HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI G.S. SINGHVI
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY
Writ Appeal No.540 of 2007
Between:
Kottakapu Sai Reddy and others. ... Appellants
And
Joint Collector-II-cum Appellate Authority
under A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955,
Ranga Reddy District and others. ... Respondents
:: J U D G M E N T ::
Counsel for the appellants : Sri V. Venkata Ramana
Counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 3 : Government Pleader for Revenue
2nd July, 2007
Per G.S. Singhvi, C.J.
This is an appeal for setting aside order dated 9-4-2007 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.7093 of 2007, whereby he declined the appellants' prayer for quashing order dated 24-2-2007 passed by Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District (respondent No.1) in Cases No.F1/1677/2004 and F1/5839/2004 as also order dated 24-1-2004 passed by Revenue Divisional Officer, Chevella Division, Rajendra Nagar, Ranga Reddy District (respondent No.2) for grant of Occupancy Rights Certificates in favour of respondent Nos.4 to 9.
Appellant No.1 is the son of Kottakapu Narsaiah, who was protected tenant of land measuring Ac.16.12 guntas comprised in Survey Nos.367 and 368 situated at Alwal Village, Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District (for short, 'the subject land'). Appellant Nos.2 to 4 are the sons of appellant No.1 and appellant No.5 is related to them. Respondent Nos.4 to 9 are related to the original pattadar of the subject land. The appellants filed a petition under Rule 5(2) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Rules, 1975 for issue of Inam Patta Certificate/Occupancy Rights Certificate. Respondent Nos.4 to 9 also filed application for grant of Occupancy Rights Certificate. After considering the objections received from various persons, respondent No.2, vide his order dated 24-1-2004, dismissed the application filed by the appellants and accepted the one filed by respondent Nos.4 to 9. The operative part of that order reads as under:
"For all the reasons stated above and all the circumstances of the cases and basing on revenue records and orders passed by various authorities, this Tribunal concludes that except Naseeruddin and others, no party/person has been in enjoyment of possession in respect of land under Sy.No.367 and 368 admeasuring Ac.16.12 guntas and Ac.11.29 guntas respectively. As such, the claim petition filed by Naseeruddin and others is hereby allowed. The other claim petitions filed by K.Sai Reddy and others, M.Yadi Reddy and another are hereby rejected. Also the land under Sy.Nos.367 and 368 admeasuring Ac.16.12 guntas and Ac.11.29 guntas respectively is a inam land. This Tribunal orders to register the names of Khaja Ahmed Uddin, S/o. late Khaja Abdullah and Khaja Abdul Rahman, S/o. late Khaja Abdullah, both R/o. Himayathnagar, Hyderabad as inamdars in respect of lands under Sy.Nos.367 and 368 admeasuring Ac.16.12 guntas and Ac.11.29 guntas respectively situated at Khanojiguda, Alwal Village, R.R. District and their claim in respect of imam land in Sy.Nos.367 and 368 to the extent of area as mentioned above is allowed. They are directed to pay the premium payable in respect of the said lands. Accordingly, occupancy rights are conferred in respect of Sy.Nos.367 and 368 admeasuring 16 acres 12 guntas and 11 acres and 29 guntas respectively in the name of following persons only i.e., Khaja Ahmed Uddin, S/o. late Khaja Abdullah and Khaja Abdul Rahman, S/o. late Khaja Abdullah, both R/o. Himayathnagar, Hyderabad u/s. 4 of the A.P. (T.A.) Inams Abolition Act, 1955."
The appellants challenged the aforementioned order by filing an appeal under Section 24 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 (for short, 'the 1955 Act'). The same was registered as Case No.F1/1677/2004. Smt. Sageerunnisa also filed an appeal under Section 24 of the 1955 Act claiming that being a successor of Khaja Jalal Maktha, the original pattadar, she was entitled to a share in the land and that respondent Nos.1 to 4 (the appellants herein) and respondent Nos.5 to 8 (respondent Nos.4 to 9 herein) had colluded with each other and obtained Occupancy Rights Certificates in respect of the subject land.
Respondent No.1 disposed of the two appeals along with two other appeals with which we are not concerned. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, respondent No.1 formulated the following points:
"1. Are the lands in question Inam lands?
2. If so, whether the lands in question were under agriculture as on the crucial date?
3. If so, who is entitled to grant of Occupancy Right Certificate?"
Respondent No.1 then referred to the revenue records i.e. Wasool Baqui of 1354 Fasli, Sethwar of Alwal Village, Classer Register of 1355 Fasli and Sesala Pahani, took cognizance of order dated 3-4-1972 passed by the Board of Revenue in File No.U3/145/1971 and held that there is no credible evidence on the record to show that the lands in question are patta lands. He further held that as per permanent survey and revenue records, the subject lands are inam lands. Respondent No.1 then referred to khasra pahani, Seesala pahani, pahani of 1973- 74 and pahanis of surrounding years and declared that the land was "kancha land" and was used for grazing purposes. He further held that neither the appellants nor respondent Nos.4 to 9 are entitled to occupancy rights and accordingly set aside order dated 24-1-2004. For better appreciation of the consideration made by respondent No.1 under point Nos.1, 2 and 3, the relevant portions of order dated 24-2-2007 are extracted below:
"I. Are the lands in question Inam lands?
The following revenue records have been examined to arrive at a finding regarding the classification of the lands:-
a) Wasool Baqui of 1354 Fasli
b) Sethwar of Alwal Village
c) Classer Register of 1355 Fasli
d) Seesala Pahani.
a) As per Wasool Baqui of Alwal Village, new Sy.No.367 and 368 are carved out of old Sy.No.285. The old Sy.No.285 is classified as "Bapath Panmaqtha". The particulars are as under:-
Khata Name of the Mazid Classification Area New Extent
No. Khathedar Sy.No. Sy.No.
(old
Sy.No.)
2 Khaja Jalausa 285 Bapath 157.20 372 12-32
Panmaktha
371 13-29
369 12-32
370 5-37
368 11-04
359 1-35
367 16-12
366 11-16
358 1-03
365 9-06
b) As per Sethwar of Alwal Village, the classification of the said Survey numbers is as
under:-
Sy.No. Nature of land Extent
Act.gts.
367 Panmaktha 16-12
368 Panmaktha 11-29
c) As per Classer Register of Alwal Village, the particulars are as under:-
Sy.No. Nature of land Extent
Act.gts.
367 Panmaktha 16-12
368 Panmaktha 11-29
d) As per Seesala Pahani, the particulars are as under:-
Sy.No. Nature of land Extent
Act.gts.
367 Panmaktha 16-12
368 Panmaktha 11-29
The Wasool Baqui, Sethwar and Seesala Pahani are supposed to be the permanent records on the basis of which a conclusive evidence regarding classification of the land can be arrived at. From the said records, it is abundantly evident that the land in question is classified as "Inam lands."
However, during the course of hearing, the Advocate for few of the appellants has drawn attention to the order passed by the Board of Revenue in File No.U3/145/1971, dated 3-4-1972, and contended that the lands in question are patta lands and not Inam lands.
The Advocate has in particular drawn attention to the observation made by the Board of Revenue in the said order which is as follows:-
"The said lands are no longer Panmaktha lands which they have used to be till 1956, but from that year onwards they are Khalsa lands. Amal to that effect having been sanctioned by the Nazim Jamabandi in the Faisal Patti of 1956 and so, for all purposes, the lands are treated only as Khalsa lands."
The said observation cannot be relied upon to derive any conclusion about the classification of the lands for the following reasons:-
a) In the said proceedings, the Board of Revenue was principally dealing with an appeal filed against the orders of Joint Collector, Hyderabad U/s. 61 of A.P.T.A. Land Revenue Act. The classification of lands was not at all a primary issue in the case. The orders only make a passing reference to the classification of the lands. It is not evident as to whether all the revenue and survey records were examined before making any observation on the classification of the land. Therefore, the said observation is only a passing reference and does not constitute a conclusive finding regarding the classification of the land.
b) Section 3 of the A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 provides for abolition of all Inams and declares that these lands shall vest in the State. Therefore, upon enactment of the said legislation, all the Inams stood abolished and the lands vested with the State and certain categories of cultivators were entitled to be registered as occupants. The said Board orders refers to conversion of Inam lands to Khalsa in the year 1956 i.e. after enactment of the Abolition of Inams Act. Upon abolition of Inams, such conversion of lands from Inams to Khalsa by way of a Jamabandi proceedings is not permissible. As per the scheme of the Act, upon abolition of Inams, conversion of inam lands to patta tenure is possible only by way of grant of Occupancy Right Certificate to eligible categories of cultivators. Therefore, this observation in the Board orders cannot be relied upon to arrive at a finding regarding the classification of the land.
There is no credible evidence or record to even remotely show that the lands in question are patta lands. Therefore, upon careful examination of the permanent survey and revenue records, it can be safely concluded that the Sy.Nos.367 and 368 of Alwal village are Inam lands.
II. Were the lands in question under agriculture as on the crucial date?
The following records have been examined to verify whether the lands were under cultivation:-
1. Khasra Pahani
2. Seesala Pahani
3. Pahani of 1973-74
4. Pahanies of surrounding years.
1) As per Khasra Pahani of 1954-55 the said Sy.Nos. are recorded as "KANCHA" lands, not shown to be under agriculture. The particulars are as under:
Sy.No. Extent Field Name Crop
367 16-12 Bonthala Kancha Blank
368 11-29 Bonthala Kancha Blank
2) As per the Seesala Pahani also, the lands in question are shown as "KANCHA" lands. The particulars are as under:-
Sy.No. Extent Crop
367 16-12 Blank
Bonthala Kancha Maktha
368 11-29 Blank
Bonthala Kancha Maktha
Thus, as per the Khasra Pahani and Sesala Pahani, the lands in question are shown as "KANCHA" lands. As per these records, the cultivation columns pertaining to the said lands are blank indicating that the lands are not under cultivation. It can therefore be safely concluded that the lands in question were used for grazing purposes and were not under cultivation in the year 1955 i.e., when the A.P. (T.A.) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955 was enacted.
Another crucial date for consideration is 1.11.1973 i.e., the date of vesting. As per the pahanies of 1973-74 and the surrounding years, the cultivation particulars in respect of the said lands are not cogently recorded. In some of the years, a small extent of the lands in question is shown to be under cultivation. For instance, in pahani of 1973-74, an extent of around 1.00 acre out of Acs. 16.12 gts. In Sy.No. 367 is shown to be under cultivation. It is difficult to identify this 1.00 acre of land at this distance of time.
The Inam Abolition Act provides for registering occupancies provided the following condition are satisfied:-
a) Applicant should be in possession of the land as on the crucial date of vesting i.e., 1.11.1973,
b) The land must be under his personal cultivation and
c) The land together with any land he separately owns and cultivates personally are not in excess of the stipulated "family holding".
However, as per Section 4 (1) (a) of A.P.T.A. Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, Occupancy Right Certificate cannot be issued in respect of "lands set apart for the village community, grazing lands, mines and quarries, tanks, tank beds and irrigation works, streams and rivers;"
From the above, it is clear that (a) Occupancy Right Certificate can be issued only if the lands are under agriculture (b) if the lands are set apart for grazing purposes, no Occupancy Right Certificate can be issued in respect of such lands.
In the instant case, there is no conclusive evidence to show that the lands were under cultivation as on the crucial date. On the other hand, as per Khasra, Chesala and other records, there is preponderance of evidence indicating that these lands were earmarked as "KACHA LANDS" (grazing lands). Even at present, the land is fallow as per the R.D.Os report and no cultivation or agricultural activity is carried on the said lands.
For the above reasons, Occupancy Right Certificate in respect of the said lands cannot be issued. The Occupancy Right Certificate issued by the Revenue Divisional Officer vide the impugned proceedings is, therefore, liable to be set aside on the following grounds:-
a) There is no evidence to show that the land was under cultivation as on the date of Abolition of Indams.
b) The revenue records show that the said land was used for grazing purposes and the land was used as "KANCH LANDS".
