Karnataka High Court
Sri. Hombaiah vs Sri. Doddanarasaiah on 5 November, 2025
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NC: 2025:KHC:45430
WP No. 55155 of 2016
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION NO.55155 OF 2016 (KVOA)
BETWEEN:
SRI HOMBAIAH
S/O LATE SRI NARASIMHAIAH,
SINCE DEAD REPRESENTED BY HIS LRs.
1. SMT. HANUMAKKA,
W/O LATE SRI HOMBAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS,
2. SRI BASAVARAJU
S/O LATE SRI HOMBAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
3. SMT. HOMBAMMA
D/O LATE SRI HOMBAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
R/O MELEKOTE, HARIJANA COLONY,
KANAKAPURA TOWN,
RAMANAGARA DISTRICT.
Digitally signed by
MAHALAKSHMI B M
4. SRI NARASHIMAMURTHY
Location: HIGH S/O LATE SRI HOMBAIAH,
COURT OF
KARNATAKA AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
PETITIONERS 1, 2 AND 4 ARE
R/O HEJJALA COLONY, BIDADI HOBLI,
RAMANGARA TALUK,
RAMANGARA DISTRICT-562116. ...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI V.R. BALARAJ, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI DODDANARASAIAH
S/O LATE SMT. LAKSHMAMMA,
SINCE DEAD REPRESENTED BY HIS LRs.
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WP No. 55155 of 2016
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1(a) SRI NARASIMHA MURTHY .N
S/O LATE SRI DODDANARASAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
1(b) SRI VENKATESH .N
S/O LATE SRI DODDANARASAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
1(c) SMT. DURGAMMA
D/O LATE SRI DODDANARASAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
1(d) SRI GOVINDARAJU
S/O LATE SRI DODDANARASAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS,
RESPONDENTS 1(a) TO 1(d) ARE
RESIDENTS OF JUTTANAPALYA VILLAGE,
HAMLET OF HEJJALA, BIDADI HOBLI,
RAMANAGARA TALUK AND DISTRICT-562116.
2. SRI V. HANUMANTHAIAH
S/O LATE SRI VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
3. SRI V. VENKATARAMANA
S/O LATE SRI VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
RESPONDENTS 2 & 3 ARE RESIDENTS OF
HEJJALA COLONY, BIDADI HOBLI,
RAMANAGARA TALUK AND DISTRICT-562116.
7. THE TAHSILDAR
RAMANAGARA TALUK,
RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-562116. ...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.C. RAJANNA, ADVOCATE FOR R-1(A TO D);
SRI B.V. KRISHNAPPA, ADVOCATE FOR R-2 & R-3;
SRI RAJ KUMAR M., AGA FOR R-4)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 03.09.2016 PASSED BY THE LEARNED III
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WP No. 55155 of 2016
HC-KAR
ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE, RAMANAGARA IN
M.A.NO.5/2009 PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-A AND FURTHER TO
QUASH THE ORDER DATED 06.08.1996 PASSED BY THE LEARNED 4TH
RESPONDENT VIDE ANNEXURE-B AND ETC.
THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 'B'
GROUP, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioner, who was the appellant in M.A.No.5/2009, is before this Court questioning the legality and correctness of the Order dated 03.09.2016, passed by the III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ramanagara (hereinafter referred to as 'trial Court' for short). By the impugned order, the trial Court rejected the appeal filed by the appellant-Hombaiah under Section 2(2) of the Karnataka Village Offices (Abolation) Act, 1961 ('KVOA Act' for short), as barred by time. The subject property land bearing Sy.No.1 of Hejjala Village, Bidadi Hobli, Ramanagar Taluk, measuring 21 guntas, was originally a Thoti service inam attached to the Thoti Village of Hejjala. Upon abolition of the village offices under the KVOA Act, the land became eligible for re-grant. One -4- NC: 2025:KHC:45430 WP No. 55155 of 2016 HC-KAR Hanumanthaiah, who was discharging Thoti duties, died before the re-grant was effected, leaving behind two daughters Smt. Narasimhakka, the mother of the appellant and Smt. Lakshmamma, the mother of Doddanarasaiah-respondent No.1.
