Sri.N Gangadhar vs Smt. Usha B

Karnataka High Court

Sri.N Gangadhar vs Smt. Usha B on 25 October, 2025

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

Reserved on : 24.09.2025
Pronounced on : 25.10.2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.230 OF 2025 (IO)

BETWEEN:

1 . SRI N. GANGADHAR
S/O. NANJAPPA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS.

2 . SRI SURYA PRASAD
S/O NANJAPPA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS.

3 . SMT. ADHILAKSHMI
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
W/O LATE AMR REDDY,
REPRESENTED BY PETITIONER NO.2

ALL ARE R/AT NO.1228,
1ST MAIN, 3RD CROSS,
YASHWANTHPUR,
BENGALURU - 560 022
... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI VINAYA KUMAR P., ADVOCATE)
2

AND:

1. SMT. USHA B.,
W/O.LATE BHADRACHALAPATHI RAO
AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS,
R/AT 36/3, VASAVI TEMPLE ROAD,
V.V. PURAM,
BANGALURU - 560 004.

AND ALSO R/AT AT NO.45,
1ST CROSS, 2ND BLOCK,
ANJANEYANAGAR,
B.S.K. 3RD STAGE,
BENGALURU - 560 085

2. M/S. VENKATESHWARA ENGINEERING WORKS,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR
SRI C.V. SOMASHEKAR
HAVING REGISTRED OFFICE AT
NO.162/2, TANK BUND ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 002.

3. THE SUB-REGISTRAR,
BASAVANAGUDI,
GANDHI BAZAAR MAIN ROAD,
GANDHI BAZAAR,
BASAVANAGUDI
BENGALURU - 560 004,
KARNATAKA.
... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI HIRAN KRISHNASWAMY, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1)
SRI SESHU V., HCGP FOR R3)

THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION
115 OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE 1908, CALL FOR RECORDS IN
O.S.NO.6654/2024 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE 12TH ADDL. CITY
CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BANGALORE AND SET ASIDE THE
3

ORDER DATED 11-02-2025 ON IA NO.4 FILED UNDER ORDER 7
RULE 11 (a) AND (d) OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1908 AND
ALLOW IA NO.4 BY ALLOWING THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION
WITH COSTS.

THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 24.09.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

CAV ORDER

The petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 are at the doors of this

Court calling in question rejection of an application, I.A.No.4 filed

by them under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC seeking

rejection of plaint, on the score that the cause that is sought to be

projected before the Court is barred by limitation.

2. Heard Sri P. Vinaya Kumar, learned counsel appearing for

the petitioners, Sri Hiran Krishnaswamy, learned counsel appearing

for respondent No.1 and Sri V. Seshu, learned High Court

Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.3.
4

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

3.1. Before embarking upon considering of the issue in the lis,

I deem it appropriate to notice the protagonists involved. The 1st

respondent is the plaintiff; petitioners 1, 2 and 3 are defendants 1,

2 and 3 and respondents 2 and 3 are defendants 4 and 5. The

schedule property was purchased by the plaintiff's father-in-law,

one Munnoji Rao on 29-12-1949 through a registered sale deed.

The said property was then acquired by the husband of 1st

respondent/plaintiff after the death of Munnoji Rao which also

becomes the subject matter of partition deed. On 23-01-1995, the

husband of the plaintiff is said to have executed a General Power of

Attorney in favour of the 1st defendant. Pursuant to execution of

General Power of Attorney, on 27-07-2004, the 1st defendant is

allegedly executed a registered agreement of sale seeking to sell

the schedule property in favour of the 3rd petitioner/defendant

No.3's late husband one A.M.R. Reddy. Pursuant to agreement of

sale so registered on 27-07-2004, two sale deeds also come to be

executed on 02-04-2005 by the 2nd petitioner in favour of A.M.R.
5

Reddy. The said A.M.R. Reddy then enters into an agreement of

sale conveying the schedule property in favour of the 2nd defendant.

