1
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.LAXMAN
I.A.No.1 OF 2022
IN/AND
APPEAL SUIT No.477 of 2016
COMMON JUDGMENT:
1. By this judgment, the interlocutory application which is
filed to adduce additional evidence and the main appeal are
taken up for disposal.
2. This appeal has been directed against the judgment and
decree dated 18.04.2016, in O.S.No.420 of 2007, on the file of
the learned Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District,
L.B.Nagar, Hyderabad, wherein and whereby, the suit filed by the
first respondent herein for declaration and recovery of possession
in respect of the suit schedule property was decreed.
3. Respondent No.1 herein is the plaintiff, the appellant herein is defendant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein is defendant No.2 in the suit. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree in the suit, the present appeal is filed at the instance of defendant No.1. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter are referred to as they are arrayed in the suit.
4. The sum and substance of the case of the plaintiff is that he is the absolute owner and possessor of house plot bearing No.246-C, admeasuring 300 square yards, covered by Survey 2 No.71 of Kondapur Village, Serilingampally Mandal, R.R.District. The pleadings also show that originally survey No.71 is owned and possessed by N.Narsing Rao and 10 others and they have plotted the land owned by them. Out of the said lay out, the owners represented by General Power of Attorney viz., Narayan Rao sold away the suit plot in favour of T.Krishna Veni through sale deed document No.7364/1995, dated 29.03.1995, and delivered possession to the purchaser. The plaintiff has purchased the suit property from said T.Krishana Veni under sale deed document No.8781/1997, dated 22.12.1997. Since then, he was in possession as absolute owner of the suit property. The defendants on the basis of created documents dispossessed the plaintiff and occupied the land. Therefore, the present suit has been filed.
5. The case of the defendants is that they admit the ownership and possession of N.Narsing Rao and ten others and they also claimed their ownership through the said owners. According to them, one M.V.Chalam, GPA holder of N.Narsing Rao and ten others, has sold out suit property to Muneer Begum under an agreement of sale dated 28.10.1983 and the said agreement was validated on 29.05.2006, in file No.4887/AR/2006 in the office of District Registrar, Ranga Reddy District. Subsequently, Muneer Begum sold the suit 3 property to Zeeshan Ali Khan (defendant No.2) under registered sale deed document No.11984/2006, dated 01.06.2006. Defendant No.1, in turn, purchased the suit property under agreement of sale-cum-GPA document No.1180/2007, dated 18.01.2007 from defendant No.2. After purchase, defendant No.1 constructed compound wall and he has been in physical possession of such property. Defendant No.1 has denied the claim of the plaintiff that he illegally occupied the suit property and prayed to dismiss the suit.
6. On the basis of the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the followed issues:
"(i) Whether the plaintiff is lawful owner of the plaint schedule plot and he was dispossessed there from by the defendants on 15.05.2006?
(ii) Whether the registered sale deed dated 01.06.2006 in document No.11987/2006 executed by the defendant No.2 in favour of defendant No.1 in respect of suit land is binding on the plaintiff?
(iii) Whether the defendant No.2 was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and she delivered the same to the first defendant under the sale deed dated 01.06.2006?
(iv) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of his title to the suit schedule property and recovery of vacant possession after dismantling the compound wall to it?
(v) To what relief?
7. The plaintiff, to support his case, examined P.Ws.1 and 2 and relied upon Exs.A-1 to A-4. The defendants, to support their case, examined D.W.1 and relied upon Exs.B-1 to B-14. 4
8. The trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence on record found that the plaintiff has made out a case for declaration and consequently the suit was decreed declaring the plaintiff as the owner of the suit property and ordered for eviction of the defendants and also to demolish the structures erected by the defendants. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal has been preferred by defendant No.1.
