Kerala High Court
Moideen M.H vs State Of Kerala on 9 July, 2025
Author: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
Bench: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
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WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. V. JAYAKUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 9TH DAY OF JULY 2025 / 18TH ASHADHA, 1947
WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
MOIDEEN M.H
AGED 28 YEARS
S/O HAMSA, BISMILLA MANSIL, S.P.NAGAR, HIDAYATHU NAGAR,
KASARGODE, PIN - 671123
BY ADVS.
SHRI.M.H.HANIS
SMT.T.N.LEKSHMI SHANKAR
SMT.NANCY MOL P.
SMT.NEETHU.G.NADH
SHRI.ANANDHU P.C.
SMT.RIA ELIZABETH T.J.
SHRI.SAHAD M. HANIS
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY, HOME (SSA)
DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM,
PIN - 695001
2 THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR
CIVIL STATION, KASARGOD DISTRICT, PIN - 680003
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3 THE CITY POLICE CHIEF,
CIVIL STATION ROAD, KASARGOD DISTRICT,
PIN - 680003
4 THE CHAIRMAN,
ADVISORY BOARD, KAAPA, SREENIVAS, PADAM ROAD,
VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, ELAMAKKARA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT,
PIN - 682026
BY ADVS.
GOVERNMENT PLEADER
ADDL.DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROSECUTION
OTHER PRESENT:
ADV. ANAS K A, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON
09.07.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025 3
JUDGMENT
RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V, J.
The above-captioned Writ Petition is filed seeking the following relief:
"(i) Call for the records leading to Exts. P1 and P2 and quash them by the issuance of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction.
2. Ext. P1 order of detention was issued by the 2nd respondent on 11.05.2023, and the same was confirmed by the Government through Ext. P2 order dated 12.07.2023. The petitioner underwent detention pursuant to the said order and was released on 13.11.2023. After undergoing the entire period of detention, he has approached this Court by filing the present Writ Petition on 18.03.2025.
3. The petitioner contends that for classifying him as a "known goonda"
under the provisions of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 ('KAA(P) Act' for the sake of brevity), the respondents relied upon six criminal cases registered against him, the details of which are as follows:
a) Crime No. 413 of 2018 of Vidyanagar Police Station, registered under Sections 451, 427, 354(A) r/w. Section 34 of the IPC.
b) Crime No. 224 of 2019 of Vidyanagar Police Station, registered under 2025:KER:50680 WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025 4 Sections 395, 506(ii), and 294(b) of the IPC.
c) Crime No. 264 of 2019 of Vidyanagar Police Station, registered under Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the NDPS Act.
d) Crime No. 855 of 2021 of Vidyanagar Police Station, registered under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324 r/w. Section 149 of the IPC.
e) Crime No. 246 of 2022 of Vidyanagar Police Station, registered under Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 326, 308, 506(i) r/w.Section 149 of the IPC.
f) Crime No. 165 of 2023 of Vidyanagar Police Station, registered under Section 27(b) of the NDPS Act.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the last prejudicial act, as considered by the detaining authority, pertains to an incident on 14.03.2023, where the specific allegation is that the petitioner was found smoking ganja in a public place. It is contended that, as per the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Suhana v. State of Kerala1, when considering crimes or offences coming under Sections 20, 21 & 22 of the NDPS Act, for passing a preventive detention order under KAA(P) Act, possessing a small quantity of narcotic drug would not attract the definitions of 'anti-social activity', 'goonda' and 'known goonda'. According to the learned counsel, if Crime No. 165 of 2023 were to be excluded from consideration, the last prejudicial act would be Crime No. 246 of 2022, which was registered as early as on 13.02.2022.
1 [2024 (7) KHC 212] 2025:KER:50680 WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025 5 5. It is further submitted that there is an unexplained delay of more than
two months in the issuance of the detention order. The sponsorship report itself was submitted only after a delay of 30 days. According to the petitioner, both Ext. P1 detention order and Ext. P2 confirmation order suffers from non-application of mind and are in violation of the principles of natural justice.
6. Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor, does not dispute the assertion regarding the issuance of Ext. P1 order on 11.05.2023, the petitioner's detention on 14.05.2023, and his release on 13.11.2023. He points out, however, that after his release, the petitioner was again involved in multiple criminal cases registered at the Vidyanagar Police Station in the months of September and October, 2024. It was on account of his continued involvement in criminal activities that a fresh detention order was passed on 12.12.2024. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that the challenge to Ext. P1 order was made only on 18.03.2025, almost ten months after its issuance, and significantly, after the petitioner had undergone the entire period of detention. This inordinate delay, coupled with the fact that the petitioner was subsequently detained again under a fresh order, disentitles him from any relief from this Court. He also contends that the plea of "stigma" raised by the petitioner is rendered academic in light of the petitioner's subsequent involvement in multiple criminal cases. The failure to challenge the earlier detention order at the relevant time, and even after the issuance of a second order on 12.12.2024, is also highlighted by the learned Public Prosecutor.