3.2. After the aforesaid events, the husband of the plaintiff

dies. The plaintiff contends that she became aware of the fraud

played in the purported execution of agreements of sale and

registered sale deeds when she obtained encumbrance certificate in

respect of the schedule property. On the aforesaid premise, she

institutes the subject suit in O.S.No.6654 of 2024 seeking the relief

of declaration and injunction. Notices are served on the

defendants. The defendants then file an application under Order

VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on

the score that the cause of action is barred by limitation. The

concerned Court rejects the application filed by the present

petitioners holding that projection of limitation is always a mixed

question of law and fact and, therefore, it would be a matter of

trial. Rejection of the application is what has driven the petitioners

to this Court in the subject petition.
6

4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners'

Sri P. Vinaya Kumar would vehemently contend that registered

Power of Attorney is of the year 1995. Pursuant to execution of

General Power of Attorney agreements of sale entered into are of

the years 2004 and 2006. In the interregnum registered sale deeds

are executed in the year 2005. Therefore, cause of action is of the

years 1995, 2004, 2005 and 2006. This is sought to be challenged

in the year 2024. The learned counsel would further contend that

petitioners are the absolute owners of the subject property. The

plaintiff is not the owner of the subject property at all. The 1st

petitioner/defendant No.1 and the 2nd petitioner/defendant No.2 are

the same person who have changed their names in the affidavit.

The relationship between the plaintiff and her husband is itself in

dispute. Criminal proceedings had been initiated against the

petitioners in respect of the schedule property. They have been

acquitted of all the blame of forgery or fraud and the acquittal has

become final. On all these issues, the learned counsel would submit

that the plea of limitation ought to have been accepted and the

plaint rejected.
7

5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st

respondent would submit that identity of defendants 1 and 2 is

itself in dispute. The affidavit so produced before the concerned

Court dated 07-07-2021 declaring change of name would itself

require a trial. The registered agreement of sale is executed by one

Gangadhar and the name is said to have been changed to Surya

Prasad. Finger prints of petitioner No.1/defendant No.1 and

petitioner No.2/defendant No.2 are identical. There are various

agreements and sale deeds executed on the same schedule

property fraudulently. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of this case

the issue of limitation does become a mixed question of law and

fact. He would seek dismissal of the petition.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the

material on record. In furtherance whereof, the only issue that falls

for consideration is:

"Whether the concerned Court was right in rejecting

the application filed by these petitioners under Order VII
8

Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC, on the score that it is a mixed

question of law and fact?"

7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. Certain dates

assume significance and would require iteration only from the date

on which a General Power of Attorney comes to be executed. In the

year 1995 i.e., on 23-01-1995 one M. Bhadrachalapathi Rao,

husband of the plaintiff is said to have executed a registered

General Power of Attorney in favour of the 1st defendant. The

preamble in the power of attorney is as follows:

"POWER OF ATTORNEY

THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY is executed on this, the 23rd
day of January 1995 at Bangalore, BY (Mr.M.B.RAO) M.
BHADRACHALAPATHY RAO, s/o. Munoji Rao, aged about 50
years, Residing at No.162/1, Lay & New No.39/2, Mavalli Tank
Bund Road, BANGALORE - 560 002, in favour of Mr. N.
GANGADHAR, aged about 34 Years, Residing (b) at No.1228, Ist
Main, 3rd Cross, Yeshwanthpur, Bangalore -560 022.

WHEREAS I the (Mr. M.B.RAO) M. BHADRACHALAPATHY
RAO absolute Owner of the Property bearing Bangalore
Corporation No.162/1 & New No. 39/2 Mavalli Tank Bund Road,
Bangalore - 560 002, WHEREAS We have given our assent and
agreed and hereby, by virtue of this document, empower the
said Mr. N. GANGADHAR to enter into or execute any document
required the purpose to Deposit the Title Deeds for the purpose
of obtaining monies and to sign all papers and documents be
required for the purpose.
9

By this power of attorney I hereby authorise
Sri.N.GANGADHAR Residing at No.1228, Ist Main, 3rd Cross,
Yashwanthpur, B'lore-22 to do the following acts and deeds."

Pursuant to execution of power of attorney, it appears that an

agreement of sale is executed by the 1st petitioner in favour of the

3rd petitioner's late husband on 27-07-2004. The preamble of the

agreement reads as follows:

" ರಸ ನ ಶುದ ಕ ಯದ ಕ ಾರು ಪತ ,

ಸ ಎರಡು ಾ ರದ ಾಲ ೇ ಇಸ ಜು"ೈ$ಾ%ೆ & ಾಂಕ ಇಪ(ತ ಾಲ ರ)*
(24.07.2004) +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು-560 022, ಯಶವಂತಪ0ರ, 1 ೇ ಮುಖ3 ರ ೆ, 1345 ೇ ನಂಬ5 ಮ ೆಯ)*
6ಾಸ6ಾ7ರುವ 8 ೕ.ಮು9 ಾ : ೆ;<, ೆ;<ಯವರ ಮಗ ಾದ 8 ೕ.ಎ.ಎಂ.ಆ5. ೆ;< ಆದ 9ಮ>ೆ.

