Sushanta Kumar Sahu vs State Of Odisha & Anr. .... Opposite ...

Orissa High Court

Sushanta Kumar Sahu vs State Of Odisha & Anr. .... Opposite ... on 12 September, 2025

Author: Chittaranjan Dash

Bench: Chittaranjan Dash

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                     CRLMC No. 471 of 2016

  Sushanta Kumar Sahu             ....                       Petitioner
                                       Mr. B. S. Rayaguru,
                                                 Rayaguru Advocate
                               -versus-

  State of Odisha & Anr.          ....                Opposite Parties
                                           Mr. R. B. Dash,
                                                     Dash Addl. P.P

                    CORAM:
  THE HON'BLE
          BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
                   Date of Judgment: 12.09.2025

Chittaranjan Dash, J.

1. Heard learned counsels for both the parties.

2. The background facts of the case, in brief, are that on 26.11.2013, one Abhiram Sethy lodged a written report before the I.I.C., Chhendipada, alleging that on the same day at about 12.00 noon, while he was returning home from Bagadia on his motorcycle, the Petitioner along with five others obstructed his way near the village High School, abused him in filthy language, and the Petitioner further assaulted him on the head with an iron rod, causing injury. It was further alleged that the Petitioner also hurled caste-related related abuses at the Informant. On the basis of the said report, Chhendipada P.S. Case No.233 of 2013 was registered for the offences under Sections 341/323/294/506/34 IPC read with Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act. Upon Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet charge sheet was submitted, whereafter the learned court took cognizance of the offences and issued process against the Petitioner.

3. Mr. Rayaguru, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that the Petitioner had earlier approached approached this Court in CRLMC No.6188 of 2014 praying for quashing of the FIR, wherein this Court, by order dated 16.12.2014, declined to interfere and permitted the investigation to proceed. It is further contended that the impugned order taking cognizance cognizance suffers from illegality inasmuch as it is based on no evidence; neither the FIR nor the materials on record disclose any prima facie case to implicate the Petitioner in the alleged offences. Learned counsel argues that allegations in the FIR are false, inherently inherently improbable, and such that no prudent person could arrive at the conclusion that they are sufficient to proceed against the Petitioner. Hence, the impugned order, being not in consonance with law, deserves to be quashed. The learned counsel for the the Petitioner relied upon the decisions reported in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. The State of Uttar another reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 668;

Karuppudayar vs. State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent of others reported in AIR 2025 SC 705;

Police, Lalgudi Trichy & others, Chirag Sen & another Etc. vs. State of Karnataka & another, another reported in 2025 INSC 903;

903 Gorige Pentaiah vs. State of A.P. & others,, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 531; Hitesh Verma vs. The State another reported in AIR 2020 SC 5584.

of Uttarakhan & another, 5584

4. Per contra, Mr. Dash, learned counsel for the State vehemently opposed the contentions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner. It is submitted that the allegations made in the FIR, duly supported by the statements of the witnesses recorded during investigation, clearly disclose the the commission of cognizable offences and prima facie implicate the Petitioner. However, at the CRLMC No. 471 of 2016 20 Page 2 of 8 stage of cognizance, the Court is only required to see whether a prima facie case exists and not to meticulously evaluate the sufficiency of evidence for conviction.

conviction. Since the investigation culminated in a charge-sheet charge sheet and the learned Magistrate, upon due consideration, has taken cognizance of the offences, the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal or without basis. Hence, the prayer for quashing, as made by the Petitioner, is devoid of merit and liable to be rejected.

rejected

5. In this context, it is apposite to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 668, 668 as follows -

"17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at a place within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abuses at the complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to humiliate him. From the charge-sheet charge sheet dated 21st January, 2016 filed by the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/STSC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge-

charge sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not "in any place within public view", the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time of the incident (of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was present.

