Karnataka High Court
Rajkumar S/O Shrishail Ambi vs The State Of Karnataka on 18 February, 2026
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493
WP No. 100876 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
AT DHARWAD
DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION NO.100876 OF 2025 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
RAJKUMAR S/O. SHRISHAIL AMBI
AGE. 50 YEARS, OCC. LIBRARIAN,
B.V.BELLAD LAW COLLEGE BELAGAVI,
R/O. HOSPET GALLI CHIKKODI,
TALUK. CHIKKODI,
DIST. BELAGAVI-591102.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. MANJUNATH S.TORAGAL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION,
COLLEGIATE EDUCATION,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
M.S BUILDING, BANGALORE-560001.
MANJANNA
E 2. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND
Digitally signed by
MANJANNA E PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS,
Location: HIGH COURT
OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
Date: 2026.02.21
11:31:21 +0530 BANGALORE-560001.
3. PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE-560001.
4. COMMISSIONER FOR
COLLEGIATE EDUCATION,
PALACE ROAD, BANGALORE-560009.
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493
WP No. 100876 of 2025
HC-KAR
5. CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
COLLEGIATE EDUCATION,
PALACE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560009.
6. JOINT DIRECTOR
REGIONAL OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF COLLEGIATE EDUCATION,
UB HILLS MALMADDI,
DHARWAD-580001.
7. KARNATAKA LINGAYAT EDUCATION SOCIETY
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
KLE SOCIETY HEAD OFFICE,
COLLEGE ROAD, BELAGAVI-590001.
8. PRINCIPAL
B.V. BELLAD LAW COLLEGE,
EDUCATION BUILDING COMPLEX,
KLE CAMPUS, COLLEGE ROAD,
BELAGAVI-590001.
9. THE KARNATAKA STATE LAW UNIVERSITY
REP. BY REGISTRAR, KSLU,
HUBLI-DHARWAD.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. NANDINI B.SOMAPUR, AGA FOR R1 TO R6;
MISS. LAVANNYA SWAMI, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. MALLIKARJUNASWAMY B.HIREMATH,
ADVOCATE FOR R7 AND R8;
SRI. K.L.PATIL, ADVCOATE FOR R9)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT IN THE NATURE
OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED COMMUNICATION DATED.
10.01.2025 ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.5 BEARING NO.
¸ÀASÉå:PÁ²E/13/¯Á/SÁPÁPÁ/2012-13/£Éë-2 VIDE ANNEXURE-V BY
DENYING TO APPOINT PETITIONER AS LIBRARIAN IN RESPONDENT
NO.8 COLLEGE; AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493
WP No. 100876 of 2025
HC-KAR
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA
ORAL ORDER
The question that calls for consideration is, "Whether the introduction of NET/SLET as eligibility condition for recruitment and appointment of petitioner as librarian in respondent No.8-College as per the Gazette Notification dated 11.07.2009 prescribed by the University Grant Commission ("UGC" for short) and the State Government Order dated 24.12.2009 will effect the appointment of the petitioner under the State Pay Scale, in accordance with the existing Rules before 11.07.2009, when the eligibility condition was not compulsorily NET/SLET?"
2. The petitioner who is serving as a Librarian in respondent No.8-B.V.Bellad Law College, Belagavi, has approached this Court calling in question the communication dated 10.01.2025 issued by respondent No.5-Chief Administrative Officer, Office of the Commissioner, Collegiate Education, Bengaluru, whereby his request for -4- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR consideration under the grant-in-aid scheme in terms of the Government Order dated 26.08.2015 was rejected.
Brief Facts:
3. The petitioner applied for the post of Librarian in respondent No.8-College in October, 2007 while awaiting his M.Lib., Master Degree examination results and was appointed on 27.11.2007, through a regular selection process. At the time of appointment, the compulsory requirement of NET/SLET/Ph.D under the UGC Regulations was not in force. The petitioner initially secured 54.75% marks in M.Lib., and upon revaluation declared on 20.05.2009, he secured 55% marks thereby satisfying the minimum eligibility under the then prevailing norms. His appointment was confirmed on 13.07.2009 and he has been continuously serving in the said post for more than 18 years. The State Government, by proceedings dated 26.08.2015 granted aid to 19 Law Colleges and approved several appointments including Librarians under the State -5- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR Pay Scale, even when the appointees did not possess NET/SLET/Ph.D qualification. The petitioner's proposal was forwarded by the college authorities for approval under the grant-in-aid scheme. However, by the communication dated 10.01.2025, the Government rejected on the ground that the petitioner did not fulfil the minimum qualifications prescribed under the UGC Regulations. Aggrieved by the rejection, the petitioner is before this Court.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner was appointed as a Librarian on 27.11.2007 through a constituted selection process and his appointment was subsequently confirmed on 13.07.2009. At the time of appointment of the petitioner, the requirement of NET/SLET/Ph.D under the UGC Regulations has not been made compulsory.
