accused No.1. Further, absence of explanation for the injury and silence of accused No.1 after she found missing till 11.00 pm., and the place where dead body was found, all demonstrate that it is accused No.1 who authored and executed the offence. The Court below rightly appreciated the evidence on record and rightly invoked the presumption due to non-explanation of accused No.1. Such findings require no interference.
23. Before dealing with all the ingredients Section 304B of IPC, it is apt to refer to decision of Apex Court in M.Srinivasulu v. State of A.P.2, whereunder it has been held as follows:
"6. Section 304B IPC deals with dowry death which reads as follows:
304B, Dowry Death- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any bums or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death" and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.2
MANU/SC/7890/2007.
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ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 Explanation - For the purpose of this sub-section 'dowry' shall have same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
7. The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demand for dowry. In order to attract application of Section 304B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:
(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance.
(ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage.
(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband.
(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry.
(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.
8. Section 113B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows:
113B: Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation - For the purposes of this section 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
Section 304B IPC, the essential ingredients are as follows:
(i) The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance.
(ii) Such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage.
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(iii) She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband.
(iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry.
(v) Such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death.
8. Section 113B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand. Both Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act were inserted as noted earlier by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Section 113B reads as follows:
113B: Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation - For the purposes of this section 'dowry death' shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
9. The necessity for insertion of the two provisions has been amply analysed by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report dated 10th August, 1988 on 'Dowry Deaths and Law Reform". Keeping in view the impediment in the pre-existing law in securing evidence to prove dowry related deaths, legislature thought it wise to insert a provision relating to presumption of dowry death on proof of certain essentials. It is in this background presumptive Section 113B in the Evidence Act has been inserted. As per the definition of 'dowry death' in Section 304B IPC and the wording in the presumptive Section 113B of the Evidence Act, one of the essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the concerned woman must have been "soon before her death" subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with the demand of dowry". Presumption under Section 113B is a presumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials: (1) The question before the Court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman. (This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence under Section 304B IPC). (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives.
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ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 (3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with any demand for dowry.
(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.
10. A conjoint reading of Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances'. The expression 'soon before' is very relevant where Section 113B of the Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC are pressed into service. Prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by prosecution. 'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression 'soon before' is not defined. A reference to expression 'soon after' used in Section 114 (illustration (a)) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before" is left to be determined by the Courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence."
24. The evidence on record shows that the marriage of deceased with accused No.1 was performed on 11.05.2011 and 15 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 the incident had occurred on 14.06.2011. The evidence also clearly establishes that Rs.2,10,000/- was agreed to be paid by parents of the deceased to accused No.1 towards dowry, out of which Rs.1,60,000/- was paid at the time of marriage and they agreed to balance amount of Rs.50,000/- within one month from the date of marriage. The cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses also demonstrates that Rs.1,60,000/- was returned after the present incident. This corroborates the testimony of the prosecution witnesses particularly P.Ws.1 and 2, with regard to payment of dowry and balance amount which was to be paid. The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 consistently goes to show that 15 days after marriage, the deceased telephoned to P.W.2 stating that the accused No.1 demanded to pay balance amount of dowry to purchase a bike and in fact P.Ws.1 and 2 went to the house of the accused and agreed to pay balance amount within 15 days by lifting a chit and in the meantime, the present incident occurred.
25. The evidence on record also shows that on the date of incident the deceased accompanied her parents along with accused No.1 to 3 to attend funeral at Chepyal Village. There is no evidence that when they travelled together and when the deceased told P.W.1 about the harassment in connection with demand of dowry. The evidence of P.W.1 also shows that the 16 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 demand of balance amount of dowry alone was communicated by deceased to P.W.2 and he did not spoke that accused Nos.1 to 3 harassed for balance amount. He further states that such harassment was informed to him by the deceased. There is some inconsistency in the statements made by the P.Ws.1 and 2 with regard to harassment for non-payment of balance dowry of Rs.50,000/-. If really there was harassment for non-payment of balance dowry, the deceased could have been informed to her parents when they travelled with them along with accused Nos.1 to 3 to Chepyal Village for attending a funeral. However, such harassment was not spoken by the deceased with her parents. This corroborates the statement of P.W.1. This means though there is demand to pay balance dowry, there was no harassment in connection with such balance dowry.