2. After Hanumanthaiah's death, Smt. Lakshmamma made an application before the Tahsildar, Ramanagara, seeking re-grant of land. The Tahsildar passed an order of re-grant on 06.08.1996 in her favour. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed M.A.No.5/2009 along with I.A.No.I under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 13 years. The said M.A. came to be rejected on the ground of delay. The rejection of the miscellaneous appeal is challenged by the appellant-petitioner before this Court in this writ petition.
3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the respondents and perused the material on record.
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4. The appellant contended that both branches of Hanumanthaiah's family were joint cultivators of Thoti land, that Lakshmamma had suppressed the existence of her sister Narasimhakka, and that the Tahsildar had failed to conduct proper enquiry or verify the barabardar register before granting the land exclusively to Lakshmamma. It is argued that re-grant ought to have been made jointly to all the heirs of the original barabardar. Regarding the delay in preferring the miscellaneous appeal, learned counsel submits that the petitioners became aware about the re-grant order only recently, when revenue records were verified, and that the delay was bonafide and unintentional. It is contended that a liberal interpretation ought to have been taken into consideration by the trial Court, and would contend that the substantial justice should prevail over technicality.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the respondents opposed the -6- NC: 2025:KHC:45430 WP No. 55155 of 2016 HC-KAR appeal and the application for condonation of delay before the trial Court, contending that the appellant had knowledge of the re-grant since 1996, as the certified copy of the Tahsildar's order was obtained by Kempaiah and others on 18.11.1996, and the RTC entries of 1995-96 already reflected Lakshmamma's name. It is contended that the appellant himself had alienated 20 guntas of the same land on 24.01.1972 in favour of one Dasappa, and therefore had no subsisting right or locus standi to question the re-grant. It is contended that Tahsildar had conducted proper enquiry, spot inspection, and recorded statement before issuing the re-grant order.
6. The trial Court, on consideration of the records and pleadings, rejected I.A.No.I, holding that the delay of 13 years was wholly unexplained. The Court observed that:
i. The certified copy of the re-grant order produced by the appellant showed the date as -7- NC: 2025:KHC:45430 WP No. 55155 of 2016 HC-KAR 18.11.1996, proving that they had knowledge of the order at that time.
ii. The RTC of 1995-96 indicated mutation of the land in Lakshmamma's name, thereby indicating the appellant was aware of the re-grant since then.
iii. The appellant suppressed the material fact of sale of 20 guntas in 1972, which disentitled him to any equitable relief.
iv. There was no convincing reason or evidence to explain why the appeal was not filed within the prescribed time.
7. The trial Court observed that that sufficient cause must be sufficiently proved with cogent and valid reasons and observed that the appellant had approached the Court after an inordinate delay and with unclean hands, the delay condonation application accordingly was rejected.
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8. Consequently, I.A.No.VI filed by the legal representative seeking permission to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file fresh proceedings was also rejected, the Court observed that Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC was not applicable and that no defect or jurisdictional bar existed warranting such withdrawal. Having found the appeal being barred by limitation, the Court dismissed M.A.No.5/2009 and confirmed the Tahsildar's order dated 06.08.1996, observing that technical pleas cannot be used to open settled matters when the party had knowledge and had chosen to remain silent for more than a decade.
9. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced and perused the material on record including the impugned order passed by the trial Court.
10. It is not in dispute that land in Sy.No.1 Hejjala Village, Bidadi Hobli, measuring 21 guntas was a Thoti service inam land attached to the Village Office of Hejjala that the original barbardar was Sri Hanumanthaiah, who -9- NC: 2025:KHC:45430 WP No. 55155 of 2016 HC-KAR had two daughters namely Narasimhakka and Lakshmamma. After his death, Lakshmamma alone applied for re-grant under the Act which came to be allowed by the Tahsildar, Ramanagar on 06.08.1996, re- granting the land in her favour.