5. It is submitted that he has secured 55% in the M.Lib upon revaluation on 20.05.2009, thereby fulfilling the minimum qualification prevailing at the relevant point of -6- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR time. It is further contended that the Government Order dated 26.08.2015 granted aid to 19 Law Colleges and approved several appointments under the State Pay Scale including who did not possess NET/SLET/Ph.D qualification.
It is contended that the similarly situated candidates were extended the benefit of the State Pay Scale without insisting upon the UGC norms and therefore denial of similar benefit to him amounts to discrimination.
6. Per contra, learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondents-State submits that the petitioner did not possess the required qualification for appointment under the State Pay Scale. It is further stated that the appointment of the petitioner was on 13.07.2009 and the UGC Regulation having come into effect, the petitioner is required to acquire NET/SLET/Ph.D qualification. Having not obtained the requirement, the petitioner is not entitled for grant-in-aid.
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7. This Court has carefully considered the rival contentions and perused the material on record.
8. The petitioner was appointed on 27.11.2007 through the process which was started on 27.10.2007 and his services were confirmed on 13.07.2009. The material on record also discloses that the petitioner secured 55% marks in M.Lib upon revaluation prior to the relevant cut-off date. As on the date of his appointment and confirmation, the requirement of NET/SLET/Ph.D was not mandatory.
9. The Apex Court in the case of P. Suseela & others Vs. University Grants Commission & others1 (P. Suseela), framed second point for consideration which is relevant for the present facts, "whether 2009 UGC Regulations are in perspective in as much as they apply only to appointments made after the date of notification and do not apply to the appointments made prior to the date?" At paragraph Nos.14 to 17, it has held as under:
1(2015) 8 Supreme Court Cases 129 -8- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR
14. The other interesting argument made is that such regulations should not be given retrospective effect so as to prejudicially affect the interests of any person to whom such regulation may be applicable. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to distinguish between an existing right and a vested right. This distinction was made with great felicity in Trimbak Damodhar Rajpurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil, 1962 Suppl. 1 SCR 700. In that case a question arose as to whether an amendment made to Section 5 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Amendment Act could be said to be retrospective because its operation took within its sweep existing rights. A bench of five Hon'ble Judges of this Court held that Section 5 had no retrospective operation.
15. This Court held:
"8. Besides, it is necessary to bear in mind that the right of the appellant to eject the respondents would arise only on the termination of the tenancy, and in the present case it would have been available to him on March 31, 1953 if the statutory provision had not in the meanwhile extended the life of the tenancy. It is true that the appellant gave notice to the respondents on March 11, 1952 as he was then no doubt entitled to do; but -9- NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR his right as a landlord to obtain possession did not accrue merely on the giving of the notice, it accrued in his favour on the date when the lease expired. It is only after the period specified in the notice is over and the tenancy has in fact expired that the landlord gets a right to eject the tenant and obtain possession of the land. Considered from this point of view, before the right accrued to the appellant to eject the respondents amending Act 33 of 1952 stepped in and deprived him of that right by requiring him to comply with the statutory requirement as to a valid notice which has to be given for ejecting tenants.
9. In this connection it is relevant to distinguish between an existing right and a vested right. Where a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all existing rights are included. As observed by Buckley, L.J. in West v Gwynne [(1911) 2 Ch 1 at pp 11, 12] retrospective operation is one matter and interference with existing rights is another.
'...If an Act provides that as at a past date the law shall be taken to have been that which it was not, that Act I understand to be retrospective. That is not this case. The question here is whether a certain provision as to the contents of leases is addressed to
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR the case of all leases or only of some, namely, leases executed after the passing of the Act. The question is as to the ambit and scope of the Act, and not as to the date as from which the new law, as enacted by the Act, is to be taken to have been the law.' These observations were made in dealing with the question as to the retrospective construction of Section 3 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 13). In substance Section 3 provided that in all leases containing a covenant, condition or agreement against assigning, underletting, or parting with the possession, or disposing of the land or property leased without licence or consent, such covenant, condition or agreement shall, unless the lease contains an expressed provision to the contrary, be deemed to be subject to a proviso to the effect that no fine or sum of money in the nature of a fine shall be payable for or in respect of such licence or consent. It was held that the provisions of the said section applied to all leases whether executed before or after the commencement of the Act; and, according to Buckley, L.J., this construction did not make the Act retrospective in operation; it merely affected in future existing rights under all leases whether executed before or after the date of the Act. The position in regard to the operation of Section 5(1) of
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR the amending Act with which we are concerned appears to us to be substantially similar.
