1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 05TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA
WRIT PETITION NO.51914 OF 2019 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
SRI. P C MOHAN
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
S/O PERICAL CHIKKAMUNISWAMAPPA
RESIDING AT NO.1928
30TH CROSS, BANASHANKARI II STAGE
BENGALURU-560070
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI: G L VISHWANATH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
(SOUTH)
SOUTH END ROAD, GUPTA LAYOUT
JAYANAGAR
BANGALORE-560070
2. ANANDA T R
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
S/O T S RANGANATHA
NO.922, 3RD CROSS
SRIRAMPURAM
2
BANGALORE-560021
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI: V.S. HEGDE, SPP-II A/W
SMT: K.P. YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1;
SRI: S. NAGARAJA, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
---
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
COMPLAINT DATED 12.9.2019 BEARING PCR NO.46/2019 PENDING
ON THE FILE OF HON'BLE LXXXI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE AT BANGALORE (SPECIAL COURT EXCLUSIVELY TO
DEAL WITH CRIMINAL CASES RELATED TO ELECTED MPs/MLAs IN THE
STATE OF KARNATAKA) FILED BY R-2 UNDER SECTION 200 OF
CR.P.C. FOR OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 171-G, 177,
181, 191, 193, 199 AND 200 OF IPC, PRODUCED AT ANNX-G AND
QUASH THE ORDER DATED 8.11.2019 PASSED BY HON'BLE LXXXI
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AT BANGALORE
(SPECIAL COURT EXCLUSIVELY TO DEAL WITH CRIMINAL CASES
RELATED TO ELECTED MPs/MLAs IN THE STATE OF KARNATAKA) IN
PCR NO.46/2019 DIRECTING INVESTIGATION UNDER SECTION 156(3)
OF CR.P.C. AND REFERRING THE COMPLAINT FOR INVESTIGATION
AND REPORT TO DCP (SOUTH) AT ANNEXURE-H.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 22.12.2020 AND COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER, THROUGH VIDEO CONFERENCE, THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
3
ORDER
Respondent No.2 herein filed a private complaint seeking prosecution of the petitioner for the offences punishable under sections 171G, 177, 181, 191, 193, 199, 200 of Indian Penal code, on the allegation that the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as "accused") intentionally out of fear that he would hurt the feeling of a particular community and thereby loose elections, suppressed the assets held by him and made a false declaration in Form No.26 submitted before the Returning Officer for contesting the Parliamentary Election in the year 2014 and 2019 and filed false affidavit on oath suppressing the factum of holding assets in the form of immovable properties measuring 42 acres 14 guntas situated at Lakshmipura Village, Kasaba Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk, Bangalore Rural District worth more than Rs.33,60,00,000/-.
2. The contention of the petitioner is that he has not withheld any material information either in his affidavit or in Form No.26. The properties purchased by him under various 4 sale deeds were purchased by him for and on behalf of the firm by name P.C. Realty. In this regard, he has entered into a Partnership Deed dated 30.03.2013. It is registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (hereinafter referred to as "Act" for brevity). On 07.07.2014, he executed a "Confirmation and Reconstitution Deed to the Partnership Agreement dated 30.03.2013" (hereinafter referred to as "Confirmation and Reconstitution Deed" for short) and all the six items of immovable properties purchased by him under registered sale deeds dated 27.12.2013 were brought into the Partnership Firm as the capital contributed by him. The relevant recitals in this regard read as under:-
"(1) It is expressly made clear that the Schedule Property mentioned are registered in the name of the first party is for and on behalf of the Firm and as such the First Party individually has no right over the Schedule Property.
(2) However, in order to dispel any doubts and to bring clarity it is hereby agreed that the First Party herein has contributed the Schedule Property which was held by him for and on behalf of the partnership firm to the firm as his capital once again by this deed of confirmation and reconstitution."
5
3. Based on the above recitals and the terms of Confirmation Deed dated 07.07.2014, learned counsel appearing for petitioner emphatically submitted that the properties in question were brought into hotchpotch as the capital of the petitioner and as a result, petitioner had only interest in the partnership assets of the firm which has been clearly mentioned in the respective declarations submitted by the petitioner before the Returning Officer in Form No.26. Learned counsel referred to Annexure-II of the Form No.26 dated 26.03.2014 and the same is extracted as hereinbelow:-
Sl. Description of the Self-P.C. Spouse Dependent-1 Dependent-2 PC
No. Investments Mohan Mrs. Shyla Ms Rithika Mr. Rithin Mohan
Mohan HUF
Shares in Private
Companies
1 Celebrations Software 50,000 50,000 Nil Nil Nil
Pvt Ltd.
(5000 shares of Rs.10
each)
2 G M C Bank (160 shares 4,000 Nil Nil Nil Nil
of Rs. 25 each)
3 Sudhashree Tech Park Nil 2,60,000 Nil Nil Nil
Pvt. Ltd.
(26,000 shares of Rs. 10
each)
Other Investments
1 P C Realty (Partnership 14,65,04,955 Nil Nil Nil Nil
Firm)
2 Vishaka Real Estate and 12,89,248 Nil Nil Nil Nil
Builders (Partnership
Firm)
Total 14,78,48,203 3,10,000 Nil Nil Nil
6
Likewise, in Form No.26 submitted by him on 22.03.2019, in the liability column, he has declared as under:-
Sl.No. Description Self Mr. P.C. Mohan Spouse- Mrs. Shyla HUF- P C
Mohan Mohan
HUF
1 Loan or dues to Bank/ Financial
Institution(s)
Name of the Bank or Financial 1. Overdraft loan from Kotak 1. Housing Loan from Institution, Amount outstanding, Mahindra Bank, Amount Bank of Baroda-Joint Nil Nature of Loan Outstanding Rs. Loan with Mr. P.C.
1,92,63,355/- Mohan Outstanding
Rs. 46,32,375/-
2. Housing Loan from Bank
of Baroda-Joint Loan with 2. Loan against Property Shyla Mohan Outstanding with Kotak Mahindra Rs. 46,32,375/- Bank-Joint Loan with Mr. P.C.Mohan Outstanding Rs. 5,98,84,729/-
3. Loan against Property with Kotak Mahindra Bank-
Joint loan with Shyla Mohan Outstanding Rs.5,98,84,729/-
Loan or dues to any other Loans:
Individuals/entity other than
mentioned above. 1. P.C.Mohan HUF, Rs.
Name(s), Amount outstanding, 26,82,969.
nature of loan Nature: Personal Loan Nil Nil
2. Shyla Mohan
Rs.5,21,57,681,
Nature: Personal Loan
Any other liability
Sundry Creditors Rs. 30,74,314/- Nil Nil
Other Current Liabilities Rs. 5,18,778/- Nil Nil
Rental Deposit Received Rs.84,95,168 Rs.84,95,168/- Nil
P C Realty Rs.12,63,340/- Rs. 8,75,36,976/- Nil
Grand Total of Liabilities Rs. 15, 19, 72,709/- Rs. 16,05,49,248/- Nil
7
4. Thus, it is contended that the petitioner has not suppressed any vital information relating to the assets held by him nor has he sworn to any false affidavit attracting the ingredients of the offence under sections 171G, 177, 181, 191, 193, 199, 200 of IPC and therefore, initiation of criminal action against the petitioner based on the complaint filed by the respondent No.2 and the reference made by the learned Special Judge under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. is wholly illegal and has resulted in gross abuse of process of justice.
5. Assailing the legality of the order passed by learned Special Judge under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., learned counsel for petitioner vehemently submitted that all the offences alleged against the petitioner are non-cognizable in nature and therefore learned Special Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said offences or to refer the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in view of the bar contained in section 155(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure which mandates that, "No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the 8 order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial."
6. Further, placing reliance on the decision of this Court in W.P.No.108175/2014 dated 27.11.2015, learned counsel pointed out that, by virtue of the prohibition contained under section 195 Cr.P.C., the Special Court could not have taken cognizance of any of the offences. On the same point, learned counsel referred to para 13 of the decision in MAKSUD SAIYED vs. STATE OF GUJARAT & Others, (2008) 5 SCC 668, wherein it is held as under:-
13. Where a jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind. The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of the Company when the accused is the Company. The learned Magistrate failed to pose unto himself the correct question viz. as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, would lead to the conclusion that the respondents herein were personally liable for any offence. The Bank is a body corporate. Vicarious liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. Statutes 9 indisputably must contain provision fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract the provisions constituting vicarious liability.
7. On the question whether the Magistrate or the Special Judge has any discretion to call for a report under section 202 Cr.P.C., instead of directing investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on the decision in RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LTD. vs STATE OF GUJARAT, (2015) 6 SCC 439, with reference to para 11, wherein it is held that, "11. ... The Magistrate has discretion either to direct registration of a case under Section 156(3) or to conduct inquiry himself as the situation may warrant. This discretion is to be exercised by the Magistrate in his wisdom and having regard to the nature of material available. The direction under Section 156(3) to register a criminal case and to investigate is to be exercised where the Magistrate is satisfied that prima facie a cognizable offence has been committed. On the contrary, where he thinks it necessary to conduct further inquiry before deciding whether he should proceed further in the matter, the matter has to be dealt with under Section 202. Mere allegation of forgery is not enough to require the Magistrate to pass the order under Section 156(3)."
10
8. Questioning the locus standi of the respondents to initiate criminal action against the petitioner, learned counsel referred to the decision of this Court in Criminal Petition No.5959/2018 and connected matters disposed of on 03.10.2018 wherein the respondent No.2 being one of the accused sought for bail in a case registered against him in Crime No.34/2018 for the offences punishable under sections 505(3), 380, 389, 120B, 384, 420, 408 read with 34 of IPC and pointed out that in the said order, this Court admitted the respondent No.2 to bail, subject to the condition that he should not interfere and indulge in the activities of the Mutt in any manner. Under the said circumstances, respondent No.2 having been restrained by the court to interfere with the properties of the Mutt, learned Special Judge ought to have dismissed the complaint at the threshold rather than referring the same for investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. Thus, learned counsel for petitioner sought to set-aside the impugned order and quash the proceedings initiated against the petitioner. 11
9. Learned SPP-II Sri.V.S.Hegde appearing for respondent No.1 though did not file any statement of objections on behalf of Respondent No.1 yet, in the course of arguments submitted that all the offences alleged against the petitioner being non-cognizable offences, reference made by the Special Court under Section 156(3) is legally not tenable.
10. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 however seriously disputed the contentions urged by the learned counsel for petitioner and the learned SPP II, and by referring to the various sale-deeds executed in favour of the petitioner, pointed out that in all the six sale-deeds he has been described in his individual capacity as the sole purchaser. By virtue of section 19 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, unless custom and usage permit, the petitioner cannot enter into any transaction on behalf of the Firm. As per section 22 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the instrument executed in favour of the petitioner cannot bind the Firm. No documents are shown or produced by the petitioner to show that the properties were purchased by him for and on behalf of the Firm. In the absence of a registered 12 document, the properties purchased by the petitioner in his individual name cannot be transferred to the firm. As per section 75A of Representation of People Act, 1951, the petitioner is required to disclose all the properties in his possession, including agricultural and non-agricultural properties. But, in the declaration submitted by him, in the relevant columns meant for the details of non-agricultural properties are mentioned as "Nil" eventhough all the properties purchased by the petitioner were non-agricultural properties. It is the submission of learned counsel for respondent No.2 that the petitioner is now taking advantage of the recitals contained in the sale-deeds but these recitals do not absolve the petitioner from disclosing the assets and the properties held by him, be it in the name of the Firm or in his individual name. He further submitted that the documents produced along with the complaint clearly disclose that the information which was required to be furnished by the petitioner has been deliberately suppressed rendering the petitioner liable for prosecution for the above offences and thus sought for dismissal of the petition.
13
11. In the light of the contentions urged by the parties, the following questions arise for consideration:-
1) Whether the order of reference made by learned Special Judge under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is bad in law for non-compliance of requirements of section 155(2) of Cr.P.C.?
2) Whether the facts alleged in the complaint prima-
facie disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner?
Reg: POINT No.1:
12. The order of reference dated 08.11.2019 made by the Special Court reads as under:-
"Complainant is present.
It is submitted to refer this complaint for investigation to DCP, South.
Heard. In view of the fair submission, this complaint is referred u/s. 156(3) of Cr.P.C. to DCP, South for investigation and report. Await report from DCP, South by 21.12.2019.
Sd/-
LXXXI A.C.C. & S.J. (CCH-82) (Special Court exclusively to deal with Criminal Cases related to elected MPs/MLAs in the State of Karnataka)"
14
13. Undisputedly, all the offences alleged against the petitioner are non-cognisable offences.
14. Law is now well settled that before directing the police to investigate under sub-section (3) of section 156 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate/Court should form an opinion that the complaint discloses a cognizable offence. When the allegation made in the complaint does not disclose cognizable offence, the magistrate/court has no jurisdiction to order police investigation under sub-section (3) of section 156 Cr.P.C.
15. In the present case, the learned Special Judge without applying his mind has directed investigation by the police. Such an order is clearly an order without jurisdiction. Therefore, to that extent, the order passed by the Special Court directing the police to investigate under sub-section (3) of section 156 Cr.P.C. is liable to be quashed.
