Karnataka High Court
Owusu Collinus Ghanian vs State Of Karnataka on 27 October, 2025
Author: Shivashankar Amarannavar
Bench: Shivashankar Amarannavar
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422
CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR
CRIMINAL PETITION No. 9552 OF 2025 (439(Cr.PC) /
483(BNSS))
BETWEEN:
1. OWUSU COLLINUS GHANIAN
S/O OWUSU, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
R/AT DON RENT HOUSE, SAI EAST LAYOUT
RAMMURTHY CAFFE CUP FACTORY
OPP HIRANDAHALLI, BIDARAHALLI HOBLI
BANGALORE - 560 049.
...PETITIONER
Digitally signed by (BY SRI M R BALAKRISHNA, ADVOCATE)
LAKSHMINARAYANA
MURTHY RAJASHRI
Location: HIGH AND:
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY KOTHANURU POLICE
REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BANGALORE.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SMT. PUSHPALATHA B ADDL. SPP)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439 Cr.PC (FILED
U/S 483 BNNS) PRAYING TO ENLARGE HIM ON BAIL IN CRIME
No.109/2025 OF KOTHANUR POLICE FOR OFFENCE PUNISHBLE
UNDER SECTION 22(C), 8(c) OF THE NDPS ACT AND SECTION
14 OF FOREIGNER ACT PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE XXXIV
ADDL.DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE
(NDPS) BANGALORE.
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422
CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025
HC-KAR
THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR
ORAL ORDER
This petition is filed by accused No.1 under Section 483 of BNSS praying to grant bail in Crime No.109/2025 of Kothanuru Police Station registered for the offence punishable under Section 22(c), 8(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short 'NDPS Act') and Section 14 of Foreigners Act.
2. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for respondent.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the petitioner is having Passport and Visa and it was valid as on the date of alleged offence and therefore, offence under Section 14 of Foreigners Act is not attracted. Learned counsel submits that petitioner is seeking bail only on the ground that grounds of arrest -3- NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR have not been communicated as required under Article 22(1) of Constitution of India, Section 47 of BNSS and Section 52(1) of NDPS Act. The restrictions contained in Section 37 of NDPS Act for grant of bail does not apply since grounds of arrest are not communicated to the petitioner in the language known to him. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the following decisions:
(i) Pankaj Bhansal vs. Union of India (2023 INSC 866)
(ii) Prabhir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024 INSC 414)
(iii) Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2025 INSC 162)
(iv) Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs. State of A.P. (2025 INSC 768)
(v) Ashish Kakkar vs. UT of Chandigarh (Crl.A.1518/2025)
(vi) V.Senthil Balaji vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2024 INSC 739)
4. Learned counsel for respondent would contend that grounds of arrest have been intimated to the accused at the time of arrest. Even though the grounds are in Kannada, the same have been explained in English and -4- NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR the petitioner has affixed his signature and LTM on the same. Even the arrest of the petitioner has been communicated to his friend who has also affixed his signature on arrest report dated 01.05.2025. The contraband has been sent for examination to FSL and test report indicates that MDMA and quantity seized is commercial quantity and therefore, limitations/restrictions contained in Section 37 of NDPS Act apply. There are no grounds to say that petitioner has not committed offence under NDPS Act. There is a reverse burden on the petitioner to show that he has not committed offence under NDPS Act. The petitioner is a foreigner and he is dealing with narcotic drugs and it affects society. The petitioner is caught red-handed possessing MDMA of commercial quantity and therefore, he is not entitled for grant of bail. If the petitioner is granted bail, there are chances of hampering investigation and committing similar offence. With this, he prayed to reject the petition.
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5. Having heard the learned counsels, the Court has perused the FIR, complaint and other materials placed on record.
6. The case of prosecution is that 416 grams of MDMA was seized from the possession of petitioner. The said contraband seized has been sent for examination to FSL. The FSL report indicates that contraband seized from the possession of the petitioner is MDMA. It is not in dispute that quantity of MDMA seized from the possession of the petitioner is of commercial quantity. Section 37 of NDPS Act reads thus:
37. Offences to be cognizable and non-
bailable. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),--
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless--
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and -6- NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
7. As per Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act, a person accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall not be released on bail, unless there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
Considering the fact that the petitioner is found in possession of commercial quantity of MDMA, there are no grounds to hold that he is not guilty of such offence.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has sought bail only on the ground that grounds of arrest have not been communicated to the petitioner therefore, he is entitled for -7- NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR grant of bail. In the cases relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, the Apex Court has considered whether accused persons are entitled for grant of bail, if grounds of arrest are not furnished.
9. In the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India (2023 INSC 866), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
35. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002 of informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception.
10. In the case of Prabir Purkayashta vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024 INSC 414) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
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29. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds is exactly the identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the 'grounds' of "arrest" or "detention", as the case may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet of the fundamental right as made by the Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned.
30. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Non-
compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be.