26. To invoke presumption of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the prosecution must rule out possibility of natural and accidental death so as to come to the conclusion that the death was occurred otherwise under normal circumstances. The prosecution shall also prove that soon before death there shall be harassment and cruelty in connection with dowry.
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27. The words 'soon before death' requires importance of proximity test for proving dowry death as well as for drawing presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The use of such words implies that interval between cruelty and death should not be much. There must be existence of a proximate and live links between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death.
28. In the present case, the medical evidence establishes that there was contusion on the left temporal area of deceased, which proves physical abuse on the deceased. There is no evidence that previously or immediately prior to incident there was any instance of harassment or cruelty in connection with demand of additional dowry. The evidence of prosecution does not show any demand of dowry by accused No.1. Though, P.Ws.1 and 2 states about the harassment of accused Nos.1 to 3, the deceased had not spoken about any harassment for dowry when she travelled with them on the date of incident. This corroborates the testimony of P.W.1, who did not speak about the harassment in connection with death.
29. The prosecution failed to prove cruelty and harassment soon before the death and there is no proximate and live link between the alleged harassment and cruelty and concerned 18 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 death. The trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record in this regard. Therefore, the conviction and sentence of accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC is not sustainable.
30. In order to prove the charge under Section 498-A, the prosecution must prove that the husband of a woman subjected such a woman to cruelty. Such a cruelty may be willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of such woman. The harassment of a woman is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or is on account of failure to meet such demand.
31. In the present case, there was demand only, but no evidence of harassment to force the deceased to bring balance dowry or any conduct exist which would likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the deceased. Therefore, the Court below erred in convicting accused No.1 under Section 498-A of IPC and such finding requires to be set aside.
32. The ingredients to attract the conviction under Section 201 of IPC, the prosecution has to prove that the accused knowing 19 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 the commission of offence causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment.
33. In the present case, accused No.1 is the person who knows the commission of offence. In order to escape from the legal punishment, accused No.1 shifted the dead body from his house to lake to create a case of suicide or accidental fall. The circumstances of scene of offence and absence of explanation clearly demonstrate that it is accused No.1 who authored and executed the offence and later shifted the dead body to the outskirts of the village in the late night and thrown the dead body in the pit to escape from the legal punishment. This has been rightly appreciated by the trial Court and rightly convicted the appellant/accused No.1. Hence, the said findings of the trial Court require no interference.
34. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused has contended that even the offences could have been proved, such offence had occurred out of grave and sudden provocation, as such, the offence falls under exceptions to Section 300 of IPC and conviction can only be made under Section 304-II of IPC, but not under Section 302 of IPC.
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35. The contention of the learned Public Prosecutor is that the incident had occurred not on sudden provocation and the death is result of subsequent acts of smothering. If the death occurred as a result of slapping, definitely the offence would have fallen under Section 304-II of IPC instead of Section 302 of IPC. But, the evidence on record shows that after slapping when the deceased became unconscious, the accused smothered and caused the death of the deceased. The said act of the accused is intentional and hence, the conviction cannot be converted under Section 304-II of IPC.
36. The Exception to Section 300 of IPC applies only if death is caused during the time the offender is deprived of the power of self control as a result of grave and sudden provocation. The degree of the loss of power of self-control envisaged is that of a reasonable person having regard to the degree of gravity of the provocation. If the degree and duration of the loss of the power of self-control are not commensurate with the degree of gravity of provocation, the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC, cannot, be availed of by the offender.
37. In the present case, as rightly contended by the learned Public Prosecutor, the death had occurred on account of smothering but not by the injury sustained by the deceased on 21 ML,J & MGP,J Crl.A.No.976_2013 account of slap given by the accused. This Court, in infra paras, found that the death was result of smothering. Therefore, the accused is not entitled to the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of IPC. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/accused is rejected.
38. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed. The judgment dated 24.10.2013 in Sessions Case No.181 of 2012 on the file of the IV Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) at Siddipet, is set aside insofar as it relates to conviction and sentence of the accused for the offences under Sections 304B and 498-A of IPC, as the accused is found not guilty for the said offences and he is acquitted for the same and it is confirmed insofar as it relates to conviction and sentence of the accused for the offences under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC.
_______________ M.LAXMAN, J _____________________________ SMT.M.G.PRIYADARSINI, J Date: 13.04.2023.
TJMR