[Cites 37, Cited by 0]
Karnataka High Court
Sri. B.N. Rajanna vs The Police Inspector on 24 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 24TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE M G UMA
WRIT PETITION NO. 62298 OF 2016 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI. B.N. RAJANNA
S/O B.L. NANJAPPA
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
R/A NO.1309, 13TH CROSS,
2ND STAGE, MAHALAKSHMIPURAM
WEST OF CORD ROAD,
BANGALORE - 560 086
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SR. ADVOCATE
SRI. R. HEMANTH RAJ, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE POLICE INSPECTOR,
BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT,
Digitally signed KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA
by PRASHANTH
NV OFFICE SITUATED AT
Location: High B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
Court of BANGALORE - 560 001
Karnataka
2. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT,
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA,
OFFICE SITUATED AT
B.R. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BANGALORE - 560 001
3. THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF POLICE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA
OFFICE SITUATED AT B.R. AMBEDKAR
VEEDHI, BANGALORE - 560 001
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4. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHIEF SECRETARY OFFICE
SITUATED AT B.R. AMBEDKAR
VEEDHI, VIDHANA SOUDHA
BANGALORE - 560 001
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. B.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W 482 OF CR.PC PRAYING TO
QUASH THE FIR AND CHARGE SHEET IN SPECIAL CASE NO.70/2014
ON THE FILE OF THE SPECIAL JUDGE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT,
BENGALURU PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURE-B AND CHARGE SHEET
DTD:16.3.2011 VIDE ANNEXURE-K RESPECTIVELY AND ALL FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS THEREON.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 06.02.2026 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE M G UMA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner being the accused in Spl.Case No.70/2014
on the file of the learned Special Judge, Bengaluru Rural
District registered for the offences punishable under Section
13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Correction Act, 1988 (for short
'PC Act') is seeking to quash the criminal proceedings initiated
against him.
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2. Heard Sri. D.R. Ravishankar, learned Senior
Advocate for Sri. R Hemanth Raj, learned Counsel for the
petitioner and Sri B.S. Prasad, learned counsel for the
respondents. Perused the materials on record.
3. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner
contended that the, petitioner was working as Assistant
Executive Engineer at KPTCL, Peenya. A Source Information
Report (for short 'SIR') is said to have been submitted by the
police inspector without issuing notice to the accused. No
preliminary enquiry was held. But on the basis of such source
report, FIR came to be registered by the police inspector in
Cr.No.09/2011 of Lokayukta Police.
4. Learned Senior Advocate referring to Section 17 (b)
and (c) of the PC Act submitted that, it is either Assistant
Commissioner of police or Deputy Superintendent of Police as
the case may be, or the police officer of equivalent rank who
are authorised to investigate any offence punishable under the
special statute. After registration of the FIR, realising that the
police Inspector is not competent to conduct the investigation,
DYSP was appointed as the Investigating Officer. But the
investigation that was already conducted earlier by the Police
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inspector ,who was not authorised to conduct the investigation
was carry forwarded, without holding de novo investigation.
Therefore, the investigation undertaken by the police officer
without any authority, is bad under law. Hence, the criminal
proceedings is liable to be quashed.
5. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in
D Nagaraj Vs. State of Karnataka1 to contend that, a
preliminary enquiry is a must before submitting the 'SIR'. When
no such primary enquiry is held, the 'SIR' which was drawn
without following the procedure as contemplated and which is
also very bald, is liable to be rejected. In the present case,
since the 'SIR' is treated as a complaint and the FIR came to be
registered, the same is bad under law.
6. The next contention raised by the learned Senior
Advocate is regarding sanction accorded by the Board of
KPTCL. Referring to Section 19 of the PC Act, learned Senior
Advocate contended that only the competent authority can
accord sanction to prosecute the accused. In the present case,
the Board is not competent to accord sanction. He placed
reliance on the decisions of this Court in V.Venkatasiva
1
2024 SCC Online KAR 27226
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Reddy Vs. State by Karnataka Lokayukta2 and contended
that the coordinate Bench of this Court referring to a similar set
of facts, held that under the erstwhile regulations, there was a
provision for grant of sanction. Sub clause (f) of regulation 14A
was incorporated only in the year 2003. But no notification as
required was issued by KPTCL in that regard. Under such
circumstances, it was held that sub clause (f) of regulation 14A
has never been laid before the legislature nor notified in the
gazette which led to a chaotic situation and therefore, the
sanction accorded by the Board is not a sanction in the eyes of
law.
7. Learned Senior counsel contended that, the said
decision of the Coordinate Bench in V. Venkatasiva Reddy
(supra) was challenged in Special leave appeal before the
Hon'ble Apex Court, which came to be dismissed as there was
no reasons to interfere with the same. Hence, the order has
attained finality. Therefore, learned counsel submits that in the
present case also, Board of KPTCL accorded sanction, which is
bad under law and cannot be considered as a sanction as
2
Crl.P.No.7157/2016 dated 28.10.2016
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required under Section 19 of the PC Act. On that ground also,
criminal proceedings is liable to be quashed.
8. Learned Senior Advocate contended that the
Bengaluru Rural Superintendent of Police had no authority to
authorise the investigation into the matter as the petitioner was
working in Bengaluru City i.e., at Peenya and therefore,
registration of the criminal case is bad under law.
9. Learned Senior Advocate contended that the wife of
the petitioner is a Class -I contractor, who is an income tax
assesse. She had purchased several properties out of her own
income. The same cannot be considered as the property
acquired by the petitioner by illegal means. The accused was
never notified by the Investing Officer about the investigation.
If a notice was issued to the petitioner at the time of
preliminary enquiry, the petitioner would have produced the
relevant documents to substantiate his defence. Without there
being any opportunity to the accused, the criminal proceedings
is launched, which is bad under law and is liable to be quashed.
Accordingly prays for allowing the petition.
10. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent opposing
the petition submitted that even though the coordinate Bench
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of this Court in V.Venkatasiva Reddy (supra) allowed the
petition by observing that the sanction was not a sanction in
the eyes of law, in the subsequent petition, i.e., in
G.Krishnamurthy Vs. Karnataka Lokayuktha3, which came
up before the same Hon'ble Judge, under similar
circumstances, the petitioner was permitted to withdraw the
petition as 'not pressed' and it was specifically recorded
therein that, certain provisions of law were not brought to the
notice of the Court when the earlier decision was rendered.
