Kerala High Court
Ashkar vs State Of Kerala on 27 October, 2025
Author: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
Bench: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
2025:KER:80334
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
MONDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2025 / 5TH KARTHIKA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 37737 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
ASHKAR
AGED 35 YEARS
S/O ABDUL HAKEEM, VAZHAKALAYIL VEEDU, NEETHIVILASAM
COLONY DESOM, ERIYAD, KODUNGALLOOR, THRISSUR.,
PIN - 670112
BY ADVS.
SHRI.M.H.HANIS
SMT.T.N.LEKSHMI SHANKAR
SMT.NANCY MOL P.
SHRI.ANANDHU P.C.
SMT.NEETHU.G.NADH
SMT.RIA ELIZABETH T.J.
SHRI.SAHAD M. HANIS
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HOME AND
VIGILANCE DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE,
RANGE OFFICE, THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 670002
3 THE CHAIRMAN
ADVISORY BOARD, KAAPA, SREENIVAS, PADAM ROAD,
VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, ELAMAKKARA,ERNAKULAM DIST, PIN -
682026
BY ADVS.
SRI.K.A.ANAS, G.P.
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
27.10.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
WP(C) No.37737 of 2025 :: 2 ::
2025:KER:80334
JUDGMENT
Jobin Sebastian, J.
This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P1 order of externment passed against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. By the said order, the petitioner was interdicted from entering the limits of the Revenue District Thirssur for a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the order.
2. The records available before us reveal that, it was after considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities on 13.07.2025, the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural submitted a proposal for the initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the jurisdictional authority, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range. For initiation of proceedings, the petitioner has been classified as a "known rowdy" as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007.
3. The authority considered five cases in which the petitioner got involved while passing the order of externment. The case registered against the petitioner with respect to the last prejudicial WP(C) No.37737 of 2025 :: 3 ::
2025:KER:80334 activity is crime No.1191/2025 of Kodungallur Police Station, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110, 296(b) r/w 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short "BNS").
4. Heard Sri.M.H.Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. According to the counsel, there is an inordinate delay in passing the impugned order, and hence, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment is snapped. The learned counsel further urged that the jurisdictional authority ought to have taken note of the fact that already proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner under Section 126 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (for short "BNSS"), 2023, and the same would have been sufficient to prevent the petitioner from being involved in criminal activities. On these premises, it was urged that the impugned order of externment is liable to be set aside.
6. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority WP(C) No.37737 of 2025 :: 4 ::
2025:KER:80334 after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Government Pleader, there is no unreasonable delay in passing the impugned order, and hence, the petitioner could not be heard to say that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment was snapped. Similarly, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being satisfied that proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS would not suffice to prevent the petitioner from engaging in criminal activities. According to the learned Government Pleader, the detaining authority passed the Ext.P1 order after arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction, and no interference is warranted in the said order.
7. On perusal of the records, it is evident that the last prejudicial activity considered by the jurisdictional authority while passing Ext.P1 order of externment is crime No.1191/2025 of Kodungallur Police Station registered, alleging commission of the offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 118(1), 110, 296(b) r/w 3(5) of BNS. The incident which led to the registration of the case with respect to the last prejudicial activity occurred on 30.06.2025, and in the said case, the petitioner was arrested on 01.07.2025 and subsequently released on bail on 09.07.2025. It was on 13.07.2025, while the externee was on bail, the District Police Chief, Thrissur Rural, WP(C) No.37737 of 2025 :: 5 ::
2025:KER:80334 forwarded the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P)Act against the petitioner. Later it was on 29.08.2025, Ext.P1 externment order was passed.
8. The sequence of events narrated above reveals that there is no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the externment order. The proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act was mooted by the sponsoring authority within thirteen days and the externment order was passed within two months from the date of the last prejudicial activity. Moreover, an externment order under the KAA(P) Act has a significant bearing on the personal as well as fundamental rights of an individual. Therefore, some minimum time is required to collect the details of the cases in which the petitioner is involved and to comply with the procedural formalities. Therefore, we are of the view that the minimum delay occurred in this case is only justifiable, and it could not be said that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the impugned order is snapped. Moreover, unlike in the case of an order of detention passed under Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act, even if some delay has occurred in passing an order of externment, the same has no serious bearing as the consequences of both the orders are different. Because an order of detention is a grave deprivation of the personal liberty of the person detained. We are cognizant that Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act also visits the person concerned with an intrusion on his personal liberty WP(C) No.37737 of 2025 :: 6 ::
2025:KER:80334 within the limit of Article 21, especially when the said order restrains a citizen from his right to travel in any part of India. However, when a detention order under Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act is compared with an order of externment passed under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, the latter visits a person with lesser deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the nature of proceedings under Sections 3(1) and 15(1)(a) are inherently different. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and others [2011 (1) KHC 852]. Moreover, an order under Section 15(1)(a) can be treated only as equivalent to a condition imposed in a bail order, especially when the same only curtails the movement of the petitioner. Consequently, we have no hesitation in holding that the minimal delay in mooting the proposal and in passing the externment order after the date of the last prejudicial activity has no serious impact at all, and the same is only liable to be discarded.
9. Another contention taken by the learned counsel is that, as already proceedings under 126 of BNSS were initiated against the petitioner and the same would have been sufficient to prevent the petitioner from being involved in criminal activities. While considering the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS would have been sufficient to restrain the petitioner from repeating the criminal activities, first of all, it is to be noted that proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS, WP(C) No.37737 of 2025 :: 7 ::
2025:KER:80334 and action under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act operates in different spheres. Under Section 126 of the BNSS, a person is only called to furnish security for his good behaviour. On the other hand, under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, a person who has criminal antecedents is interdicted from entering a particular area where he has repeatedly been involved in criminal activities. Therefore, action under the KAA(P) Act is more effective and operates in a totally different sphere. It is for the jurisdictional authority to decide whether action under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act is necessary against a person against whom already proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS have been initiated. Proceedings under Section 126 of the BNSS will in no way preclude the jurisdictional authority from initiating proceedings under the KAA(P) Act. Moreover, in the impugned order, the fact that the petitioner has already executed a bond in terms of Section 126 of BNSS is specifically adverted to. Likewise, in the order, it is recorded that all the actions already taken under are insufficient, and an order under the KAA(P) Act is highly necessary to restrain him from repeating criminal activities. The said explanation in the impugned order justifies the present externment order.
10. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the necessary requirements before passing an order under Section 15(1)
(a) of the KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in this case. We are further satisfied that the competent authority passed the WP(C) No.37737 of 2025 :: 8 ::
2025:KER:80334 externment order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner.
In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
DR. A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR JUDGE Sd/-
JOBIN SEBASTIAN
JUDGE
ANS
WP(C) No.37737 of 2025 :: 9 ::
2025:KER:80334
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 37737/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. B3-
17368/2025/TSR DATED 29.08.2025 OF THE
2ND RESPONDENT
Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
08.10.2025 IN O.P.NO. 201/2025 OF THE
3RD RESPONDENT