Sri.R.Ramachandra vs State Of Karnataka

Karnataka High Court

Sri.R.Ramachandra vs State Of Karnataka on 21 November, 2025

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                                                             CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016



                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                               DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2025

                                                   BEFORE
                               THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
                              CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO.1149 OF 2016
                       BETWEEN:

                           SRI R. RAMACHANDRA
                           S/O. LATE RAMAIAH
                           AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
                           RESIDENT OF NEAR KUPPUSHETTY BAVI
                           MALUR TOWN.

                           NOW RESIDING AT
                           INDIRANAGAR, MASTHI CIRCLE, MALUR TOWN
                           KOLAR DISTRICT-563 131.
                                                                            ...PETITIONER
                           (BY SRI M.R. NANJUNDA GOWDA, ADVOCATE)

                       AND:

                           STATE OF KARNATAKA
                           BY MALUR POLICE STATION
                           MALUR TOWN, KOLAR DISTRICT
                           REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
                           HIGH COURT BUILDING
                           BENGALURU-560 001.
                                                                           ...RESPONDENT
Digitally signed by
MOUNESHWARAPPA
                           (BY SMT. SOWMYA R., H.C.G.P.)
NAGARATHNA
Location: High Court
of Karnataka
                                                     ***

THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 397 READ WITH SECTION 401 OF THE CR.P.C. PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND ORDER ON SENTENCE DATED 16-6-2014 PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE AND JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS, MALUR, IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.107 OF 2013 AND JUDGMENT DATED 24-8-2016 PASSED BY THE II ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE, KOLAR, IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.45 OF 2014.

CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016 THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON 31-10-2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T CAV ORDER Heard Sri M.R. Nanjunda Gowda, learned counsel for the petitioner-accused, and Smt. Sowmya R., learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondent-State.

2. The petitioner-accused has filed this revision petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') to set aside the judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 16-06-2014 passed by the Principal Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Malur, in Criminal Case No.107 of 2013 and confirmed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Kolar, in Criminal Appeal No.45 of 2014 dated 24-8-2016.

3. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their rankings before the trial Court. The -3- CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016 petitioner is the accused and the respondent is the complainant-State.

4. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that, on 31-12-2012 around 1.00 p.m., at Malur-Hosur Main Road, near divider situated in front of Taluk Office, Malur, the accused, being the driver of autorickshaw, bearing registration No.KA-03/4164, drove the same in a rash and negligent manner and dashed to the motorcycle, bearing Registration No.KA-08 Q-8753, which was coming from opposite direction. Thus, the first informant-Narasimha Murthy and pillion rider-Shankarappa sustained severe injuries, and Shankarappa succumbed to the injuries. Hence, PW1 lodged a complaint. This led to registration of F.I.R. and the Investigating Officer investigated the matter and filed the charge-sheet against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, 'IPC').

5. After receipt of the charge-sheet, the trial Court took cognizance of the offences and recorded plea of the -4- CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016 accused. In order to prove its case, the prosecution in all examined eight witnesses as PW1 to PW8 and got marked twelve documents as per Exs.P1 to P12. Based on oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial Court convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order on sentence, the accused preferred an appeal in Criminal Appeal No.45 of 2014 before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate Court confirmed the judgment passed by the trial Court. Hence, this revision petition.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused has contended that the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court are contrary to law, facts and evidence. However, the trial Court has come to a wrong conclusion and convicted the accused; the trial Court convicted the accused on surmises and conjunctures without appreciating the true and material facts that have been placed before it; some of the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution are not -5- CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016 eyewitnesses to the alleged incident and they have turned hostile to the case of the prosecution, however, the Courts below have failed to take note of this fact. Hence, he prays for extending the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused; there is no direct evidence produced by the prosecution and it has failed to prove that the accused committed the alleged offences; there are many contradictions, inconsistencies and variations in the evidence of one witness to another, there is no corroboration in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, however, the trial Court and the First Appellate Court have not taken note of these contradictions in the evidence; the prosecution has failed to produce the report regarding the vehicle tyre marks on the road, where the accident took place and the concerned photographs of the accident spot; the accused is a poor man doing coolie work for his living.

7. The testimony of PWs.1, 3 and 4 do not indicate any allegation of rash and negligent driving on the part of the accused. Hence, the prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of 279 of the IPC. Further, there is delay in -6- CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016 examination of eyewitnesses to the incident and place of the accident is also not proved. In Ex.P11-spot sketch, neither the Investigating Officer nor the person, who prepared sketch has located PWs.1, 3 and 4. Thus, PWs.3 and 4 appears to be planted eyewitnesses. The Investigating Officer could have recorded the statements of eyewitnesses at the earliest point of time. In this case, the best available evidence was the driver of the bus, who has not examined. Hence, on all these grounds, he prays to allow the revision petition.

8. Learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondent-State has contended that since the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have given concurrent findings, interference by this Court to set aside the judgment of conviction and order on sentence passed against the accused would not arise. She contended that the accident and the death of Shankarappa in the accident are not disputed, the manner of accident and identity of the accused are also not disputed. Hence, she prays to dismiss the revision petition.

CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016

9. In view of the submissions made by both parties, the following points arise for Court consideration:

Whether the revision petitioner has made out sufficient grounds to interfere in the concurrent findings passed by trial Court as well as First Appellate Court?

10. Admittedly, the revision Courts power allows a Superior Court to review the legality, correctness and propriety of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court proceedings and orders to prevent injustice or abuse of process. It is an extraordinary power used sparingly and is not a substitute for an appeal. The Court cannot re- evaluate evidence to come to a different conclusion unless there is a gross error, perversity, or arbitrariness in the original decision. In the light of the above, it is just and necessary to analyse the scope of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C.

CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016

11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan and Another1 while discussing the scope of Section 397 of the Cr.P.C., at paragraph No.3 held as under:

"3. xxx xxx xxx. The revision power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged."

12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v R. Soundirarasu and Others2 at paragraph No.79 held as under:

"79. Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised to correct manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on 1 (2001) 9 SCC 631 2 (2023) 6 SCC 768 -9- CRL.RP No. 1149 of 2016 record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or procedure."

13. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar3 at paragraph No.16 held as under:

"16. xxx xxx xxx. Now it is well settled that revisional jurisdiction can be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. A Revisional Court cannot convert itself into a regular court of appeal."

14. In the light of the above principles, it is necessary to examine the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. PWs.1, 3 and 4 are the eyewitnesses to the incident. Initially, they supported the case of the prosecution. They have further stated that, the accused, being the driver of autorickshaw, came from Malur Bus stop towards Taluk Office, caused the accident to the motorcycle which was parked by the side of the divider, 3 (2008) 9 SCC 475

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which shows that the driver of autorickshaw was negligent. They also stated that PW1 and the deceased Shankarappa were proceeding towards Malur Bus Stop from Taluk Office on the motorcycle. PW1 was riding the motorcycle and the deceased Shankarappa was the pillion rider. A bus was coming from Masthi, at that time, the driver of autorickshaw caused the accident. Hence, PW1 and the deceased Shankarappa sustained severe injuries. Thus, they have clearly stated that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the accused. In the cross-examination of PWs.1, 3 and 4, nothing has been elicited to discredit their testimonies.

15. PW2-Murali, son of the deceased, is not an eyewitness and he came to the spot soon after the accident.

16. PWs.5-Manjunath and 6-Lakshminarayana are the mahazar witnesses to Ex.P2 and owners of autorickshaw. They have not supported the case of the prosecution.

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17. PW7-Gopi is another witness to spot mahazar- Ex.P2.

18. PW8-Shivaswamy, Investigating Officer, who investigated the matter and filed the charge-sheet.

19. In this case, there is no dispute with regard to accident by the accused, there is no dispute with regard to death of Shankarappa in the accident, there is no dispute regarding the involvement of autorickshaw in the accident, there is no dispute as to place of accident, and there is no dispute that the accident occurred due to mechanical defects of the autorikshaw. PWs.1, 3 and 4 are the eyewitnesses to the incident and they have supported the case of the prosecution.

20. On perusal of the material available on record, the trial Court relying upon the evidence of PWs.1, 3 and 4 and based on the contents of Ex.P2-spot mahazar, Ex.P6- inquest mahazar, Ex.P7-Post-Mortem Examination Report, Ex.P8-IMV Report and Ex.P11-sketch convicted the

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accused for the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC.

21. As rightly pointed out by the learned High Court Government Pleader that this being a revision petition against the concurrent findings of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, the scope of interference on the factual aspects is very limited.

22. The evidence on record shows that the accused did not dispute the occurrence of accident, he did not dispute the death of the deceased and his identity before the trial Court. It was his defence that PW1 rode the motorcycle in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the autorikshaw. Hence, he is not responsible for cause of the death of the deceased.

23. The trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have rightly held that Ex.P8-IMV Report, Ex.P2-spot mahazar and Ex.P11-sketch do not support the defence theory. The cumulative effect of entire evidence on record leads to the conclusion that the accident was the outcome

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of the rash and negligent driving on the part of the accused. PWs.1, 3 and 4 clearly stated about the rash and negligent driving on the part of the accused. Both the Courts below held that if the accused drove his autorikshaw cautiously, there could not have been any accident. Therefore, both the Courts below held that the accused was guilty of the offences.

24. Now, the only question that arises for consideration before this Court is whether the sentence imposed was tenable.

25. Learned counsel for the petitioner-accused submits that the accused has no criminal antecedents or had any intention to cause the accident. He is the sole bread earner in the family and hence, he prays to apply the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

26. On perusal of the judgment passed by the trial Court, the maximum sentence imposed is one year for the offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and the sentence imposed is two years for the offence punishable

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under Section 304A of the IPC. The First Appellate Court modified the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial Court and sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months for the offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and simple imprisonment for a period of six months for the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.

27. While dealing with the question, whether it is desirable to impose minimal or negligible sentence in a case of offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of GURU BASAVARAJ @ BENNE SETTAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA reported in 2012 (8) SCC 734 at paragraph Nos.22, 23, 28, 30 and 33, held as under:

"22. In Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana, this Court expressed thus:

"13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their families, criminal courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the

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offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence."

23. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to highlight what is expected of a professional driver:

"13. ... A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that a rash driving need not necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being; or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence; and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being due to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence. This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the level of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to callous driving of automobiles."

xxx xxx xxx

28. In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, it has been laid down that sentencing is an important task in relation to criminal justice dispensation system.

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"84. ... One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentence commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the manner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacket formula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles: The twin objective of the sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. What sentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature of the offence and all other attendant circumstances."

It has been further opined that "85. The principle of proportionality in sentencing a crime-doer is well entrenched in criminal jurisprudence. As a matter of law, the proportion between crime and punishment bears the most relevant influence in the determination of sentencing the crime-doer. The court has to take into consideration all aspects including the social interest and [conscience] of the society for award of appropriate sentence."

xxx xxx xxx

30. From the aforesaid authorities, it is luminous that this Court has expressed its concern on imposition of adequate sentence in respect of commission of offences regard being had to the nature of the offence and demand of the conscience of the society. That apart, the concern has been to impose adequate sentence for the offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC. It is worthy to note that in certain circumstances, the mitigating factors have been taken into consideration but the said aspect is dependent on the facts of each case.

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As the trend of authorities would show, the proficiency in professional driving is emphasized upon and deviation therefrom that results in rash and negligent driving and causes accident has been condemned. In a motor accident, when a number of people sustain injuries and a death occurs, it creates a stir in the society; sense of fear prevails all around. The negligence of one shatters the tranquility of the collective. When such an accident occurs, it has the effect potentiality of making victims in many a layer and creating a concavity in the social fabric. The agony and anguish of the affected persons, both direct and vicarious, can have nightmarish effect. It has its impact on the society and the impact is felt more when accidents take place quite often because of rash driving by drunken, negligent or, for that matter, adventurous drivers who have, in a way, no concern for others. Be it noted, grant of compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is in a different sphere altogether. Grant of compensation under Section 357(3) with a direction that the same should be paid to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused has been sentenced has a different contour and the same is not to be regarded as a substitute in all circumstances for adequate sentence. xxx xxx xxx

33. There can hardly be any cavil that there has to be a proportion between the crime and the punishment. It is the duty of the court to see that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored. In Siriya v. State of M.P., it has been held as follows:-

"13.`7. ... Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a

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corner-stone of the edifice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his "Law in Changing Society"

stated that, "State of criminal law continues to be - as it should be - a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be."

28. On perusal of the material available on record, in the instant case, the factum of rash and negligent driving has been established.

29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF PUNJAB v. SAURABH BAKSHI reported in 2015 (5) SCC 182 has imposed maximum imprisonment of six months for the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.

30. In view of the ratio laid down in the cases of GURU BASAVARAJ @ BENNE SETTAPPA and SAURABH BAKSHI, referred to supra, at least, the minimum imprisonment of six months is required to be imposed for the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.

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31. Having regard to the fact that the accused was aged 47 years at the time of accident and he has faced the proceedings since 2013 and also the fact that, he has no criminal antecedents, considering the factual and legal aspects of the matter, the First Appellate Court has held that the petitioner-accused is guilty of the offences alleged against him and convicted him for a period of six months for the offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court, which was confirmed by the First Appellate Court do not require any interference at the hands of this Court. Hence, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed, and accordingly, it is dismissed.

Sd/-

(VENKATESH NAIK T) JUDGE KVK