Jharkhand High Court
Prem Prakash vs Union Of India Through The Directorate ... on 10 September, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:27891
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. RevisionNo.1226 of 2024
With
Cr. Revision No. 333 of 2025
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Prem Prakash, aged about 48 years, son of Pramod Kumar Sinha, resident of Flat No. 3K/7, Harmu Housing Colony, PO Harmu, PS Argora, District Ranchi. ... ... Petitioner [In both cases] Versus Union of India through the Directorate of Enforcement ... Respondent [In both cases]
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CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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For the Petitioner(s) :Mr.Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mrs. Sneh Singh, Advocate Mr. Rishav Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent(s) :Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate;
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate;
Mr. Varun Girdhar, Advocate
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th C.A.V. on 27 August, 2025 Pronounced on 10/09/2025
1. Since these matters are interlinked and, as such, both are heard together and being disposed of by a common order.
2. Both of these Criminal Revision petitions have been filed under sections 438 & 442 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
3. Criminal Revision No.1226 of 2024 is directed against the order dated 08.8.2024 passed by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-1 -cum- Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No. 05 of 2023 in ECIR/RNZO/10/2023 registered for the offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (in short PMLA,2002) whereby and whereunder, the Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 2205 of 2024 filed by the petitioner seeking discharge has been rejected. 1
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4. Criminal Revision No. 333 of 2025 is directed against the order dated 04.2.2025 passed by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-1 -cum- Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No. 05 of 2023 in ECIR/RNZO/10/2023 registered for the offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, whereby and whereunder, the charge has been framed against the petitioner.
Factual Matrix:
5. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the instant petitions which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under:
(i) An ECIR bearing No. RNZO/10/2023 was recorded on 07.03.2023 and investigation under the provisions of prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) was initiated on the basis of FIR being Sadar PS Case No. 399 of 2022 dated 08.09.2022 registered for the offences under sections 406,420,467,468, 447, 504,506, 341, 323 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code since offences under sections 420 and 467 of IPC are Scheduled Offences under Part A of the Schedule of PMLA, 2002. On 1.9.2023, after completion of investigation in connection with aforementioned ECIR, the Directorate of Enforcement filed the Prosecution Complaint arraigning the petitioner as Accused No.8.
(ii) The Prosecution Complaint contained reference to the First Information Report being Sadar PS Case No. 399 of 2 2025:JHHC:27891 2022 which was registered on the directions of the learned court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi in connection with Complaint Case No. 3111 of 2021 passed by order dated 28.6.2022. The said complaint case was filed by Umesh Kumar Gope against Rajesh Rai, Imtiaz Ahmad, Bharat Prasad, Lakhan Singh, Punit Bhargava and Bishnu Kumar Agarwal for fraudulently acquiring one acre of land situated at Cheshire Home Road, Plot No. 28, Khata No. 37, Mouza Gari, Ranchi, Jharkhand.
(iii) The allegations in the First Information Report being Sadar PS Case No. 399 of 2022 are briefly as follows:
(a) The FIR alleged that Rajesh Rai illegally and fraudulently made a power of attorney in the name of Imtiaz Ahmad and Bharat Prasad. On the strength of the said Power of Attorney they prepared a forged sale deed and sold the above-mentioned parcel of land admeasuring 1 acre to Punit Bhargava for an amount of Rs. 1,78,55,800/-.
(b) Puneet Bhargava further sold the said land to Bishnu Kumar Agarwal through two Sale Deeds for a total amount of Rs. 1,80, 00,000/- (Two Sale Deeds dated 01.04.2021 for an amount of Rs. 1, 02,60,000/- and Rs. 77, 40, 000/-).
(iv) Investigation further revealed that through the consideration amount in the deed between Imtiaz Ahmed, 3 2025:JHHC:27891 Bharat Prasad and Puneet Bhargav is shown as Rs.
1,78,55,800/- only an amount of Rs. 25,00,000/- was paid from the account of Shiva Fabcons- one proprietorship firm of Punit Bhargava into the account of Rajesh Rai on 12.02.2021. Investigation further reveals that out of the said Rs. 25 lakh an amount of Rs. 18,00,000/- was immediately transferred to the Bank account of Green Traders, a partnership firm under the control of Md. Saddam Hussain.