Therefore, learned counsel for respondent contends that the
decision in V.Venkatasiva Reddy (supra) is no more a good
law and cannot be relied on by the learned counsel for the
petitioner.
11. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in
M/s. Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited
Vs. P.N.Hanumanthaiah4 and State of Karnataka,
represented by its Police Inspector Vs. Sri.Jaikumar A.S.5
to contend that, the coordinate Benches of this Court
consistently held that even under the new Act, it is the Board of
3
Crl.P.No.9358/2016 C/w WP.No.59662/2016 dated 24.01.2017
4
Crl.R.P.No.56/2020 C/w Crl.R.P.No.155/2021 dated 24.04.2024
5
Crl.R.P.No.889/2024 dated 28.08.2025
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KPTCL, which is competent to appoint Assistant Executive
Engineer and is also competent to accord sanction to prosecute.
12. Learned Counsel submits that, the coordinate
Benches have referred to Section 14A(f) of Karnataka
Electricity Board (KEB) Employees' (Classification, Disciplinary,
Control and Appeal Regulations 1987 (for short ' KEB
Regulations, 1987) to hold that criminal prosecution
investigated by either Lokayuktha or any other authority, the
appointing authority specified in the schedule to the regulations
who are competent to impose the penalty of removal of the
accused is also competent to accord sanction for prosecuting
the accused. Placing reliance on these decisions, learned
counsel for the respondent contended that sanction is obtained
in accordance with law and the same cannot be disputed at this
stage.
13. Learned counsel also submitted that the
investigation is completed and the charge sheet came to be
filed. The Cognizance is taken and the accused is before the
Trial Court. The entire charge sheet is not produced before this
Court deliberately by the petitioner.
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14. Learned Counsel also submitted that, Section 17
(c) is to be read along with the proviso, which enables a police
officer of rank of police Inspector who could be authorised by
the State Government on his behalf to investigate into the
matter. There is a general order issued by the State
Government as required under first proviso to Section 17,
which authorises the concerned police inspector to investigate
into the matter.
15. Learned counsel also submitted that, the
Superintendent of police, Bengaluru Rural has authorised the
police inspector to investigate into the matter and thereby,
satisfied with the requirement of second proviso to Section
17(c). Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the investigation was held by an unauthorised
officer, cannot be accepted.
16. Learned counsel for the respondent further
submitted that preliminary enquiry was held by the police
officer and several materials were collected to prima-facie
satisfy the allegations regarding disproportionate assets
amassed by the petitioner, and only thereafter, 'SIR' was
submitted. After being satisfied with the 'SIR', FIR came to be
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registered. On the basis of the FIR, a detailed investigation was
undertaken. Voluminous documents were produced before the
learned Special Judge. All those materials were suppressed by
the petitioner. Now the special Court has already taken
cognizance of the matter and it is pending for trial. Under such
circumstances, the petitioner cannot seek quashing of the
criminal proceedings. No grounds are made out for quashing
the criminal proceedings and accordingly prays for dismissal of
the petition.
17. In view of the rival contentions urged by learned
counsel for both the parties, the point that would arise for my
consideration is:
"Whether the petitioner has made out any
grounds to allow the petitions and to quash the
criminal proceedings initiated against him?"
18. My answer to the above point is in the 'Negative'
for the following:
REASONS
19. It is the contention of the learned Senior Advocate
for the petitioner that, petitioner's wife is a Class-I contractor
and an Income Tax Assessee. The assets referred to by the
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Investigating Officer were acquired by her from out of her own
income and therefore, the same cannot be taken to the account
of the petitioner to invoke Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. This
could be the defence that could be taken by the petitioner
before the trial Court. But this Court cannot hold a mini trial to
find-out the truth or otherwise in such contention and to quash
the criminal proceedings on such grounds.
20. It is the contention of the petitioner that a
preliminary enquiry should have been held and before holding
such preliminary enquiry, the petitioner should have been
notified. To substantiate this contention, learned Senior
Advocate for the petitioner places reliance on the decision in
D Nagaraj (supra). Even though the Coordinate Bench of this
Court considering the facts of the said case held that there is
non-compliance of requirements of law, as the police officer
had not submitted the report to the learned Magistrate under
Section 157 of Cr.PC, nor the same was forwarded to the
Superintendent of Police along with the 'SIR' and other
materials, which forms the basis for investigation under the
second proviso to Section 17 of the Act, it is to be noticed that
the said decision rendered by the co-ordinate Bench of this
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Court was sets aside by the Hon'ble Apex Court vide it order
dated 06.10.2025 in State of Karnataka Vs. D Nagaraj and
another6. The Apex Court referring to its earlier decision in
State Of Karnataka by Lokayukta P.S., Bengaluru City v.
Syed Muneer Ahmed and another (Crl.A.No.3686/2025 and
connected matters) in paragraph Nos.5 to 8, reiterated the
following:
"5. The issue involved in the present cases, stands
covered by a decision of this Court in the case of State
of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy reported in 2025
SCC OnLine SC 382, whereby, this Court quashed and
set aside an identical order passed by the Karnataka
High Court. The High Court decided the identical issues
in the batch of criminal petitions filed before it and held
as follows: -
i. That no preliminary enquiry whatsoever was
conducted in accordance with Section 9 of the Karnataka
Lokayukta Act, 1984 and hence, the direction given by
the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta,
Bangalore to register the FIRs against the respondent(s)
therein for the offence/s punishable under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short 'PC Act'),
was illegal and without jurisdiction.
ii. That the direction given by the Superintendent of
Police to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, for
investigating the cases pursuant to registration of the
FIRs, was contrary to the mandate of Section 17 of the
PC Act.
6. This Court in T.N. Sudhakar Reddy (supra) overturned
both these findings of the High Court and affirmed the
6
Diary No.25826/2025
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action of the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka
Lokayukta, Bangalore, in directing the registration of the
FIR under the PC Act without conducting any preliminary
inquiry and the consequent investigation thereof by the
Deputy Superintendent of Police.