+ೆಂಗಳ.ರು-560 002, $ಾವ?@ Aಾ3ಂB ಬಂC ರ ೆ, 162/1 ೇ ನಂಬ5 :ಮ ೆಯ)*
6ಾಸ6ಾ7ರುವ 8 ೕ.ಮು ೋE ಾF ರವರ ಮಗ ಾದ 8 ೕ.ಎಂ.ಭದ ಚಲಪ ಾF
(ಎಂ.I. ಾF)ರವರ ಜನರJ ಫªÀgï ಆL ಅAಾ9N %ೋಲ<5 ಆದ +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು-560 022,
ಯಶವಂತಪ0ರ, 3 ೇ Oಾ P, 1 ೇ ಮುಖ3 ರ ೆ, 1228 ೇ ನಂಬ5 ಮ ೆಯ)* 6ಾಸ6ಾ7ರುವ 8 ೕ.
ನಂಜಪ(ರವರ ಮಗ 8 ೕ.ಎ . ಗಂ>ಾಧ5 ಆದ ಾನು ಒS( ಬ ೆ OೊಟU ರ ಸ ನ ಶುದ ಕ ಯದ ಕ ಾರು
ಪತ ದ ಕ ಮ6ೇ ೆಂದ ೆ:

ಆVಾ7 +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು W, OಾXೕN ೇಷ ; ಜ ನಂಬ5 27, $ಾವ?@, Aಾ3ಂB ಬಂಡ
ರ ೆಯ)*ರುವ 162/1 %ೊಸ ನಂಬ5 39/2 ರ ಸ ತು & ಾಂಕ 12.05.1986 ರಂದು 8 ೕ. ಎಂ.
ಭದ ಚಲಪ ಾFರವZ>ೆ ಇವರ ಅಣ\ ತಮ]ಂ&ರುಗ^ಾದ 1 ೇ 8 ೕ. ಎಂ.ಅಶ ತ ಾ ಾಯಣ ಾF, 2 ೇ
ಎಂ. ಭದ ಚಲಪ ಾF, 3 ೇ 8 ೕ. ಎಂ._ಾಂಡುರಂಗ ಾF, 4 ೇ 8 ೕ.ಎಂ.ಎಕ ಾಥ ಾF ರವರುಗಳa
$ಾ;Oೊಂಡ bಾಗ ಪತ ವ0 +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು, >ಾಂcನಗರ, Oೇಂ& ಯ ಉಪ ೋಂದeಾcOಾZಯವರ
ಕfೇZಯ)*, 1 ೇ ಪ0ಸಕ, 3270 ೇ ಸಂಪ0ಟ, 134 Zಂದ 144 ೇ ಪ0ಟಗಳ)* 314 ೇ ನಂಬ ಾ7
ZEಸU5 ಆ7ರುವ bಾಗ ಪತ ದ ಮೂಲಕ I _ೆಡೂ3Jನ)* ನಮೂದು $ಾ;ರುವ ಸ ತು
8 ೕ.ಎಂ.ಭದ ಚಲಪ ಾFರವರ g¸Éì>ೆ ಬಂದು, ನಂತರ +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು ಮ%ಾನಗರ _ಾ)Oೆ 6ಾCN
ನಂಬ5 42ರ)* hಾiೆಯನುj kಾಮ ಾಜ_ೇAೆ ವಲಯ, ಸಹ ಕಂVಾಯ ಅcOಾZಯವರ ಕfೇZಯ)*
ೋಂVಾm Oೊಂಡು & ಾಂಕ 19.1.1995 ರಂದು ; ಎ 42/S ಆ5116/94-95 ರಂiೆ hಾiಾ
10

