Orissa High Court
Badrinaryan Mishra vs State Of Odisha on 12 September, 2025
Author: B.P. Routray
Bench: B.P. Routray
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA
Designation: Personal Assistant
Reason: Authentication
Location: OHC, Cuttack
Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
WP(C) No.1462 of 2024
(In the matter of an application under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India)
Badrinaryan Mishra .... Petitioner
-versus-
State of Odisha, represented
through its Principal Secretary,
Home Department and Others ... Opposite Parties
Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
For Petitioner : Mr. P.K. Nanda, Advocate
For Opp. Parties : Mr. S.K. Rout, ASC
CORAM: JUSTICE B.P. ROUTRAY
JUDGMENT
th 12 September, 2025 B.P. Routray, J.
1. Heard Mr. P.K. Nanda, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. S.K. Rout, learned ASC for State - Opposite Parties.
2. The Petitioner, who was holding Arms Licence No. 257/2002/ Cuttack, has approached this court against the order of the authority dated 3rd September, 2020 under Annexure-4 thereby suspending his WP(C) No.1462 of 2024 Page 1 of 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24 arms licence with direction to surrender the arms. The said order of the authority under Annexure-4 having been challenged before the appellate authority, has been confirmed vide order dated 8th January, 2024 under Annexure-8. Both the orders are challenged in the present writ petition.
3. The facts of the case are that the Petitioner was the holder of Arms Licence No.257/2002/Cuttack granted by the Collector and Arms Magistrate, Cuttack vide order dated 22nd October, 2001. The Petitioner by profession is a businessman and after availing arms licence in his favour he possessed two fire arms, one a .32 bore revolver along with ammunitions and another a .32 bore NPB pistol along with ammunitions.
4. Before grant of licence in the year 2002, the Petitioner was involved in Kharavelanagar P.S. Case No.250 dated 1st October, 2001 registered under Section 47(a) of the Bihar and Odisha Excise Act for illegal possession of huge quantity of IMFL liquor. Subsequently he was also involved in Bhubaneswar EOW P.S. Case No.22 dated 31st October, 2018 registered for commission of offences under Section 420/467/468/471/406 of I.P.C. on the report lodged by the Bank authority.
5. After coming to know about involvement of the Petitioner in criminal cases and considering the report of the Deputy Commissioner of WP(C) No.1462 of 2024 Page 2 of 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24 Police, the Commissioner of Police, Bhubaneswar-Cuttack vide his order dated 3rd September, 2020 suspended the arms licence of the Petitioner in exercise of his power under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act after considering the show cause reply submitted by the Petitioner. Being aggrieved by the same, the Petitioner preferred appeal which was also rejected under Annexure-8.
6. It is submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that though his involvement in two criminal cases, as stated above, are not disputed but the fact remains that none of such cases alleges misuse of fire arms in committing those offences. It is further submitted that the Petitioner is having a licensed IMFL shop at Bhubaneswar and therefore, his involvement for alleged commission of offence under the Bihar and Odisha Excise Act would have no connection with possession of the fire arm. Secondly, the case of fraud as alleged by the Bank authority in EOW P.S. Case No.22/2018 has also no connection with possession of the fire arm with the Petitioner and in fact said case has been negotiated with the Bank authorities in the meantime. Therefore the apprehension raised by the authority to suspend his arms license is without any basis and unsupported by substantial material.
WP(C) No.1462 of 2024 Page 3 of 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24
7. As seen from the impugned order under Annexure-4, the competent authority in exercise of his discretion under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act has suspended the license of the Petitioner as the same was considered essential in public interest. Clause (b) of sub-Section (3) of Section 17 authorizes the licensing authority to suspend the arms license for such period or to revoke the license, if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of public peace or for public safety. For better appreciation Section 17(3) is reproduced bellow:-
"17. Xx .. xx ....
(3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence-
(a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or
(b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or
(c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or WP(C) No.1462 of 2024 Page 4 of 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24
(d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or
(e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence."