10. A similar question had been raised for the decision of this Court in Jivabhai Purshottam v. Chhagan Karson [Civil Appeal No 153 of 1958 decided on 27-3-1961] in regard to the retrospective operation of Section 34(2)(a) of the said amending Act 33 of 1952 and this Court has approved of the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court on that point in Durlabbha Fakirbhai v. Jhaverbhai Bhikabhai [(1956) 58 BLR 85]. It was held in Durlabbhai case [(1956) 58 BLR 85] that the relevant provision of the amending Act would apply to all proceedings where the period of notice had expired after the amending Act had come into force and that the effect of the amending Act was no more than this that it imposed a new and additional limitation on the right of the landlord to obtain possession from his tenant. It was observed in that judgment that:
"4. ...a notice under Section 34(1) is merely a declaration to the tenant of the intention of the landlord to terminate the tenancy; but it is always open to the landlord not to carry out his intention. Therefore, for the application of the restriction under sub-section 2(a) on the right of the landlord to
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR terminate the tenancy, the crucial date is not the date of notice but the date on which the right to terminate matures; that is the date on which the tenancy stands terminated".
16. Similar is the case on facts here. A vested right would arise only if any of the appellants before us had actually been appointed to the post of Lecturer/Assistant Professors. Till that date, there is no vested right in any of the appellants. At the highest, the appellants could only contend that they have a right to be considered for the post of Lecturer/Assistant Professor. This right is always subject to minimum eligibility conditions, and till such time as the appellants are appointed, different conditions may be laid down at different times. Merely because an additional eligibility condition in the form of a NET test is laid down, it does not mean that any vested right of the appellants is affected, nor does it mean that the regulation laying down such minimum eligibility condition would be retrospective in operation. Such condition would only be prospective as it would apply only at the stage of appointment. It is clear, therefore, that the contentions of the private appellants before us must fail.
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR
17. One of the learned counsel for the petitioners argued, based on the language of the direction of the Central Government dated 12th November, 2008 that all that the Government wanted the UGC to do was to "generally" prescribe NET as a qualification. But this did not mean that UGC had to prescribe this qualification without providing for any exemption. We are unable to accede to this argument for the simple reason that the word "generally" precedes the word "compulsory" and it is clear that the language of the direction has been followed both in letter and in spirit by the UGC regulations of 2009 and 2010."
10. Another decision of the Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Sharma and others Vs. State of Bihar and others2 (Jagdish Prasad Sharma) has observed that, regulations framed by the UGC under the UGC Act, 1956 cannot alter any terms and conditions of enactments by State under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. State Governments were given option to adopt the said scheme in the composite form and further held that there can be no 2 (2013) 8 SCC 633
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR automatic application of regulations/schemes framed by UGC, in the State.
11. The appointment of the petitioner was made under the State Pay Scale by the State. It is also relevant to state that the UGC scheme 11.07.2009 was implemented by the State on 24.12.2009, which is after the confirmation of the petitioner's services, i.e., on 13.07.2009.
12. It is also not in dispute that pursuant to the Government Order dated 26.08.2015, several similarly placed teaching and non-teaching staff including Librarians were granted approval under the State Pay Scale without insisting upon any NET/SLET/Ph.D qualification. The respondents have not placed any material to demonstrate that a distinct or a differential criteria are applied in the present case. The impugned communication proceeds on the sole ground that the petitioner did not fulfil the minimum qualification prescribed under the UGC Regulations. However, when the benefit is sought under the
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR State Pay Scale framework and when similarly situated employees have been extended such benefit without application of UGC norms, selective application of UGC norms to the petitioner alone would be arbitrary.
13. It is well settled that the eligibility criteria of UGC which came to be enacted on 11.07.2009 which was adopted by the State on 24.12.2009 cannot be given a retrospective effect. The impugned communication dated 10.01.2025 suffers from arbitrariness and non-application of mind. Accordingly the point framed for consideration is answered and this Court pass the following:
ORDER i. The writ petition is hereby allowed.
ii. The impugned communication dated 10.01.2025 is hereby quashed.
iii. The respondents are directed to consider the petitioner's case for approval under the grant-in-aid scheme strictly under the State Pay Scale Norms applicable as on the
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NC: 2026:KHC-D:2493 WP No. 100876 of 2025 HC-KAR date of his appointment, without insisting for NET/SLET/Ph.D qualifications and to pass appropriate orders within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.
Sd/-
JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA EM Ct:VH List No.: 1 Sl No.: 5