III. If so, who is entitled for grant of Occupancy Right Certificate:
As the lands are not agricultural lands, the question of determination of entitlement to Occupancy Right Certificates does not arise.
For a moment even if it were assumed that the lands in question is agricultural lands, the determination of entitlement to occupancy rights is not feasible at this distance of time. As per the Act, possession and cultivation has to be determined as on 1.11.1973 for the purposes of registering occupancy rights. In the instant case, the application for registering occupancy rights has been made long after the date of vesting. The impugned order has been issued in the year 2004 i.e., almost three decades after the date of vesting.
With lapse of time, it is quite likely that multiple interests might have emerged on the scene. It is also likely that the original claimants are no longer in the picture and are succeeded by their legal heirs and successors in interest. As a result, recognition of rights will not be amenable to a summary enquiry conducted by a Revenue Authority. The issue would assume a complex dimension requiring a comprehensive adjudication by a competent Civil Court.
In other words, a claim for occupancy rights three decades after the date of vesting is clearly barred by time. Any enquiry into the entitlement to occupancy rights at this distance of time would not enable proper and accurate determination of rights. On the other hand, any enquiry into the possession and claims with reference to 1.11.1973, at this distance of time will only be fallacious and result in miscarriage of justice.
For the reasons explained above, the impugned order of Revenue Divisional Officer in Procgs. No. L/760/2001, dated 24.1.2004 is hereby set aside. The lands in question being Inam lands, vest with the State upon abolition of inams as per Section 3 of the Act. As the lands in question are shown as "KANCHA" lands at the time of Abolition of Inams, occupancy in respect of these lands cannot be registered as per Section 4 (1) (a) of the Act. Notwithstanding that, entitlement to occupancy rights cannot be determined at this distance of time i.e., nearly three decades after the date of vesting, given the fact that there are multiple diverse claims in respect of the said land. The lands therefore, vest with the State and Mandal Revnue Officer, Malkajigiri is directed to safeguard the said lands..........."
The appellants questioned the determination made by respondent No.1 in Writ Petition No.7093 of 2007, but could not persuade the learned Single Judge to set aside order dated 24-2-2007. The learned Single Judge briefly referred to the findings recorded by respondent No.1 and held that in view of Sections 3(2)(b) and 4(1) of the 1955 Act, no one can be granted occupancy rights in respect of the subject land.
Sri V. Venkata Ramana assailed order dated 24-2-2007 by arguing that the finding recorded by respondent No.1 about nature of the subject land is beyond the scope of the issues, which he was required to decide in the appeal preferred against order dated 24-1-2004. He further argued that the land in question cannot be treated as covered by Section 3(2)(b) or Section 4(1) of the 1955 Act because "kancha land" is not necessarily used for grazing purposes. He emphasised that the two sections refer to waste lands, pasture lands and forest lands, but do not refer to "kancha land" and, therefore, Occupancy Rights Certificate can be granted in respect of the subject land. Learned counsel then argued that respondent No.1 did not give opportunity to the appellants to adduce evidence to show that the subject lands are being used for cultivation and, therefore, the order passed by him is liable to be nullified on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice.
We have given our most anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel, but have not felt persuaded to accept the same. In regard to the last argument of Sri Venkata Ramana, it is sufficient to observe that in the writ petition filed by them, the appellants did not make a grievance that they were not given opportunity by respondent No.1 to adduce evidence to prove that the subject land was cultivable and was not used for grazing purposes. Before the learned Single Judge, no such point was argued. Therefore, at this stage, the appellants cannot be permitted to raise a new plea, adjudication of which necessarily requires determination of the truthfulness or otherwise of the factual assertion which is implicit in the argument of the learned counsel.
On the main issue, we find that respondent No.1 minutely analysed the documentary evidence brought on record and categorically recorded a finding of fact that the subject land is recorded as "kancha land" and no crop is being grown over it. He further held that the appellants have failed to prove that they were in cultivating possession of the land on the cut-off date i.e. 1-11-1973. The appellants have not produced any evidence before this Court to prove that the subject land is being cultivated by them or by any one else or that the same is not recorded as "kancha land" in the khasra pahani, seesala pahani and other records. Therefore, it is not possible to find any fault with the conclusion recorded by respondent No.1 that neither the appellants nor respondent Nos.4 to 9 are entitled to occupancy rights.
The power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised in such matters only if it is shown that the adjudication made by the quasi-judicial authority suffers from any jurisdictional infirmity or is vitiated due to violation of the rules of natural justice or the findings recorded by the concerned authority are vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. This Court can scrutinise the matter to satisfy itself that the decision-making process is not tainted by arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of the rules of natural justice, but cannot sit in appeal over the actual decision except when it is shown to be perverse.
A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals or quasi-judicial authorities. A writ can also be issued where, in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or the Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority acts illegally or improperly, i.e., it decides a question without giving an opportunity of hearing to the party affected by the order or where the procedure adopted by it is opposed to the principles of natural justice. However, it must be remembered that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory in nature and not appellate one. This necessarily means that the finding of fact reached by the inferior Court, Tribunal etc., as a result of the appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings except when the judgment, order or award suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record. An error of law is one which can be discovered on a bare reading of the judgment, order or award under challenge along with the documents which have been relied upon by the inferior Court, Tribunal or quasi- judicial authority. An error, the discovery of which is possible only after a detailed scrutiny of the evidence produced by the parties and lengthy debate at the bar cannot be regarded as an error of law for the purpose of a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority can be corrected only if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Court etc., had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence and the same has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, a finding of fact based on no evidence would be regarded as error of law which can be corrected by issuing a writ of certiorari. However, sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence relied upon by the inferior Court of Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority cannot be gone into by the High Court while considering the prayer for issue of a writ of certiorari. Likewise, mere possibility of forming a different opinion on re-appreciation of evidence produced by the parties is not sufficient for issue of a writ of certiorari.
[1] I n Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan , the Supreme Court considered the scope of the High Courts' power to issue a writ of certiorari and laid down the following propositions:
"i) A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice.
ii) The jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari.
iii) A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court."
The proposition laid down in Sayed Yakoob1 (supra) has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar & Anr. v. Ist ADJ Varanasi & [2] ors. .
In Shaikh Mahammad Umarsaheb v. Kadalaskar Hasham Karimsab [3] and others , their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of High Court's power under Article 226 to re-appreciate the evidence produced before the trial Judge, held as under:
"Where the evidence adduced before the trial Judge was not so immaculate that another Judge might not have taken a different view, it cannot be said that there was no evidence on which the trial Judge could have come to the conclusion he did. When the trial Court accepts the evidence, the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227."
[4] In R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and others , the Supreme Court upheld the order passed by the High Court dismissing the writ petition filed against the order of the petitioner's removal from the office of the President of Municipal Committee. Some of the observations made in that decision, which are worth noticing read as under:
"The court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings."
[5] In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai , the Supreme Court noted the history of the development of High Court's jurisdiction to issue writs, orders or directions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and laid down the following propositions:
"i) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.
ii) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.
iii) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.
iv) The parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a strait-jacket formula or rigid rules. Not less than often, the High Court would be faced with a dilemma. If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a given case may make it more appropriate for the High Court to exercise self-restraint and not to intervene because the error of jurisdiction though committed is yet capable of being taken care of and corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if any, would be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or revision preferred at the conclusion of the proceedings. But there may be cases where "a stitch in time would save nine". At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the judge."
In view of the above discussion, we hold that orders dated 24-1-
2004 and 24-2-2007 passed by respondent No.2 and respondent No.1 respectively do not suffer from any legal infirmity and the learned Single Judge rightly declined to entertain the appellants' challenge to that order.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
As a sequel to dismissal of the appeal, WAMP.No.1047 of 2007 filed by the appellants for interim relief is also dismissed.
G.S. SINGHVI, C.J.
2nd July, 2007.
C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY, J.
ARS [1] AIR 1964 SC 477 [2] JT 2002 (8) SC 69 = (2002) 9 SCC 375 [3] AIR 1970 SC 61 [4] JT 1999 (6) SC 507 = (1999) 8 SCC 90 [5] AIR 2003 SC 3044