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7. We have considered the submissions advanced and have perused the
records.
8. From the records, it appears that on account of the involvement of
the detenu in six crimes, the last of which was registered on 14.03.2023, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief on 12.04.2023, and a detention order was passed by the 2nd respondent after arriving at the requisite satisfaction. The detenu was detained on 14.05.2023, and he underwent the entire period of detention and was released on 13.11.2023. The order of detention was not challenged by the detenu. After his release, he got involved in Crime No. 389 of 2024 (registered on 01.09.2024), Crime No. 417 of 2024 (registered on 08.09.2024), Crime No. 457 of 2024 (registered on 19.09.2024), and Crime No. 577 of 2024 (registered on 18.10.2024), all at the Vidyanagar Police Station. A fresh detention order was passed on 12.12.2024 against the detenu. It was only on 18.03.2025, that this Writ Petition was filed, challenging the order of detention dated 11.05.2023, after almost two years. The instant Writ Petition was filed after filing a Writ Petition challenging the subsequent order of detention.
9. Even on merits, we are not impressed with the contention advanced before us. Insofar as the delay in passing the order and consequential snapping of the live link is concerned, the Apex Court in T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of 2025:KER:50680 WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025 7 Kerala2, has held that the question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances, and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down on that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is an undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of the detention order, the court has to scrutinize whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. In the case on hand, we do not find any undue delay in passing the said order.
10. We are also not impressed with the contention that the last prejudicial act cannot be reckoned with, for the purpose of passing the order. Under Section 7 of the KAA(P) Act, an order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid, merely because one or more of the facts or circumstances cited among the grounds are vague, non-existent, irrelevant or invalid, for any reason whatsoever, 2 [1990 SCC (Cri) 76] 2025:KER:50680 WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025 8 and such order shall be deemed to been made by the Government or the authorised officer after having been satisfied about the need for detention with reference to the remaining facts and circumstances, provided with the minimum conditions for being classified as a "known gooda" or "known rowdy" are satisfied. The authorities had reckoned six crimes in which the detenu was involved in the past seven years, and the last prejudicial act was an offence under the NDPS Act.
11. Furthermore, no valid explanation is given by the detenu for the long and indiscriminate delay in approaching this Court, after being released on expiry of the period of detention and after suffering a second detention order. Gajendragadkar, C.J, speaking for the Constitution Bench, in Smt Narayani Devi Khaitan. v. State of Bihar3, observed as under:
"It is well-settled that under Article 226, the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ is discretionary. There can be no doubt that if a citizen moves the High Court under Article 226 and contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by any executive action, the High Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but even in such a case, if the petitioner has been guilty of laches, and there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner, ends of justice may require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. There can be little doubt that if it is shown that a party moving the High Court under Article 226 for a writ is, in substance, 3 CA No. 140 of 1964 2025:KER:50680 WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025 9 claiming a relief which under the law of limitation was barred at the time when the writ petition was filed, the High Court would refuse to grant any relief in its writ jurisdiction. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably."
12. In Bangalore City Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. State Of Karnataka And Others4, it was observed that though the Framers of the Constitution have not prescribed any period of limitation for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and it is only one of the several rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by the superior courts that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is essentially an equity jurisdiction, should not be exercised in favour of a person who approaches the Court after a long lapse of time and no cogent explanation is given for the delay.
13. In Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even in cases involving the alleged violation of fundamental rights, the matter must be left to the discretion of the High 4 [2012 SCC 3 727] 5 [(1969) 1 SCC 185] 2025:KER:50680 WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025 10 Court when the petitioner approaches the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution after an inordinate delay.
14. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is discretionary in nature, and undue delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction may, in appropriate cases, justify the refusal of relief notwithstanding the merits of the claim.
15. Even otherwise, on a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the necessary requirements before passing an order under Section 3(1) of KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in this case. The competent authority passed the detention order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite objective, as well as subjective satisfaction. The detention order is challenged after almost a year, and after undergoing the detention. No explanation, let alone any satisfactory explanation, is offered for the delay in approaching this Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner.
In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. This Writ Petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
JUDGE
Sd/-
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WP(C) NO. 11354 OF 2025 11
K. V. JAYAKUMAR
APM JUDGE
APPENDIX OF WP(C) 11354/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER
NO.DCKSGD/3642/2023/D1(1) DATED 11.05.2023 OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF GO.(RT).NO.1880/2023/HOME DATED 12.07.2023 OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT