Kerala High Court
The Union Bank Of India vs Alice Ulahannan on 23 July, 2025
Author: Anil K.Narendran
Bench: Anil K.Narendran
1
WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.
WEDNESDAY, THE 23RD DAY OF JULY 2025 / 1ST SRAVANA, 1947
WA NO. 1571 OF 2025
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 26.06.2025 IN OP (DRT) NO.180 OF
2025 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS 2 AND 3:
1 THE UNION BANK OF INDIA,
2ND FLOOR, UNION BANK BHAVAN, M.G.ROAD, ERNAKULAM,
REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER, PIN - 682035
2 THE AUTHORIZED OFFICER,
UNION BANK OF INDIA, 2ND FLOOR, UNION BANK BHAVAN,
M.G.ROAD, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682035
BY ADV SHRI.ASP.KURUP
RESPONDENTS/PETITIONER/RESPONDENTS 1 AND 4 TO 6:
1 ALICE ULAHANNAN,
AGED 66 YEARS
D/O LATE ULAHANNAN, 1014 (5/789), NJATTUTHOTIYIL, 4,
KOLENCHERY, POOTHRIKKA PANCHAYAT, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT,
REPRESENTED BY HER NEXT FRIEND MRS. ALEYAMMA JOHN,
AGED 72 YEARS, W/O. LATE JOHN, RESIDING AT
NJATTUTHOTTIYIL, PERINGOLE, KOLENCHERY, ALKARANAD
P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 682311
2 THE DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL,
5TH FLOOR, KSHB BUILDING, PANAMPILLY NAGAR, ERNAKULAM,
REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR, PIN - 682036
3 BASIL N. PAUL,
2
WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370
S/O LATE PAPPACHAN, OMBALAYIL BUILDING, BLOCK
JUNCTION, KOLANCHERRY, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682311
4 M/S PLAZA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR BASIL N.PAUL, OMBALAYIL
BUILDING, BLOCK JUNCTION, KOLANCHERRY, ERNAKULAM, PIN
- 682311
5 M/S PRINT PLAZA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR GIBI BASIL, OMBALAYIL
BUILDING, BLOCK JUNCTION, KOLANCHERRY, ERNAKULAM, PIN
- 682311
SRI.GEORGE POONTHOTTAM, SR.COUNSEL
THIS WRIT APPEAL WAS FINALLY HEARD ON 01.07.2025, THE COURT
ON 23.07.2025 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
3
WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370
JUDGMENT
Muralee Krishna, J.
This intra-court appeal is filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, by respondents 2 and 3 in O.P. (DRT) No.180 of 2025 challenging the judgment dated 26.06.2025, whereby the original petition filed by the 1st respondent herein/petitioner was disposed of by the learned Single Judge with the following directions:
"3. After hearing both sides, I am inclined to grant three weeks to produce such materials on behalf of the petitioner so as to enable the Tribunal to consider the stay petition afresh, in particular the contention noticed above, based on which the Tribunal will take a fresh decision, in accordance with law, within three weeks thereafter. Till orders are passed as directed above, the coercive steps against the petitioner will stand deferred."
2. The 1st respondent-petitioner filed the original petition through her next friend, stating that the 1 st respondent has been mentally disabled since birth. According to the 1 st respondent, her father died intestate. By Annexure A3 partition deed bearing No.2932 of 1988 of S.R.O. Puthencruz dated 19.08.1988, the immovable properties belonging to the father of the 1 st respondent 4 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 were partitioned between his three children, including the 1 st respondent. But, the signatories to Annexure A3 partition deed are the 1st respondent's brothers and her mother. The mother of the 1st respondent signed that document on behalf of the 1 st respondent as her guardian. As per Annexure A3 partition deed, the 'A' schedule property having an extent of 20.24 Ares in different survey numbers was allotted to the share of the 1 st respondent's brother Pappachan, wherein life interest was reserved to the 1st respondent, permitting her to reside in the house situated therein during her lifetime. The 'B' schedule property in the partition deed was allotted to the 1 st respondent's another brother John. The 'C' schedule property having an extent of 20.24 Ares in different survey numbers, was allotted to the share of the 1st respondent. Though the mother of the 1 st respondent signed in Annexure A3 partition deed on behalf of the 1st respondent, she has not obtained permission from the Court of law to effect the transfer of immovable properties of the 1 st respondent. Later, the brother of the 1 st respondent, namely Pappachan and mother Sara, executed Annexure A4 Power of Attorney dated 21.02.1988 in favour of Chinamma, authorising 5 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 the Power of Attorney holder to sell the 'A' schedule property to one Basil N. Paul, the 3rd respondent herein. On the strength of Annexure A4 Power of Attorney, Chinamma executed Annexure A5 sale deed No. 820/1998 of SRO, Puthencruz dated 24.02.1998 in favour of the 3rd respondent, parting the 'A' schedule property in Annexure A3 partition deed, including the life interest of the 1 st respondent. Subsequently, some other conveyances were also effected in respect of the property, and finally, the entire 'A' schedule property in Annexure A3 partition deed was re-conveyed in the name of the 3rd respondent. It was later understood that the 'C' Schedule property in Annexure A3 partition deed, which was allotted to the share of the 1 st respondent was also parted with by her relatives without obtaining the permission of the Court. Annexure A3 partition deed itself is a void document since it was executed without obtaining necessary permission from the authority concerned appointed under the National Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation, and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999, or from the Court concerned under the provisions of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
2.1. Recently, it has come to light that the 3rd respondent 6 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 obtained loans from the appellant Bank for the purpose of his business by mortgaging the properties. On account of non- payment of dues towards the appellant Bank, it has initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act ('SARFAESI Act' for short) and the Rules thereunder. Contending that the property wherein the 1st respondent is having life interest and also the portion of which was alienated without obtaining permission from the Court cannot be treated as a security in terms of the SARFAESI Act for realisation of the amounts due to the appellant Bank from respondents 3 to 5, the 1st respondent preferred Ext.P1 securitisation application S.A. No.402 of 2025 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Ernakulam. In that application, the 1st respondent filed I.A. No.2380 of 2025 seeking an order restraining the appellant Bank from taking any further recovery measures. However, on 24.06.2025 when the matter came up for admission, the Tribunal declined to grant the interim relief sought for and issued notice to the appellants by Ext.P2 order. Meanwhile, the bank proceeded with the recovery measures and issued Ext.P4 fresh sale notice fixing the date of auction as 7 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 15.07.2025. Thereafter, the 1st respondent through her next friend approached this Court by filing the original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs:
"i) Calling for the records leading to Exhibit P2 Order passed by the Hon'ble Debt Recovery Tribunal and set aside the same;
ii) Declaring that all recovery measures adopted by respondents 2 and 3 under the SARFAESI Act and Rules are bad in law for want of creation of a valid security interest over the property;
iii) declaring that the mortgage created over the property by respondents 4 to 6 in favour of the 2nd respondent bank is invalid and the recovery proceedings in its entirety is bad in law;
iv) declaring Annexure A7 Order in Exhibit P1 permitting dispossession of the petitioner from the property and Exhibit P4 sale notice is improper, irregular and illegal and therefore liable to be set aside;
v) declaring that the recovery measures adopted by the 2 nd respondent Bank as against the petitioner - an aggrieved person, who is mentally disabled, is in violation of her fundamental rights under Article 21 and the constitutional protection guaranteed to the said mentally disabled person."
3. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants and the learned Senior Counsel for the 1 st respondent. 8
WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370
4. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the Apex Court in several judgments deprecated the practice of approaching the constitutional Court seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein an efficacious alternative remedy is available to the party concerned. The learned Counsel submitted that though the original petition was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment is by exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Sreedhar v. Raus Constructions Pvt. Ltd. [2023 KLT Online 1007 (SC)] and argued that to maintain an appeal against the order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, the 1st respondent has to deposit 50% of the debt due, out of which only 25% can be waived by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and hence, 1st respondent has to mandatorily deposit 25% of the debt before the Appellate Tribunal, apart from the prescribed fees. It is to avoid deposit of such an amount, the 1st respondent approached this Court with the above original petition. The learned counsel further relied on 9 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 the judgment of this Court in State Bank of India and another v. M/s. Kinship Services (India) (P) Ltd., Cochin and another [2013 (4) KHC 21] and the judgment dated 12.12.2024 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.2032 of 2024 in support of his argument regarding the nature of the relief granted by the learned Single Judge.
5. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent would argue that while passing the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge has exercised only a discretion vested with the constitutional Court. The 1 st respondent is a mentally retarded person. Whatever transactions effected on her property without obtaining permission from the jurisdictional authority or the Court concerned is not binding on her property. Considering the plight of the 1st respondent, this Court, by exercising its appellate jurisdiction, may not interfere with the limited relief granted by the learned Single Judge. By relying on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 30.05.2025 in OP(KAT) No.186 of 2025, the learned Senior Counsel argued that if the Court is able to form an opinion that the Bank is wielding its power and authority to opress and harass 10 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 the aggrieved, the Court shall not refrain from using its power under Article 226 of the Constitution even though the challenge is made under Article 227 of the Constitution.
