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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Naginder Singh And Ors vs State Of Punjab And Anr on 2 May, 2024
Author: Anoop Chitkara
Bench: Anoop Chitkara
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:061782
CRM-M No. 16115 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M No. 16115 of 2024
Reserved on: 01.05.2024
Pronounced on: 02.05.2024
Naginder Singh and others
......Pe oners
Vs.
State of Punjab and another
......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present: Mr. J.K. Singla, Advocate
for the pe oners.
Mr. Kanav Bansal, D.A.G., Punjab.
Ms. Shivani Singla, Advocate
for the complainant.
****
ANOOP CHITKARA J.
FIR No. Dated Police Sta on Sec ons
34 03.05.2010 Dayalpura, District 323, 336, 148, 149 IPC and 25, 27
Bathinda of Arms Act, 1959
1. The pe oners, arraigned as accused in the above cap oned FIR, have
come up before this Court under Sec on 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequen al proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved person.
2. During the pendency of criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved person have compromised the ma?er, and its copy is annexed with this pe on as Annexure P-2.
3. AAer that, the pe oners came up before this Court to quash the FIR, and in the quashing pe on, impleading the aggrieved person as respondent No.2.
4. On 16.04.2024, the aggrieved person Sukhjinder Singh (R-2) appeared before the JMIC, Phul and stated that there would be no objec on if the court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings. As per the concerned court's report dated 26.04.2024, the par es consented to the quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings without any threat.
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5. Despite the severe opposi on of the State's counsel to this compromise, the following aspects would be relevant to conclude this pe on: -
a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably se?led the ma?er between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the concerned Court;
b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the se?lement has not been secured through coercion, threats, social boyco?s, bribes, or other dubious means;
c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullifica on of criminal proceedings;
d) There is no objec on from the private respondent in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed;
e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve ma?ers concerning public policy;
f) The rejec on of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial affects career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to bring peace to family, community, and society;
i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequen al proceedings is jus fied to secure the ends of jus ce.
6. The injured and all the accused had appeared before the Court of JMIC and had stated that they had entered into a compromise. The report of the concerned Court is extracted as follows:-
"On 16.04.2024, complainant Sukhjinder Singh appeared before the undersigned and the accused namely Naginder Singh, Balvir Singh, Veerpal Kaur, Sukhpal Singh @ Pal 2 2 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 07-05-2024 00:12:37 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:061782 CRM-M No. 16115 of 2024 Singh, Kala Singh @ Manpreet Singh and Manpreet Singh suffered statement to the effect that they have entered into compromise with complainant, namely, Sukhjinder Singh, in FIR No.34 dated 03.05.2010, Under Sec1on 323, 336, 148, 149 IPC and 25/27 Arms Act, PS Dialpura, District Bathinda. They further placed on record photocopies of their Aadhar cards as Mark-B to Mark-G. Even, the complainant Sukhjinder Singh stated that he has no objec1on if the FIR No. 34 dated 03.05.2010, Under Sec1ons 323, 336, 148, 149 IPC and 25/27 Arms Act, PS Dialpura, District Bathinda lodged against abovesaid accused persons be quashed in terms of the compromise. He further stated that the present FIR was lodged by him against accused Naginder Singh, Balvir Singh, Veerpal Kaur, Sukhpal Singh @ Pal Singh, Kala Singh @ Manpreet Singh and Manpreet Singh only. He placed on record copy of Aadhar Card as Mark-A. The compromise has been arrived at between the par1es without any coercion, undue influence or any pressure. Therea@er, ASI Amrinder Singh No.1757/BTI, P.S. Dialpura, appeared on 26.04.2024 and has stated that the accused persons namely Naginder Singh, Balvir Singh, Veerpal Kaur, Sukhpal Singh @ Pal Singh, Kala Singh @ Manpreet Singh and Manpreet Singh are involved in FIR No.34 dated 03.05.2010, Under Sec1ons 323, 336, 148, 149 IPC and 25/27 Arms Act, PS Dialpura, District Bathinda. He further stated that no persons have been declared as proclaimed offender in above said FIR or any other case. He further stated that the present FIR was lodged against accused namely Naginder Singh, Balvir Singh, Veerpal Kaur, Sukhpal Singh @ Pal Singh, Kala Singh @ Manpreet Singh and Manpreet Singh by Sukhjinder Singh who is the only complainant/vic1m in the present case. The point wise report is as under:-
1. As per the statement of ASI Amrinder Singh No.1757/BTI, P.S. Dialpura, there are only six accused namely Naginder Singh, Balvir Singh, Veerpal Kaur, Sukhpal Singh @ Pal Singh, Kala Singh @ Manpreet Singh and Manpreet Singh in the present case.3
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2. As per the statement of ASI Amrinder Singh No.1757/BTI, P.S. Dialpura, the present pe11on has been filed by all the accused persons.
3. As per the statement of ASI Amrinder Singh No.1757/BTI, P.S. Dialpura, no accused has been declared proclaimed offender in this case or in any other case.
4. The compromise effected between the par1es appears to be genuine voluntary and without any coercion or undue influence. Statements of par1es were duly recorded before the undersigned and they were duly iden1fied by their respec1ve counsels.
5. As per the statement of ASI Amrinder Singh No.1757/BTI, P.S. Dialpura, accused namely Balvir Singh son of Mukh1ar Singh is involved in FIR no. 62 dated 21.07.2000 under Sec1on 61 of the Excise Act, PS Dialpura, FIR No. 161 dated 30.11.2003, under Sec1on 323/324 of the IPC, PS Dialpura, FIR No. 7 dated 10.01.2018 under Sec1on 15 of the NDPS Act, PS Dialpura, FIR No. 161 dated 02.11.2023 under Sec1on 306 IPC, PS Dialpura, FIR No. 176 dated 14.11.2015 under Sec1on 15 of NDPS Act, PS Dialpura. The accused Sukhpal Singh is arrayed as an accused in FIR No. 85 dated 26.08.2008 under Sec1on 354 IPC, PS Dialpura.
The accused Manpreet Singh son of Malkeet Singh is arrayed as an accused in FIR No. 73 dated 03.06.2018 under Sec1on 447, 511, 427, 149 of the IPC PS Dialpura.
6. As per the statement of ASI Amrinder Singh No.1757/BTI, P.S. Dialpura, there is one complainant namely Sukhjinder Singh son of Jarnail Singh in the present case.
7. Yes, the complainant and the injured have been impleaded as par1es in the present pe11on."
Perusal of the report clarifies that there is no reference of receipt of sanc on under Arms Act from the concerned District Magistrate, as such this Court is only concerned with the offences other than Arms Act.
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7. In the present case, the offences under sec on 336, 148, & 149 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) are not compoundable under Sec on 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecu on qua the non-compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings.
8. In Y. Suresh Babu v State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 347, Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with sec on 326 of IPC, which was non-compoundable offence, permi?ed the par es to compound the offence.
9. In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 2014:INSC:496 [Para 4] , 21.7.2014, Supreme Court holds, [4]. Now, the ques on before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sec ons 326 and 307 of the IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Sec on 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 :
(2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under sec on 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the par es have amicably se?led their disputes and the vic m has no objec on, even though the offences are non-
compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discre on to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are en rely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of jus ce, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecu on becomes a lame prosecu on. Pursuing such a lame prosecu on would be waste of me and energy. That will also unse?le the compromise and obstruct restora on of peace.
10. In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not 5 5 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 07-05-2024 00:12:37 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:061782 CRM-M No. 16115 of 2024 compoundable under Sec on 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a convic on against the accused and the en re exercise of a trial is des ned to be an exercise in fu lity. There is a subtle dis nc on between compounding of offences by the par es before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecu on under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against convic on, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a se?lement arrived at between the par es in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Sec on 320, the High Court may quash the prosecu on even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code are not for that purpose controlled by Sec on 320 Criminal Procedure Code Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Sec on 482 Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and cau on. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that con nuance of the prosecu on would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situa ons in which the exercise of power under Sec on 482 may be jus fied. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of jus ce and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be jus fied in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a pe on under Sec on 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.
11. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, 2017:INSC:1003, [Para 15], (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are reproduced as follows: -
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following proposi ons:
16 (i) Sec on 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of jus ce. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invoca on of the jurisdic on of the High Court to quash a First Informa on Report or a criminal proceeding on 6 6 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 07-05-2024 00:12:37 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:061782 CRM-M No. 16115 of 2024 the ground that a se?lement has been arrived at between the offender and the vic m is not the same as the invoca on of jurisdic on for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of sec on 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Sec on 482 is a?racted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdic on under Sec on 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of jus ce would jus fy the exercise of the inherent power; 16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of jus ce or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Informa on Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and vic m have se?led the dispute, revolves ul mately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaus ve elabora on of principles can be formulated; 16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Sec on 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been se?led, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the vic m or the family of the vic m have se?led the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to con nue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences; 16 (vii) As dis nguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a dis nct foo ng in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned; 16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercan le, partnership or similar transac ons with an essen ally civil flavour may in appropriate situa ons fall for quashing where par es have se?led the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a convic on is remote and the con nua on of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16 (x) There is yet an excep on to the principle set out in proposi ons (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implica ons which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be jus fied in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an ac vity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour.
The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
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12. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on 29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [11]. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable' cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers under Sec on 320 Cr.P.C. Any such a?empt by the court would amount to altera on, addi on and modifica on of Sec on 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Sec on 320 Cr.P.C., which may jus fy its wider interpreta on and include such offences in the docket of 'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdic on to compound an offence within the framework of Sec on 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for jus fiable reasons can press Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of jus ce.
[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that par es have amicably se?led their dispute and the vic m has willingly consented to the nullifica on of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequen al effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereaAer adopt a pragma c approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not nker with or paralyze the very object of the administra on of criminal jus ce system. [13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non- heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespec ve of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against convic on. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering jus ce. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful excep ons. It goes without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck postconvic on, the High Court ought to exercise such discre on with rec tude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and aAer the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraordinary power under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of jus ce. There can be no hard and fast line constric ng the power of the High Court to do substan al jus ce. A restric ve construc on of inherent powers under Sec on 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious jus ce, which in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injus ce. On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as 8 8 of 10 ::: Downloaded on - 07-05-2024 00:12:37 ::: Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:061782 CRM-M No. 16115 of 2024 cau ously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6 SCC 466, ¶ 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15].
[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve ma?ers concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the poten al to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a 'se?lement' through duress, threats, social boyco?s, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty man escape, if it can be avoided."
13. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Jus ce arises propi ously when par es, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
14. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compromise, placement of par es, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the compromise deed and its objec ves point towards its acceptance.
15. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Associa on v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Pe on (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that ma?er was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave Pe ons against the order of the High Court rejec ng their pe on for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ pe on has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automa cally stands vi ated."
16. Considering the en re facts, compromise, and in the light of the above- men oned judicial precedents, I believe that con nuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruiVul purpose whatsoever.
17. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdic on under sec on 482 CrPC and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the pe oner(s). The bail bonds of the pe oner are accordingly discharged. All pending applica on(s), if any, stand closed.
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18. Given the nature of allega ons and the other circumstances peculiar to this case, the pe oner/accused shall surrender all weapons, firearms, ammuni on, if any, and the arms license to the concerned authority within thirty days from today and inform the concerned SHO about the compliance, however, if the police chief of the concerned district, (S.P./S.S.P/Commissioner), gives wri?en permission by passing a reasoned order to arrive at such a decision to retain the firearms and license and in that case, this condi on shall not be applicable. If the pe oner does not have such licence, then no such permission should be granted to acquire firearms and ammuni on. However, if the police chief of the concerned district (S.P./S.S.P/Commissioner) gives wri?en permission through a reasoned order to get the firearms and license, then this condi on shall not be applicable.
19. Pe++on allowed in the terms men+oned above. All pending applica ons, if any also stands disposed.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
02.05.2024
Jyo Sharma
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether reportable: No.
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