7. Subsequent to the decision in T.N. Sudhakar Reddy
(supra), this Court considered another batch of appeals
arising from similar orders of the Karnataka High Court
led by Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 12156 of 2023
(The Karnataka Lokayuktha Police v. K.L.
Gangadharaiah). Following the ratio of T.N. Sudhakar
Reddy (supra), the impugned orders were set aside, and
the criminal petitions were remitted to the Karnataka
High Court to examine the challenge laid by the
respective writ petitioners (respondent(s) before this
Court) to their prosecution on merits. The remand was
directed considering the fact that the grounds taken by
the respective writ petitioners, touching upon the merits,
were not adverted to by the High Court as the quashing
petitions were decided on the preliminary issues of
jurisdiction only.
8. In view of the above discussion, the impugned orders,
cannot be sustained and the matters deserve to be
remitted to the High Court for fresh decision on merits."
21. In the present case, admittedly, a 'SIR' was
prepared after receipt of a credible information regarding
commission of the offence under section 13(1)(e) of PC Act. As
per 'SIR', the petitioner has amassed assets worth Rs.1.36
Crores, his expenditures during the check period was Rs.20
lakhs, whereas, his income was only Rs.95 lakhs and
disproportionate asset was estimated at Rs.61.40 lakhs, which
is 64.63% more than the income from known source. The
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Superintendent Of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha, Bengaluru
Rural District after verifying the SIR, accorded permission to
register the FIR and for holding regular investigation. Based on
this permission, the FIR came to be registered and the
investigation was undertaken.
22. Even though, it is contended by the learned Senior
Advocate for the petitioner, that the petitioner should have
been notified while conducting preliminary enquiry, no law
prescribes for such issuance of notice at the earliest stage.
What is contemplated under law is holding preliminary enquiry
to find prima-facie materials to constitute a cognisable offence.
If at all the petitioner is having any defence stating that his
wife is a Class -I contractor and an income tax assessee, who
acquired several properties in her name from out of her own
income, it is only the defence that can be taken before the Trial
Court but the same cannot be a ground for quashing the
criminal proceedings.
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court way back in the year
1970, while deciding P. Sirajudheen v. State of Madras7 felt
necessary that, before a public servant is publicly charged with
7
(1970) 1 SCC 595
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acts of dishonesty, which amounts to serious misconduct and a
first information is lodged against him, there must be some
suitable preliminary enquiry to be held with regard to the
allegations by a responsible officer. Taking clue from this
decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court has again in Lalitha Kumari
v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and others8, felt it
necessary to issue certain directions for holding of preliminary
enquiry and registration of the FIR under Section 154 of Cr.PC.
Even though, PC Act never prescribes holding of preliminary
enquiry, in Lalitha Kumari (supra), it is held that before
proceeding against a public servant in matters of corruption, it
is desirable to have a preliminary enquiry. The Court has
suggested to hold preliminary enquiry to be conducted in a
particular case, depending upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. In paragraph 120.6, the Court has suggested
illustratively the categories of cases in which such preliminary
enquiry is desirable, which include corruption cases. The Court
has considered various facets of the contentions raised in the
case, issued following directions, which are relevant to the case
in hand;
8
(2014) 2 SCC 1
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"Conclusion/Directions
120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under
Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary
inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
120.2. If the information received does not disclose a
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to
ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.
120.3. If the inquiry discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases
where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint,
a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to
the first informant forthwith and not later than one
week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the
complaint and not proceeding further.
120.4. The police officer cannot avoid his duty of
registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed.
Action must be taken against erring officers who do not
register the FIR if information received by him discloses
a cognizable offence.
120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify
the veracity or otherwise of the information received but
only to ascertain whether the information reveals any
cognizable offence.
120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary
inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The category of cases in
which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
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(d) Corruption cases....XXX."
(emphasis supplied)
24. It is relevant to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v.
Sri. Channakeshava.H.D. and another9, wherein the Court
considered an order passed by this Court quashing the criminal
proceedings against the accused for the offence under Section
13(1)(b) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act alleging
amassing of disproportionate assets by a public servant, who
was working as an Executive Engineer in Bangalore Electricity
Supply Corporation ( for short 'BESCOM') which was called in
question by the State of Karnataka. By referring to its earlier
decision in P. Sirajudheen and Lalitha Kumari (supra), the
Hon'ble Apex Court held in paragraph Nos.12 as under:
"12. To sum up, this Court has held that in
matters of corruption a preliminary enquiry although
desirable, but is not mandatory. In a case where a
superior officer, based on a detailed source report
disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence,
passes an order for registration of FIR, the requirement
of preliminary enquiry can be relaxed."
9
2025 SCC OnLine SC 753
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14. Mr. Devadatt Kamat, senior counsel, has
relied upon a recent Three-Judge Bench decision of this
Court in CBI V.Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi,
(2021) 18 SCC 135 where it was specifically stated
that an accused public servant does not have any right
to explain the alleged disproportionate assets before
filing of an FIR. We are also of the opinion that this is
the correct legal position as there is no inherent right of
a public servant to be heard at this stage."
(emphasis supplied)
25. Thus the Court has considered the contention taken
by the accused before it that he was not given a chance to
explain his position before registration of the FIR and that the
registration of FIR has been used as an instrument to harass
the public servant without prior notice or hearing and without
holding a preliminary inquiry. Referring to its earlier decision in
the
CBI V. Thommandru Hannaah Vijayalakshmi10, where it
was specifically held in the said case that an accused-public
servant does not have any right to explain the alleged
disproportionate assets before registration of the FIR. The
Court endorsed the said opinion as the correct legal position as
10
(2021) 18 SCC 135
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there is no inherent right available to the public servant to be
heard at that stage.
26. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Channakeshava.H.D.
(supra) held in paragraph Nos.6, 7, 8 and 10 as under:
"6. The learned Single Judge of the Karnataka
High Court was of the opinion that although before
lodging of the FIR, orders did come from the
Superintendent of Police ('SP') but the SP had not
conducted any preliminary enquiry before passing his
orders and therefore, there was no application of mind
by the SP. In the opinion of the learned Judge of the
High Court, this would affect the entire proceedings and
thus, High Court vide impugned order dated 25.04.2024
quashed the FIR.