ಪ $ಾಣ ಪತ ವನುj ಪnೆದುOೊಂಡು ಕಂVಾಯವನುj ಸOಾNರOೆ _ಾವ $ಾ;Oೊಂಡು
ಅನುಭ Oೊಂಡು ಬರು ರುವ0ದು ಸZಯoೆU, ಸದZ ಸ ನ 9>ಾವeೆ ಮತು ವ3ವ%ಾರ $ಾಡಲು
& ಾಂಕ 23.01.1995 ರಂದು +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು W, ಬಸವನಗು; ಉಪ ೋಂದeಾcOಾZಯವರ
ಕfೇZಯ)* 4 ೇ ಪ0ಸಕ, ಎP. ಎL 187 ೇ ಸಂಪ0ಟ, 134 Zಂದ 136 ೇ ಪ0ಟಗಳ)*, 522 ೇ ZEಸU5
ಜನರJ ಪವ5 ಆL ಅAಾ9N ಪತ ವನುj 8 ೕ ಎ .ಗಂ>ಾಧ5 ಆದ ನನ>ೆ 9ೕ;ರುiಾ ೆ, ಈ Zೕ qಾ7
ಎಂ.ಭದ ಚಲಪ ಾF ರವZಂದ ಅcOಾರ ಪnೆದುOೊಂಡು oೆಡೂ3Jನ)* ನಮೂದು $ಾ;ರುವ ಸ ತನುj
ಾನು ಅrವೃ& ಪ; Oೊಂಡು ಬರು ರುವ0ದು ಸZಯoೆU."

Pursuant to the agreement of sale, two sale deeds are executed on

02-04-2005 in favour of the 3rd defendant's late husband one

A.M.R. Reddy. On 21-10-2006, A.M.R. Reddy executed a sale deed

conveying the property in favour of 2nd petitioner/defendant No.2.

Therefore, there are transactions that have happened in 1995, the

GPA; in 2004, registered agreement of sale; in 2005, two registered

sale deeds; in 2006, a registered agreement of sale and in 2007 the

husband of plaintiff dies.

8. The plaintiff, in 2023, is said to have gained knowledge

about execution of certain documents concerning the schedule

property between the defendants and the husband of the plaintiff.

The knowledge is gained when encumbrance certificate is sought in

respect of the subject property and the suit comes to be instituted

in O.S.No.6654 of 2024. It is trite law that to consider the
11

application under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the CPC, it is not

the defence or it is not the contents in the statement of objections,

but the plaint averments that are necessary to be noticed.

Accordingly, relevant averments in the plaint are germane and they

read as follows:

".... .... ....

9. Further, Late M Bhadrachalapathi Rao S/o Late Munnoji
Rao had acquired the Schedule property vide Partition
Deed dated 12.05.1986, registered as Book-I, Volume
3270, Pages 134 to 144, document bearing number 413,
at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Gandhinagar,
Bangalore. The certified copy of this partition deed dated
12.05.1986 is enclosed herewith as Annexure C.

10. Late Sri. M Bhadrachalapathi Rao S/o Late Munnoji Rao
expired on 12.08.2007 leaving behind the Plaintiff (Smt.
Usha Bhadrachalapathy) as the only surviving legal heir.
The copy of the crematorium certificate is enclosed
herewith as Annexure D. The original copy of the family
tree certificate of Smt. Usha B is enclosed herewith as
Annexure E.

11. After the death of her husband, the Plaintiff moved in to
live with her brother, Sri N.S.Suresh. The Plaintiff was
aware of the property situated at Bangalore City, Corpn.
Division No.27, Ward No. 42, Mavalli Tank Bund Road,
Municipal No. 162/1, new no.39/2 measuring 135 feet by
45 feet, owned by her late husband. However, more
recently, her health started deteriorating and she
required money to meet her growing medical needs. She
desired to sell her late husband's property to cover her
medical expenses and other needs to maintain herself.
However, it was at this point that she was informed that
her husband's Schedule Property had been sold off by one
Surya Prasad (Defendant No. 2), claiming to be a GPA
holder of her late husband.
12

12. The Plaintiff's younger brother (Sri. N S Suresh) took it
upon himself to investigate and extract all the necessary
documents to understand how the Schedule Property was
sold/ alienated. He found certain incriminating documents
when he obtained the encumbrance certificate. With great
difficulty and with the help of his well-wishers, the
Plaintiff's brother, obtained the certified copies and other
copies of the documents fabricated and executed in
relation to the Schedule Property.

13. The Schedule Property was allegedly sold off on the basis
of the power of attorney allegedly executed late
Bhadrachalapathy Rao. The said power of attorney was
registered before the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi,
bearing number 522 of 1994-95, stored in Book-IV,
volume no. SF187, pages 134 to 136. The certified copy
of the power of attorney dated 23.01.1995 on the basis of
which the said Surya Prasad has sold the Schedule
Property is enclosed herewith as Annexure F.

It is pertinent to note that this power of attorney does not
authorize Surya Prasad (Defendant No.2) but N
Gangadhar (Defendant No.1). Further, the execution of
this power of attorney is itself disputed by the Plaintiff
and her family. No such execution has taken place and
the said power of attorney is fabricated.

14. On the basis of the fabricated power of attorney, the
Defendant No.1, (N Gangadhar) executed a registered
agreement to sell the Schedule Property in favour of one
AMR Reddy (Defendant No.3's late husband). The copy of
the registered agreement of sale dated 24.07.2004,
bearing number BSG-1-02473/2004-05, stored in CD No.
BSGD28 is enclosed herewith as Annexure G.

15. Subsequently a totally different person viz, Surya Prasad,
the Defendant No.2 herein, executed two sale deeds in
favour of AMR Reddy (Defendant No.3's late husband).

i. Sale Deed dated 02.04.2005, bearing no. BSG-1-
00030/2005-06 stored in CD BSGD48 at the Office
of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi.
13

ii. Sale Deed dated 02.04.2005, bearing no. BSG-1-
00031/2005-06 stored in CD BSGD48 at the Office
of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi.

Each of the said sale deeds allegedly conveyed one half of
the property situated at Bangalore City, Corpn. Division
No.27, Ward No. 42, Mavalli Tank Bund Road, Municipal
No. 162/1, new no. 39/2 measuring 135 feet by 45 feet
belonging to the Plaintiff, Smt. Usha, w/o Late
Bhadrachalapathy Rao. Both the sale deeds convey one
half of the Schedule Property. The motive behind this
exercise was to ensure that the details of these sale
deeds should not be reflected in the encumbrance
certificate of the Schedule Property. A cursory glance at
the encumbrance certificate enclosed as Annexure K
herewith would prove this averment. Both the sale deeds
are missing from the encumbrance certificate of the
Schedule Property.

The certified copies of the two sale deeds are enclosed
herewith as Annexures H and I respectively.

16. It is pertinent to note that the two sale deeds dated
02.04.2005 was executed and registered by Surya Prasad
(Defendant No.2) on the basis of the fabricated power of
attorney granted in favour of N Gangadhar (Defendant
No.1). Surya Prasad's name was not even mentioned in
this fabricated power of attorney.

17. Moreover, the agreement of sale dated 24.07.2004 was
purportedly executed by N Gangadhar (Defendant No.1)
in favor of late AMR Reddy (Defendant No.3's late
husband). Even in the said Agreement, nowhere is Surya
Prasad's name mentioned.

18. Further, it is pertinent to note that the signatures of the
executants on the Agreement of Sale dated 24.07.2004
and the two sale deeds dated 02.04.2005, are identical. A
bare perusal of these three registered documents would
show that Surya Prasad (Defendant No.2) and N
Gangadhar (Defendant No. 1) were impersonators with
different identities.
14

19. Further, a glance at the biometric fingerprints would also
show that the fingerprints of Surya Prasad (Defendant
No.2) and N Gangadhar (Defendant No.1) are identical.
Defendant Nos. 1-3 are a part of an organized criminal
network which impersonates the identities of different
persons for criminal activities.
.... .... ....

29. To summarize the documents pertaining to the Schedule
Property which nave been forged and fabricated are:-

Sl. Date of Particulars Parties having
No. Execution executed the
document

1. 23.01.1995 Registered Power Allegedly by the
of Attorney (Ann. Plaintiff's late
F). husband and the
Defendant No.1.

2. 24.07.2004 Registered Defendant No.1
Agreement To in favor of
Sell (Ann. G). Defendant
No.3.

3. 02.04.2005 Sale Deed for Defendant No.2
half of the in favor of late
Schedule AMR Reddy
Property (Ann. (Defendant
H). No.3's late
husband).

4. 02.04.2005 Sale Deed for Defendant No.2
the remaining in favor of late
half of the AMR Reddy
Schedule (Defendant
Property No.3's late
(Ann.I). husband).

5. 21.10.2006 Registered Late AMR Reddy
Agreement of (Defendant No.3's
15

Sale (Ann. J). husband) in favor
of Defendant No.2.

30. The Schedule Property continues to be an empty piece of
land. The photographs of the Schedule Property are
enclosed herewith as Annexure O.

31. CAUSE OF ACTION: The Plaintiff, Smt. Usha B W/o Late
Bhadrachalapathy Rao is the sole and absolute owner of
the Schedule Property. When the Plaintiff wished to sell
the Schedule Property, she was informed that the said
property was already sold to some third-party stranger.
Shocked by this information, the Plaintiff's younger
brother, N S Suresh, took it upon himself to find out more
information about the alleged sale of the Schedule
Property. When the Plaintiff obtained the encumbrance
certificate on 27.09.2023, she found out that a series of
fraudulently fabricated and forged documents have been
registered by unknown persons. The Plaintiff with the
assistance of her younger brother, applied for obtaining
the copies of all other documents and sought the
necessary legal opinion. The cause of action arose on
27.09.2023 when the encumbrance certificate was
obtained by the Plaintiff.
.... .... ....

PRAYER

35. WHEREFORE the Plaintiff most respectfully prays that this
Hon'ble Court be pleased:

i. Declare that the Power of Attorney dated 23.01.1995
registered as document bearing number 522 of 1994-95,
stored in Book-IV, volume no. SF187, pages 134 to 136,
at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi,
Bangalore (Annexure F) is null and void and not binding
on the Plaintiff.

ii. Declare that the Registered Agreement to Sell Power of
Attorney dated 24.07.2004, bearing number BSG-1-
16

02473/2004-05, stored in CD No. BSGD28 at the Office of
the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi, Bangalore (Annexure
G) is null and void and not binding on the Plaintiff.

iii. Declare that the Sale Deed dated 02.04.2005, bearing no.
BSG-1-00030/2005-06 stored in CD BSGD48 at the Office
of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi (Annexure H) is null
and void and not binding on the Plaintiff.

iv. Declare that the Sale Deed dated 02.04.2005, bearing no.
BSG-1-00031/2005-06 stored in CD BSGD48 at the Office
of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi (Annexure I) is null
and void and not binding on the plaintiff.

v. Declare that the Registered Agreement to Sell Power of
Attorney dated 21.10.2006, bearing number BSG-1-
03836-2006-07 stored in CD No. BSGD84 at the Office of
the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi, Bangalore (Annexure J)
is null and void and not binding on the Plaintiff....."

The averment in the plaint is that sale has taken place between

defendants 1, 2 and 3. A suspicion arose when an affidavit is

executed in the year 2001 by Gangadhar changing his name to

Surya Prasad. In the petition, Gangadhar is different and Surya

Prasad is different. The registered agreement of sale is executed by

Gangadhar/1st petitioner in favour of 3rd petitioner's husband one

AMR Reddy and in turn, the said AMR Reddy has executed the

agreement of sale in favour of the 2nd petitioner/Surya Prasad. The

narration is clear and the document produced is that the schedule

property even today continues to be a vacant land.
17

9. In the light of the averments in the plaint, which prima

facie depict cause of action, plethora of objections are projected

before this Court to contend that the suit is barred by limitation.

Same contention is projected before the concerned Court. The

concerned Court, by the impugned order, rejects the application on

the following reasons, inter alia:

".... .... ....

31. Further, regarding vacant possession of suit schedule
property is concerned, the plaintiff in paragraph 25 of the plaint,
stated that her husband had leased the schedule property to a
business concern defendant No.4 for parking their vehicles and
she has produced copy of lease agreement dated 21.06.1997
and produced photographs which show board of parking in the
name of defendant No.4. This application is filed before
appearance of defendant No.4 and this defendant appeared
before court before service of summons submitted that on 19-
11-2024 there is urgency in the matter and made the court to
hear on IA prior to issuance of suit summons to defendant No.4
and filed citation with copy of order in Execution Petition
No.25417/2023. The said execution petition is filed to execute
decree passed in OS No.25706/2015. In that case, it is stated
that the defendant of that case is parking his lorries in the
schedule property. Why this court is considering it here is,
though it is defence of defendant, because as stated supra, the
plaintiff has stated that the suit schedule property is leased by
her husband in favour of 4th defendant and connected document
is produced by her. The defendant who is using it as parking
area in that case is different from defendant No.4 in this case.
In that execution petition, the operative portion runs as under;

"The petition is allowed.

The office is hereby directed to issue attachment
in respect of the Jabitha mentioned and call for the sale
of property and pay to the DHR out of the sale proceeds.
18

Further directed to put the DHR in possession of
the suit schedule property with the help of the police
and also arrest the JDR and keep him in detention until
realization of the entire decretal amount.

No order as to costs."

... ... ...

36. According to plaintiff, the suit schedule property
was purchased by her father-in-law vide registered sale
deed dated 29-12-1949 and she has produced certified
copy of the same. Her husband acquired the suit schedule
property vide partition deed dated 12-05-1986 and she
has produced certified copy of the same. After his demise
on 12-08-2007, this plaintiff inherited the suit schedule
property as sole surviving legal heir and document
pertaining to his death and family tree are produced by
her. Due to health reasons after his death, she has moved
to her brother's house, but recently as she required
money for her medical needs, wanted to sell the suit
schedule property and at that time, she came to know
that the defendant No.2 had sold the suit schedule
property claimed to be a GPA Holder of her husband.
Then, the period of limitation includes mixed question of
facts and law and it needs trial to conclude on it.

37. Further, it is stated by the plaintiff that, on
enquiry through her brother, she came to know that the
suit schedule property is sold and the same is reflected in
EC, but she is claiming that the said GPA is fabricated
one. The plaintiff mainly claiming against the GPA by
producing the certified copy of the same that the said
GPA does not authorise Surya Prasad (Defendant No.2)
but N. Gangadhar (Defendant No 1 ). According to
plaintiff, on the basis of alleged GPA, as alleged to be
fabricated, the defendant No.1 executed registered
agreement to sell suit schedule property in favour of
defendant No 3's husband and said Surya Prasad is
totally different person who executed two sale deeds in
favour of husband of 3rd defendant. Through the said two
sale deeds, one half of schedule property is conveyed.
19

There is dispute about signatures of defendant No.1 and
defendant No.2 by way of impersonation and the
execution of this GPA is itself disputed as no such
execution has ever taken place and as it is fabricated,
which shows that there is a matter of trial to be decided.

38. Further, the averments of the affidavit filed in
support of IA No.4 are nothing but the defence of
defendant No.1 and hence, without trial, they can't be
decided and further, the defendant No.5 has to file
written statement and defendant No.4 is yet to appear,
but this defendant requested the Court hear and dispose
of this IA by representing himself as authorised person of
the defendants, but there is no authority produced by him
than the GPA executed by defendant No.3 to prosecute in
earlier case. Moreover, there is no ground of res-judicata
as plaintiff is not party to that case. The facts and
circumstance of the case in the plaint involve mixed
question of facts and law which needs trial.

39. Further in the affidavit to IA, it is sworn as "I
Gangadhar @ Surya Prasad, Major, R/at No 1996, 7th
Cross, Judicial Layout, Bangalore, 560064". But in the
plaint, they are treated as different persons as defendant
No.1 and defendant No.2 respectively. There is no
document produced by this defendant as both the names
are belonging to him. Further in the affidavit, only one
signature is found and there is no GPA of either
defendant No.1 or defendant No.2 or defendant No.3
executed by them on behalf of person who appeared
party in person before the court which itself needs trial.
This applicant relied upon 2023 SAR (Civ) 740 (Ramisetty
Venkatanna and Anr vs Nasyam Jamal Saheb and others)
about rejection of plaint on the basis of period of
limitation. But as discussed above, here in this case, the
period of limitation is matter of trial.

40. Therefore, as per the facts and circumstances of
the case and above discussions, it is the considered
opinion of the Court that the applicant of this IA has not
made out grounds to reject the plaint and hence this
Court answers Point No.1 in the Negative.
20

41. Point No.2:- For the foregoing reasons and as
per negative answer to Point No.1, this court thinks that
IA No.4 filed by the defendant No.1 as applicant is liable
to be rejected and accordingly proceed to pass the
following;
ORDER

IA No.4 filed by defendant No.1 as Gangadhar @ Surya Prasad under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read Section 151of CPC is hereby rejected."

(Emphasis added)

10. The issue now would be, whether the reasons rendered by the concerned Court to reject the application are in tune with law or otherwise. Referring to several judgments that are cited would only bulk this order. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to notice the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of P. KUMARAKURUBARAN v. P.NARAYANAN1. The Apex Court in the said judgment has held as follows:

                               "....    ....   ....

               11. It  is   well-settled   that   Article  59    of
        the Limitation    Act,  1963,    governs   suits   seeking

cancellation of an instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of three years from the date when the plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief. The emphasis under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction per se, but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases involving allegations of fraud or 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975 21 unauthorized execution of documents, hinges upon the date on which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of such facts.

12. In the present case, the appellant has specifically averred in the plaint that upon becoming aware of registration of documents allegedly carried out among the defendants in relation to the suit property, he immediately approached the Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and lodged a land grabbing complaint on 09.12.2011 against the family of Defendant No. 1. Subsequently, he applied for patta in his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised objections on 05.03.2012 to Defendant No. 4 stating that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and that no registration concerning the same should be carried out. He has also submitted an objection petition to Defendant No. 5 requesting that no planning permit be granted to anybody except the appellant in respect of the suit property. Thereafter, the appellant instituted the suit on 03.12.2014 seeking a declaration and consequential reliefs. On the other hand, the respondents/defendants stated in their application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the appellant had knowledge of the execution of the sale deed by his father in favour of Defendant No. 1 at the earliest point of time and hence, the suit instituted by the appellant was barred by limitation. While the trial Court rejected the said application holding that the issue of limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact, the High Court in revision, took a contrary view and allowed the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and rejected the plaint solely on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.

