HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JODHPUR (1) S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 229/2022
1. Hanuman Singh S/o Sh. Jai Singh, Aged About 39 Years, R/o Behind Kripal Bhairu Ji Temple, Sarvodaya Basti, Bikaner. (Raj.)
2. Goverdhan Singh S/o Sh. Bharat Singh, Aged About 43 Years, R/o Near Narsingh Sagar Talab, Sarvodaya Basti, Bikaner (Raj.)
----Petitioners Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary To The Government, Department Of Home, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. Director, General Of Police, Rajasthan Police Head Quarter, Jaipur (Raj.)
3. Superintendent Of Police, Bikaner (Raj.)
4. Additional Superintendent Of Police (City), Bikaner (Raj.)
----Respondents (2) S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 230/2022
1. Hanuman Singh S/o Sh. Jai Singh, Aged About 39 Years, R/o Behind Kripal Bhairu Ji Temple, Sarvodaya Basti, Bikaner. (Raj.)
2. Goverdhan Singh S/o Sh. Bharat Singh, Aged About 43 Years, R/o Near Narsingh Sagar Talab, Sarvodaya Basti, Bikaner (Raj.)
----Petitioners Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary To The Government, Department Of Home, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. Director, General Of Police, Rajasthan Police Head Quarter, Jaipur (Raj.)
3. Superintendent Of Police, Bikaner (Raj.)
4. Additional Superintendent Of Police (City), Bikaner (Raj.)
----Respondents (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (2 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] For Petitioner(s) : Mr. B.S. Sandhu Mr. D.S. Gharsana For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vineet Jain, Sr. Advocate, Special PP with Mr. Pravin Vyas Mr. Gaurav Singh, PP Mr. M.A. Siddiqui, GA-cum-AAG II JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA Order Reportable 07/07/2022
1. The instant petitions call in question orders dated 17.05.2022 and 20.05.2022, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, No.4, Bikaner and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bikaner respectively (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial Court'), while invoking this Court's powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the rival counsel, it would be apt to unfold the factual canvas of the case.
3. The petitioners are practicing advocates at Bikaner and Jaipur. According to the petitioners, the police authorities are/were having vengeance against them because, they had unravelled various irregularities/illegalities and corruption in various government departments including police.
4. Initially, an FIR being FIR No.39 dated 16.02.2010 came to be lodged by one Kundanmal at P.S. Kotgate, Bikaner, inter alia, levelling allegations of forgery, filing false complaints, extortion and creating false and forged documents.
5. Another FIR being FIR No.47/2010 came to be registered at P.S. Naya Shahar, Bikaner at the instance of Constable Gajanand, (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (3 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] posted at P.S. Kotgate, Bikaner reporting that during the investigation of FIR No.39 dated 16.02.2010, the petitioners' house and office were searched and various seals, particularly that of Junior Specialist, Government Satellite Hospital, Bikaner was found and seized. It was alleged that petitioners had been misusing the official seals which amounted to offences under Sections 420, 463 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code.
6. In relation to FIR No.39, which was registered at Kotgate, Bikaner, the Investigating Officer, after due investigation, submitted negative final report on 23.01.2014, inter alia, observing that the complainant has filed a false written report as he was having animosity with the accused persons (petitioners herein).
7. Negative final report also came to be filed qua FIR No.47/2010, registered at P.S. Naya Shahar, Bikaner on 27.12.2013, concluding that the seal that was found in petitioners' premises, might have been used for attesting certain documents but ingredients of Sections 420, 463 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code were absent, because arms license was not issued to the petitioners.
8. Upon submission of the above mentioned final negative reports, the complainant filed protest petitions and the same are pending consideration before the trial Court(s). It is noteworthy that in both the cases, charges have not been framed yet.
9. Having narrated the factual background, Mr. Sandhu, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that both the petitions involve common questions of facts and law and requested that they be decided conjointly. He however, requested the Court to (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (4 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] take Writ Petition No.229/2022, as the lead case and made submissions accordingly.