15
16. The allegations made in the complaint and the documents produced in support thereof prima-facie disclose the ingredients of sections 171G, 191, 193, 199 and 200 IPC. This material is sufficient to proceed against the petitioner for the above offences. In the said circumstances, the proper course available for learned Special Judge was to take cognizance of the alleged offences by himself under section 190 Cr.P.C. and thereafter proceed in accordance with section 200 to 204 Cr.P.C. In this regard, it may be useful to refer to the law expounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of SUNIL BHARTI MITTAL v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (2015) 4 SCC 609, wherein in paras 47, 48 and 51, it is held as under:-
"47. We have already mentioned above that even if the CBI did not implicate the appellants, if there was/is sufficient material on record to proceed against these persons as well, the Special Judge is duly empowered to take cognizance against these persons as well. Under Section 190 of the Code, any Magistrate of First Class (and in those cases where Magistrate of the Second Class is specially empowered to do so) may take cognizance of any offence under the following three eventualities:16
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts; and
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.
This Section which is the starting section of Chapter XIV is subject to the provisions of the said Chapter. The expression "taking cognizance" has not been defined in the Code. However, when the Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under Sections 200-203 of the Code, he is said to have taken cognizance of an offence. This legal position is explained by this Court in Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd [(2008) 2 SCC 492] in the following words: (SCC p.499, para 19) "19. The expression 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means 'become aware of' and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connoted 'to take notice of judicially'. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings 17 in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.
20. 'Taking Cognizance' does not involve any formal action of any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence."
48. Sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence is the application of mind by the Magistrate and his satisfaction that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence. It is, therefore, imperative that on a complaint or on a police report, the Magistrate is bound to consider the question as to whether the same discloses commission of an offence and is required to form such an opinion in this respect. When he does so and decides to issue process, he shall be said to have taken cognizance. At the stage of taking cognizance, the only consideration before the court remains to consider judiciously whether the material on which the prosecution proposes to prosecute the accused brings out a prima facie case or not.
xxx xxx
51. On the other hand, Section 204 of the Code deals with the issue of process, if in the opinion of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is 18 sufficient ground for proceeding. This section relates to commencement of a criminal proceeding. If the Magistrate taking cognizance of a case (it may be the Magistrate receiving the complaint or to whom it has been transferred under Section 192), upon a consideration of the materials before him (i.e., the complaint, examination of the complainant and his witnesses if present, or report of inquiry, if any), thinks that there is a prima facie case for proceeding in respect of an offence, he shall issue process against the accused."
(Underlining supplied)
17. In the light of this legal position, the learned Judge ought to have taken cognisance of the alleged offences based on the material produced before him rather than referring the complaint for investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The restrictions under section 155 are not applicable to the Magistrate or the Court. The locus-standi of the complainant is immaterial as long as no malafides or vindictiveness is disclosed on the face of the record. Even otherwise, the indictment of the complainant not to interfere with the activities of the Mutt has 19 nothing to do with the initiation of criminal action against the petitioner for the avowed violation of law.
18. The contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner based on section 195 Cr.P.C., in my view, does not preclude the learned Special Judge to proceed against the petitioner for the above offences in accordance with sections 200 to 204 IPC. As per section 195 Cr.P.C., the Court is debarred from taking cognizance of any offences punishable under sections 172 to 188 except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of any offence punishable under sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 only, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court.
19. In the instant case, the offences alleged against the petitioner do not relate to any proceedings conducted before the Civil Court, Criminal Court or a tribunal; as such, the bar prescribed under section 195 Cr.P.C. is not applicable to the 20 facts of the case. On the other hand, the allegations made in the complaint and the documents produced in support thereof clearly go to show that the petitioner has made a false statement in connection with an election and has concealed the necessary information which he was legally bound to furnish to the election officer, thus, prima-facie making out the ingredients of section 171G and 177 of IPC. These statements having been made by the petitioner on oath or affirmation to a public servant, the ingredient of section 181 of IPC are also attracted. Likewise, the petitioner having caused the circumstances to exist, intending that such false statement may appear in the proceedings taken before a public servant, even the ingredients of section 191 IPC punishable under section 193 IPC and sections 199 and 200 IPC are prima-facie made out.
20. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has not withheld any material information in his affidavit and that the information divulged by him is true and the same does not amount to concealment of information or furnishing false information to public servant is concerned, 21 suffice it to note that the petitioner himself has admitted the fact that much before filing the nomination papers and swearing to an affidavit in terms of Rule 4 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, he had purchased six items of properties under six different sale deeds for a total consideration of Rs.33,66,00,000/-. Undisputedly, these purchases were made by the petitioner on 30.03.2013. Form No.26 was filed by him at the first instance on 26.03.2014 (Annexure-'E') and as on that day, all these properties were standing in his name as the sole purchaser thereof. No-doubt, it is true that in the respective sale deeds, it is recited that the petitioner herein was a partner of the firm "P C Realty" and the sale deeds were being executed in the name of purchaser in the capacity as partner of the said firm for and on behalf of the said firm. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the entire consideration was paid by the petitioner in his name. It is not the case of the petitioner that the consideration for purchase of the said properties were paid out of the funds of the firm. Deed of Confirmation and Reconstitution was entered into by the 22 petitioner alongwith his wife as the other partner of the Firm 'P C Realty' only on 07.07.2014 subsequent to filing of the first affidavit on 26.03.2014(Annexure-E). Even in this Deed of Confirmation and Reconstitution, it is clearly stated that all the six items of the properties purchased by the petitioner were brought into hotchpotch as the capital contributed by the petitioner. As a result, the right and title of the petitioner in the above properties remained with the petitioner as on the date of submitting the nomination on 26.03.2014. Even as on the date of filing Form No.26 on 22.03.2019, the petitioner was holding 75% interest in the Firm. It is trite law that Firm name is only a compendious name given to the partnership and the partners are the real owners of assets. Partnership Firm is not a legal entity like a company. The partnership property belongs to all the partners constituting the firm. In the Deed of Confirmation and Reconstitution entered into by the petitioner and his wife dated 30.03.2013(Annexure-D), it is clearly recited that net profit or loss in each financial year shall be divided among the partners as follows:-
23
Sl.No. Particulars Amount
(Rs.)
1. Party of the First Part 75%
2. Party of the Second Part 25%
TOTAL 100%
21. Thus, even going by the recitals of the partnership deed, it is seen that as on the date of filing the affidavits and making declaration in Form No.26, the petitioner was holding 75% share out of the total assets of Rs.33,60,00,000/-; but in Form No.26 submitted by him on 26.03.2014(Annexure-E), he has furnished the details of investment in P C Realty (Partnership Firm) amounting to Rs.14,65,04,955/-. The shares held by his spouse do not find place therein. Thus, there is clear case of concealment and suppression of material facts attracting the ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner. Worse still, in the Form No.26 filed by him on 20.03.2019(Annexure-F), he has declared his liability in P C Realty as Rs.12,63,340/- and the liability of his wife at Rs.8,75,36,976/-. Even though the petitioner has contended that he has not withheld any material 24 information either in his affidavit or in Form No.26, no material is produced before the Court justifying the figures shown in Sl.No.8 of Form No.26(Annexure-F). The averments made by the petitioner in the petition as well the documents produced by him clearly point out that as on the date of filing of Form No.26, the petitioner was holding assets in his name to the tune of Rs.25,24,50,000/- as partner of P C Realty. Under the said circumstances, there being prima-facie material to proceed against the petitioner for the alleged offences, I do not find any justifiable ground to quash the proceedings initiated against the petitioner.
22. Law is now well settled that the inherent powers under section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to give effect to an order under the Code to prevent abuse of process of the court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Though the petitioner has also invoked Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the reliefs claimed in the petition fell within the ambit of section 482 Cr.P.C and the inherent powers under this section cannot be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court 25 should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without full material.
23. In RISHIPAL SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER, (2014) 7 SCC 215, it is held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under:-
"What emerges from the above judgments is that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the tests to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made in the complaint prima facie establish the case. The Courts have to see whether the continuation of the complaint amounts to abuse of process of law and whether continuation of the criminal proceeding results in miscarriage of justice or when the Court comes to a conclusion that quashing these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice, then 26 the Court can exercise the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. While exercising the power under the provision, the Courts have to only look at the uncontroverted allegation in the complaint whether prima facie discloses an offence or not, but it should not convert itself to that of a trial Court and dwell into the disputed questions of fact."
In the light of the above discussion, the petition is allowed-in-part. The impugned order 08.11.2019 passed by learned LXXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge at Bangalore (Special court exclusively to deal with criminal cases related to elected MPs/MLAs in the State of Karnataka) in PCR No.46/2019(Annexure-H) is modified and the Special Judge is directed to take cognisance of the alleged offences under section 190 Cr.P.C. and thereafter proceed in accordance with sections 200 to 204 of Cr.P.C.
Sd/-
JUDGE Bss/mn/-