9. Defendant No.1 has filed I.A.No.1 of 2022 to permit him to adduce additional documents i.e., (i).G.O.Ms.No.747, Renenue (UC.I) Department, dated 18.06.2008 containing conditions for regularization for unauthorized occupation; (ii) Notice and order of Competent Authority under Section 10(5) of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regularization) Act, 1976; (iii) Letter of Competent Authority addressed to the Special Public Prosecutor, ULC; (iv) Application of defendant No.2 for regularization of plot No.246-C, along with property tax demand notice of GHMC and electricity bills, annexures, etc. Other documents, which were filed, are already marked as exhibits. Therefore, consideration of such documents is unnecessary.
10. Heard the learned counsel for both sides and perused the material placed on record.
5
11. In the light of above submissions, the points emerge for consideration in this appeal are as follows:
"(1) Whether the plaintiff is made out his title to the suit lands? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession and mandatory injunction for removal of the structures? (3) Whether the jurisdiction of Civil Court is ousted in the light of the case set up by the plaintiff under the Telangana Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act 1982?"
Point No.3:
12. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.1 is that the pleadings of the plaint clearly demonstrate that there is an allegation of act of land grabbing. When such an allegation is there, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted and such a dispute can only be adjudicated by the Special Court or Tribunal constituted under the Telangana Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 [for short, 'Act']. According to him, the judgment passed by the trial Court suffers from nullity for the reason that such a judgment was passed by the Court which inherently lacks jurisdiction. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for defendant No.1 has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Konda Lakshmana Bapuji Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh1, Jagmittar Sain Bhagat Vs. Director, Health Services, 1 AIR 2002 SC 1012 6 Haryana2, and Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Sathaiah3.
13. The learned counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff has contended that the suit was filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession. Using of words in the pleadings of the plaint to the effect that the defendants grabbed the land does not indicative to decide that the cause of action pleaded in the plaint fall under the Act. The entire pleadings have to be read to see whether the pleadings made by the plaintiff constitute a cause of action covering the Act.
14. It is also his contention that the issue of jurisdiction is a mixed question of fact and law, and based on such pleadings, no such bar is created. In fact, such an issue is waived off and both the parties are subjected to trial Court jurisdiction and no issue was framed in this regard by the trial Court. Even in the grounds of appeal, no such ground is framed. For the first time, such an issue was raised in the present appeal and such adjudication depends upon the evidence let in by the parties. According to him, the evidence and pleadings if together read, it is not a case of land grabbing as is intended under the Act so as to oust the jurisdiction of the trial Court. In support of his 2 (2012) 10 SCC 136 3 1993 (2) ALT 252 (S.B) 7 contentions, he relied upon the Full Bench decision of the then High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Mohd. Siddiq Ali Khan Vs. Shassun Finance Limited, Chennai4 and a decision of the Apex Court in Hira Lal Patni Vs. Sri Kali Nath5.
15. In the light of the said contentions, it is apt to refer to paragraph Nos.17 and 18 in Konda Lakahmana Bapuji's Case (supra) and they read as under:
"17. It is pertinent to note that mere allegation of an act of land grabbing is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Special Court. In both Section 7(1) and Section 8(1) of the Act the phrase 'any alleged act of land grabbing' is employed and not 'act of land grabbing'. It appears to us that it is designedly done by the legislature to obviate the difficulty of duplication of trial once in the courts under the Act and over again in the ordinary Civil Court. The purpose of the Act is to identify cases involving allegation of land grabbing for speedy enquiry and trial. The courts under the Act are nonetheless Civil Courts which follow Code of Civil Procedure and are competent to grant the same reliefs which can be obtained from ordinary Civil Court. For the purpose of taking cognizance of the case the Special Court is required to consider the location or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required and to give an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner (sub-section (1-A). It is plain that sub-section (2) opens with a non obstante clause and mandates that notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure, or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts, Act, 1972, any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of question of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land alleged to have been grabbed under the Act, shall be triable only in a Special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed is situated and the decision of the Special Court shall be final. Sub-Section (2B) specifically provides that notwithstanding anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 4 2005 (2) ALD 675 (FB) 5 (1962) 2 SCR 747 8 1973, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to try all offences punishable under this Act. It is left to the Special Court to determine the order in which the civil and criminal liability against a land grabber be initiated. Sub-Section (6) provides that every findings of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of the land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land alleged to have been grabbed, shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land. It contains three provisos but they are not relevant for the present discussion. Sub-Section (8) brings about automatic transfer of any case pending before any Court or authority immediately before the constitution of a Special Court, as would have been within the jurisdiction of the Special Court if the cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based, has arisen after the constitution of the Special Court. The provisions of sub-Section (2) of Section 8 which commences with a non obstante clause confer jurisdiction on the Special Court and Section 15 of the Act directs that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any order law for the time being in force or custom, usage or agreement or decree or order of a Court or any other tribunal or authority. A combined reading of these provisions leads to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under the Civil Courts Act is ousted and the Act which is special law will prevail and as such the Special Court will have jurisdiction in respect of the matters dealt with thereunder. [See: Sanwarmal Kejriwal vs. Vishwa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. &Ors. [1990 (2) SCC 288].
18. Section 9 provides, inter alia, that except as expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court and for purposes of the said Code, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session and shall have all the powers of Court of Session."
16. A reading of the above decision, it is clear that when the cause of action is falling under the Act, the jurisdiction of the 9 civil and criminal Courts is taken away and the Special Court or Special Tribunal constituted under the Act has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the civil and criminal liability of the persons concerned. The civil and criminal Courts cannot take such a cause of action within its purview and decide the same.
17. Now the question is whether the pleadings of the plaint prima facie establish the cause of action falls under the purview of the Act?
18. The plaint pleadings show that the defendants, having no title over the suit property, grabbed on 15.05.2006 by committing forgery and creating a false document to deprive the plaintiff's claim over the suit property. Further, such land grabbers got the support of unsocial elements and such acts were complained to the police. After encroachment over the suit property, with malafide intention, the defendants illegally constructed compound wall without obtaining permission and also erected a gate.
19. The case of the defendants show that they denied the Act of land grabbing and they have set up their own case that the vendor of defendant No.2 i.e., Muneer Begam had purchased the suit property under a notarized agreement of sale dated 28.10.1983 from the original owner through his General Power of 10 Attorney holder M.V.Chalam. The said unregistered agreement of sale was validated on 29.05.2006 and Muneer Begam sold the suit property to defendant No.2 under a registered sale deed document No.11987/2006. Defendant No.2, in turn, sold the same to defendant No.1 under sale document No.1180/2007, dated 18.01.2007. In the light of the above pleadings and the defence of the defendants, this Court has to see whether the pleadings make out a case to fall under the purview of the Act or within the jurisdiction of the civil Court.
20. The object of the Land Grabbing Act is to prevent organized attempts on the part of certain lawless persons either operating individually and in groups, to grab, either by force or by deceit or otherwise, lands belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf or any other private persons. Such persons are designated as "land grabbers". The other object is to prevent indulgence in large scale and unprecedented and fraudulent sales of lands belonging to the above persons. One more reason is that on account of such unlawful activities of land grabbers, the public order has been adversely affected. For achieving such objects, the Act was enacted and special Courts and special Tribunals were established under the Act for the purpose of speedy enquiry on the alleged act of land grabbing, and trial of cases in respect 11 of the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed.
21. A reading of the entire provisions of the Act, it is clear that the Act is intended to achieve the objects of creating one forum for trial of both the civil and criminal liabilities of land grabbers. The land grabbing was made as an offence punishable with some imprisonment. The special Courts or special Tribunals constituted under the Act are empowered to adjudicate the civil and criminal liabilities. The jurisdiction of civil and criminal Courts in this regard is taken away and vested with the special Courts or special Tribunals constituted under Act. The special Courts and special Tribunals are empowered to adjudicate the ownership and title and lawful possession of the land grabbed apart from adjudicating the criminal liability.
22. The predominant object of the Act is to curb the organized attempts and large scale indulgence in the act of grabbing of the lands of the Government, institutions and private persons. The predominant object is to punish the land grabbers. While achieving the predominant object, the special Courts and special Tribunals were empowered to adjudicate the ownership, title and lawful possession of the land grabbed. There is no provision under the Act expressly barring the civil Court's jurisdiction. When the cause of action falls under the Act by implication, the 12 special Courts and special Tribunals were given all powers that of a civil Court to adjudicate upon the ownership, title and lawful possession of the land grabbed and such orders were given finality.
23. If the facts pleaded in the plaint make out a prima facie case of act of land grabbing, as is defined under the Act, the suit is barred from the jurisdiction of the civil Court. The only remedy is to file case before the special Court or special Tribunal. There are occasions, where the pleadings are vague and there is a counter-claim from the defendants about bar of civil Court's jurisdiction. Then such a claim has to be adjudicated based on the evidence on record for the reason that the jurisdiction is a mixed question of fact and law. If, from the evidence, it is made out that the case set up by the plaintiff falls under the purview what is intend under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted. However, mere use of words "land grabbing" itself is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that the claim of the plaintiff falls under the Act.
24. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.1 in Konda Lakahmana Bapuji's Case (supra), whereunder the Apex Court held as follows:
13"34. The various meanings, noted above, disclose that the term "grab" has a broad meaning - to take unauthorisedly, greedily or unfairly - and a narrow meaning of snatching forcibly or violently or by unscrupulous means. Having regard to the object of the Act and the various provisions employing that term we are of the view that the term "grab" is used in the Act in both its narrow as well as broad meanings. Thus understood the ingredients of the expression "land grabbing" would comprise of
(i) the factum of an activity of taking possession of any land forcibly, violently, unscrupulously, unfairly or greedily without any lawful entitlement and (ii) the mens rea/intention - "with the intention of/ with a view to" (a) illegally taking possession of such lands or (b) enter into or create illegal tenancies, lease and licences agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands; or (c) to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire; or (d) to give such lands to any person on (i) rental or (ii) lease and licence basis for construction, or (iii) use and occupation of unauthorised structures.
35. A combined reading of clauses (d) and (e) would suggest that to bring a person within the meaning of the expression "land grabber" it must be shown that: (i) (a) he has taken unauthorisedly, unfairly, greedily, snatched forcibly, violently or unscrupulously any land belonging to government or a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person; (b) without any lawful entitlement; and (c) with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter or create illegal tenancies or lease and licences agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands or to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of unauthorised structures; or (ii) he has given financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon; or (iii) he is collecting or attempting to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimation; or (iv) he is abetting the doing of any of the above- mentioned acts; or (v) that he is the successor-in-interest of any such persons."
25. From the above decisions, it is clear that to constitute act of land grabbing, the pleadings must make out a factum of activity of taking possession of any land forcibly, violently, unscrupulously, unfairly or greedily without any lawful entitlement and mens rea/intension i.e., with an intension 14 of/with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands or enter into or create illegal tenancies, lease and licences agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands or to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or to give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation of unauthorised structures.
26. It is also relevant to refer to the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff in Mohd. Siddiq Ali Khan's case (supra), wherein the Full Court of the then High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as follows:
"106. That unless the allegations made in the application satisfy and attract the ingredients of "land grabber" and "land grabbing" as provided for under Section 2 (d) and (e) of the Act, mere repetition of words "land grabbing" would not be enough for taking cognizance of a case, unless that statement or allegations satisfies both the ingredients - the factum as well as the intention. As has been held in Shalivahana Builders' case (supra), that an act of land grabbing involves "taking of any land belonging to Government, etc., or any other private person unauthorisedly, unfairly, greedily, either forcibly, violently, unscrupulously or otherwise but without any lawful entitlement. Taking possession of the land without any lawful entitlement thereto is the sine qua non to hold a person to be a land grabber. It may be noted, to make out a case that a person is a land grabber the applicant must aver and prove both the ingredients - the factum as well as the intention. Unless a person unauthorisedly and without any lawful entitlement thereto enters or intrudes into a land forcibly or otherwise, he cannot be held to be a land grabber. The emphasis is on taking possession without any lawful entitlement."
107. In P. Nanda Kumar v. K. Eswara Rao, 1999 (6) ALT 493 (D.B.), a Division Bench of this Court upheld the order of the Special Court refusing to take cognizance of a case and rejected the application at the threshold on the ground that on the allegations made in the application that the lessee who was lawfully inducted into the possession of the property cannot be 15 characterised as "land gabber" on his continuing in possession after termination of the lease because the initial entry was lawful. It is further observed:
"....... we have to see the status of person at the time of initial entry in the land. If a person enters into the land with the intention of grabbing it, which belongs to others, then he has to be styled as 'land grabber'. In the present case, the initial entry in the land by the unofficial respondents herein was legal, as there was a lease between them."
27. The decision of Full Bench shows that mere use of words "land grabbing" is not sufficient enough to take cognizance under the Act. The factum as well as intention has to be pleaded. The Full Bench also took note of the ratio laid down by a Division Bench of the then High Court of Andhra Pradesh in P.Nanda Kumar v. K. Eswara Rao6, to the effect that to decide the status of a person as land grabber, the Court is required to see the status of such a person at the time of initial entry. If such an initial entry into the land is with an intention of grabbing of land belonging to others, it is termed as "land grabbing".
28. The object and purport of the Act is to maintain the public order by preventing organized and large scale acts of land grabbing. Such acts are made punishable apart from civil liability. The predominant object is to punish such person to maintain the public order and the other object is to decide the ownership, title and lawful possession to achieve further ends of predominant object of the enactment. Presence of mens 6 1999 (6) ALT 493 (D.B) 16 rea/intension must be clearly established apart from act of taking possession. If taking possession is with criminal intension, such a criminal intention would be manifested from the acts of forcible, violent, unscrupulous, unfair, greed and without any lawful entitlement.
29. A reading of the entire plaint, it cannot be said that such pleadings are clear. In fact, the pleadings suffer with vagueness, even though the words "land grabbing, forgery, creation of documents and illegal constructions" are used.
30. As noted by the Full Bench, it is the initial entry, which is the determining factor. There is no pleading in the plaint to show that initial entry of the defendants was actuated with criminal intention to grab the land. Subsequent acts may show a colour of land grabbing, which is not essential, but may be one of the factors. If the pleadings are not clear indicating the cause of action falling under the purview of the Act, then such issue of jurisdiction has to be tried as one of the issues.
31. In the impugned judgment, no issue was framed and no party raised any objection for not framing such an issue. Further, the defendants' pleadings and evidence show that they have set up their possession basing on an unregistered agreement, which was executed in the year 1983. Both the 17 parties are claiming their ownership from the same owners, but General Power of Attorneys are different i.e., one document is registered one and another GPA is unregistered one. When such are the pleadings and evidence on record, even if the issue was there touching the jurisdiction of the civil Court, it can be held that there is no cause of action falling under the Act. Such pleadings and evidence make out that cause of action is not falling under the Act.
32. Incidentally, the suit is tried by the learned Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, who is also designated as Special Tribunal under Act. Further fact is that the Act was repealed by G.O.Ms.No.113, Revenue (Land Matters) Department, dated 01.06.2016. By virtue of repealment of the Act, all the cases of post-cognizance pending before the special Courts and special Tribunals were transferred to the Court of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad or learned Principal District Judges of the respective District Courts; however, the said cases shall be tried and disposed of as LGOP, in terms of the Act.
33. Section 10 of the Act deals with burden of proof. The ingredients of the said section indicate that in any proceedings under this Act, a land is alleged to have been grabbed, and such land is prima facie proved to be the land owned by the 18 Government or by a private person. The special Courts and special Tribunals shall presume that the person who is alleged to have grabbed the land as "land grabber" and the burden is placed on the alleged land grabber, who shall prove that he has not grabbed the land. Whereas, in the civil Court, the burden of proof would be on the person who institutes the suit. The adjudication under the Act is advantageous to the party who approaches the Tribunal alleging land grabbing and it is disadvantageous to the person who is alleged to be a land grabber. No prudent plaintiff chooses the forum (civil Court) under the civil laws which is disadvantageous to him instead of choosing the forum (special Court or Tribunal) which is advantageous to him under the Act. In fact, it is a disadvantage to the defendants, if the plaintiff opted to avail the remedy under the Act.
34. Even assuming that the case set up by the parties fall under the Act, rejection of suit at this fag end of time i.e., nearly two decades, and driving the parties to the same forum but in different capacity, is a futile exercise in the light of repealment of the Act. Seeing from any angle, I am of the view that the cause of action mentioned in the suit does not fall under the provisions of the Act and therefore, civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial Court has rightly entertained the suit. Hence, 19 the contention of defendant No.1 in this regard is rejected. Accordingly, this point is decided.
Points Nos.1 and 2:
35. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.1 is that the trial Court has not considered the regularization of title of the defendants before decreeing the suit. Accordingly to him, the original land owners have filed declaration under the ULC Act and they were declared as excess land owners and portion of the lands were taken in pursuance of the ceiling proceedings. Subsequently, during the pendency of the suit proceedings, defendants' possession was regularized by the ULC authorities by collecting the consideration. There is evidence on record to show that such the suit plot was regularized. Therefore, he contended that when the plaintiff instituted the suit, he had no title since his owners were found to be excess landholders. According to him, the land on which the plots were made out including the suit property, was already vested with the Government. The Government has regularized it in favour of the defendants by rejecting the claim of the plaintiff. Therefore, he contended that this aspect was not considered by the trial Court in upholding the title of the plaintiff.
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36. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1/plaintiff has contended that the plaintiff purchased the suit property under a registered sale deed and the source of title is also based on the registered sale deed from the original owners. It is also his contention that the defendants in their written statement stated that the plaintiff's original owners and defendants' original owners are one and the same. This means, there is no dispute with regard to the source of ownership. The only dispute is whether the plaintiff acquired title on the basis of registered sale deed or the defendants got title on the basis of impounded agreement of sale, which is the basic document for the defendants to set up their title. According to him, the basic document of the defendants is only the agreement which is not a genuine one. If it is a genuine document, such a person cannot claim title under the said document. In fact, agreement was not proved by the defendants by examining parties/witnesses to the document. Therefore, their case must fail.
37. It is also his contention that no evidence was placed to show that the original owners were declared to be excess landholders and such lands were vested with the Government by virtue of the finality of proceedings. It is his further contention that the urban land ceiling proceedings were challenged before this Court after repealment of the Act and this Court allowed the 21 writ petitions setting aside the declaration holding that the possession of the excess land declared was not taken by the Government by the date of repealment of the Act and they were exempted from the purview of the ULC Act.
38. Adverting to the order in writ petitions, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.1 contended that the orders in those writ petitions were challenged in the writ appeals and the same are pending. He further contended that it is an admitted fact that the impugned judgment is not suspended in the present appeal and it is in operation. To cover up the omissions with regard to the evidence to demonstrate filing of the declaration and vesting of such lands with the Government, the appellant/defendant No.1 filed an interlocutory application i.e., I.A.No.1 of 2022 to permit him to adduce the additional evidence only to demonstrate filing of declaration and issuance of notice under Section 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act. There is no evidence to show that the possession of the land was taken by the Government in pursuance of the declaration and vesting of the land in terms of the provisions of the Act, so as to have some relevancy in the adjudication process.
39. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.1 relied upon the decision of the Apex Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar 22 Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand7 to contend that where the additional evidence sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative, the additional evidence can be adduced.
40. In the present case, there is no pleading from the defendants that there are declarations, the original owners commonly pleaded by them, which declared to be excess land holders and the land is vested with the Government. The possession of the land was taken over by the Government in pursuance of the declaration declaring them as excess landholders. Such pleadings are essential, but the same are lacking in the present case. The case set up by the defendants is that their possession was regularized basing on the subsequent events and regularization was obtained under G.O.Ms.No.747, Revenue (Land Matters) Department, dated 01.06.2016.
41. In this regard, a few of the requirements which the Government Order (G.O) contemplated for making an application for regularization are relevant and they are as follows: "Now, therefore, the Government, while keeping in view the provisions of Section 3(1)(a) of the Urban Land (Celling & 7 2022 (7)_ SCC 247 23 Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 providing that the repeal of the principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section10, possession of which has been taken over by the Government or any authorized person or the competent authority, etc., and also in view of several representations received from the public who have not utilized the benefit of the orders issued in G.Os. first read above, and after careful consideration of the issue have decided to re-issue the scheme for allotment of excess lands to the third parties in occupation/land owners and accordingly, issue the following guidelines for allotment of excess lands which were vested with Government and possession of which has been taken over by the Government under the provisions of principal Act 1976 to the land owners/declarants/third parties in occupation; subject to the following conditions:
(a).The allotment shall be considered where the excess land already vested with the Government U/s 10(3) and possession of which has been taken over by the Government;
(b).These orders shall not apply to the cases where allotment of land has already been made by the Government prior to these orders and decided to be retained by the Government for public purpose.
(c).The allotment shall be subject to withdrawal of all litigations filed either by the occupant of excess land, or the excess land holders, or any other interested person and pending, other than those covered under the Repeal Act relating to the excess land as on the date of this G.O.
(d).The allotment shall be subject to payment of amount to Government at the rates indicated separately for each agglomeration in Schedule-I to this order.
(e).Allotment under these orders shall be confined to:
(i).Excess land in the occupation of third parties, (other than the excess land holder or his successors) where such occupation is evidence by a registered document of purchase from the excess land holder or person claiming through him/her regardless of the fact of such land being covered by a structure or not."
42. A reading of the above Government Order, it is clear that excess land in the occupation of third parties must be based on the registered document of purchase from the excess landholder 24 or person claiming through him/her regardless of fact of such a land being covered by a structure or not.
43. In the present case, the defendants' basic document (source document) is not a registered one, but it is an unregistered agreement of sale. After impounding such an agreement, the sale deeds were created. On the contrary, the plaintiff obtained the registered sale deed from the excess landholders. In fact, the plaintiff fulfilled the requirement of regularization, if any.
44. The defendants placed memos issued by the ULC Authorities to show that their claim was considered and the claim of the plaintiff was rejected. The plaintiff denied the claim that he has made any application for regularization. The memos produced under Exs.B-5 and B-6 are not having official seal. Further, the memo of rejection, which bears the original signature, was addressed to the plaintiff. It is not understandable and unexplained how such an original memo went into the hands of the defendants when it was addressed to the plaintiff. Further, such original does not bear the correct addressed of the plaintiff. In the said circumstances, the trial Court has not considered such subsequent events. 25
45. The additional documents sought to be introduced are
(i).G.O.Ms.No.747, Revenue (UC.I) Department, dated 18.06.2008, (ii) Notice and order of Competent Authority under Section 10(5) of the Act, (iii) Letter of Competent Authority addressed to the Special Public Prosecutor, ULC, (iv) Application of defendant No.2 for regularization, along with property tax demand notice of GHMC and electricity bills, annexures, etc. Other documents, which were filed, are already marked as exhibits. The said documents have no bearing in the light of the discussions made by me hereinabove. Therefore, I am not inclined to allow I.A.No.1 of 2022, as no purpose would be served in allowing the said IA. Therefore, I.A.No.1 of 2022 is liable to be dismissed.
46. From the evidence on record, the plaintiff has made out that he has title to the suit property on the basis of registered sale deeds and the trial Court has rightly appreciated such evidence and rightly declared that the plaintiff is the owner and rightly ordered for recovery of possession. Such findings require no interference.
47. In the result, the appeal and I.A.No.1 of 2022 are dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree dated 18.04.2016 in O.S.No.420 of 2007 on the file of the learned Principal District Judge, Ranga Reddy District, L.B.Nagar, 26 Hyderabad. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.
______________________ JUSTICE M.LAXMAN Date: 28.11.2022 TJMR