7. This order of the High Court has been
challenged by the State of Karnataka before this Court
primarily on the ground that a preliminary enquiry
visualized under the said proviso is desirable but not
mandatory. Further, it has been argued on behalf of the
State of Karnataka that, in the present case, SP had
passed an order dated 04.12.2023 under Section 17 of
the PC Act and this order was passed on consideration of
relevant materials inasmuch as it was passed on the
basis of a source report dated 05.10.2023.
8. There is no provision for a preliminary enquiry
under Section 13 or Section 17 of the PC Act. The
second proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act does not
speak of a preliminary enquiry. It was only in Lalita
Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
(2014) 2 SCC 1 that this Court had held that before
proceeding against a public servant in matters of
corruption, it is desirable to have a preliminary enquiry.
Much before Lalita Kumari (Supra), this Court in P.
Sirajuddin v. State of Madras (1970) 1 SCC 595
had observed that "before a public servant, whatever be
his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty
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which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct
of the type alleged in this case and a first information is
lodged against him, there must be some suitable
preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible
officer." Relying on this judgement, Lalita Kumari
(Supra) had put the corruption matters under the
category of cases in which preliminary enquiry may be
made before registration of FIR.
"117. In the context of offences relating to
corruption, this Court in P. Sirajuddin
[P.Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC
595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240] expressed the need for
a preliminary inquiry before proceeding against
public servants."
.....
(Emphasis supplied)
The learned counsel for the State of Karnataka would,
however, argue that once a detailed source report is
there before the SP, explaining the reasons for initiation
of proceedings and when details are given, a formal
preliminary enquiry may not be necessary as all the
relevant material is already there before the SP.
10. According to this source report, it was prima
facie found that respondent no.1 had acquired assets
disproportionate to his known sources of income during
the check period i.e. 11.11.1998 to 30.09.2023, to the
tune of Rs.6,64,67,000. Based on this source report,
which is nothing but a kind of preliminary enquiry, an
order was passed by the SP directing the registration of
an FIR against respondent no.1.
(further emphasis supplied)
27. On going through these decisions of the Apex Court
right from 1970 till the recent decision in Sri.
Channakeshava.H.D. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has
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time and again consistently reiterated the requirement of
holding the preliminary enquiry when an information regarding
commission of the offence was received, but the same was not
sufficient to prima facie make out a cognizable offence,
specifically when it is desirable to have a prima-facie materials
for commission of a cognizable offence. It mandates the
Investigating Officer to hold a preliminary inquiry for the
purpose of collecting the information informally, only for the
purpose of satisfying himself or to satisfy his higher officer
regarding commission of the cognizable offence by the
accused- public servant.
28. Holding of enquiry in the present case to collect the
information, which was reduced into 'SIR' by the police officer
itself is a preliminary enquiry held by him for the purpose of
satisfying himself and to place on record the prima facie
materials regarding commission of the cognizable offence
punishable under Section 13(1)(e) PC Act.
29. On going through the 'SIR' submitted by the police
officer in the present case, it is evident that the petitioner is
working as Assistant Executive Engineer in 'BESCOM', who
joined service on 31.03.1984 as Junior Engineer. At the time of
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preparation of SIR, his basic pay was around Rs.17,000/- per
month. He was promoted as Assistant Engineer on 19.06.1998
and as Assistant Executive Engineer on 03.05.2006. It is stated
that, the petitioner is not enjoying good reputation in the
department. He owns one residential house bearing No.1309 at
Bengaluru built on a site measuring 40x60 with 8 square feet
RCC house constructed in the year 1974. The land with an old
house was purchased on 23.02.2004. Subsequently, the old
house was demolished and he constructed a 35 square feet
house consisting of ground and first floors, with an estimated
value of Rs.40 lakhs, which was constructed in the year 2007.
The accused owns a shopping complex in Rajaji Nagar
Industrial area, Bengaluru with ACC shed measuring 60X65
feet, purchased on 07.04.2003 for a total consideration of
Rs.15 lakhs by Rame Gowda and Smt. Ratnamma in-laws of
the petitioner and subsequently, gifted the same to their
daughter Mangala. Subsequently, the old industrial shed was
demolished and the petitioner has constructed a commercial
complex consisting of cellar, ground and four floors to the
extent of 103 square feet and the total approximate value of
Rs.40 lakhs. The petitioner has also purchased a site measuring
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40X60 feet in Kadabgeri, Bengaluru during 2004, which is
valued at Rs.8 lakhs. He purchased 3.38 acres of land in the
name of Smt. Mangala in Mahadevapura for a consideration of
Rs.2,40,000/-. He also owns 1450 grams of gold ornaments, 10
kgs of silver, UTI shares in the name of his son. Six LIC policies
in the names of his family members. Apart from owning various
household and electrical and electronic gadgets, incurring
expenses towards education, loan repayment, stamp,
registration and household expenses, it is stated that the salary
income of the accused during the check period was
approximately Rs.35 lakhs. But the total income assets and the
expenditures incurred by the accused was approximately Rs.95
lakhs. There is reference to income from commercial complex
and a housing loan and it is estimated that he was having
disproportionate income at 64.63% when compared to his
known source of income. Therefore the Superintendent of
Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha on the basis of the information
received from 'SIR', recommended for registration of the FIR
and for regular investigation.
30. The contents of 'SIR' prima-facie discloses that the
petitioner, who was a public servant, amassed wealth which
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was disproportionate to his known source of income and there
by he committed misconduct under Section 13(1)(e) punishable
under Section 13(2) of PC Act.
31. On receipt of the recommendation to register the
case for the offence under Section 13(1)(e) R/w Section 13(2)
of PC Act by the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka
Lokayuktha, on the basis of the SIR, the FIR in the
Cr.No.9/2011 for the said offence came to be registered on
16.03.2011 by the Karnataka Lokayuktha, Bengaluru Rural
District, Bengaluru, arraying the petitioner as the accused. This
FIR was registered by Vazir Ali Khan, the Police Inspector,
attached to Karnataka Lokayuktha Bengaluru rural District,
Bengaluru.
32. Under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, as it stood then, every information relating to
commission of a cognizable offence, if given to an officer in-
charge of police station, whether given in writing or reduced
into writing, shall be entered in a book to register the FIR.
Therefore, registration of the FIR under Section 154 of Cr.PC is
the job of an officer in-charge of the police station. In the
present case, the police Inspector attached to Karnataka
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Lokayuktha Police, Bangalore Rural District, registered the FIR
as the officer in charge of the police station.
33. All these procedures discloses that on receipt of
credible information regarding commission of the offence, a
formal preliminary enquiry was conducted and an SIR was
submitted to the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka
Lokayuktha Police, Bangalore Rural District, who after being
satisfied with the prima facie materials regarding commission of
the offence, recommended for registration of the case and
ordered for regular investigation. The preparation of 'SIR' in the
present case itself is a preliminary enquiry held by the police
officer by collecting the materials informally, which are
sufficient for registration of FIR for a cognizable offence.
Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that no preliminary enquiry was held as required
under law, or the accused was not given prior notice to explain
regarding his assets or the source from where he acquired the
same, or that the police inspector who registered the FIR was
lacking authority to register the FIR does not find any merits
and hence, the same is to be rejected.
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34. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred
to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Surender Kaushik
and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others11 to
contend that the investigation was undertaken without
registration of the FIR and the same is bad under law as there
is abuse of process of law. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Surender
Kaushik (supra) dealt with permissibility of a second FIR for
the same incident. It has considered whether a second FIR
could be registered when already an FIR was registered
concerning the same incident and it has summed up by
clarifying the test of sameness for multiple FIRs. In the present
case, no two FIRs were registered. Only the preliminary enquiry
was held and the 'SIR' came to be submitted to the
Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayuktha. Source
Information Report (SIR) cannot be equated with the First
Information Report (FIR). SIR is never referred to either in
Cr.PC or in the present BNSS. It is the practice that is evolved
on the basis of various decisions of the Apex Court referred to
above. By no stretch of imagination the 'SIR' can be equated to
11
(2013) 5 SCC 148
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FIR that is registered under Section 154 of Cr.PC or under
Section 173 of BNSS.
35. Learned for the petitioner has also referred to the
decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohindro Vs. State of
Punjab12 to contend that, the investigation could not have
been undertaken without entering commission of the offence in
the station house diary. However, reliance on said decision is
misplaced, as mere receipt of bald information regarding
commission of an offence does not necessarily require entry in
the station house diary or registration of an FIR. In order to
ascertain whether prima facie material exists to constitute an
offence, a preliminary enquiry is necessary enabling the officer
to collect prima-facie materials, though informally, for the
purpose of determining whether an FIR should be registered
and further investigation is to be undertaken or not.
36. The learned Senior Advocate has further raised a
contention regarding the competency of the Police Inspector to
conduct investigation in view of Section 17 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. Section 17 deals with persons authorised to
investigate. As per Section 17(b), the Assistant Commissioner
12
AIR 2001 SC 2113
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of Police is authorised to investigate into the matter, and as per
Section 17(c), a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police
officer of equivalent rank is competent to investigate any
offence punishable under the Act without the order of the
Magistrate. The first proviso to Section 17 states that a police
officer not below the rank of Inspector of Police may also be
authorised by the State Government by a general or special
order to investigate such offence without the order of the
learned Magistrate of the First Class, while the second proviso
provides that an offence under Section 13(1)(e) shall not be
investigated without the order of a police officer not below the
rank of Superintendent of Police.
37. Learned counsel for the respondent produced the
copy of the notification issued by the Government dated
20.08.1997, which reads as under:
"In exercise of the powers conferred by the first
proviso to Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 (Central Act 49 of 1988), and in permission of
notification No.HD 55 PEG 95. Dated 10th April 1996,
the Government of Karnataka hereby authorises all the
Inspectors of Police Office of the Karnataka Lokayukta
for the purpose of the said proviso subject to the
general and over all control and supervision by the
Lokayuktha or Uplokayukta as the case may be."
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38. By this notification issued under the first proviso to
Section 17 of PC Act, all the Inspectors of Police of Karnataka
Lokayuktha are vested with the authority to investigate such
offences. Hence, the Superintendent of Police, Bengaluru Rural
District, authorised the Police Inspector to investigate into the
matter initially and subsequently the Deputy Superintendent of
Police was authorised to conduct investigation. Prima facie,
there is no illegality in conducting investigation as sought to be
projected by the petitioner.
39. It is further contended by the learned counsel for
the petitioner that, under Section 17A of PC Act, there is a clear
bar for the police officers to conduct either enquiry or inquiry or
even investigation into any offence alleged to have been
committed by the public servant under the PC Act. When
constitutional validity of Section 17A of PC Act was challenged,
recently, the Apex Court has given split verdict in Center for
Public Interest Litigation vs. Union of India13 which led to
the matter being referred to a larger Bench to decide as to
whether such protection creates an unfair shield for certain
classes of officers or not.
13
2026 INSC 55
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40. One of the view that was expressed is that Section
17A violates Article 14 as it creates an illegal classification by
shielding a specific class of public servants and violates the
right to equity. Hence it is unconstitutional and should be
struck down. It was viewed that inclusion of Section 17A by Act
16/2018 w.e.f 26.07.2018 is the third attempt by the
Government to shield the corrupt officials by blocking even a
preliminary enquiry. It prevents the truth from coming out and
protects the corrupt officials rather than protecting the honest
ones.
41. The other view expressed is that the section is
constitutionally valid but must be read down to include stricter
safeguards. However, the decision from the larger Bench is
awaited in this regard.
42. The next contention urged by the learned counsel
for the petitioner is with regard to the validity of sanction
accorded by the Board of KPTCL. Section 19 of PC Act deals
with previous sanction necessary for prosecution. There is a bar
for taking cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections
7, 11, 13 and 15 under the PC Act alleged to have been
committed by a public servant, except with the previous
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sanction of a competent authority. Under Section 19(c), such
sanction is to be accorded by a person having authority
competent to remove him from his office.
43. In the present case, the petitioner is admittedly
working as an Assistant Executive Engineer in BESCOM. The
Indian Electricity Act, 1910 was repealed and the Electricity
Act, 2003 was brought into force with effect from 10.06.2003
when it was published in the official gazette. As per Section 185
of the Act, 2003, it repeals the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Electricity Regulatory
Commission Act, 1998. As per the saving clause, anything done
or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken,
including any rule, notification, inspection, order or notice made
or issued etc., shall insofar as it is not inconsistent with the
provisions of 2003 Act, be deemed to have been done or taken
under the corresponding provisions of the Act 2003.
44. The learned counsel for the respondent placed
reliance on the decisions of the coordinate Bench of this Court
in P.N.Hanumanthaiah (supra) where this Court considered
an order passed by the Trial Court, discharging the accused, for
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the offence under the Provisions of PC Act. It held in paragraph
Nos.13, 14, 15 as under :
"13. Keeping in mind the ratio in the above decisions, it
is necessary to examine whether the trial Court is justified in
discharging accused No.1. The one and the only reason given
by the trial Court to discharge accused No.1 is that the
sanction order granting permission to prosecute him is not
issued by the Board and therefore it is not valid. Of course,
there is no dispute that at the relevant point of time, accused
No.1 was working as Assistant Executive Engineer (Elec),
BESCOM and the Provisions of the 1987 Regulations are
applicable. As per Resolution passed by the Board in its 79th
meeting dated 24.08.2011, the Schedule V and VI of 1987
Regulations are amended and according to it, authority
appointing the Assistant Executive Engineer (Elec) is the
Director (Admn & HR).
14. As per order dated 20.03.2002 in
KPTCL/B.37/B.21/5710/2001-02 Bangalore, Clause(f) is
added to Regulation 14A to the effect that in the respect of
cases of criminal prosecution investigated either by the
Lokayukta or by any other authorities, the appointing
authorities specified in the schedules to these regulations,
competent to impose the penalty of removal on the accused
employee shall, if they deem fit after verifying that record,
accord sanction to prosecute the accused employee. On the
outcome of the said criminal case, the Appointing Authority of
the post of the said criminal case, the appointing authority of
the post of the said employee shall be competent to take
further action.
15. Thus as per these amendments, the Appointing
Authority is authorized to remove the employee and also
empowered to issue the sanction order. Without referring to
these subsequent amendments and insertions, the trial Court
referring to the old regulations has come to a wrong
conclusion that the sanction issued by Director (Admn & HR)
is not valid, and therefore, accused No.1 is entitled for
discharge. The trial Court has also failed to consider the ratio
in the above decisions which provide that in case of sanction
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order being there, its validity is required to be appreciated at
the trial and not at the threshold."
(emphasis supplied)
45. The learned counsel for the respondent has also
placed reliance on the decision of the coordinate Bench of this
Court in and Sri.Jaikumar A., (supra) wherein it has held at
paragraph Nos.18 to 26 as under:
"18. There is no dispute that under Regulation 10A(1)
of the Regulations, 1987, the Board is competent to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against any other
employee of the Board. The said provision also enables
any other authority empowered by the Board in
general or by special order to initiate disciplinary
proceeding against the Board employee.
19. Regulation 10A(1)(b) of Regulations, 1987 enables the
Board to direct initiation of disciplinary proceeding against
such employees, by the disciplinary authority competent to
impose penalties specified in Regulation 9.
20. Regulation 10A-(2) of Regulations, 1987 refers to
schedules V, VI, VII and VIII in Regulations, 1987. And the
said provision also provides that Disciplinary Authority named
in schedules V, VI, VII and VIII, competent to impose
penalties specified in Clauses (i) to (iv) (a) of Regulations,
1987, may initiate the disciplinary proceeding to impose
penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (viii) of Regulation-9.
21. In other words, under Regulation 10A(2), the power is
also conferred on the authority competent under schedules V,
VI, VII and VIII of the Regulations, 1987 to initiate
disciplinary proceedings, for imposing penalties specified in
clauses (v) to (viii) if the authority is also competent to
impose penalty specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of Regulation 9
of Regulations, 1987.
22. The question is, "Whether Director, Administration and
Human Resources is the competent authority to impose the
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penalty of dismissal as provide in clauses (v) to (viii) of
Regulation 9?"
23. Under the schedule provided to Regulations, 1987, it is
noticed that the Director, Administration and Human
Resources is the competent person to appoint Assistant
Executive Engineer. This was the position before the
amendment to Regulations, 1987 and even after the
amendment.
24. In addition to that, it is also noticed that the Director,
Administration and Human Resources is also an authority
competent to impose the penalty of dismissal as provided
under Regulation 9(viii). Though there is an amendment to
the said schedule, even after the amendment, the position
remains the same as far as the power to impose penalty is
concerned. The said power is conferred to remove the person
in the cadre of Assistant Executive Engineer.
25. The Trial Court has proceeded on the assumption that
amendment requires Notification in the Official Gazette and in
the absence of such Notification, the amendment cannot be
given effect to. Though the amendment requires Notification
and unless there is a Notification, the amendment cannot be
given effect to, what is required to be noticed is even before
the amendment, the power to impose penalty of removal from
service is conferred.
26. This being the position, this Court is of the view that
Regulations, 1987 enables the Appointing Authority to impose
penalty of dismissal also enables to grant under
Section 19(1)(c) of Act, 1988.
