Bankat Lal Gupta vs State And Ors (2024:Rj-Jp:5161)

Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 697 Raj/2
Judgement Date : 31 January, 2024

Rajasthan High Court

Bankat Lal Gupta vs State And Ors (2024:Rj-Jp:5161) on 31 January, 2024

Author: Sameer Jain

Bench: Sameer Jain

[2024:RJ-JP:5161]                       (1 of 4)                        [CW-1188/2000]


        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                    BENCH AT JAIPUR

                    S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1188/2000

Bankat Lal Gupta son of Shri Madan Lal aged 38 years Resident
of village and post Dubaliya via Sunel dist. Jhalawar
                                                                       ----Petitioner
                                       Versus
1. State of Rajasthan, through Home Secretary Revenue (Group)
department Rajasthan Jaipur
2. District Collector, (Revenue Record) Jhalawar
                                                                    ----Respondents
For Petitioner(s)            :     Mr. Ravi Kasliwal
For Respondent(s)            :


         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
                      Order
31/01/2024

1. The present writ petition was filed with the following prayers:

"(i) by an appropriate writ order or direction the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to quashed the order dated 10.01.1997.

(ii) by an appropriate writ order or direction the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the non petitioner to reinstated the petitioner in the service with all consequential benefits."

2. The facts of the case, as per the learned counsel for the petitioner, are as follows. The petitioner was appointed on the post of 'Patwari' on 06.09.1986. On 10.11.1994, a FIR (being FIR No. 123/1994) was registered against the petitioner for the alleged offence under Section 376 of IPC. Accordingly, the petitioner was placed under suspension from 11.11.1994. The Trial Court acquitted the petitioner vide judgment dated 02.08.1996 and accordingly, the services of the petitioner were terminated vide (Downloaded on 06/02/2024 at 08:40:41 PM) [2024:RJ-JP:5161] (2 of 4) [CW-1188/2000] order dated 10.01.1997. The conviction of the petitioner was set aside by this Court vide judgment dated 04.02.1999 in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 561/1996. Appeal against the same was also dismissed in limine by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (Criminal) No. 2660/2000.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that during the currency of the petition, in 2002, the petitioner was reinstated in service and is now seeking the limited relief of back wages. In support thereof, reliance is placed on judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal Singh: (2004) 1 SCC 121, Raj Narain Vs. Union of India & Ors.: (2019) 5 SCC 809 and State Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Mohammed Abdul Rahim: (2013) 11 SCC 67.

4. Heard and considered.

5. As per the settled position of law, the petitioner can only seek the relief as prayed for if his acquittal in the criminal case was an honorable one. The mere fact of an acquittal would not suffice but rather it would depend on whether it was a clean acquittal based on total absence of evidence or in the criminal jurisprudence requiring the case to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, that parameter having not been met, benefit of doubt had been granted to the Accused. Reliance in this regard can be placed on Hon'ble Supreme Court judgments of Avtar Singh vs Union Of India: (2016) 8 SCC 471, The State of Rajasthan and Ors. vs. Love Kush Meena: (2021) 8 SCC 774, and The State Of Karnataka & Anr. Vs Umesh (2022) 6 SCC 563. However, Court of law should not be swayed by mere terminologies of (Downloaded on 06/02/2024 at 08:40:41 PM) [2024:RJ-JP:5161] (3 of 4) [CW-1188/2000] 'benefit of doubt' or 'honorable acquittal'; it has to be seen from analysis of order of acquittal.

6. The petitioner was convicted for the heinous offence of rape of a minor girl, aged less than 12 years. The petitioner was even convicted by the Trial Court. It was only upon appeal, had Co- ordinate Bench of this Court set aside the conviction. The SLP was, admittedly, dismissed in limine by the Apex Court on the ground of delay. The SLP, as such, was not decided on merits. Having perused the judgment of acquittal, this Court is not convinced that the acquittal of the petitioner was entirely clean. The Co-ordinate Bench found the theory that the petitioner was falsely implicated, as advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, as highly probable and it was in this context that the Co-ordinate Bench observed that the petitioner was falsely implicated. It was not a case of no evidence, as is required to grant the relief as prayed for. In these circumstances, when the petitioner has already been reinstated in service, no interference is called for at this stage qua back wages.

7. Even otherwise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Jaipal Singh (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, has observed and held as under:

"4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefor does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon by the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically recorded therefor it operates as a binding precedent as well. On going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Ranchhodji [(1996) (Downloaded on 06/02/2024 at 08:40:41 PM) [2024:RJ-JP:5161] (4 of 4) [CW-1188/2000] 11 SCC 603]. If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside."

8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically held that the workman cannot claim back wages for the interregnum period between conviction and acquittal.

9. In view of the foregoing analysis, the present petition stands dismissed. Pending application(s), if any stands disposed of.

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