10. It was firstly contended by learned counsel that because of the forthrightness of the petitioners, large scale corruption rampant in the government departments including the police department came to limelight due to which the administration got annoyed with the petitioners and multiple FIRs came to be lodged against them and the petitioners had to file at least 8 criminal misc. petitions challenging those FIRs. He submitted that finally, negative final reports came to be filed qua almost all the FIRs and resultantly, those criminal misc. petitions were rendered infructuous.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited Court's attention towards the order dated 13.08.2018, passed by this Court in S.B. Criminal Contempt Petition No.400/2010 and highlighted that a Coordinate Bench of this Court had noticed its concern about petitioners' victimization at the hands of State machinery.
12. Learned counsel apprised the court that during the pendency of protest petition, the State moved an application for returning the case diary for further investigation, which came to be rejected by the trial Court vide its order dated 16.12.2014. The trial Court categorically held that the application in question did not disclose any justifiable ground while also observing that no reason has been indicated therein as to why after 4 years of furnishing the final report, further investigation is warranted. It was also recorded by the trial Court that the letter of the Inspector General of Police simply contained an endorsement/ remark to do and no direction to investigate the matter further. (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM)
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13. Learned counsel submitted that though the trial Court had dismissed above referred application observing that it was filed in a cavalier manner, yet another application of similar nature has been filed by the State on 17.05.2022, praying that the case diary of FIR No.47/2010 be returned. But this time, regardless of the fact that the application hardly discloses any reason, the trial Court has accepted it by an unreasoned order passed on the same day (17.05.2022).
14. Oppugning the order dated 17.05.2022, whereby the case diary has been returned giving a liberty to investigate further, learned counsel argued that the trial Court has hastily passed the order no sooner had the police filed the application than the trial Court returned the case diary for further investigation.
15. While reading the short application and the equally short order, learned counsel argued that not only the application but also the order of the Court does not assign any reason for returning the case diary. He remarked that learned Magistrate has passed the impugned order in routine manner, as if an administrative order has been passed.
16. It was argued by Mr. Sandhu that returning of file and the impugned order dated 17.05.2022 amounts to fresh investigation, hence, the trial Court was required to apply its mind and give detailed reasons while doing so.
17. It was next contended by learned counsel that in the teeth of earlier order dated 16.12.2014, where identical request for returning the case diary had been turned down, it was not open for the trial Court to take a u-turn and return the case diary, (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (6 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] pursuant to an application, which was vague and cavalier in nature.
18. It was also argued by learned counsel that neither any fresh material has been collected nor has such material come to light necessitating leave for further investigation. He commented that the State has put the cart before the horse by saying that let the case diary be returned, whereafter the police would collect material by further investigation.
19. It was emphasized that unless the prosecution comes with some additional material and places the same before the Magistrate and establishes that there exists some material or ground requiring further investigation, an application for such purpose cannot be allowed.
20. In support of his contention that an order for further investigation cannot be passed in the manner done by the trial Court, learned counsel relied upon the following judgments:-
(i) Amrubhai Shambhubhai Patel Vs. Sumanbhai Kantibhai Patel and others (2017) 4 SCC 177
(ii) Chug Singh Rajput Vs. State of Rajasthan 2018(3) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1240
(iii) Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu 2020 Cr.L.R (SC) 1251
21. Mr. Vineet Jain, learned Senior Counsel, appearing as Special Public Prosecutor, argued that the writ petition as framed by the petitioners is not maintainable. He argued that firstly order of returning file or permitting further investigation is a judicial/quasi- judicial order and secondly, the petitioners have no vested right to assert that the case diary be not returned and further investigation be not ordered.
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22. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that unless the negative final report is accepted by the Court, the investigating agency can carry out further investigation albeit with the leave of the Court until the stage of framing charges.
23. In respect to the earlier order dated 16.12.2014, which was passed by the trial Court while refusing the request to return the case diary, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the earlier application was rejected on technical ground and a liberty was granted to the State to move fresh application on receipt of any additional material. He argued that the order dated 16.12.2014 cannot be read to mean that State's right to ask for further investigation has been denied for all times to come.
24. In order to satisfy the Court about the fresh material/information, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the complainant has been representing the higher authorities of the police department and requesting to carry out further investigation and when the representation dated 13.05.2022, written by the complainant came to be received by the Superintendent of Police, he referred the mater to the Additional Superintendent of Police, Bikaner City, Bikaner. When the Additional Superintendent of Police examined the matter, he realised the need for further investigation and thus, moved application dated 16.05.2022 in the trial Court on 17.05.2022.
25. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that in his interrogatory note, which was prepared in relation to FIR No. 97 dated 15.04.2012, the accused (petitioner No.2) has clearly accepted that he was possessing 19-20 seals of various departments, including that of Junior Specialist, Satellite Hospital, (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (8 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] Bikaner, which he had used for preparation of certificates with forged signature of the doctor.
26. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that in a haste of completing the investigation or otherwise, the then Investigating Officer had filed negative final report without conducting proper investigation.
27. Navigating the Court through the negative final report No.432 dated 27.12.2013 he submitted that the same is based on conjectures and surmises. He added that despite finding that a number of seals were found at the premises of the petitioners, the then Investigating Officer had superficially observed that ingredients of Sections 420, 463 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code were absent and concluded that no offence had been committed.
28. Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the recent judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in the case of Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr., reported in 2019 Cr.L.R. (SC) 1279 and particularly para Nos.38 and 39 thereof, which are reproduced hereunder:-
"38. There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions as to why a Magistrate's powers to order further investigation would suddenly cease upon process being issued, and an accused appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of the police to further investigate the offence continues right till the stage the trial commences. Such a view would not accord with the earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri (supra), Samaj Parivartan Samudaya (supra), Vinay Tyagi (supra), and Hardeep Singh (supra); Hardeep Singh (supra) having clearly held that a criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only after charges are framed. What is not given any importance at all in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a fair and just conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to the Magistrate's nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (9 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] but that the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases mid-way through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h), and Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this power be exercises suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such jurisdiction on the facts of each case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being caused in concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi (supra). Therefore, to the extent that the judgments in Amrubhai Shambubhai Patel (supra), Athul Rao (supra) and Bikash Ranjan Rout (supra) have held to the contrary, they stand overruled. Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana Vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1997) 1 SCC 361 and Reeta Nag Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2009) 9 SCC 129 also stand overruled.
40. We now come to certain other judgments that were cited before us. King Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmand, AIR 1945 PC 18, was strongly relied upon by Shri Basant for the proposition that unlike superior Courts, Magistrates did not possess any inherent power under the Cr.P.C. Since we have grounded the power of the Magistrate to order further investigation until charges are framed under Section 156(3) read with Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C., no question as to a Magistrate exercising any inherent power under the Cr.P.C. would arise in this case."
29. He further invited Court's attention towards para Nos.40.4 and 40.5 of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Vinay Tyagi Vs. Irshad Ali, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 762 which are being reproduced hereunder:-
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(10 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] "40.4. Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision therein bars exercise of such jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8).
40.5. The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive a construction which would advance the cause of justice and legislative object sould to be achieved. It does not stand to reason that the legislature provided power of further investigation to the police even after filing a report, but intended to curtain the power of the Court to the extent that even where the facts of the case and the ends of justice demand, the Court can still not direct the investigating agency to conduct further investigation which it could do on its own."
30. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of Apex Court in Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi Vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2004) 5 SCC 347.
31. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
32. Before adverting to the submissions made by rival counsel, this Court would like to delve upon the nature of the impugned order dated 17.05.2022. A careful reading of the order suggests that it is not an order of returning case diary simplicitor. It grants a leave or permission to the police to undertake further investigation. When the Court permits further investigation pursuant to a request made by the police or Investigating Officer, it has to satisfy itself about the existence of fresh evidence/material or need of further investigation. But, in no case, the Court is required to pass a detailed order setting out reasons for the same, particularly when the magistrates propose to allow an application filed by the Investigating Officer/Agency. (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM)
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33. Since such order is not a quasi-judicial order, neither the accused is required to be heard nor is the application/letter filed for such purpose by the Investigating Officer required to contain reasons. This Court is not much convinced with the argument of Mr. Sandhu that the Investigating Officer has put the cart before the horse and has first claimed the case diary to find reasons to file supplementary charge-sheet.
34. The petitioners' contention that in the face of earlier order dated 16.12.2014, whereby the Court had turned down the request for returning the case diary moved by the police, fresh application was not maintainable, appears to be attractive on the first blush but it turns out to be lacking substance, if considered carefully.
35. True it is, that the State's earlier application was rejected by the trial Court with an observation that no reasons have been assigned but according to this Court, it is the subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate having due regard to the nature of allegations involved, final report and the other incriminating material made available by the police authorities to the Court to enable it to opine as to whether the case diary should be returned for further investigation or not.