18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the complainant complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any further to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet charge that the same makes kes no reference to the utterances of the appellant during the course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the complainant belonged, except for the allegation/observation that caste-related caste related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be clear clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with casteist remarks.

Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars invocation of thee court's jurisdiction under section 438, Cr.PC and having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances utterances made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R. (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and events), but at least in the charge-sheet charge (which is prepared based either on statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the situation before it, prior prior to taking cognisance of the offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied CRLMC No. 471 of 2016 20 Page 4 of 8 in a case of the present nature, the charge-sheet charge sheet dated 21st January, 2016 does not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the appellant under sectionn 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial."

trial.

6. Similarly, in Karuppudayar vs. State Rep. By The Deputy Police Lalgudi Trichy & others,, reported in Superintendent of Police, 705 the Hon'ble Court reiterated the settled position AIR 2025 SC 705, that the insult or intimidation must be in a place 'within public view' and by using the caste name of the victim.

"9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-SC-ST Act would reveal that for constituting an offence of thereunder, it has to be established that the accused intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence under Section Secti 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST SC ST Act, it will be necessary that the accused abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.

10. The term "any place within public view" initially came up for consideration before before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh and others v. State through Standing Counsel and another1. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and another2 referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal position as under:

"14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State,, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place"

and "in any place within public view". It was held 1 (2008) 8 SCC 435 2 (2020) 10 SCC 710 CRLMC No. 471 of 2016 20 Page 5 of 8 that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh,, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, 736d and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:"Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view."] . The Court Co held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, 443 para 28) "28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with wit the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the CRLMC No. 471 of 2016 20 Page 6 of 8 municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha sab or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies."

(emphasis in original)

11.. It could thus be seen that, to be a place 'within public view', the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the th utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view."

view.

7. The emphasis laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, decisions is crystal clear that mere allegation of abuse, without the utterances being made in any place 'within public view' and without reference to the caste name of the victim, does not constitute an offence under the SC/ST (PoA) Act. The Court has categorically held that every insult or altercation involving a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe will not ipso facto fall within the sweep of Section 3(1) of the Act unless it is shown that the insult was targeted at the victim for belonging to such caste and was made in a place where it could be witnessed by the public. This judicial pronouncement underscores that the SC/ST Act, being a stringent statute with overriding effect, effe must be invoked only when its foundational ingredients are clearly established, and not on vague or omnibus allegations.

8. Having regard to the settled position of law, upon examination of the present case, case it is seen that after completion of investigation, on, the Police have submitted a charge-sheet charge sheet bringing on record substantial materials indicating that the Petitioner had hurled caste-related related abuses, and the utterances attributed to him prima CRLMC No. 471 of 2016 20 Page 7 of 8 facie attract the provisions of the SC/ST (PoA) Act. The question questi as to whether such utterances were made within public view or not is essentially a matter of evidence, which can only be adjudicated during the course of trial, and no ground is made out at this stage to absolve the Petitioner from the rigour of law. The The FIR, on its face, also discloses allegations of threat, intimidation and assault which, taken together with the materials in the charge-sheet, charge sheet, bring the Petitioner within the ambit of the offences alleged. The pleas raised by the Petitioner, being matters matters of defence, can appropriately be agitated in the course of trial. In this connection, it is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, Lal reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, 335, that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article Article 226 of the Constitution is to be exercised sparingly. It is further emphasised ed that for an offence under the SC/ST Act to be made out, the allegations must disclose that caste-

caste related abuses were hurled within public view and directed at the victim on account of his caste. However, the determination of these ingredients being a matter of evidence, such issues cannot be gone into at the stage of cognizance or in a petition for quashing. In the absence of any cogent ground warranting interference at this stage, the Petition does not merit consideration and stands liable to be rejected. Hence, ordered. The CRLMC is accordingly dismissed.

(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BIJAY KETAN SAHOO Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 15-Sep-2025Bijay 19:18:55 CRLMC No. 471 of 2016 20 Page 8 of 8