(emphasis supplied)
46. A specific contention appears to have been raised in
the said case before the Trial Court that Karnataka Electricity
Board Regulations, the Board is the competent authority to
remove the employee and to issue the sanction to prosecute
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the accused. But the sanction order was issued by the Director
(Admin & HR) of KPTCL and hence the same is not valid. This
court after considering the contentions raised by both the
parties held that the accused No.1 in the said case was working
as Assistant Executive Engineer (Elec.), BESCOM and that the
provisions of 1987 Regulations were applicable to him. It was
noticed that a resolution was passed by the Board in its
meeting dated 24.08.2011 and Schedule V and VI of 1987
Regulations were amended. According to which, the authority
appointing the Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical) is the
Director (Admin and HR). The court has also referred to the
order dated 20.03.2002, where clause (f) is added to
Regulation 14(A) to the effect that in respect of the cases of
criminal prosecution investigated either by the Lokayuktha or
by any other authorities, the appointing authorities specified in
the schedule to these Regulations, who are competent to
impose the penalty of removal of the accused employee shall
accord sanction to prosecute the accused. Therefore, it was
held that the appointing authority is authorized to remove the
employee and therefore, empowered to issue sanction. The
Court noticed that the subsequent amendments and the
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insertions were not referred to by the Trial Court and thereby it
has arrived at a wrong conclusion.
47. Thus, the co-ordinate Benches of this Court in P. N.
Hanumanthaiah (supra) and Jaikumar A.S. (supra)
consistently held that even though the Act of 2003 came into
force by repealing Act of 1910, and the Regulations, 1948,
there is no requirement of once again notifying the authority of
the Board and the competent authority to accord sanction, as
the authority already vested in the Board was never taken
away. When the Board is the appointing authority, which also
has the authority to remove the employee from service, it is
the competent authority referred to under Section 19(1) of PC
Act.
48. In view of the above, this Court consistently held
that the sanction accorded by the appointing authority who is
authorized to impose penalty of dismissal from service is
competent to accord sanction. The Court has made it further
clear that even before the amendment, the power to impose
penalty of removal from service was conferred. Since the same
is not inconsistent with the amended provision, the contention
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raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that regard
cannot be accepted.
49. Moreover, under the Karnataka Electricity Board
(KEB) Employees' Services (Conduct) Regulations 1988. The
Board is defined as the Karnataka Electricity Board constituted
under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It is to be
noticed that as per Section 2(7) of the Act, 2003, The word
'Board' is defined as a State Electricity Board, constituted
before the commencement of this Act, under sub-section (1) of
Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Therefore, even
though the old Act of 1910 was repealed, and the Electricity Act
of 2003 was enacted, the definition of the word Board means
the same Board, which was constituted before the
commencement of the new Act, under Section 5.1 of the
Electricity Supply Act of 1948.
50. It is brought to the notice of the court that KPTCL,
which took over the erstwhile Karnataka Electricity Board (KEB)
has passed a resolution dated 22.06.2021. As per Order
No.KPTCL/B84/24333/2021-21, a resolution was passed by the
Board of Directors of KPTCL at its 124th meeting held on
09.04.2021 and the name of the existing rules i.e. Karnataka
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Electricity Board Employees (Classification, Disciplinary Control
and Appeal) Regulations (CDC&A) was renamed as Karnataka
Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. Employees (Classification,
Disciplinary control and Appeal) Regulations. Moreover,
approval was accorded to adopt Karnataka State Civil Services
(Conduct) Rules 2021 issued by the Government of Karnataka
vide Notification dated 07.01.2021 mutatis mutandis in KPTCL
as annexed to the KPTCL Employees Service (Conduct)
Regulations, 2021. Therefore, it is clear that the Karnataka
Electricity Board Employees (Classification, Disciplinary Control
and Appeal) Regulations, 1987 is renamed as KPTCL Employees
(Classification, Disciplinary Control and Appeal) Regulations and
it is applicable till date.
51. As per this regulation, appointing authority as per
Section 2(a) in relation to a Board means, the Authority which
appointed the Board Employee to such service grade or post, as
the case may be, whichever authority is the highest Authority.
As per Section 2(b), Disciplinary Authority in relation to
imposition of penalty on a Board Employee means the Authority
competent under these regulations to impose him that penalty.
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52. As per Section 2(a) of the Karnataka Electricity
Board Employees' (Classification, Disciplinary, Control and
Appeal) Regulations, 1987, the appointing and disciplinary
authorities are defined as under:
"2 INTERPRETATION:- In these Regulations, unless the
context otherwise requires:-
a) 'APPOINTING AUTHORITY' in relation to a Board
employee means:-
i) the authority empowered to make appointments to the
service of which the Board employee is for the time being a
member or to the grade of the service in which the Board
employee is for the time being included, or
il) the authority empowered to make appointments to the
post which the Board.employee for the time being hold, or
iii) the authority which appointed the Board employee to
such service; grade or post, as the case may be, which ever
authority is the highest authority
b): 'DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY' in relation to the
imposition of a penalty on a Board employee means the
authority competent under these Regulations to impose on
him that penalty:"
53. Furthermore, as per Section 2(c), the Board
employee is defined as under:
"c) 'BOARD EMPLOYEE' means a person on monthly
rate of pay in any establishment in the Board and includes
any person whose services are temporarily placed at the
disposal of the Central / State Government or a Local
Authority, whether working in the Board or on deputation to
the Government or anyother organisation."
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54. Section 10(A) the Regulation prescribes Authority to
institute proceedings. As per Section 14(A) of the Regulation,
special procedure is explained in certain cases of misconduct.
55. Section 7 of the Regulation, 1987 reads as under:
"7. APPOINTMENTS TO BOARD SERVICES :
1) Save as otherwise provided, all first appointments to
the Board services in Groups - A, B, C and D shall be made by
the Authorities specified in the Schedule - I, II, III and IV
from time to time."
56. As per Schedule II(A), the Chief Engineer Electricity
(General) is the appointing authority for the Assistant Executive
Engineer (Electrical). In the present case the very same Chief
Engineer has accorded sanction for and on behalf of the Board.
On going through the above-mentioned definitions of the
appointing authority, disciplinary authority, board employee
and the schedules attached to the Regulation, 1987 therein, it
is clear that all the ingredients of Section 19 of PC Act for
according sanction have been met. Thus, I do not find any
irregularly or illegality in such sanction. Since, the accused was
appointed by the Board and the Chief Engineer is the Appoint
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Authority, it is the Board, represented by such Chief Engineer is
competent to remove him.
57. The next contention take by the learned counsel for
the petitioner is that, since the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948, has been repealed with the enactment of Electricity Act,
2003, the Board had no jurisdiction to accord sanction. He
placed heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in V.
Venkatasiva Reddy Vs. State By Karnataka Lokayukta14,
where the co-ordinate Bench of this Court considered the
sanction accorded by KPTCL, for prosecuting its employee and
held that, the KPTCL had not notified the regulation in terms of
Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. A resolution
has been passed by the Board to include Regulation 14(A)(f)
which empowered the appointing authority to accord sanction
for prosecution in cases investigated by Lokayuktha. But the
Court found that, since the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 has
been repealed by the Electricity Act, 2003 and there was no
official notification in terms of Section 79 of the erstwhile Act,
the Karnataka Electricity Board stood dissolved and KPTCL has
been registered as Company during 1999, for which there is no
14
Crl.P.No.7157/2016 dated 28.10.2016
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stipulation under the Act, 2003. Therefore, it was held that the
sanction that was accorded by the Board after the enactment of
Electricity Act, 2003, is not a sanction in the eye of law.
58. It was also held by the Co-ordinate Bench that if
there was a regulation under the erstwhile regulations and
power to grant such a sanction was traceable to the same, the
same position would continue as on date and the ambiguous
situation claiming that erstwhile regulations would apply
would be insignificant. It is also held that if this is accepted
then sub clause (f) of Regulation 14(A) has never been laid
before the legislature nor notified in the gazette. This would
lead to a chaotic situation whether or not the authority had
power to grant a sanction. Consequently, the sanction order
that is sought to be relied upon is not a sanction in the eye of
law.
59. The learned counsel for the respondent placed on
record the order dated 24.01.2017 passed by the very same
Hon'ble Judge in Criminal Petition No.9358/2016 with
connected matters in G. Krishnamoorthy Vs. Karnataka
Lokayuktha to contend that the same Bench has subsequently
acknowledged that the order passed in V. Venkatasiva Reddy
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(supra) was a mistake, and ignoring the provisions that are in
the statute. The Co-ordinate Bench in G. Krishnamoorthy
(supra) passed the following order.
"The Counsel for the petitioners seek permission
of the court to withdraw the petitions with liberty to
approach the trial Court in an appropriate application.
2. Special Public Prosecutor however would point
out that there is an order of this Court passed in almost
similar circumstances, where it has been held that there
is no statutory sanction for the Regulations under which
sanction has been ordered. This however was without
reference to certain provisions which have not been
brought to light and considered by this court. This
aspect of the matter is left open.
The petitions are dismissed as withdrawn with
liberty to approach the trial Court."
60. Even though learned counsel for the respondent
contended that the reference in paragraph No.2 extracted
above is to the decision in V. Venkatasiva Reddy (supra),
learned counsel for the petitioner disputes the said fact
contending that there is no specific reference to V.
Venkatasiva Reddy (supra) and therefore it cannot be
accepted.
61. The respondent in the above case is Karnataka
Lokayuktha, where the accused filed similar petition under
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Section 482 Cr.PC seeking to quash the criminal proceedings
initiated against him for the offence under Section 7, 13(1)(d)
R/w Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act. However,
The learned counsel for the petitioners sought permission to
withdraw the petition with liberty to approach the Trial Court.
The Special Prosecutor in the said case specifically brought to
the notice of the Court about the order passed in almost similar
circumstances holding that there was no statutory sanction for
the regulations under which the sanction has been accorded.
That exactly is the order passed by the said Bench in
V. Venkatasiva Reddy (supra). The court has specifically
stated that the said order was passed without reference to the
provisions which have not been brought to light and considered
by the court and hence the same is left open. Therefore, I do
not find any reason to reject the contention of the learned
counsel for the respondent. Hence, no reliance could be placed
on V. Venkatasiva reddy (supra).
62. The last contention raised by the petitioner is with
regard to the jurisdiction of the SP/DY.SP Bengaluru Rural
District either to permit registration of FIR or to investigate and
file final report on the ground that the petitioner was working
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within Bengaluru Urban District. The materials on record
discloses that the accused had worked at various places during
the check period and finally was working at Peeenya, Bengaluru
Urban. As per SIR, the petitioner has accumulated wealth in the
form of movable and immovable properties at different places,
while working at various stations. The offence alleged is a
continuing one which appears to have been committed in more
local areas than one. The SIR and the final report discloses that
the petition had immovable properties within the Bengaluru
Urban and Rural Districts.
63. Section 178 CR.P.C and Section 198 of the present
BNSS refer to the place of inquiry or trial and where the offence
is continuing one and committed partly in one local area and
partly in another, or when such offence consists of several acts
done in different local areas, like the one in the present case,
such offence may be enquired into or tried by a Court having
jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, I do not
find any merits in the contention that is raised in this regard.
64. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is the
primary legislation. Karnataka Lokayuktha is an institution
having dual function to investigate and enquire under
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Lokayuktha Rules and also under the Provisions of PC Act. The
officers working under Karnataka Lokayuktha Act and Rules are
the police officers working on deputation. The Apex Court in
C. Rangaswamaiah Vs.Karnataka Lokayuktha15 already
held that the police officers on deputation to Lokayuktha do not
lose their powers to investigate the offences under the
Provisions of PC Act, 1988. They act as police officers under
Cr.PC while investigating the offences under PC Act.
65. In the present case, admittedly, the final report
came to be filed after investigation by the DYSP, Karnataka
Lokayuktha, Bangalore Rural District. As per Section 17(c), the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, or a police officer of
equivalent rank, is authorized to investigate and submit the
final report. Therefore, I do not find any irregularity either in
conducting preliminary enquiry, registration of FIR, conducting
investigation, in according sanction or in submitting the final
report. It is interesting to note that the petitioner has produced
only a portion of the final report. The entire final report with
enclosures are not produced by the petitioner for the reasons
best known to him.
15
1998 AIR SCW 2498
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66. From the discussions held above, there are prima-
facie materials to prosecute the petitioner for the offence
alleged. Under such circumstances, I do not find any reason to
quash the criminal proceedings. I have no reason to hold that
the prosecution is an abuse of process of law. Hence the
petitioner is liable for prosecution.
Accordingly, I answer Negative and proceed to pass the
following:
ORDER
The petition is dismissed.
Sd/-
(M G UMA) JUDGE BH CT:VS List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1