THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY
WRIT APPEAL No.898 of 2018
% Dated: 18.06.2021
# Vorla Ramachandra Reddy and another.
... APPELLANTS
VERSUS
$ Joint Collector I,
Ranga Reddy District,
Lakdikapool,
Hyderabad and others.
...RESPONDENTS
! Counsel for the Appellants : Mr. Ch. Siddhartha Sarma ^ Counsel for the Respondents : Mr. E. Madan Mohan Rao Mr. Resu Mahender Reddy GP for Revenue Mr. T. Lakshmi Narayana Mr. A. Pulla Reddy Mr. T. Rajinikanth Reddy Mr. A. Venkat Laxma Reddy Ms. M.L. Neelima Mr. Polali Venkatesh < GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Case referred
1. AIR 1988 AP 77
2. (2003) 7 SCC 667
3. 2005 (5) ALD 9
4. 2015 (4) ALD 490
5. AIR 1989 SC 1753 2 HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY WRIT APPEAL No.898 of 2018 Date: 18.06.2021 BETWEEN Vorla Ramachandra Reddy and another.
... APPELLANTS AND Joint Collector I, Ranga Reddy District, Lakdikapool, Hyderabad and others.
...RESPONDENTS Counsel for the Appellants : Mr. Ch. Siddhartha Sarma Counsel for the Respondents : Mr. E. Madan Mohan Rao Mr. Resu Mahender Reddy GP for Revenue Mr. T. Lakshmi Narayana Mr. A. Pulla Reddy Mr. T. Rajinikanth Reddy Mr. A. Venkat Laxma Reddy Ms. M.L. Neelima Mr. Polali Venkatesh The Court made the following:
3JUDGMENT: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice B. Vijaysen Reddy) This appeal has been filed by the appellants/petitioners challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 01.05.2018, dismissing WP.No.16546 of 2005.
2. The matter arises under Section 32 of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short 'the Tenancy Act') in connection with the claim of the legal heirs of the protected tenants for restoration of possession of lands. The parties are hereinafter referred to as they were arrayed before the learned Single Judge.
3. The relevant facts of the case, necessary to decide the present appeal are as follows. On 14.10.2000, a petition was filed by the writ petitioners in Proceeding No.B/3948/2000, before the Mandal Revenue Officer/respondent No.2 under Section 40 of the Tenancy Act, claiming that they are tenants in respect of land covered by Sy.Nos.58, 59, 66, 658, 659 and 660 of Yellareddyguda, Kapra Village, Keesara Mandal (hereinafter referred to as 'the schedule lands'). Their father, Vorla Ramachandra Reddy, was a tenant of the schedule lands along with one Dudigalla Mallaiah and both of them were equal shareholders and cultivating tenants as defined under the Tenancy Act. Vorla Ramachandra Reddy expired on 14.02.1979 and till his demise, his status remained that of a tenant. Another petition was filed by one Sri Lakshmi Narayana and three others claiming inter alia that they were the successors of Dudigalla Mallaiah, who, allegedly, was 50% share holder of the protected tenancy rights in respect of the schedule lands. The Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO) passed an order dated 04.04.2001 in proceeding No.B/3948/2000, granting succession in respect of the schedule lands and declaring the petitioners No.1 to 4 4 as the successors of Vorla Ramachandra Reddy and the petitioner No.5, as the successor of Dudigalla Mallaiah.
4. On the strength of the said succession order dated 04.04.2001, the petitioners filed an application under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act before the MRO registered as proceedings No.B/1542/2001in respect of the schedule lands, admeasuring Ac.42.23 guntas in Sy.Nos.58, 59, 66 and 658 of Kapra village. Thirteen persons were arrayed as respondents in the aforesaid petition. It appears that the respondents No.9 to 13 therein, on receiving notices, did not appear or contest the case. Respondent No.1 and respondents No.2 to 8 appeared through their respective counsel and filed a counter on 18.08.2001, admitting the claim of the petitioners that they were the successors-in-title of the original protected tenants in respect of the schedule lands. They admitted that the petitioners had been in possession of the aforesaid land since a long time and they had no objection to restoration of possession thereof to them, as per the protected tenant rights. Resultantly, the MRO passed an order dated 07.09.2011, restoring physical possession of Ac.40.33 guntas covered by Sy.Nos.59, 66, 658 and part of Sy.No.58 under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act in favour of the petitioners. However, land admeasuring Ac.1.20 guntas in Sy.No.58, that was covered by built up houses and possessed by one S.E. Srinivas, was deleted since it appears that the petitioners did not press their claim in respect of the said parcel of land.
5. Subsequently, on receiving a representation dated 04.10.2001 submitted by S.E. Srinivas stating that land to the extent of Ac.7.32 guntas situated in Sy.No.658 had already been converted into non-agriculture land and HUDA had also approved a layout in the year 5 1991 and the said lands hae been sold by the respondents to one Sri C. Santhu, S/o. China Thambi, S. Vishvanatham etc., through a registered sale document dated 09.06.1997, the MRO passed an order dated 11.10.2001 in proceedings No.B/1542/2001. The MRO issued an Errata in the captioned proceedings, clarifying that land measuring Ac.8.30 guntas in Sy.No.658 should be read instead of Ac.16.22 guntas in Sy.No.658, on the premise that the restoration orders dated 07.09.2011, were not applicable to the land covered by Sy.No.658, to an extent of Ac.7.32 guntas from out of the larger chunk of land measuring Ac.16.32 guntas.
6. An appeal under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act, was filed by third parties, M/s. Sanala Srinivasa Chary and others, before the Joint Collector, registered as Case No.F2/5450 of 2001, challenging the order dated 07.09.2011 passed by the Mandal Revenue Officer in respect of land situated in Sy.Nos.58, 59, 66 and 658. The said appeal was allowed by the Joint Collector vide order dated 12.04.2015, inter alia holding that a belated application had been filed by the petitioners; though no express period of limitation is prescribed for filing an application under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, the said application must be moved within a reasonable time; the position (nature of land) might have been changed in the meantime; the other side (third parties) is likely to be adversely affected since equities may have arisen in their favour and they may have spent huge amounts on the land by improving it. It was also observed that the subsequent purchasers or their successors had carved out plots and sold smaller parcels of land to various persons and the respondents therein had not taken any steps from 22.07.1952 to seek legal recourse (i.e. from the date of purchase of the land) and the petition filed by them was highly 6 belated. Consequently, the order of the MRO dated 07.09.2011, was set aside by the Joint Collector.
7. Assailing the order dated 12.04.2005, passed by the Joint Collector, the petitioners filed WP.No.16546 of 2006, which came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 01.05.2018.
8. The learned Single Judge elaborately discussed the rival contentions of the parties and held that the application under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act had not been filed by the petitioners within a reasonable time; no details had been furnished by the petitioners in respect of the subsequent events between 1952 to 2000; the application dated 18.04.2001 filed by them under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, for restoration of possession before the MRO did not contain the dates of the death of the tenants and did not disclose the change of the status of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural; the record did not disclose that a PT certificate had been enclosed by the petitioners and the names of the purchasers viz. Chindam Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah had been incorporated in the revenue records, as pattadars and possessors; the predecessors-in- interest (i.e., the protected tenants) of the writ petitioners did not challenge any of the orders or decisions. On the contrary, they allowed those orders and decisions to attain finality during their lifetime. It was observed that the names of Chindam Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah had continued to appear in the revenue records; the writ petitioners did not file any document showing enjoyment of the subject land by the tenants or by themselves as their successors. The Court held that without verifying the ground position or the state of affairs reflected in the revenue records, the MRO had straightaway ordered restoration of 7 possession on a consent being given by persons who had no interest in the subject land. Thus, the contention of the writ petitioners was held to be misconceived since they had miserably failed to disclose what had transpired for a period spanning over 48 years and therefore it was impermissible for them to call upon the purchasers/respondents No.3 to 11 and the other respondents to disclose the sales, change of agricultural land into a layout and sale of plots carved out by Chindam Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah through GPAs executed by them in favour of several individuals. The learned Single Judge also referred to the recitals in the sale deed dated 22.07.1952 bearing document No.26 of 1952, wherein it was recorded that Chindam Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah had purchased the land after obtaining the required permission under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act.
9. The contention of the petitioners that the permission granted under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act for alienation of the schedule land had not been filed by the respondents No.3 to 11, was rejected by the learned Single Judge holding that restoration of possession claimed by them is not premised on the ground that no permission had been granted under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act. Further, it was held that by reference to such a permission, registered sale deeds had been executed and based on the registered sale deeds executed by the pattadar, M. Narayana, mutation had been carried out in the revenue records in favour of the purchasers. The tenants had lived up to the years 1975 and 1979 and they did not question any proceedings which had resulted in execution of sale deeds, mutation etc. The contention of the petitioners was held to be misconceived since the Joint Collector was required to consider the singular issue which was as to whether the application for restoration of possession filed by the petitioners was filed within a reasonable time 8 or not. Relying on the ratio in PONNALA NARSING RAO v. NALLOLLA PANTAIAIH [(1998) 9 SCC 183], where the Supreme Court has held that a petition for restoration under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act is required to be filed within a reasonable time, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.
10. The appellants/petitioners have assailed the impugned judgment on the ground that the judgment in PONNALA NARSING RAO's case (supra), does not lay down any ratio decidendi; that the impugned judgment is contrary to the law laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in SADA v. THE TAHSILDAR1 wherein it was held that neither limitation nor the plea of adverse possession can be raised against protected tenants; the provision of Section 32 of the Tenancy Act does not prescribe any limitation period for recovery of possession of land by a protected tenant; the interest of the protected tenants over the land, to the extent of 60%, could never get extinguished and the same is heritable by the lineal descendants of the protected tenants; the respondents are purchasers of land covered by protected tenancy and the sale transactions are illegal. It was further argued that the statutory Tribunals do not have any discretionary jurisdiction, they exercise compulsive jurisdiction and therefore, delay and laches cannot be a ground for consideration under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act since no limitation has been prescribed under the Statute.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners asserted that the succession granted under Section 40 of the Tenancy Act has remained unchallenged and no finding has been returned by the Joint Collector about the alleged oral surrender that had taken place in the year 1952. It was thus submitted that for all the above reasons, the appeal 1 AIR 1988 AP 77 9 preferred by third parties before the Joint Collector ought to have been rejected and the writ petition ought to have been allowed in favour of the appellants/petitioners.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any error of law or jurisdiction, the learned Single Judge, having rightly applied the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in PONNALA NARSING RAO's case (supra) and confirmed the order of the Joint collector. There are no merits in the writ appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed.
13. We have heard Mr. Ch. Siddhartha Sarma, learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners and Mr. E. Madan Mohan Rao and Mr. Resu Mahender Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents and carefully perused the records.
14. The issue involved in SADA's case (1 supra) was whether it is a condition precedent for a protected tenant to be in possession of the land at the time when a notification is issued under Section 38-E (1) for the purposes of issuance of an ownership certificate under Section 38-E (2) of the Tenancy Act and whether the new proviso introduced in Section 32 (2) by virtue of an amendment vide Act 2 of 1979, that enables a Section 38-E (2) certificate holder to seek restoration of possession, is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Several incidental issues including the applicability of the law of limitation and the claim of adverse possession have also been dealt with in the said decision. However, the law laid down in SADA's case (1 supra) is not of much of relevance for the lis involved the instant case. There is no quarrel about the proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench and contended by learned counsel for the 10 appellants/petitioners, that the law of limitation is not applicable to the proceedings under the Tenancy Act and nor is the claim of adverse possession available to landlords against protected tenants. (see para 68).
15. The issue raised in the present case is however different. The learned Single Judge was required to examine whether an application for restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act filed beyond a reasonable time, would be liable to be rejected notwithstanding the fact that the law of limitation is inapplicable to such proceedings. This stands answered by the Supreme Court in PONNALA NARSING RAO's case (supra), where the following pertinent observations have been made:-
"3. So far as the second contention is concerned, it is true that though no express period of limitation is provided for filing application under Section 32 of the Act, such applications have to be moved within reasonable time. It may be because of such belated applications, the other side may stand adversely affected. It may have changed its position in the meantime.
Equities may have arisen in his favour, he may have spent large amounts ton land by improving it. But all these questions have to be pleaded and proved..."
16. The Supreme Court has reiterated the settled proposition of law that applications under Section 32 of the Act have to be moved within a reasonable time even if the statute does not provide for an express period of limitation. The reasons for the same are not far to see. An inordinate delay in approaching the court for relief is likely to cause irreparable injury to the opposite party. The status of the land may have undergone a change and it may not be practical to put the clock back. The contention of the learned counsel for the 11 appellants/petitioners that there is no ratio decidendi laid in PONNALA NARSING RAO's case (supra) is therefore without any merit and is turned down. The ratio in PONNALA NARSING RAO's case (supra) has been consistently followed in several subsequent decisions by this Court.
17. In IBRAHIMPATNAM TALUK VYAVASA COOLIE SANGHAM v. K. SURESH REDDY2, the issue involved was regarding cancellation of the validation certificates issued under Section 50-B of the Tenancy Act and alleged to have been obtained by playing a fraud. The interpretation of the expression 'at any time' used in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Tenancy Act, which empowers the authority to exercise suo motu power for examining the legalilty or propriety of the certificate issued under Section 50-B of the Act also came up for discussion by the Supreme Court and it was held as under:
"9. ... Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised reckoning or starting from a particular date advisedly and contextually. Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears that without stating from what date the period of limitation starts and within what period the suo motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act, the words "at any time" are used so that the suo motu power could be exercised within reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of each case in the context of the statute 2 (2003) 7 SCC 667 12 and nature of rights of the parties. Use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and construed contextually and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words "at any time", the suo motu power under sub- section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo motu power "at any time" only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not (sic) prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But that does not mean that "at any time" should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, "at any time" must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation."
(emphasis added)
18. It will also be useful to refer to the judgments of two learned Single Judges of this Court, which arise out of matters relating to restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act by protected tenant or his legal heirs. The learned Single Judges, having considered the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the High Court, have reiterated the principle of law that applications for restoration of possession under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act have to be filed within a reasonable time.
In A. NARASIMHA v. A. KRISHNA3, it was held as under:
26. In the instant case, if it is to be said that the protected tenant lost the possession over the land, it occurred in the year 1952. The same land was transferred 20 years thereafter, in favour of respondents 6 and 7. The application under Section 32 of the Act is filed 30 years thereafter. Whether one treats two spells as a single unit or two distinct spans of period;3
2005 (5) ALD 9 13 the delay is in decades. The record discloses that the respondents 6 and 7 have developed the land; obtained electric connections, brought it under cultivation, by incurring expenditure. From this point of view also, the application under Section 32 of the Act was not maintainable.
19. In ITHAGANI LACHAIAH v. JOINT COLLECTOR AND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTARTE, NALGONDA4, it was held as under:
"32. ... No doubt right is vested in a protected tenant for possession and enjoyment of tenancy lands and primary objective of the Act is to protect the interest of the protected tenant. But, merely because the right is vested in a protected tenant, he cannot keep quiet, allow others to enjoy the property and sleep over the said right and wake up after long lapse of time without regard to the subsequent developments and apply for enforcement of the provision under Section 32 of the Act.
33. In the several decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, uniformly it is held that whenever there is inordinate delay in invoking the provisions of a statute, an application should be rejected on that ground alone. Principle reiterated from time and again that even if no time limit is prescribed in the statute for exercise of power, such power has to be exercised within reasonable time and what is reasonable time depends on the facts of each case. In the cases discussed above, the delay in filing an application for suo moto exercise of power ranged between five years in one case to 12 to 15 years in another case and delay of 20 years and more in other cases. The Supreme Court held it is unreasonable to exercise power in such cases."
(emphasis added)
20. Admittedly, the original authority under the provisions of the Tenancy Act is the Mandal Revenue Officer now designated as the Tahsildar. The procedure for restoration of possession under Section 4 2015 (4) ALD 490 14 32 of the Tenancy Act is regulated by the "Transfer of Possession and Eviction Rules, 1957". Rules 3 of the said Rules reads as under:
"3. (1) The Collector, Deputy Collector or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, shall on his own motion or on receipt of an application made by a person being put in possession of land, issue a notice to the person whose occupation of the land is alleged or considered to be unauthorized or wrongful, to show cause within two weeks from the date of service of the notice as to why he should not be evicted from such land and the application or any other person be put in possession thereof.
2) The Collector, Deputy Collector or the Tahsildar, shall also issue a notice to the applicant or any other person to adduce within two weeks, evidence, if any, in support of his claim for possession of the land.
3) After expiry of the period of notice under sub-rules (1) and (2), the Collector, Deputy Collector or the Tahsildar shall, after hearing such objections and representations as are made before him, determine.
(i) whether or not the occupation is unauthorized or wrongful, and
(ii) whether the claim for being put in possession by the applicant or any other person is valid and shall pass an order accordingly.
4) In case the present occupation is held to be unauthorized or wrongful the order shall specify the time within which the unauthorized wrongful occupant shall vacate the land and handover possession to the person in whose favour an order has been passed. Every such order to vacate shall be complied with within the time specified therein.