8. A plain reading of the provisions contained in clause (b) of Sub- Section (3), as stated above, shows the discretion of the licensing authority about his subjective satisfaction regarding public peace, security and safety. In Barium Chemicals Ltd vs- Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295, it is held that the expressions 'is satisfied', 'is of the opinion', or 'has reasons to believe' are indicative of subjective satisfaction, though it is true that the nature of power has to be determined on a totality of consideration of all relevant provisions.
9. In State of Maharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, (2008) 3 SCC 613, it has been observed as follows:-
"38. Subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power of preventive detention conferred on the executive, the court can always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at by the authority; if it is not, the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad.
39. A court cannot go into correctness or otherwise of the facts stated or allegations levelled in the grounds in support of detention. A court of law is "the last appropriate tribunal to investigate into circumstances of suspicion on which such WP(C) No.1462 of 2024 Page 5 of 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24 anticipatory action must be largely based". That, however, does not mean that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is wholly immune from judicial reviewability. By judicial decisions, courts have carved out areas, though limited, within which the validity of subjective satisfaction can be tested judicially."
10. Further, in CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., (1983) 4 SCC 392, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that;
"11. By now, the parameters of the Court's power of judicial review of administrative or executive action or decision and the grounds on which the Court can interfere with the same are well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions of this Court commencing from Barium Chemicals case [Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967 SC 295 : 1966 Supp. SCR 311 : (1966) 36 Com Cas 639] on the point. Indisputably, it is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the Court would be justified in interfering with the same. This Court in one of its later decisions in Shalini Soni v. Union of India [(1980) 4 SCC 544 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 38 : AIR 1981 SC 431 : (1981) 1 SCR 962] has observed thus: "It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote". Suffice it to say that the following passage appearing at pp. 285-86 in Prof. WP(C) No.1462 of 2024 Page 6 of 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24 de Smith's treatise Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4th Edn.) succinctly summarises the several principles formulated by the Courts in that behalf thus:
"The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories; failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account; and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. Nor, is it possible to differentiate with precision the grounds of invalidity contained within each category."WP(C) No.1462 of 2024 Page 7 of 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA
Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24
11. In the case at hand, the impugned order under Annexure-4 speaks that before getting his satisfaction for a direction to suspend the licence the authority had called for a show cause reply from the Petitioner and after going through the same and considering all such materials on record regarding the profession of the Petitioner and his necessity to possess the fire arm, has found it appropriate to revoke the arms licence of the Petitioner in the interest of public safety. When an statutory authority is exercising his power after his satisfaction on the subject considering the materials brought on record thereof, this court has the limited scope to interfere with the same.
12. The fact of involvement of the Petitioner in two criminal cases having not been disputed, his reasons assigned for challenging the impugned order that none of the offences do allege involvement or use of any fire arm could not be a satisfactory answer in reply to the satisfaction on the part of the authority.
13. In the instant case when the criminal cases are still pending against the Petitioner the assertions made on his part that it would no way affect the use of fire arms to disturb public safety is not found convincing. At the same time it needs to be mentioned here that when the licensing authority having considered all such materials on record WP(C) No.1462 of 2024 Page 8 of 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MANAS KUMAR PANDA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC, Cuttack Date: 16-Sep-2025 11:28:24 has satisfied about the threat posed by the Petitioner for possessing the fire arms to the public peace and safety it would not be wise on the part of this court to interfere with the same on the facts that the conduct of the Petitioner is not justifying such action on the part of the licensing authority. Therefore the impugned order under Annexure-4 and confirmation of the same by the appellate authority under Annexure-8 does not warrant any interference. The writ petition is dismissed. However, as prayed by the petitioner he is at liberty to apply for renewal of licence before the authority after disposal of the criminal cases pending against him.
( B.P. Routray) Judge M.K. Panda/P.A WP(C) No.1462 of 2024 Page 9 of 9