6. As far as the jurisdiction of this Court in interfering with the matters under the SARFAESI Act is concerned, there are umpteen judgments by the Apex Court as well as this Court. The crux of all those judgments is that unless the exceptional circumstances enumerated therein are made out, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot interfere with the steps taken by the secured creditor to recover the debt by proceeding against the secured asset.
7. In Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. [2018 (1) KHC 786], the Apex Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a writ petition only under exceptional circumstances and that it is a self-imposed restraint by the High Court. The four exceptional circumstances such as, where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to 11 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, were re iterated in paragraph 6 of the said judgment by relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603].
8. In South Indian Bank Ltd. (M/s.) v. Naveen Mathew Philip [2023 (4) KLT 29] after discussing the various judgments on the point as to circumstances in which the High Court can interfere with matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act, it is held by the Apex Court as under:
"Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues 12 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 but also envisage constitution of quasi - judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute".
9. In PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank [2024 (3) KHC SN 3] the Apex Court held that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in matters arising out of RDB Act and SARFAESI Act, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available.
10. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Jasmin K. v. State Bank of India [2024 (3) KHC 266] reiterated the position of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments.
11. From the judgments quoted above, it is clear that unless the four exceptional circumstances mentioned by the Apex Court in Mathew K.C. [2018 (1) KHC 786], the 1st respondent cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, though the 1 st respondent filed the Original Petition under Article 227 of the 13 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 Constitution of India as if the relief sought is by exercising supervisory jurisdiction, the reliefs Nos. (ii) to (v) would show that they are of the nature that can be granted by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Those reliefs sought by the 1st respondent are matters to be decided by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in the securitisation application filed by the 1st respondent challenging the recovery proceedings initiated by the Bank.
12. In M/s. Kinship Services (India) (P) Ltd. [2013 (4) KHC 21] a Division Bench of this Court considered the appeal filed against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge staying confirmation of sale till further orders in respect of one item of property which is sought to be sold in an auction scheduled under SARFAESI proceedings. By relying on an unreported judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.6 of 2009 in the case of State of M.P. v. Sanjay Kerlaker dated 05.01.2009, the Division Bench held that the nature of the interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge is nothing but a discretion exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
13. While going through the direction issued by the learned 14 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 Single Judge in the instant case, in the light of the judgment in M/s. Kinship Services (India) (P) Ltd. [2013 (4) KHC 21], we are of the considered opinion that the order of the learned Single Judge not to take coercive steps against the 1 st respondent till a decision is taken by the Debts Recovery Tribunal is the one that can be passed only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
14. As noticed hereinbefore, the 1 st respondent had already initiated proceedings against the steps taken by the Bank to recover the debt from the secured asset by filing a securitisation application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. If no interim relief has been granted by the Tribunal, the remedy available to the 1st respondent is to challenge the same before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. The said section reads thus:
"18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal:
Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the 15 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less:
Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder."
15. In Sreedhar [2023 KLT Online 1007 (SC)] the Apex Court, while considering the requirement of deposit of 25% of the debt due before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal to avail the statutory remedy of appeal, held thus:
"6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that what was challenged before the High Court by the borrower in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was the judgment and order passed by the DRT-I. Against the judgment and order passed by the DRT-I dismissing the application, the borrower had a statutory remedy available by way of appeal before the DRAT. If the borrower would have preferred an appeal before the DRAT, he would have been required to deposit 25% of the debt due. To circumvent the provision of appeal before the DRAT and the pre-deposit, the borrower straightway preferred the writ petition before the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.16
WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 Therefore, in view of alternative statutory remedy available by way of appeal before the DRAT, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the judgment and order passed by the DRT- I. By entertaining the writ petition straightway under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by the DRT-I, the High Court has allowed/permitted the borrower to circumvent the provision of appeal before the DRAT under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act."
