Karnataka High Court
The State Of Karnataka vs Smt. B.R. Chandramma on 3 November, 2025
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NC: 2025:KHC:44211
WP No. 26806 of 2019
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
WRIT PETITION NO. 26806 OF 2019 (KLR-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
M.S BUILDING
BENGALURU-560 001
RERPESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
2. THE TAHSILDAR
ANEKAL TALUK
ANEKAL
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. NEELAKANTAPPA K PUJAR, HCGP)
AND:
Digitally signed
by PANKAJA S
Location: HIGH SMT. B.R. CHANDRAMMA
COURT OF SINCE DEAD BY LR
KARNATAKA
1. B.S GANESH PRASAD
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
S/O B. SADASHIVAIAH
R/AT NO.69, SAMPIGE HALLI,
BANNERGHATA POST
JIGANI HOBLI
ANEKAL TALUK
BENGALURU - 560 083.
(AMENDED VIDE ORDER DATED 03.11.2025)
2. THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER-2
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NC: 2025:KHC:44211
WP No. 26806 of 2019
HC-KAR
BANGALORE SOUTH SUB-DIVISION
BANGALORE-09
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. UDAY K.S, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. C.M. NAGABHUSHAN, ADVOCATE FOR LRS OF R1,
R2-SERVICE OF NOTICE DISPENSED WITH)
THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTILCES 226 AND 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER PASSED BY THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER-2
DTD 12.03.2018 VIDE ANNX-A.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH RAI K
ORAL ORDER
The State has called in question the correctness of the order dated 12.03.2018 in RRT(2)(A)CR.29/09-10 passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner-2, Bangalore North Sub-
Division, Bangalore Urban District, Bangalore, whereby the Special Deputy Commissioner-2 dropped the proceedings based on the reference made by the Tahsildar, Anekal Taluk in respect of land bearing Sy.No.64/P40 measuring 2 acres situated at Bhoothanahalli village, Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk.
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2. The abridged facts of the case are that, one Eeraiah and five others were granted land in Sy.No.64 totally measuring 12 acres situated at Bhoothanahalli village, Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk and among them, the said Eeraiah had granted 2 acres of land vide grant order No.186/49-50 dated 28.04.1950. Subsequently, the said Eeraiah was in possession and enjoyment of said land. He alienated the said land in favour of one Doddaramaiah vide Sale Deed dated 09.05.1968 in respect of the said property. Based on the said registered Sale Deed, the said Doddaramaiah in-turn sold the said land to respondent No.1 herein vide Sale Deed dated 17.09.1985. Ever since then, respondent No.1 was in possession and enjoyment of the said property. Subsequently, the revenue entries were mutated in her name as per MR:08/85-86.
3. Things stood thus, the Tahsildar of Anekal made a reference before the Special Deputy Commissioner-
2/respondent No.2 in respect of genuineness of grant made in favour of original grantee-Eeraiah in the year 1950.
Accordingly, the Special Deputy Commissioner-2, suo moto registered the said reference in RRT(2)(A)CR.29/09-10 and -4- NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR conducted a detailed enquiry. In the said enquiry, the Special Deputy Commissioner-2 observed that as per the original grant records and the subsequent revenue entries, Eeraiah, the original grantee was granted 2 acres of land in Sy.No.64/P40 situated at Bhoothanahalli village, Jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk and subsequently, Eeraiah sold the said property to one Doddaramaiah and in-turn Doddaramaiah sold the said property to respondent No.1. Further, all the revenue entries i.e., RTC, mutation and saguvali chit were entered in the name of respondent No.1 and she has been in possession and enjoyment of the said land. Accordingly, the Special Deputy Commissioner-2 ordered to remove the entries made by the Tahsildar in the RTC that the said land is of Government land and directed to enter the name of respondent No.1 in RTC. The said order has been challenged by the State in this Writ Petition.
4. I have heard the learned HCGP Sri Neelakantappa K. Pujar for the petitioners and learned counsel Sri Uday K.S., for respondent No.1.
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5. It is the primary contention of the learned HCGP that the subject land is a gomala/forest land and grant made in favour of original allottee-Eeraiah itself is not sustainable, since it is not as per law. Hence, the Sale Deeds executed by the original grantee-Eeraiah to Doddaramaiah and in-turn Doddaramaiah to respondent No.1 are not sustainable under law. He also contends that the Tahsildar after due enquiry, removed the name of respondent No.1 from RTC and entered the name of the Government. The Special Deputy Commissioner-2, without properly appreciating the said aspect, passed the impugned order. Accordingly, he prays to allow the Writ Petition.
6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 by supporting the impugned order passed by respondent No.2 submits that respondent No.2 has meticulously examined all the documents including the original grant which was made in the year 1950, Sale Deeds, mutation, RTC and saguvali chit issued in favour of respondent No.1. As such, the Special Deputy Commissioner-2 has rightly passed the impugned order -6- NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR which does not call for any interference at the hands of this Court. Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the Writ Petition.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, so also perused the documents placed before me including the impugned order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner-2.
8. It could be gathered from records, the larger extent of the subject land i.e., 12 acres originally granted in favour of six grantees including one Eeraiah (who had been granted 2 acres) in the year 1950 vide grant order No.186/49-50 dated 28.04.1950. Subsequently, the said Eeraiah sold the subject land in favour of one Doddaramaiah and in-turn Doddaramaiah executed a Sale deed in favour of respondent No.1.
9. Further, the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner-2 reveals that all the revenue entries of the subject land stood in the name of respondent No.1 and she was in possession of subject land. The Tahsildar, without conducting any enquiry made reference before the Special Deputy Commissioner-2 stating that the subject land was a gomala -7- NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR land. Admittedly, the Tahsildar has not placed any documents to that effect.
10. It is the contention of the learned HCGP that the subject land is a gomala/forest land, however, there is no such authenticated documents placed before the Special Deputy Commissioner-2 to substantiate the said aspect. Moreover, the grant is of the year 1950.
11. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.46616/2017 has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another v. D. Narsing Rao and Others1 reported in (2015) 3 SCC 695, wherein the Apex Court, while holding that it is impermissible for the exercise of revisional powers under Section 166-B of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act as regards alleged fraudulent entries when such power was sought to be exercised after 50 years, has observed as under:
"25. The legal position is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court which have laid down that even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of any -8- NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR power, revisional or otherwise, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. This is so even in cases where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of any corrective power. We may briefly refer to some of the decisions only to bring home the point that the absence of a stipulated period of limitation makes little or no difference insofar as the exercise of the power is concerned which ought to be permissible only when the power is invoked within a reasonable period.
27. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy [(2003) 7 SCC 667] wherein this Court held that even in cases of fraud the revisional power must be exercised within a reasonable period and that several factors need to be kept in mind while deciding whether relief should be denied only on the ground of delay. The Court said: (SCC p. 677, para 9) "9. ... In cases of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as the Land Ceiling Act).
"28. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Sulochana Chandrakant Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport [(2010) 8 SCC 467 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 415] wherein this Court reiterated the legal position and held that the -9- NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR power to revise orders and proceedings cannot be exercised arbitrarily and interminably. This Court observed: (SCC p. 476, para 28) "28. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix a time-limit for exercising the revisional power nor inserted the words 'at any time' in Section 34 of the 1976 Act. It does not mean that the legislature intended to leave the orders passed under the Act open to variation for an indefinite period inasmuch as it would have the effect of rendering title of the holders/allottee(s) permanently precarious and in a state of perpetual uncertainty. In case it is assumed that the legislature has conferred an everlasting and interminable power in point of time, the title over the declared surplus land, in the hands of the State/allottee, would forever remain virtually insecure. The Court has to construe the statutory provision in a way which makes the provisions workable, advancing the purpose and object of enactment of the statute."
29. In State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh [(2004) 10 SCC 585] this Court held that in the absence of any special circumstances a delay of 15 years in suo motu exercise of revisional power was impermissible as the delay was unduly long and unexplained. This Court observed: (SCC pp. 588-89, para 6) "6. We are now left with the second question which was raised by the respondents before the High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the power under sub-section (3) of Section 20. As indicated above, the Financial Commissioner exercised the power after
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NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR 15 years of the order of the Collector. It is true that sub- section (3) provides that such a power may be exercised at any time but this expression does not mean there would be no time-limit or it is in infinity. All that is meant is that such powers should be exercised within a reasonable time. No fixed period of limitation may be laid but unreasonable delay in exercise of the power would tend to undo the things which have attained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as to what is the reasonable time within which the power of suo motu action could be exercised. For example, in this case, as the appeal had been withdrawn but the Financial Commissioner had taken up the matter in exercise of his suo motu power, it could well be open for the State to submit that the facts and circumstances were such that it would be within reasonable time but as we have already noted that the order of the Collector which has been interfered with was passed in January 1976 and the appeal preferred by the State was also withdrawn sometime in March 1976. The learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out such other special facts and circumstances by reason of which it could be said that exercise of suo motu power after 15 years of the order interfered with was within a reasonable time. That being the position in our view, the order of the Financial Commissioner stands vitiated having been passed after a long lapse of 15 years of the order which has been interfered with. Therefore, while holding that the Financial Commissioner would have power to proceed suo motu in a suitable case even
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NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR though an appeal preferred before the lower appellate authority is withdrawn, may be, by the State. Thus, the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable.
But the order of the Financial Commissioner suffers from the vice of the exercise of the power after unreasonable lapse of time and such delayed action on his part nullifies the order passed by him in exercise of power under sub-section (3) of Section 20.
"30. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [(1992) 2 SCC 598 :
AIR 1993 SC 802] wherein the Court explained the legal position as under: (SCC pp. 602-03, para 13) "13. The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not as to physical running of time. Where the circumstances
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NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. The decision in Tilokchand case [Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110] relied on is distinguishable on the facts of the present case. The levy if based on the net profits of the railway undertaking was beyond the authority and the illegal nature of the same has been questioned though belatedly in the pending proceedings after the pronouncement of the High Court in the matter relating to the subsequent years. That being the case, the claim of the appellant cannot be turned down on the sole ground of delay. We are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in dismissing the writ petition in limine and refusing to grant the relief sought for. We however agree that the suit has been rightly dismissed."
31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of
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NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.
32. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to be corrected is described as fraudulent, there is nothing in the notice impugned before the High Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered by the State. A specific statement in that regard was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact, which ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to the respondents. The attempt of the appellant State to demonstrate that the notice was issued within a reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged fraud is, therefore, futile. At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in question for housing sites to be given to government employees in the year 1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course of official business. Inasmuch as, the notice was issued as late as on 31-12-2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed."
12. Thus, applying the findings of the above judgment of the Apex Court to the facts and circumstances of this case, which was followed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and also considering the aspect that the original grant was made in the year 1950 and the same was challenged after six decades
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NC: 2025:KHC:44211 WP No. 26806 of 2019 HC-KAR i.e., in the year 2010, that too when the Special Deputy Commissioner-2 after delving in detail, has passed the impugned order. I find no good grounds to interfere with the impugned order and the Writ Petition lacks merit. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed.
SD/-
(RAJESH RAI K) JUDGE HKV List No.: 1 Sl No.: 19