Karnataka High Court
Sri B Uttam Kumar vs Smt Geetha Prakash on 19 February, 2026
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258
WP No. 3441 of 2026
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO. 3441 OF 2026 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
1. SRI. B. UTTAM KUMAR
S/O. LATE G.H. BANGERA,
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS,
R/AT NO 404, 1ST MAIN
9TH CROSS, PANCHASHEELAN NAGAR,
MOODALAPALYA, GOVINDARAJA NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 072.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. H. MANJUNATH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. GEETHA PRAKASH
S/O. SRI P.G. PRAKASH,
AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS,
Digitally signed
by RESIDENT OF NO.7, 3RD BLOCK,
SHARADAVANI B
Location: High 4TH MAIN ROAD, T.R. SHAMANNA ROAD,
Court of
Karnataka NEAR JAIN TEMPLE,
TYAGARAJA NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 028
2. SMT RAGHINI
W/O SRI KRIAN KUMAR J.,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO 12/1
2ND MAIN, IX CROSS,
CHAMRAJPET,
BENGALURU -560 018
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WP No. 3441 of 2026
HC-KAR
3. SRI B. CHANDRASHEKAR,
S/O LATE G.H. BANGERA,
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
RESIDNG AT NO 12/1,
2ND MAIN, IX CROSS,
CHAMRAJPET,
BENGALURU - 560 018
4. SMT SUJATHA B
D/O LATE G.H. BANGERA,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
RESIDING C/O. TANUJA SRINIVAS,
DODDAGUBBI VILLAGE,
BIDARAHALLI HOBLI,
BAGALUR ROAD,
HOSAKOTE TALUK,
BENGALURU EAST - 560 049
5. SMT HEMVATHI,
W/O SRI HARI,
AGED ABOUT 69 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF NO.17,
KUVEMPU CROSS ROAD,
JARAGANAHALLI JP NAGAR VI PHASE,
KANAKAPURA MAIN ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 078
6. SMT MANGALA GOWRI,
D/O LATE G.H. BANGERA,
W/O SRI RAGHURAM,
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS,
RESIDNG AT NO 8/1, 4TH MAIN,
IX CROSS, RAMACHANDRA AGRAHARA,
CHAMRAJPET,
BENGALURU - 560 018
.
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258
WP No. 3441 of 2026
HC-KAR
7. SRI MAHESH KUMAR,
S/O SRI SHIVARAMAIAH S.H.,
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO B-8,
AIR STAFF QUARTERS,
5TH MAIN, 7TH CROSS,
OPP TO STERLING APARTMENTS,
RMV 2ND STAGE,
BENGALURU - 560 094
...RESPONDENTS
THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A. CALL FOR THE
RECORDS PENDING DISPOSAL ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF
THE X ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AT
BENGALURU (CCH-26) IN O.S NO 1307/2023 AND ETC.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
In this petition, petitioner seeks the following reliefs:
Wherefore, the petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to A Call for the records pending disposal on the file of the Court of the X Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, at Bengaluru (CCH-26) in O.S No 1307/2023, B. Allow this Writ petition and consequently, set-aside the impugned order dated 3/01/2026 in OS No 1307/2023 rejecting the application (IA No 487) made by the respondent No 1 under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC, 1908 on the file of Court of X Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge at Bengaluru (CCH-26) which is produced as Annexure-A. -4- NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR C. Pass any other order/s as this Hon'ble Court deem fit to pass under the facts and circumstances of the revision petition.
2. This petition by the defendant No.3 in O.S.No. 1307/2023 is directed against the impugned order dated 03.01.2026 passed by the X Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore, whereby the applications, IA Nos. 4 and 7 filed by the plaintiff to implead some lis pendens/pendente lite purchasers as additional defendants 8 to 14 was allowed by the trial Court.
3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and defendant No.3 and perused the material on record.
4. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the first respondent - plaintiff has Instituted the aforesaid suit against the petitioner defendant No.3 and six other defendants for declaration of title, permanent injunction and other reliefs in relation to the suit schedule immovable property. The petitioners along with defendant Nos.1 and 2 have filed the written statement and are disputing and denying the claim of the plaintiff and have also put forth a counter claim for declaration, -5- NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR permanent injunction and other reliefs in relation to the written statement schedule properties. During the pendency of the suit, the respondent No.1 - plaintiff filed two applications viz. IA Nos.
4 and 7 under Order I Rule 10 CPC to implead additional defendants No.8 to 14 on the ground that they were lis pendens alinees of portions of the suit schedule property during the pendency of the suit. The said application having been opposed by the petitioner, the trial Court proceeded to pass the impugned order allowing the application by holding as under
" I.A. No.4 & 7 filed by the plaintiff U/O I R 10 of CPC are allowed.
Plaintiff is permitted to bring the proposed defendants No.8 to 14 as defendants No.8 to 14.
However, it is made clear that if the proposed defendants No.8 to 14 feel that they are not necessary or proper parties in the present suit, they are at liberty to seek for their deletion immediately after their appearance before this Court. "
5. A perusal of the impugned order will indicate that the trial Court has come to the correct conclusion that the first respondent - plaintiff has sought to implead the lis pendens purchasers as additional defendants to the suit on the ground that the portions of the suit schedule property had been -6- NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR alienated in their favour and that the suit schedule property had devolved upon them during the pendency of the suit in terms of Order XXII Rule 10 CPC.
6. Under identical circumstances, in the case of M/s J N Real Estate vs. Shailendra Pradhan and Others (2025 INSC 611, it is held as under:
23. In Mumbai International Airport (supra), this Court explained the import of the expressions "necessary party" and "proper party" as thus:
"14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party : (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party.
15. A "necessary party" is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a "necessary party" is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A "proper party" is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely -7- NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. It is limpid in the aforesaid observation that if a party is found to either a necessary or proper party, the court would have the jurisdiction to implead him, even against the wishes of the plaintiff concerned. In Mumbai International Airport (supra) another pertinent question that arose was whether there existed any conflict between the three-judge bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733 and the decision of a two-judge bench in Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.), (2007) 10 SCC 82.
25. In Kasturi (supra), the respondent nos. 1 and 4 to 11 respectively therein, based their claim to be added as party defendants on an independent title and possession of the contracted property. In such a backdrop, while rejecting the applications for impleadment, this Court had expounded the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and laid down certain tests for determining whether a person is a 'necessary party' for the purpose of impleadment in a suit for specific performance as follows:
(i) First, that a bare reading of Order I Rule 10(2) clearly indicates that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale or an agreement to sell, are the parties to the contract or, if they are dead, their legal representatives, as also persons who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. A subsequent purchaser would be a necessary party since his rights would be affected irrespective of whether he had purchased the contracted property, with or without notice of the contract. However, it was clarified that a person whose claim is adverse to the claim of a vendor, is not a 'necessary party'. Therefore, two tests were laid down by this Court, which must be satisfied for determining the question as to who is a necessary party -- (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. The relevant observations read as under:-8-
NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR "7. In our view, a bare reading of this provision, namely, second part of Order 1 Rule 10 sub-rule (2) CPC would clearly show that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract or if they are dead, their legal representatives as also a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are -- (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party."
(Emphasis supplied)
(ii) Secondly, as regards the meaning of "proper party", it was observed that in case of a suit for specific performance, the guiding principle for deciding who is a proper party is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell. Such a question has to be decided while keeping in mind the scope of the suit for specific performance. If the addition of that party enlarges the scope of such suit so as to convert it into a suit for title, then the presence of such a party cannot be said to be necessary for the effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit. The relevant observations read as under:
"11. As noted hereinearlier, two tests are required to be satisfied to determine the question who is a necessary party, let us now consider who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. For deciding the question who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance the guiding principle is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Thus, the question is to be decided keeping in mind the scope of the suit. The question that is to be decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract. If the person seeking addition is added in such a -9- NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title. Therefore, for effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit, presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at all. Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Tasker v. Small [(1834) 40 ER 848 : 3 My & Cr 63] made the following observations : (ER pp. 850-51) 'It is not disputed that, generally, to a bill for a specific performance of a contract of sale, the parties to the contract only are the proper parties; and, when the ground of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in suits of that kind is considered it could not properly be otherwise. The Court assumes jurisdiction in such cases, because a court of law, giving damages only for the non- performance of the contract, in many cases does not afford an adequate remedy. But, in equity, as well as at law, the contract constitutes the right, and regulates the liabilities of the parties; and the object of both proceedings is to place the party complaining as nearly as possible in the same situation as the defendant had agreed that he should be placed in. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach of it.'
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13. From the aforesaid discussion, it is pellucid that necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before the court would be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person."
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15. [...] In the case of Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha [(1996) 10 SCC 53] this Court had taken the same view which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above. This Court
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR in that decision clearly held that to decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit. Therefore, in our view, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. [...]"
(Emphasis supplied)
(iii) Thirdly, an intervenor seeking to be impleaded must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell. It was held that a person is considered to be legally interested in the answers to the controversy, only if he can satisfy the court that it may lead to a result that would legally affect him.
The relevant observations read as under:
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"17. [...] Apart from that, the intervener must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. In Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd. [[1956] 1 All ER 273 : [1956] 1 Q.B. 357 : [1956] 2 WLR 372] it has been held that a person is legally interested in the answers to the controversies only if he can satisfy the court that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. However, this Court, in its subsequent decision in Sumtibai (supra), was faced with a factual scenario wherein the sons of the original defendant were also prima facie found to be co-owners of the contracted property. The sons were already impleaded in their capacity of being legal representatives to the deceased defendant who had entered into an agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff therein. In this background, it was observed that it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that in a suit for specific performance, a third party can never be impleaded. It was opined that the decision of this court in Kasturi (supra) must be seen in the context in which it was delivered. Furthermore, some circumstantial flexibility is necessary to be taken into
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR account in each case, since an additional or different fact may materially change the conclusion. Therefore, the sons of the original defendant were allowed to file an additional written statement and take the defence of co-ownership which was available to them.
27. While distinguishing Kasturi (supra), it was held in Sumtibai (supra) that if a third party can show a fair semblance of title or interest, he can file an application for impleadment in the suit for specific performance. The relevant observations read thus:
"13. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [(2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778] a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed : (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-
12) '9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.
Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [[1951] A.C. 737 (HL)] (AC at p. 761) Lord MacDermott observed : (All ER p. 14 C-D) [...]'
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14. In view of the aforesaid decisions we are of the opinion that Kasturi case [(2005) 6 SCC 733] is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. In our opinion, if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment. To take a contrary view would lead to multiplicity of proceedings because then C
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR will have to wait until a decree is passed against B, and then file a suit for cancellation of the decree on the ground that A had no title in the property in dispute. Clearly, such a view cannot be countenanced."
(Emphasis supplied)
28. This Court in Mumbai International Airport (supra) was also of the view that different situations require the application of different facets of Order I Rule 10(2) and consequently, held that there was no conflict between the decisions of this Court in Kasturi (supra) and Sumtibai (supra). It was reiterated that that Order I Rule 10(2) CPC did not pertain to the 'right' of a non- party to be impleaded as a party but deals with the 'judicial discretion' of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of the proceeding. In exercising this judicial discretion, courts must act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice.
29. It was observed that the court may exercise discretion in impleading a person who is a 'proper party' upon an application by a non-party to the suit for specific performance. If the court is of the view that the impleadment of such a proper party will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may either refuse to implead such person or order for his impleadment on certain conditions. However, even otherwise, the court would not be precluded from impleading a 'proper party' unconditionally in its discretion. The relevant observations rendered in Mumbai International Airport (supra) read thus:
"24.4 If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bona fides, etc., the court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non-party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party and the court finds him to be a proper party, the court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the scope of the specific performance suit; or the court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if D claiming to be a co-owner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of P
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR representing that he is the co-owner with half-share, and P files a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half-share, the court may permit the other co-owner who contends that D has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the defendant vendor to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other co-owner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded co- owner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject-matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit only the issues relating to specific performance, that is, whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced.
25. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Having discussed the aforesaid position of law, it would be apposite to look into the reasoning which was adopted by the High Court in its impugned decisions. It appears from the line of reasoning that the High Court entertained a serious doubt on the genuineness of the entire transaction between one (Late) Mr. Sameer Ghosh i.e., original defendant no. 3 and the appellant herein i.e., original defendant No. 8. (Late) Mr. Sameer Ghosh is said to have obtained a probate on the strength of one particular will and on the strength of that probate he is said to have executed first, an agreement of sale in favour of the original defendant no. 8 and thereafter, a sale deed with respect to the suit property. According to the High Court, this transaction is doubtful. The High Court has gone further to say that the documents i.e., the agreement and the sale deed are also doubtful.
31. xxxxxxxxxxxx
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32. Having regard to the material on record, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the order passed by the Trial Court impleading the original defendant no. 8 (appellant herein) as one of the defendants in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. We say so because the genuineness of the transaction, if any, including the genuineness of the documents is to be looked into in the course of the trial. A party who is seeking impleadment may not be a necessary party but still, could be termed as a proper party. There is a fine distinction between a necessary party and a proper party. A necessary party is a person in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. Whereas a proper party is one who though not a necessary party is a person whose presence would enable the court to effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit.