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11. In Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and another (2025 INSC 162), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
14. Thus, the requirement of informing the person arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in Part III of the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person arrested and detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as possible. If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1). It will also amount to depriving the arrestee of his liberty. The reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no person can be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The procedure established by law also includes what is provided in Article 22(1).
Therefore, when a person is arrested without a warrant, and the grounds of arrest are not informed to him, as soon as may be, after the arrest, it will amount to a violation of his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 as well. In a given case, if the mandate of Article 22 is not followed
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR while arresting a person or after arresting a person, it will also violate fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered illegal. On the failure to comply with the requirement of informing grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest is vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.
12. In Kasireddy Upender Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others (2025 INSC 768), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
27. The object underlying the provision that the grounds of arrest should be communicated to the person arrested has been very succinctly explained in Vihaan Kumar (supra). On learning about the grounds for arrest, the person concerned will be in a position to make an application before the appropriate Court for bail, or move the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Further, the information will enable the arrested person to prepare his defence in time for the purposes of his trial. For these reasons, it has been provided by the Constitution that, the ground for the arrest must be
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR communicated to the person arrested as soon as possible.
28. For the purposes of Clause (1) of Article 22, it is not necessary for the authorities to furnish full details of the offence. However, the information should be sufficient to enable the arrested person to understand why he has been arrested. The grounds to be communicated to the arrested person should be somewhat similar to the charge framed by the Court for the trial of a case.
13. In Asish Kakkar vs. UT of Chandigarh (Crl.A.No.1518/2025), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
"We are in agreement with the submission made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the said arrest memo cannot be construed as grounds of arrest, as no other worthwhile particulars have been furnished to him.
This, being a clear non-compliance of the mandate under Section 50 of the Code which has been introduced to give effect to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950 we are inclined to set aside the impugned judgment, particularly, in
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR light of the judgment rendered by this Court reported as Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254."
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in V.Senthil Balaji vs. The Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement (2024 INSC 739) has held as under:
26. There are a series of decisions of this Court starting from the decision in the case of K.A. Najeeb, which hold that such stringent provisions for the grant of bail do not take away the power of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on the grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India.
We have already referred to paragraph 17 of the said decision, which lays down that the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed in a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. One of the reasons is that if, because of such provisions, incarceration of an undertrial accused is continued for an unreasonably long time, the provisions may be exposed to the vice of being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
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15. The object underlying the provision for grounds of arrest should be indicated to the person arrested has been very succinctly explained in Vihaan Kumar (supra).
The information will enable the arrested person to prepare his defence in time for the purposes of his trial. On learning about the grounds for arrest, the person concerned will be in a position to make an application before the appropriate Court for bail, or move the High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. For these reasons, it has been provided by the Constitution that, the ground for the arrest must be communicated to the person arrested as soon as possible.
16. It is not necessary for the authorities to furnish full details of the offence for the purpose of Article 22(1) of Constitution of India. However, the information should be sufficient to enable the arrested person to understand why he has been arrested.
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17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Sri Darshan (2025 SCC Online SC 1702) has held as under:
20. In the present case, the High Court, by the impugned order, enlarged the respondents on bail, primarily relying on a set of factual and legal findings. However, a closer examination of these findings reveals serious infirmities that warranting interference. We shall discuss the same in detail.
20.1. Delay in furnishing the grounds of arrest cannot, by itself, constitute a valid ground for grant of bail.
20.1.1. The learned counsel for the respondents -
accused contended that the arrest was illegal as the grounds of arrest were not furnished immediately in writing, thereby violating Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and Section 50 Cr.P.C (now Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita). This submission, however, is devoid of merit.
20.1.2. Article 22(1) of the Constitution mandates that "no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by,
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR a legal practitioner of his choice". Similarly, Section 50 (1) Cr.P.C. requires that "every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.
20.1.3. The constitutional and statutory framework thus mandates that the arrested person must be informed of the grounds of arrest - but neither provision prescribes a specific form or insists upon written communication in every case. Judicial precedents have clarified that substantial compliance with these requirements is sufficient, unless demonstrable prejudice is shown.
20.1.4. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, it was reiterated that Article 22(1) is satisfied if the accused is made aware of the arrest grounds in substance, even if not conveyed in writing. Similarly, in Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, it was observed that when arrest is made pursuant a warrant, reading out the warrant amounts to sufficient compliance. Both these post- Pankaj Bansal decisions clarify that written, individualised grounds are not an inflexible requirement in all circumstances.
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR 20.1.5. While Section 50 Cr.P.C is mandatory, the consistent judicial approach has been to adopt a prejudice-oriented test when examining alleged procedural lapses. The mere absence of written grounds does not ipso facto render the arrest illegal, unless it results in demonstrable prejudice or denial of a fair opportunity to defend.
20.1.6. The High Court, however, relied heavily on the alleged procedural lapse as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the offence under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. It noted, inter alia, that there was no mention in the remand orders about service of memo of grounds of arrest (para 45); the arrest memos were allegedly template-based and not personalised (para 50); and eyewitnesses had not stated that they were present at the time of arrest or had signed the memos (para 48). Relying on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra), it concluded (paras 43, 49 - 50) that from 03.10.2023 onwards, failure to serve detailed, written, and individualised grounds of arrest immediately after arrest was a violation entitling the accused to bail.
20.1.7. In the present case, the arrest memos and remand records clearly reflect that the respondents were aware of the reasons for their arrest. They
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR were legally represented from the outset and applied for bail shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail. As reiterated above, the High Court treated it as a determinative factor while overlooking the gravity of the charge under Section 302 IPC and the existence of a prima facie case. Its reliance on Pankaj Bansal and Prabir Purkayastha is misplaced, as those decisions turned on materially different facts and statutory contexts. The approach adopted here is inconsistent with the settled principle that procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail.
18. In the present case, the arrest memo and remand records clearly reflect that the petitioner was aware of the reasons for his arrest. The petitioner was legally represented on the outset and applied for bail
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR shortly after arrest, evidencing an immediate and informed understanding of the accusations. No material has been placed on record to establish that any prejudice was caused due to the alleged procedural lapse. In the absence of demonstrable prejudice, such as irregularity is, at best, a curable defect and cannot, by itself, warrant release on bail.
19. The decisions which have been relied upon by the petitioner are turned on materially different facts and statutory contexts. The procedural lapses in furnishing grounds of arrest, absent prejudice, do not ipso facto render custody illegal or entitle the accused to bail. Even though the arrest memo is in Kannada, it has been served on the petitioner and he has affixed his signature and LTM for having received copy. The arrest of the petitioner has been intimated to his friend and he also has affixed signature on arrest report dated 01.05.2025. The fact that the petitioner immediately approached the Sessions/Special Court seeking bail itself indicate that he
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR was aware of grounds of arrest. The petitioner has affixed his signature on arrest memo and he has been explained in English by the IO regarding grounds of arrest, more so, the petitioner has been caught red handed while possessing contraband/MDMA of commercial quantity.
20. In V.Senthil Balaji (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed thus:
24. There are a few penal statutes that make a departure from the provisions of Sections 437, 438, and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. A higher threshold is provided in these statutes for the grant of bail. By way of illustration, we may refer to Section 45(1)(ii) of PMLA, proviso to Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, 'NDPS Act'). The provisions regarding bail in some of such statutes start with a non-obstante clause for overriding the provisions of Sections 437 to 439 of the CrPC. The legislature has done so to secure the object of making the penal provisions in such enactments. For example, the PMLA provides for Section 45(1)(ii) as money laundering poses a serious threat not only to the
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR country's financial system but also to its integrity and sovereignty.
21. The legislatures have included Section 37 of NDPS to curb serious offences which have affected entire society, particularly youngsters of the country.
22. In John Moses D @ Madan Kumar vs. State of Karnataka (W.P.No.22042/2024 decided on 28.11.2024), a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has observed as under:
15. The Police Stations, in the country are close to 20,000, arrests happen day in and day out.
If grounds of arrest is to be informed, as is held by the Apex Court in PANKAJ BANSAL, PRABIR PURKAYASTHA and ARVIND KEJRIWAL in every arrest on any cognizable offence, it would undoubtedly open a Pandora's box, of interpretation of what could be the grounds of arrest, and mushroom huge litigation before the constitutional Courts.
16. The Apex Court holds it mandatory in the aforesaid three cases, owing to the fact that enlargement of an accused for the offences under
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR the UAPA and PMLA on grant of bail, is extremely limited. The burden to prove that he is not guilty begins at the threshold. It is in fact a reverse burden on the accused. It is, therefore, in such cases the grounds of arrest should be informed to the accused. In the case, before the Apex Court, the arrest memo did not contain any grounds of arrest and it was blatant violation of the statute and the Constitution. Therefore, interpretation that has stood the test of time, qua Section 50 of the Cr.P.C., of information of grounds of arrest to the accused is what is required to be followed even in the case at hand as the offences are under the IPC and KCOCA, both of them would not mandate divergence of grounds of arrest except as found in Section 50 of Cr.P.C. What is informed to the petitioner in the case at hand is information of arrest. Cr.P.C. mandates that the accused should be informed of the grounds of arrest. In my considered view, the information of grounds of arrest as is indicated to the petitioner in the case at hand, would suffice and it would not vitiate the arrest and result in enlargement on grant of bail or interim bail.
23. The mandate in Section 47(1) of BNSS and Section 52(1) of NDPS Act that the accused should be
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NC: 2025:KHC:42422 CRL.P No. 9552 of 2025 HC-KAR informed of the grounds of arrest has been complied with and arrest is not vitiated. The petitioner is aware of grounds of arrest and he immediately made bail application before the Special Court by engaging the counsel.
24. Considering all these aspects and looking to the gravity of offence, petitioner is not entitled for grant of bail. In the result, petition is dismissed.
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(SHIVASHANKAR AMARANNAVAR) JUDGE DKB List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1