36. Both the learned counsel have cited a number of judgments, which are on general principles governing Magistrate's power to order further investigation. None of the judgments throw light on the core question involved herein. Hence, this Court does not deem it necessary to deal with those judgments individually.
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37. In light of the judicial precedents including those cited at the Bar, it is settled that the Court has the power to order further investigation until the stage of framing of the charges. But, the question as to whether such order should contain reasons for the same, does not come forth from the judgments cited.
38. According to this Court, it is the discretion of the Magistrate to order or permit further investigation, of course as per his subjective satisfaction based on material available. Exercise of such discretion pre-supposes application of mind hence, an order of further investigation cannot be passed as a matter of course. It is to be understood that application of mind by itself does not call for recording of reasons - the reasons may be express or implied.
39. In the instant case while passing the order for further investigation vide its proceedings of 17.05.2022, the trial Court has not recorded reasons, which in the opinion of this Court is permissible, particularly when the Court has clearly recorded that it has perused the file and application moved by the police.
40. Mr. Jain, learned Senior Counsel, asserted that the expression "i=koyh" used in the proceedings of 17.05.2022 does not refer to the available case record. It points towards office copy of the case diary commonly known as C.O. File and other documents placed therein.
41. Learned Public Prosecutor has produced copy of case diary (C.O. Diary) which contains various other documents than those are contained in the case diary. While wading through the same it has transpired that on 13.05.2022, a representation has been addressed by the complainant (Kundanmal Bohra) underscoring (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (13 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] that the then Investigating Officer had not conducted any inquiry about the signatures, which were inscribed along with the seal (rubber stamp) of Junior Specialist to ascertain as to whether the signatures are genuine or not.
42. Pursuant to the representation, the Superintendent of Police, Bikaner asked the Additional Superintendent of Police, Bikaner City, Bikaner to give his factual report, whereupon the Additional Superintendent of Police, on 16.05.2022, found and reported that on 23.09.2010, the Forensic Science Laboratory, Jodhpur, vide its letter No.276, had communicated that the Investigating Officer had sent the specimen of the impression of the seal on a paper instead of sending the contentious seal (rubber stamp) itself. It is also noteworthy that on 05.10.2013, the Circle Inspector, vide his letter dated 02.05.2013, had asked the S.H.O., P.S. Naya Shahar, Bikaner to obtain the original seal (rubber stamp) and send the same to the Laboratory, but nothing was done in this regard.
43. For the sake of convenience, the relevant fact noticed by the Additional Superintendent of Police, Bikaner City, Bikaner is reproduced hereinfra:-
"rRi'pkr i=koyh esa vfxze vuqla/kku vuqd`fr mTtSfu;k o`rkf/kdkjh uxj }kjk vuqla/kku "kq: fd;k tkdj xokg tSrdaoj xks;y rRdkfyu dEikmaMj lSVsykbZV vLirky chdkusj ls vuqla/kku dj c;ku ys[kc) fd;sA izdj.k esa iwoZ esa ,Q,l,y gsrq Hksth xbZ lhy eksgj ds feyku ds laca/k esa ,Q,l,y tks/kiqj }kjk vius i= dzekad fnukad 23-09-10- dk izkIr gqvk ftles ,rjkt fd;k x;k fd fooknxzLr eqgj u Hkst dj blds uewuk eksgj rS;kj dj Hksth tkuh pkfg;s ftl ij o`rkf/kdkjh us vius i= dzekad 2573 fnukad 05-10-13 }kjk Fkkukf/kdkjh iqfyl Fkkuk u;k"kgj chdkusj dks funsZ"k fn;s x;s fd mDr "khYM"kqnk eksgj iSdsV dks ekuuh; U;k;ky; ds le{k is"k dj "khYM"kwnk iSdSV dh lhy rqMok;k tkdj "khYM eqgj dk uequk fy;k tkdj iSdsV dks iqu% "khYM djok;k tkos o fooknxzLr nLrkost (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (14 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] guqekuflag ij yxh eksgj dk feyku gsrq i= okLrs ijh{k.k iqu% tkjh djok;k tkosA fdarq bl laca/k esa vfxze dk;Zokgh djus lacaf/kr i=-koyh dh fdlh Hkh lhMh esa dksbZ vadu ugha gS blls Li'V gS fd mijksDr ds laca/k esa vfxze dk;Zokgh fu'ikfnr ugha dh xbZ gSA"
44. It is, therefore, clear that an important aspect has come to the notice of the Additional Superintendent of Police that the stamp/seal in original was not sent for FSL for which, requisite investigation as to whether the contentious rubber stamp (seal), which was recovered during the raid at petitioners' premises was stolen or was got prepared by the petitioners. When this fact came to the notice of the learned Magistrate, he proceeded to permit further investigation.