21. It is, thus, clear from a perusal of the above Rules that the Tahsildar shall have to conduct a necessary enquiry as to who is in the alleged wrongful possession of the lands in question. In the present case, it is borne out from the record that the landlords had sold the property in question vide registered sale deed bearing document No.26 of 1952, dated 22.07.1952 after obtaining permission under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act. There are consistent entries spanning over about five decades, that show that the lands have changed hands 15 several times over, right from the year 1952 onwards and several third party rights have been created. The sale of lands by the original landlord, M. Narayana to Chindam Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah is duly reflected in the Faisal Patti maintained for the year 1953-54, Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 and Sesala Pahani for the years 1955-58 and the subsequent pahanies. The sale deed and the revenue entries have remained unchallenged for several decades.
The scheduled lands are stated to have been converted into plots in the year 1972 under a Gram Panchayat layout. Admittedly, a part of the land was found to be covered by plots to the extent of Ac.1.20 guntas of land in Sy.No.58 and subsequently, on an application moved by one S.E. Srinivas, the MRO had deleted land to the extent of Ac.7.32 guntas in Sy.No.658, also covered by house sites, which shows that the nature of land had been changed several years ago.
22. The MRO, who is the original authority under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, is also the original/recording authority under the provisions of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1979 (for short 'ROR Act'). The MRO was under a mandate to conduct a preliminary enquiry on the basis of the revenue records so as to verify as to whether there was any change in the title. It was also necessary to find out whether the protected tenancy rights had been surrendered or not and the land was capable of being used for agricultural purposes. Unfortunately, without resorting to such an exercise, the MRO had in a casual manner, directed delivery of possession of the land to the writ petitioners by recording the consent of the contesting respondents before it, who by then, were not left with any interest over the lands in question. It is also relevant to point out that if a proper, genuine and honest exercise had been conducted 16 by the MRO to establish as to who was in the alleged unauthorized possession of the land, whether third party rights had been created and as to the nature of the land, this entire avoidable and wasteful litigation could have been avoided.
23. It needs to be emphasized that the Tenancy Act is a beneficial legislation. It has been enacted for implementing agrarian reforms and more particularly, to protect the interest of cultivators of the land. The underlying philosophy of 'land to the tiller' was introduced to bestow certain statutory benefits and protection to the tenants so that they could not be unduly and arbitrarily evicted by the landlords who were found to be influential, both economically and socially. Towards this end, several amendments have been made in the Tenancy Act from time to time, that have been upheld by the constitutional courts.
24. However, the authorities cannot be oblivious to the fact that the agricultural landscape of the Ranga Reddy District (wherein the schedule lands are situated) and the surrounding areas has drastically changed with rapid urbanization. For the past over three decades, many agricultural lands have been converted into residential and/or commercial plots. Several areas of Ranga Reddy District have been merged into the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. Master Plans have been prepared from time to time for regulating urban development in the Ranga Reddy District. The Cyberabad Development Authority had been constituted two decades ago under the relevant statute for regulating urban development in several areas of the Ranga Reddy District which are contiguous to Hyderabad and Secunderabad cities. Such being the changed scenario, the authorities are expected to exercise reasonable care and caution while enquiring into claims filed belatedly under Section 32 of the Act by trying to take 17 undue advantage of the beneficial legislation. It is also incumbent for the authorities to conduct local inspections to verify the nature of the land, change of title etc. apart from verifying the revenue records so as to find out who is in actual physical possession of the land and as to whether any third party interests are likely to be adversely affected.
25. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge has observed that in the application for mutation filed by the appellants/petitioners, the dates of death of Varla Ramachandra Reddy and Dudigalla Mallaiah was shown as 08.08.1965 and 09.04.1960. In the writ affidavit, the date of demise of Varla Ramachandra Reddy is mentioned as 1979 and of Dudigalla Mallaiah, in the year 1975. The question that arises is as to when were the appellants/petitioners dispossessed. The date or period of dispossession would enable the authorities to decide whether the application for restoration under Section 32 was filed within a reasonable time. But the appellants/petitioners have conveniently failed to furnish the date or the period of dispossession and made a bald statement in the restoration application that they were dispossessed after the demise of their father and grandfather, which is highly ambiguous and open ended.
26. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants/ petitioners that successions proceedings dated 04.04.2001 were not challenged and as such, the contesting respondents could not have opposed the petition filed under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, is found to be without any merit. The dispute regarding succession is inter se the legal heirs. In certain circumstances, perhaps third parties can intervene to oppose such succession proceedings. But, succession proceedings is only for the purposes of declaring the 18 appellants/petitioners as legal heirs of the original protected tenants. That alone does not create or confer any further rights on them. However, when a petition under Section 32 of the Act is instituted, every third party or any person whose rights are affected, can oppose such a petition on any of the legal grounds available to them, as has been done in the instant case.