12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold 22 stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.

12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following decisions of this Court, which have consistently held that when the question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC:

(i) DalibenValjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai7 "10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants made an application for correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration.

11....

12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit for cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground of limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in all such cases will arise from date of knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows:

"15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the registered sale deed is dated 18- 10-1996. The limitation to challenge the registered sale deed ordinarily would start running from the date on which 23 the sale deed was registered. However, the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of JaikrishnabhaiPrabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning the ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached their brothers (original Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their possession and to partition the property and provide exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so designated towards their share. However, when they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any heed to their request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and filed the subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has been filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1- Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us.

...

19. In the present case, we find that the appellant- plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed executed by original Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such execution and within two days from the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view taken by the trial court that the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC."

(emphasis supplied)

13. In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the plaint averments itself. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the limitation period commences from the date 24 of registration itself. In this view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable."

(ii) Salim D. Agboatwala v. ShamaljiOddhavji Thakkar8 "11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy [(2015) 8 SCC 331 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100], the rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint is sought on the ground of limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11.

12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. KiritbhaiJalkrushnabhai Thakkar [(2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524], the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold.

13...

14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few sentences here and there from the plaint and contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the proceedings and that therefore limitation started running from the date of constructive notice. In fact, the plea of constructive notice is raised by the respondents, after asserting positively that the plaintiffs had real knowledge as well as actual notice of the proceedings. In any case, the plea of constructive notice appears to be a subsequent invention."

(iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India "6. The central question is: whether the plaint as filed by the appellant could have been rejected by invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC?

7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample power to the court to reject the plaint, if from the averments in the 25 plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by any law including the law of limitation. This position is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20, the Court observed as follows :

(SCC pp. 65-66) "13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be rejected in the following cases:

'(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9;'

14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that:

'9. ... the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power ... at any stage of the suit -- before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage....' (SCC p. 560, para 9).

15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.

16. "The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful--not formal--reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC." (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], SCC p.

468.)

17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487], only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected.

18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 was applicable.

19. In SopanSukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus : (SCC pp.

146-47, para 15) '15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or 27 words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.'

20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain necessary averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose, it is the duty of the person who files such an application to satisfy the court that the plaint does not disclose how the same is in time. In order to answer the said question, it is incumbent on the part of the court to verify the entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected, the court has to record the order to that effect with the reasons for such order."

8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [(2012) 8 SCC 706 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows : (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12) "10. ... It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial.

11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557], in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under : (SCC p. 560, para 9) '9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 28 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit -- before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.' It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express [(2006) 3 SCC 100].

12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation : (SCC p. 470, para 5) '5. ... The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful -- not formal -- reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage.

The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.' It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred decision [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code."

14. All these events have been reiterated in Para 28 of the plaint, dealing with the cause of action for filing of the suit. Indeed, the said para opens with the expression "the cause of action to file the suit accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants when the illegal recoveries were noticed and letter dated 21-7-2000 was sent to the defendants to clarify as to how the interest was being calculated". This averment cannot be read in isolation.

....

22. It is well-established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was being processed by the regional office and the regional office would be taking appropriate decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the effect that the action taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This firm response from the respondent Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28-11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2-2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents."

13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well-reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant's assertion that the Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a misapplication of the well- established principles governing the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually distinguishable.

14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant's consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant's father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the 31 trial court's order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable."

(Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court holds that in certain cases plea of limitation becomes a mixed question of law and fact which necessitates adjudication upon evidence. When determination of limitation involves a disputed question of fact, the plaint cannot be summarily rejected without a full-fledged trial.

11. On the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court if the case at hand is noticed, what would unmistakably emerge is, that the issue revolves around seriously disputed questions of fact and law, which cannot be decided without evidence being let in. Though the power of attorney that is executed in the year 1995 is sought to be challenged in the 2024, for the reasons rendered in the plaint for such challenge and without the reasons being demolished by evidence, the plea of rejection of the plaint cannot be accepted.

12. For the aforesaid reasons, the petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

SD/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE BKP CT:MJ