7. In the case of NAK Engineering Company Pvt.
Ltd., v. Tarun Keshrichand Shah & Ors. ( 2026 INSC 8), it is held as under:
32. The above discussion takes us to another aspect of the matter as to whether the appellant is a necessary or a proper party to be impleaded. The governing principles and law in this regard are well-settled.
33. The fundamental distinction between a "necessary party" and a "proper party" was succinctly explained in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay5, wherein this Court held:
"6... A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding."
34. In Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal6, this Court crystallized the twin tests for a necessary party:
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR "...the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. ... two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question as to who is a necessary party. The tests are : (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party."
35. This principle has been consistently reiterated. In Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd.7, this Court reiterated:
"15. A "necessary party" is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a "necessary party" is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A "proper party" is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance."
36. Thereafter, in Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd.8, the broad principles governing impleadment were summarized:
"41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an effective decree cannot be passed by the court.
41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and properly adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree is to be made.
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR 41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court does not have the jurisdiction to order his impleadment against the wishes of the plaintiff."
37. In the case at hand, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are not claiming any relief against the appellant. There is no iota of material to indicate that the relief, as claimed in the suit against respondent No. 3, if granted, would be implemented against the appellant. Therefore, the appellant is not a necessary party to the suit.
38. XXX
39. XXX
40. This conclusion is reinforced by the fundamental principle laid down in Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das9, wherein this Court has observed:
"11.4. ...the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed and nor can be decided effectively. In other words, no person can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to become the co-plaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective decision of the suit.
11.5. ... a necessary party is one without whom, no order can be made effectively, a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding."
41. In the above facts and circumstances, if the High Court, for one reason or the other, has set aside the order of impleadment passed by the court of first instance, we do not consider it to be illegal so as to set it aside and restore the order of the Trial Court.
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42. There is one another reason for not interfering with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The summons issued in the suit meant to be served upon respondent No. 3, were served in the year 2008. The seal and signatures on the acknowledgement on the said summons is of the appellant which clearly indicates that the appellant had acquired knowledge of the suit in the year 2008. However, the appellant kept silent and moved the motion for impleadment only after the evidence was closed in the year 2014 and the court had directed to proceed ex- parte in the matter. The impleadment application was filed almost after nine years of the knowledge of the pendency of the suit. Thus, the impleadment has been rightly refused to the appellant by the High Court.
43. We are conscious of the fact that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 is simply supervisory in nature and that the High Court ought not to have intervened in the matter. However, once the order has been interfered with, and rightly so, we do not wish to commit another illegality by restoring an incorrect order passed by the court of first instance.
44. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the appeals lack merit and are dismissed but with the direction that the decree passed in the suit would not be used against the appellant and would not be implemented against it.
8. It is also relevant to state that if the first respondent -
plaintiff being the dominus litis intends to protect his right by impleading lis pendens/pendente lite alienees as additional defendants, the petitioner - defendant No.3 cannot be said to have been put to any prejudice by virtue of such impleadment, especially when the rival contentions of all parties including the
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR contentions urged by the petitioner would necessarily have to be decided after hearing all the parties.
9. It is also pertinent to note that the proposed defendants No.8 to 14 had not objected to their impleadment as additional defendants in the suit and as such, the petitioner cannot be said to be aggrieved by the impleadment of additional defendants No.8 to 14 who themselves did not oppose such impleadment.
10. Under these circumstances, having regard to the provisions contained in Order XXII Rule 10 CPC and the judgments of the Apex Court, referred to supra, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the trial Court allowing IA Nos.4 and 7 cannot be said to suffer from any illegality or infirmity nor can the same be said to be capricious or perverse or having occasioned failure of justice, warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as held in Radhey Shyam Vs. Chhabi Nath - (2015) 5 SCC 423, K.P. Natarajan Vs.
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NC: 2026:KHC:10258 WP No. 3441 of 2026 HC-KAR Muthalammal - AIR 2021 SC 3443 and Mohamed Ali Vs. V. Jaya & others - (2022) 10 SCC 477.
11. Under these circumstances, I do not find any merit in the petition and the same is hereby disposed of without interfering with the impugned order. Liberty is however reserved in favour of the petitioner to put forth all contentions against all parties including the additional defendants No.8 to 14 in the suit which shall be considered by the trial Court in accordance with law.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE YKL List No.: 1 Sl No.: 28