27. Another contention raised by learned counsel for the appellants/petitioners is that the sale deed dated 22.07.1952, is contrary to Section 38-D of the Tenancy Act. To substantiate the said submission, learned counsel has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in KOTAIAH v. THE PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF BAPTIST CHURCHES (PVT) LTD.5
28. The issue raised in KOTAIAH's case (5 supra) relates to the claim of the respondent - company therein for eviction of tenants under Section 19(2) of the Tenancy Act. The Tahsildar passed an order of eviction against the tenants and the respondent - company was held to be the owner of the land. On appeal being filed by the tenants, the Joint Collector, Warangal, dismissed the appeal. The matter was carried in revision to the High Court under Section 91 of the Tenancy Act, which was also dismissed. The tenants carried the matter to the Supreme Court wherein the appeal filed by the tenants had been allowed and the appellants - tenants were directed to be put in possession of the subject land. It was held by the Supreme Court that the appellants are protected tenants as recognized under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The transfer of subject land in favour of the respondent - company was not in accordance with Section 38-D of the Tenancy Act, which mandates that the land owner, intending to 5 AIR 1989 SC 1753 19 sell his land, has to first offer sale of such land to the protected tenants. Finding that there is contravention of such provision, the Supreme Court held that the title of the respondent - company is not legitimate. The instant case does not deal with the issue regarding title of the purchasers under sale deed dated 22.07.1952 as pointed out in the preceding paragraphs. The appeal filed by the contesting respondents herein was allowed by the Joint Collector on the ground that there was inordinate delay in filing the petition under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the KOTAIAH's case (5 supra) does not render any help to the petitioners.
29. The contents of the sale deed dated 22.07.1952 reflect that before alienating the lands, permission was obtained by the landlords from the concerned Tahsildar vide Letter No.76/30750 dated 15.04.1952 under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act. Thus, a presumption arises that all statutory formalities had been complied with by the MRO before granting such permission. Though such permission granted under Sections 47 and 48 of the Tenancy Act has not been placed on record, it needs to be noted that the contesting respondents are third parties and cannot be expected to have such permission in their custody. In any case, when the sale deed was registered as long back as on 22.07.1952, it has to be presumed that the registering authority had taken all the precautions by satisfying itself that such a permission had been granted. It is also noteworthy that it was never the case of the appellants/petitioners before the MRO in proceedings No.B/1542/2001 that the sale deed dated 22.07.1952 was illegal and/or void. Further, in the order dated 12.04.2005, passed by the Joint Collector, the issue discussed was not regarding the validity of the sale deed. The main ground on which the appeal was allowed by the Joint Collector was the inordinate delay on the part of 20 the appellants/ petitioners in filing the Section 32 application, the fact that several third party rights had been created in the meantime and the land had been converted into residential sites. The said order was passed by rightly placing reliance on PONNALA NARSING RAO's case (supra).
30. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that such an application filed by the appellants/petitioners could not have been entertained unless and until the date or period of dispossession was disclosed in clear terms for the authorities to understand the date on which the cause of action had first accrued in their favour. Though there is no exact time mentioned by the appellants/petitioners as to when were they dispossessed, even going by the admitted facts, as stated in the writ affidavit that the tenants viz. Vorla Ramachandra Reddy had expired in 1979 and Dudigalla Mallaiah in the year 1975, there is clearly an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than two decades in filing an application under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, in the year 2001. The protected tenants have slept over their rights for over two decades and having acquiesced to the change of ownership of the land from the original landlords to Chindham Durgaiah and Doddi Komaraiah in the year 1952 and to the transfer of title to the subsequent purchasers from time to time and later, to the conversion of the land into plots from the year 1982 onwards, the appellants/petitioners cannot be permitted to take undue advantage of the beneficial provisions of the Tenancy Act.
31. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, as discussed above, it is held that the application filed by the appellants/petitioners for restoration under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, was far beyond reasonable time and lacked bonafides. Thus, the order impugned, 21 upholding the order passed by the Joint Collector, does not warrant any interference. The writ appeal is devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed along with the pending miscellaneous petitions, if any with no order as to costs.
_____________ HIMA KOHLI, CJ __________________ B. VIJAYSEN REDDY, J June 18, 2021 Note: LR copy to be marked (B/o) DSK/PLN