11. The certified copy of the re-grant order and the RTC extract demonstrated his knowledge of the re-grant. Therefore, the plea of recent discovery was untenable. The trial Court observed that the appellant has deliberately suppressed the fact which disentitled him to equitable relief. Having perused the reasons assigned by the trial Court, this Court finds no infirmity or perversity in the conclusion arrived at. It is manifest that the appellant before the trial Court had assailed the order of re-grant nearly 13 years, without placing any cogent material. On the contrary, the documents relied upon by the petitioner/appellant clearly indicates that the grant order was obtained in November, 1996 and the RTC reflects the mutation in the name of Lakshmamma for the year 1995-
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NC: 2025:KHC:45430 WP No. 55155 of 2016 HC-KAR 96, unequivocally demonstrates that the petitioner's family had knowledge of the re-grant at the relevant point of time.
12. The belated institution of the appeal in 2009, without plausible explanation, therefore amounted to gross delay and laches.
13. In the recent decision, the Apex Court in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)1 has given a consideration to the provisions of law and has held at paragraph No.26 as under:
"26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;1
2024 SCC Online SC 513
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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others
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NC: 2025:KHC:45430 WP No. 55155 of 2016 HC-KAR are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
14. The Apex Court in another judgment in the case of Ajay Dabra Vs. Pyare Ram and Ors2 has observed that an appeal has to be filed within a stipulated period prescribed under the law belated appeals can only be condoned, when "sufficient reasons" are shown before the Court for the delay and the Courts should not be pedantic in their approach while condoning the delay and the explanation of each day's delay should not be taken literally but the fact remains there must be a reasonable 2 2023 live law (SC) 69
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NC: 2025:KHC:45430 WP No. 55155 of 2016 HC-KAR explanation for the delay and at paragraph No.5 has held as under:
"5. What we have here is a pure civil matter. An appeal has to be filed within the stipulated period, prescribed under the law. Belated appeals can only be condoned, when sufficient reason is shown before the court for the delay. The appellant who seeks condonation of delay therefore must explain the delay of each day. It is true that the courts should not be pedantic in their approach while condoning the delay, and explanation of each day's delay should not be taken literally, but the fact remains that there must be a reasonable explanation for the delay. In the present case, this delay has not been explained to the satisfaction of the court. The only reason assigned by the appellant for the delay of 254 days in filing the First Appeal was that he was not having sufficient funds to pay the court fee! This was not found to be a sufficient reason for the condonation of delay as the appellant was an affluent businessman and a hotelier. In any case, even it is presumed for the sake of argument that the appellant was short of funds, at the relevant point of time and was not able to pay court fee, nothing barred him from filing the appeal as there is provision under the law for filing a defective appeal, i.e., an appeal which is deficient as far as court fee is concerned, provided the court fee
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NC: 2025:KHC:45430 WP No. 55155 of 2016 HC-KAR is paid within the time given by the Court. We would refer to Section 149 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 which reads as under :-
"Section 149: Power to make up deficiency of Court Fees.- Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee, and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance."
It also needs to be emphasized that this Court as well as various High Courts, have held that Section 149 CPC acts as an exception, or even a proviso to Section 4 of Court Fees Act 1870. In terms of Section 4, an appeal cannot be filed before a High Court without court fee, if the same is prescribed. But this provision has to be read along with Section 149 of CPC which we have referred above. A short background to the incorporation of Section 149 in CPC would explain this aspect."
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15. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings resting on delay and laches, unless the petitioners establish that the trial Court's order was patently unreasonable or contrary to the settled position of law. The principle that, "law aids to the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights", applies with full force in re- grant proceedings under the KVOA Act, since the rights crystallized by statutory re-grant cannot be unsettled after a lapse of time at the instance of the person who stood by silently.
16. The plea of incurrence advanced by the petitioners is not supported by documents. A litigant who seeks to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction must approach the Court with clean hands and with due diligence. The unexplained and inordinate delay of 13 years in preferring the appeal before the trial Court is hopelessly barred by delay and laches. Accordingly, this Court is of the
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NC: 2025:KHC:45430 WP No. 55155 of 2016 HC-KAR considered view that trial Court was justified in declining to condone the delay and in dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation. No grounds are made out to interfere with the findings on the aspect of delay and laches. Accordingly, this Court pass the following:
ORDER i. The writ petition is dismissed.
ii. The impugned order dated 03.09.2016 passed by III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ramanagara in M.A.No.5/2009 (Annexure-A) is hereby confirmed.
Sd/-
____________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA AT List No.: 1 Sl No.: 56