16. In Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. Uco Bank [(2011) 4 SCC 548] while considering the question as to whether Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exempt a person preferring an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act from making any predeposit in terms of the said provision, the Apex Court held thus:
"8. S.18(1) of the Act confers a statutory right on a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under S.17 of the Act to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. However, the right conferred under S.18(1) is subject to the condition laid down in the second proviso thereto. The second proviso postulates that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured 17 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. However, under the third proviso to the sub-section, the Appellate Tribunal has the power to reduce the amount, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, to not less than twenty - five per cent of the debt, referred to in the second proviso. Thus, there is an absolute bar to entertainment of an appeal under S.18 of the Act unless the condition precedent, as stipulated, is fulfilled. Unless the borrower makes, with the Appellate Tribunal, a pre-deposit of fifty per cent of the debt due from him or determined, an appeal under the said provision cannot be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal. The language of the said proviso is clear and admits of no ambiguity. It is well - settled that when a Statute confers a right of appeal, while granting the right, the Legislature can impose conditions for the exercise of such right, so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions, rendering the right almost illusory. Bearing in mind the object of the Act, the conditions hedged in the said proviso cannot be said to be onerous. Thus, we hold that the requirement of pre - deposit under sub-section (1) of S.18 of the Act is mandatory and there is no reason whatsoever for not giving full effect to the provisions contained in S.18 of the Act. In that view of the matter, no court, much less the Appellate Tribunal, a creature of the Act itself, can refuse to give full effect to the provisions of the Statute. We have no hesitation in holding that deposit under the second proviso to S.18(1) of the Act being a condition precedent for preferring an appeal under the said Section, the Appellate 18 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 Tribunal had erred in law in entertaining the appeal without directing the appellant to comply with the said mandatory requirement.
9. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that as the amount of debt due had not been determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, appeal could be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal without insisting on pre-deposit, is equally fallacious. Under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of S.18 of the Act the amount of fifty per cent, which is required to be deposited by the borrower, is computed either with reference to the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. Obviously, where the amount of debt is yet to be determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the borrower, while preferring appeal, would be liable to deposit fifty per cent of the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. Therefore, the condition of pre-deposit being mandatory, a complete waiver of deposit by the appellant with the Appellate Tribunal, was beyond the provisions of the Act, as is evident from the second and third proviso to the said Section. At best, the Appellate Tribunal could have, after recording the reasons, reduced the amount of deposit of fifty per cent to an amount not less than twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso. We are convinced that the order of the Appellate Tribunal, entertaining appellant's appeal without insisting on pre-deposit was clearly unsustainable and, therefore, the decision of the High Court in setting aside the same cannot be flawed".19
WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370
17. A Division Bench of this Court wherein one among us is a party [Anil K.Narendran, J.] in Union Bank of India, Kottayam, v. M/s Suwique Traders [2025 KHC Online 709=2025:KER:46809] while considering the above issue, by considering the relevant provisions under the SARFAESI Act and also relying on the decision in Narayan Chandra Ghosh [(2011) 4 SCC 548] held thus:
"20. When complete waiver of pre-deposit is beyond the provisions of Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act, it cannot be contended that, a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, can prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, within the time limit specified in Section 18(1), along with an application for complete waiver of pre-deposit under the second proviso to Section 18(1), after remitting only the fee provided under Section 18(1), since the Appellate Tribunal cannot grant complete waiver of pre-deposit, which is beyond the scope of the provisions contained in the second and third provisos to Section 18(1). In that view of the matter, in an appeal filed under Section 18 of the Act, which is accompanied by an application invoking the provisions of the third proviso to Section 18(1) for waiver of pre-deposit, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section 18(1), the appellant has to deposit with the Appellate Tribunal twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso to Section 18(1).20
WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 The Appellate Tribunal cannot entertain, i.e., give judicial consideration of an appeal filed under Section 18 and the interlocutory application filed under the third proviso to Section 18(1) for waiver of predeposit, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section 18(1), unless the appellant has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso to Section 18(1). Therefore, we find absolutely no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents- petitioners that the respondents are required to remit only the prescribed fee as provided under Section 18(1) of the Act, at the time of preferring Ext.P2 appeal and the question of deposit with the Appellate Tribunal the pre-deposit provided under the second proviso to Section 18(1) arises only on an order being passed by the Appellate Tribunal on the application for waiver".
18. In the light of the above judgment it is only to be held that as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, to approach the Appellate Tribunal, the 1 st respondent has to deposit a minimum of 25% of the debt and can seek exemption only for the remaining 25% as provided under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. In such circumstances, we find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that it is to circumvent the said mandate, the 1 st respondent filed the original petition as if one filed under Article 227 of the Constitution 21 WA No.1571 of 2025 2025:KER:54370 of India.
19. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, we find that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the above aspects in its proper perspective. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
In the result, the writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment dated 26.06.2025 in OP(DRT)No.180 of 2025 passed by the learned Single Judge and the original petition stands dismissed.
sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE sd/-
sks MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE