THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.BHASKAR REDDY
WRIT APPEAL No. 375 of 2012
JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon'ble Sri Justice C.V.Bhaskar Reddy)
Heard Ms. P. Bhavana Rao, learned Government Pleader for
Land Acquisition appearing for the appellants and Mr. K. Sunil,
learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 5.
2. This writ appeal, under Clause 15 of Letters Patent, is directed against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.22165 of 2006 dated 13.06.2011 in allowing the writ petition filed seeking to quash the notification issued in G.O.Ms.No.721 dated 19.06.2006 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (briefly "the Act", hereinafter) and published in the A.P. Gazette dated 06.07.2006 and the declaration made in Government Memo No.40870/LA/A2/2005-1 dated 19.06.2006 under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act published in the A.P.Gazette dated 07.07.2006 to an extent of Ac.1.31 guntas in Survey No.149/4 of Jillelaguda Village, Saroornagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.
3. Respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 in the writ petition are the appellants herein and respondent Nos.1 to 5 herein are the writ petitioners. For 2 the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as arrayed in the writ petition.
4. The brief facts leading to filing of this appeal, as summed up in the writ petition, are stated as under:
The petitioners claim to be the owners of land admeasuring Ac.11.21 guntas in Survey No.149 of Jillelaguda Village, Saroornagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The respondents issued notification dated 27.11.1991 published in A.P.Gazette dated 05.12.1991 acquiring an extent of Ac.7.16 guntas for Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratories (DMRL) purpose and an extent of Ac.1.17 guntas was acquired by Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA) for laying inner ring road and compensation was also paid to the land owners. The balance extent of land available in Survey No.149 i.e., Ac.1.31 guntas is now proposed to be acquired under the impugned notification for the same purpose of DMRL. 4.1. It is the case of the petitioners that their land was subjected to repeated acquisitions causing immense loss to them and by the impugned notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, further extent of Ac.1.31 guntas of land was proposed to be acquired. While issuing the notification, the respondents dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, by invoking urgency clause contained in Section 17(4) of the Act. The main contention raised in the related 3 writ petition was that taking their property "for defence purpose, 'DMRL' " cannot be justified, as the said notification sought to deprive the petitioners of their lands thus violating the fundamental rights, as such prayed for allowing the writ petition.
5. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 (appellants herein) filed a counter affidavit in the writ petition stating that Survey No.149 of Jillelaguda Village is consisting of a total extent of Ac.11.21 guntas and out of the same, an extent of Ac.1.17 guntas was acquired by the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA) for the purpose of laying inner ring road vide proceedings No.LA/268/82 dated 22.09.1986, an extent of Ac.7.16 guntas was acquired earlier for DMRL vide proceedings No.K/2136/1990 dated 19.05.1994 and an extent of Ac.0.36 guntas is covered by passage leading to the graveyard existing in Survey No.150. The balance extent of Ac.1.31 guntas is proposed for acquisition by issuing notification dated 19.06.2006 under Section 4(1) of the Act published in the A.P.Gazette dated 06.07.2006. The Special Deputy Collector also paid the rentals for the subject land under the RAIP. It is further stated that the DMRL is covered all over the lands except the subject piece of land and there is a threat to the security of DMRL. It is also contended that the impugned notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act were approved by the Government and published in the A.P. Gazette dated 06.07.2006 and 07.07.2006 and the same 4 were also published in the local newspapers as well as in the offices of the local jurisdiction and were also served to all interested persons. Since the requisition department requested for invoking urgency clause, the Government has invoked the powers under urgency clause. Further it is stated that the impugned notification is not vague, since they followed the procedure contemplated under the Act and the acquisition will be put to use by DMRL, as such prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.
6. The learned Single Judge, after considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and by placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in Gajjela Narasimha Reddy and others vs. Collector, Ranga Reddy District1 and D.Ramadevi and others vs. District Collector, West Godavari District, Eluru and others2, held that the impugned notification issued by the respondents for acquiring lands of the petitioners for defence purpose 'DMRL' is too vague, which does not disclose the precise purpose for which the land is needed, and as such quashed the impugned notification as well as the declaration issued for acquiring the subject land of the petitioners. Aggrieved by the orders of the learned Single Judge, respondent Nos.1 to 3 in the writ petition filed the present appeal. 1 2008(5) ALT 233 2 AIR 2009 AP 15 5
7. The main ground urged by the appellants (respondent Nos.1 to 3 in the writ petition) in the grounds of appeal, is that the draft notification was published under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquiring the land "for public purpose i.e., for defence purpose DMRL" and the same is not vague. Further the appellants raised a ground stating that already major extent of land was acquired for the very same public purpose i.e., DMRL and the small bit of land i.e., Ac.1.31 guntas situated in the middle of the land already acquired is very much necessary, since the DMRL is expanding its mission to develop the advance materials and innovative process technologies for the research development activities, with an object to be a centre of excellence for providing total material solutions for defence system. It is further contended that the learned Single Judge, without taking into consideration of the above facts, by merely placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in Gajjela Narasimha Reddy's case (supra) and D.Ramadevi's case (supra), which have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case, has erroneously allowed the writ petition, as such they prayed to set aside the orders of the learned Single Judge and declare the impugned notification as a valid one.
8. Respondent No.6 in the writ appeal, in whose favour the land was acquired, filed a counter affidavit stating that during the period 1978-79, DMRL acquired Ac.99.23 guntas of land in Karmanghat and Jillelaguda Village, which includes the land to an extent of Ac.9.36 6 guntas in Survey No.149. As there existed a graveyard in Survey No.150 of Jillelaguda Village in the midst of Survey No.149, the entire area of Survey No.150, the grave yard and part of the private land in Survey No.149 up to the road were left out of the earlier acquisition. Subsequently, the road was widened into the inner ring road leaving a pocket of private land to an extent of Ac.1.31 guntas in Survey No.149/4 between DMRL and inner ring road. This made DMRL bounded by the inner ring road and MIDHANI with little scope for further expansion of the Laboratory in the DMRL complex, the expansion of the DMRL is in the interest of national importance and it is very much necessary to acquire any available land which can form part of the present DMRL complex to meet the requirements. The balance extent of land is proposed to be acquired for expansion of the DMRL, as the subsequent purchasers sought to construct building in this pocket of the land adjoining to DMRL and as there is a threat to the safety and security of the defence laboratories. Respondent No.6 also paid a sum of Rs.57.41 lakhs to the State Government to acquire the said land and the State Government, duly taking note of the circumstances which necessitated to acquire the land, has issued the impugned draft notification dated 06.07.2006 under Section 4(1) of the Act and declaration dated 07.07.2006 under Section 6 of the Act. It is also contended that there is no illegality in acquiring the land by invoking Section 17(4) of Act dispensing with the enquiry under 7 Section 5-A of the Act. The petitioners, being very well aware of the fact that this piece of land is very much required to the defence laboratory, have executed power of attorney in favour of third parties only to delay the purpose of acquisition and as such prayed for allowing the writ appeal.
9. We have considered the submissions of the respective counsel for the parties and perused the record.
10. A careful examination of the above facts would reveal that out of the total extent of Ac.11.21 guntas in Survey No.149 of Jillelaguda Village, the appellants had earlier acquired Ac.9.36 guntas, only a small portion situated in between the acquired land and the inner ring road remained unacquired and the said land was sought to be acquired by issuing the impugned notification for the purpose of expansion of DMRL. On the earlier occasion also notification was issued for the same purpose as was notified in the present notification. The DMRL is a laboratory actively involved in research and development of important strategic materials for defence system and systems of national importance under the control of Defence Ministry of Government of India.
11. The contention of respondent No.6 herein (DMRL) is that the small portion of land is allowed to be developed by the land owners for private constructions and the same would definitely be a threat to the 8 safety and security of the activities of DMRL. Since the land owners are aware of the acquisition proceedings of the land in the same survey number, it is open for the land owners to object to the proposed acquisition only on the ground that the land is not suitable and it does not serve the public purpose as was notified by the appellants. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Act issued by the Government and the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act would be considered to be conclusive evidence of the fact that the land is indeed needed for the public purpose, unless the petitioners specifically establish mala fides on the part of the acquisition authority in acquiring the subject property. However, the writ petitioners failed to point out any infirmity as far as the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and the consequent declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act.
12. The notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act is assailed on the ground of public purpose. Section 3(f) of the Act defines "public purpose", which reads as under:-
"3(f) the expression "public purpose" includes-
(i) the provision of village-sites, or the extension, planned development or improvement of existing village-sites;
(ii) the provision of land for town or rural planning;
(iii) the provision of land for planned development of land from public funds in pursuance of any scheme or policy of 9 Government and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease, assignment or outright sale with the object of securing further development as planned;
(iv) the provision of land for a corporation owned or controlled by the State;
(v) the provision of land for residential purposes to the poor or landless or to persons residing in areas affected by natural calamities, or to persons displaced or affected by reason of the implementation of any scheme undertaken by Government, any local authority or a corporation owned or controlled by the State;
(vi) the provision of land for carrying out any educational, housing, health or slum clearance scheme sponsored by Government, or by any authority established by Government for carrying out any such scheme, or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State, or a co-operative society within the meaning of any law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force in any State;
(vii) the provision of land for any other scheme of development sponsored by Government or, with the prior approval of the appropriate Government, by a local authority;
(viii) the provision of any premises or building for locating a public office;
but does not include acquisition of land for Companies."
13. In State of Bihar vs. Kameshwar Singh3 , a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the expression "public purpose" in the following manner:-
3 AIR 1952 SC 252 10 "The expression 'public purpose' is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual."
14. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Somavanti vs. State of Punjab4, observed that whether in a particular case the purpose for which land was needed was a public purpose or not was for the Government to be satisfied about and the declaration of the Government would be final subject to one exception, namely that where there was a colourable exercise of the power the declarations would be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party.
15. In State of Bombay vs. Ali Gulshan5, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered vires of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Act 23 of 1948). Interpreting provisions of the Constitution and Schedule VII thereof, the Court held that requisition of property by the Government of Bombay for accommodation of Foreign Consulate could be said to be "public purpose". It was held that every State purpose or Union purpose is a public purpose but there may be acquisition or requisition which is neither for the State nor for the Union and yet it may be for a "public purpose"; for instance, 4 AIR 1963 SC 151 5 AIR 1955 SC 810 11 acquisition for construction of hospital or educational institution by a private individual or institution.
16. In State of Bombay vs. R.S. Nanji6, land was requisitioned for accommodating employees of Road Transport Corporation. It was contended that there was no "public purpose" and hence the action was illegal. Referring to Hamabai Framjee Petit vs. Secy. of State for India in Council7, Ali Gulshan's case (supra) and State of Bombay vs. Bhanji Munji8, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court stated that the expression "public purpose" must be decided in each case examining closely all the facts and circumstances of the case. On the facts of the case, it was held that a breakdown in the organization of the Corporation, leading to dislocation of the road transport system would create a chaotic condition to the detriment of the interest of the community. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for the Corporation to provide such accommodation in order to ensure an efficient working of the road transport system and it must, therefore, be held to be "public purpose".
17. In Arnold Rodricks vs. State of Maharashtra9, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "public purpose" has no static connotation, 6 AIR 1956 SC 294 7 AIR 1914 PC 20 8 AIR 1955 SC 41 9 AIR 1966 SC 1788 12 which is fixed for all times. It is also not possible to lay down a definition of what public purpose is, as the concept of public purpose may change from time to time. It, however, involves in it an element of general interest of the community which should be regarded as a public purpose.
18. In Bhim Singhji vs. Union of India10, the Supreme Court held that the concept of public purpose implies that acquisition or requisition of property is in the interest of general public and the purpose for which such acquisition or requisition is made directly and vitally subserves public interest.
19. In Daulat Singh Surana vs. First Land Acquisition Collector11, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the validity of the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act for acquiring the land for construction of an office of Deputy Commissioner of Police (Security Control), held that the expression "public purpose" includes a public purpose in which greatest interest of the community as opposed to a particular interest of an individual is directly concerned. The concept is not static but changes with the passage of time. Power of eminent domain can, therefore, be exercised by the State in public interest.
10 (1981) 1 SCC 166 11 (2007) 1 SCC 641 13
20. In Scindia Employees' Union vs. State of Maharashtra and others12, the Supreme Court, in paragraph 3, observed as under:-
"3. Obviously, therefore, the petitioners have contended that the acquisition is not for a public purpose; it is a mala fide acquisition and a vague public purpose of defence and so acquisition is not valid in law. Precedents have been copiously cited in the High Court in that behalf. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench elaborately considered them and held that acquisition for defence purpose is a public purpose. Arnold Rodricks vs. State of Maharashtra's case (AIR 1966 SC 1788) to State of T.N. vs. L.Krishnan's case ((1996) 1 SCC 250) settled the controversy holding that acquisition for housing development is not a vague purpose. Expansion of dockyard for defence purpose is a public purpose. Publication of declaration under Section 6 accords conclusiveness to public purpose. It is for the appropriate Government to take a decision whether a particular land is needed for a public purpose or not and the Court cannot substitute its opinion on the public purpose to that of the appropriate Government. We wholly agree with the view taken by the High Court in that behalf. As regards person interested this Court dealt with the controversy from Himalayan Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd vs. Francis Victor Coutinho's case ((1980) 3 SCC 223) to Neyvely Lignite Corpn Ltd vs. Special Tahsildar (LA)'s case ((1995) 1 SCC 221), and the Constitution Bench decision, per majority. The petitioner, therefore, is not a person interested. Notice and hearing of it under Section 5A(2) is not mandatory."
21. As per the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it is very clear that the expression "public purpose" will include a purpose in which the general interest of community as opposed to the interest of an individual is directly or indirectly involved. Individual interest must give way to public interest as far as public purpose in respect of acquisition of land is concerned.
12 (1996) 10 SCC 150 14
22. After careful analysis of the various judgments of the Supreme Court, we are of the view that it must be accepted that in construing public purpose, a broad and over all view has to be taken in the larger public interest. As in this case the piece of land which is required is situated in between the large extent of the land acquired earlier for the very same purpose by DMRL, we do not hesitate to hold that the impugned notification does not suffer from any vagueness to quash the same.
23. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ appeal is allowed. Consequently the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the related writ petition is dismissed. The appellants herein are allowed to proceed further in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, pending if any, shall stand closed.
___________________________________ UJJAL BHUYAN, CJ ___________________________________ C.V.BHASKAR REDDY, J 01.12.2022 JSU