Telangana High Court
The State Of Andhra Pradesh vs T. Devadatham on 13 October, 2022
Bench: Abhinand Kumar Shavili, Namavarapu Rajeshwar Rao
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM
W.A.No.13 of 2012
and
W.A.No.1244 of 2013
COMMON JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble Sri Justice L.Narasimha
Reddy)
These two writ appeals are filed as between the same
parties. Hence, they are disposed of through a common order.
The sole respondent in the appeals was employed as a
Chainman in the appellants - Organisation, on 08.08.1985. On
completion of five years of service, he was appointed on transfer, or
promoted as Junior Assistant, through order, dated 11.05.1992.
However, a condition was incorporated to the effect that he shall
acquire qualification of intermediate, as prescribed under
G.O.Ms.No.517 General Administration (Ser-B) Department, dated
29.10.1987. According to the respondent, he is not required to pass
intermediate education at all, since he joined the service, on
08.08.1985, and the G.O., does not provide for such contingency.
When he was denied the benefit of increments, he approached this
Court by filing W.P.No.19427 of 1996, with a prayer to direct the
appellant to grant increments. During the pendency of that writ
petition, the appellant passed an order, dated 08.01.2001 reverting
the respondent to the post of Chainman, on the ground that he did
not acquire the intermediate qualification. W.P.No.2645 of 2001 was
filed against the same.
W.P.No.19427 of 1996 was allowed by a learned Single
Judge through order, dated 01.04.2011, taking the view that the
respondent is not under obligation to acquire the intermediate
qualification. Taking the said order into account, another learned
Single Judge allowed W.P.No.2645 of 2001, through order, dated
23.06.2011. Hence, these two writ appeals.
Heard Sri P.Harinath Gupta, learned counsel for the
appellant, and Sri N.Chandra Sekhar Reddy, learned counsel for the
respondent.
It is not in dispute that the respondent was appointed as
Chainman, on 08.08.1985, and his services were regularised in that
post and that he was promoted as Junior Assistant, on 11.05.1992.
A clause was added in the order of promotion as under:
"...He should acquire the Educational qualification
for Junior Assistant post as prescribed in
G.O.Ms.No.517 General Administration (ser-B)
Department, dated 29.10.1987..."
Alleging that the respondent did not acquire the qualification,
as provided for in the order of promotion, the increments were denied
to him. Accordingly, W.P.No.19427 of 1996, was filed. Even while
that was pending, the appellant reverted the respondent and that
resulted in filing of the other writ petition. Both of them were allowed.
The entire controversy revolves around the question as to
whether the respondent was qualified to be promoted as Junior
Assistant, in the year 1991, though he did not possess the
intermediate qualification. A subsidiary question would be as to
whether the imposition of the condition in the order of promotion,
dated 11.05.1992 as to acquisition of qualification, is referable to any
statutory rule. The respondent passed S.S.C., before he was
appointed as Chainman. That incidentally was the qualification for
the post of Junior Assistant, when he was appointed as Chainman.
The Government in General Administration Department revised the
qualification for the post of Junior Assistant to pass any intermediate
examination, through G.O.Ms.No.517, dated 29.10.1987. Even
there, an exception was carved out, in the matter of recruitment by
transfer from lower categories. A proviso was added to the effect
that, in case a Record Assistant, or employee holding other
equivalent post, which is a feeder category to Junior Assistant,
joined the Head of Department, before 15.12.1984, he will be
entitled to be appointed through transfer as Junior Assistant, if he
has passed S.S.C. examination. For other offices, the due date is
stipulated as 29.07.1987.
In the context of appellant, two aspects become relevant. The
first is whether it answers the description of Head of Department or
not, and if so, from when onwards. The second is as to whether the
amendment caused to the Andhra Pradesh Ministerial Service Rules
has been adopted by the appellant. On both the aspects, the
appellant is silent.
Today, a memo, dated 23.09.3013, issued by the Special
Secretary to Government in Municipal Administration Department is
placed before this Court. According to this, a list of agencies, which
are said to be Heads of Departments, under the administrative
control of Municipal Administration Urban Development Department,
is furnished and that included the name of the appellant. From this, it
is difficult to conclude that the appellant has been designated as
Head of Department, for the purpose of the Ministerial Service
Rules. At any rate, the date from which such a status was conferred
upon the appellant, is not indicated. Secondly and more importantly,
the Rules framed by the Government for its service are not per se
applicable to the appellant, which is an independent statutory
authority. To be precise, the appellant was created under the
Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas Development Act and it is supposed
to have its own service rules, governing the conditions of service of
its employees. If for the sake of convenience, it has adopted the
rules framed by the Government, it should be through a specific
resolution. Assuming that the Ministerial Service Rules have been
adopted, there is nothing on record to disclose that a subsequent
amendment has been adopted. The respective learned Judges
have taken these aspects into account and allowed the writ
petitions.
What is more important is that,
(a) no time, as such, was stipulated in the order of
promotion, dated 11.05.1992 for acquiring the
intermediate qualification;
(b) the order of reversion was passed after
W.P.No.19427 of 1996 was allowed, holding that
the appellant is not entitled to insist on intermediate
qualification, vis-à-vis the respondent and
(c) the reversion was effected after 10 years of
unblemished service of the respondent.
Viewed from any angle, we do not find any basis to interfere
with the orders under appeals.
The Writ Appeals are accordingly dismissed. We, however,
direct that, in case the appellant pays the amounts representing the
increments till the date of reversion, within six (6) weeks from today,
they shall not be under obligation to pay difference of salary, from the
date of reversion till today. In default, they shall be under obligation
to pay the difference of salary also for the period during which the
respondent was under reversion. The respondent shall be entitled to
function as Junior Assistant, from today onwards. There shall be no
order as to costs.
The miscellaneous petitions filed in these appeals shall also
stand disposed of.
____________________
L.NARASIMHA REDDY, J.
_____________________ CHALLA KODANDA RAM, J. Date:22.09.2014 GJ