45. True it is, that no reasons have been assigned by the learned Magistrate for doing the same. In the opinion of this Court, he was not required to set out reasons for the same, when the leave to carry out further investigation is granted.
46. It is to be noted that the police itself has the power to conduct further investigation. But, by way of judicial pronouncement, such power has been circumscribed and a check has been carved out that it should be done with the leave of the Magistrate. It has been held that the propriety demands that the Investigating Officer should inform and take permission from the Magistrate. There is a subtle difference between ordering further investigation and permitting further investigation. Ordering further investigation requires recording of reasons, however, brief they may be and permission for further investigation does not necessarily require recording of reasons.
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47. In the case of Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya (supra), the Apex Court has held that whether further investigation should be ordered or not is discretion of the learned Magistrate based on the facts of each case. When the Magistrate discards a final report of its own accord or pursuant to a protest petition and directs the Investigating Officer to carry out further investigation, the situation may be slightly different. Then, he is supposed to give reasons in brief why he does not agree with the conclusion drawn and/or what aspect has not been investigated by the police.
48. It has been the contention of the petitioners that further investigation is being carried out without any reason or rhyme, simply with a view to harass the petitioners. In order to ward off any such eventuality, this Court has examined and satisfied itself about the need of further investigation while exercising its inherent power.
49. In this process, the negative final report, which was filed on 27.12.2013, has also been perused. On a simple reading thereof, it is apparent that the investigation done by the then Investigating Officer was cursory rather perfunctory. He has drawn his conclusion on the basis of conjectures and surmises.
50. Having found that an official seal (stamp) was recovered from the premises of the petitioners and that it was used/misused in verifying the documents, including the ones which were submitted by the petitioner No.1 for obtaining arms license, it was incumbent upon the Investigating Officer to thoroughly examine as to whether such seal (of Junior Specialist) and other seals (rubber stamps) were used/misused by the petitioners claiming (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (16 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] themselves to be advocates in other transactions or not, particularly when it was a specific allegation of the complainant.
51. That apart, in the face of the statements given by all the Junior Specialists, posted in Satellite Hospital, Bikaner that the signatures on the application for arms license were not theirs, it was all the more a matter of concern and required thorough probe.
52. The final report makes it abundantly clear that the Investigating Officer was much swayed by the fact that the petitioner No.1 did not get the arms license. In the opinion of this Court, the end result that the petitioner No.1 was not granted arms license is of little avail. The commission of offence of forgery (if any), is not dependent upon the consequence of getting or not getting the license, but simply creating a false and forged document - the very act of inscribing forged signatures and using the official seal (stamp) of Junior Specialist of Satellite Hospital prima-facie constitutes an offence because the words used in Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is 'dishonestly induces'.
53. The Investigating Officer has seriously erred in concluding that the requisite ingredients of Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code are absent because there was no malafide intention to gain undue advantage and to cause loss to the others.
54. In the opinion of this Court, getting the documents attested with the forged signature and unauthorised seal (rubber stamp) itself is indicative of guilty animus that the petitioner No.1 wanted to gain undue advantage/gain of procuring the license for the arms. The expression "whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any (Downloaded on 13/07/2022 at 08:16:55 PM) (17 of 17) [CRLW-229/2022] person" brings within its fold the act of inducing a public authority to deliver arms license, which in a way is a valuable right having traces of 'property'.
55. As an upshot of the discussion foregoing, the final report, which was filed by the Investigating Officer on 27.12.2013, in relation to FIR No.47 at P.S. Naya Shahar, Bikaner was shoddy and perfunctory, if not malafide.
56. On over-all assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case and material available, this Court does not find any error in the impugned decision of the Magistrate allowing further investigation and returning the case diary for such purpose.
57. The writ petitions, therefore, fail.
58. The stay applications also stand disposed of accordingly.
(DINESH MEHTA),J 220-221-skm/-
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