(v) Further during the investigation, Surveys were conducted on 09.02.2023 and 15.02.2023 at the circle office Bargai Ranchi and office of Registrar of assurances Kolkata respectively and original register II/volumes containing the above entry were inspected, falsification of the original records were identified and the custody of original registers were taken. After obtaining permission the original registers were sent for examination by an expert to Directorate of Forensic Science, Handwriting and Forensic Bureau, Gandhinagar which confirmed the forgery and tampering in the above stated registers. Another FIR bearing number 137 of 2023 dated 10.05.2023 was registered under Sections 120B, 465, 467, 468 & 471 of the Indian Penal Code at Hare Street PS, Kolkata on the basis of the report of the fact-finding committee of the Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata which was also made a part of the investigation. 4
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(vi) Investigation thus revealed that the accused persons namely Afsar Ali, Md Saddam Hussain, Imtiaz Ahmed, Bishnu Kumar Agarwal, Chhavi Ranjan, Prem Prakash, Punit Bhargava, Rajesh Rai, Lakhan Singh and Bharat Prasad are habitual offenders and they are involved in mass forgery. Further, during course of investigation three immovable properties were provisionally attached vide order dated 31.08.2023.
(vii) Based on the above, the Directorate of Enforcement registered ECIR Case No. 05 of 2023 in ECIR / RNZO/10/2023 dated 07.03.2023 in connection with which the Prosecution Complaint dated 01.09.2023 was filed.
(viii)The petitioner was earlier arrested on 25.08.2022 in connection with another ECIR being ECIR No. 04 of 2022 registered for offences of Money Laundering arising out of allegations related to illegal mining activities. The petitioner was thus in Judicial Custody since 25.08.2022.The investigating agency in connection with the instant matters filed an application under section 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, pursuant to which the petitioner was produced before the learned Court of the Special Judge under PMLA at Ranchi on 11.08.2023.
On 11.08.2023, an application for custody of the petitioner/accused under Section 167 of the Code of 5 2025:JHHC:27891 Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Section 65 and 19(3) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was filed by the Directorate of Enforcement praying for 5 days custody of the petitioner. The Investigating Agency explained the grounds of arrest to the petitioner, however no copy of the grounds of arrest was furnished to the petitioner. The petitioner was arrested on 11.08.2023 at 12:15 hours and an Arrest Memo was served upon him in the Court of the Special Judge under PMLA at Ranchi.
(ix) The petitioner was taken into custody in connection with ECIR 05 of 2023 arising out of ECIR/RNZO/10/2023 and sent to police remand for a period of five days and the petitioner's statements under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was recorded in which he denied all the allegations and clearly stated that he had no connection with the alleged illegal activity(s) or with the other accused persons.On 01.09.2023, the Directorate of Enforcement filed the Prosecution Complaint before the learned Court in which the petitioner was arrayed as accused no. 8 and thereafter the learned Trial Court vide order dated 04.09.2023 took cognizance of the offence under section 3 punishable under section 4 of the PML Act, 2002 against the petitioner and other accused persons.
(x) On 20.07.2024, the petitioner filed a discharge application under section 227 of the Code of Criminal 6 2025:JHHC:27891 Procedure, 1973, praying for discharge as there was no sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioner under offences of Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 punishable under Section 4 of the Act of 2002.
(xi) The prosecution did not point out a single material which would prima facie establish the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged crime.
(xii) The Learned Special Court vide order dated 08.08.2024 without applying its judicial mind and without considering the submissions made by the petitioner, has rejected the application for discharge filed by the petitioner.
(xiii) Consequent to dismissal of the said application of discharge, the charges under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, has been framed against the petitioner on 04.02.2025.
(xiv) The order dated 08.08.2024 (in Cr. Revision 1226 of 2024) by which discharge application has been dismissed and order dated 04.02.2025 (in Cr. Revision 333 of 2025) by which charge under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, was framed against the petitioner has been assailed herein.
Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner:
6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner(s) has submitted that the learned Special Judge, PML Act, Ranchi has failed to 7 2025:JHHC:27891 appreciate that the prosecution has not produced material which would show that the petitioner has in any manner dealt with "proceeds of crime".
7. The learned Special Judge has also failed to appreciate that the petitioner cannot be said to even remotely be associated with the scheduled offence as mentioned in the ECIR as he is neither involved in any form of forgery or even has knowledge of the documents that were allegedly forged or manipulated.
8. The petitioner has been prosecuted on the basis of assumptions and surmises, and the officials of the Investigating Agency has totally overlooked the principle that there must 'reason to believe' rather than mere assumptions that the offences alleged against the petitioner have actually been committed by him.
9. The learned counsel has further submitted that a perusal of the entire prosecution complaint and the statements of witnesses and accused persons makes it clear that the master mind behind the forgery committed is Afshar Ali and his accomplices and not the accused persons who have simply purchased the land and certainly not the present petitioner who has neither purchased the land nor has any nexus with any land purchase transaction.
10. It has further been submitted that from the records it is evident that there is no cogent material to show the petitioner's involvement in forgery or manipulation of records and the case of the prosecution is also not supported with any material to show that the petitioner was aware that the deed of 1948 was forged.8
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11. The Learned Special Judge has failed to appreciate that the petitioner had no involvement in forgery or manipulation of land records. Further, it has been well recorded that the complainant of the Complaint case no. 3111 of 2021 was frivolously exerting claim on the subject land thus nothing survived in relation to the predicate offence on the basis of which the ECIR was recorded.
12. The learned Special Judge, PMLA cases at Ranchi has erred in not considering that a civil suit with respect to the title of the subject land is pending before Civil Court, Ranchi during pendency of which provisions under PMLA do not authorize the investigating officer to conclude, decide and hold the true owner of the property or even further presumption of the same being 'proceeds of crime'.
13. The petitioner was not in any way involved in purchase of land by co-accused Mr. Punit Bhargava. The prosecution's assumption that the petitioner was an accomplice to the accused, Bishnu Kumar Agarwal is unfounded.
14. It has further been contended that it has been wrongly alleged that the petitioner was connected to and has connived with some public servant/ government official to bring about illegal gain to any of the purported beneficiaries. The land in question was never transferred in the name of the petitioner nor the petitioner had received any amount from anyone whatsoever for dealing with the said land and the petitioner has no nexus with the transfer of a sum of Rs. 1,01,57,400/- to the account of M/s Jamini Enterprises, a firm of which the petitioner is not even a partner. It is evident from the reading of the prosecution complaint as 9 2025:JHHC:27891 well as from the materials collected in course of investigation, that the petitioner cannot be said to be aware that the sale proceeds generated from the sale of land by Punit Bhargava was in any way relatable to an offence committed at a prior point of time when the purchaser namely Bishnu Agarwal as also Punit Bhargava before purchasing the property in question had made a due diligence in search of the title relating to said land and had been made to believe that the title of the vendor of Punit Bhargava, namely Rajesh Rai had a perfect right, title, interest over the property in question.
15. It has further been contended that the prosecution has failed to collect any material which would show that the petitioner possessed the requisite mens rea to commit an offence punishable under section 4 of the PMLA. It is fairly well settled that mens rea, unless expressly excluded will have to be read into a penal statute. It has also been contended that the case of the prosecution rests upon the statements of the witnesses and accused persons which has been made under section 50 of the PMLA without any independent corroboration of the said statements through independent sources.
16. It has been contended that the statements recorded while in custody (although in connection with ECIR No.4/2022) will not be admissible and is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act since the same were given whilst in Judicial custody, pursuant to another proceeding instituted by the same Investigating Agency.The statements given by the co-accused even if there is anything incriminating will not have the character of substantive evidence and as such no prosecution could be 10 2025:JHHC:27891 initiated against the petitioner on the basis of such statements as the same will be hit by Section 30 of the Evidence Act.
17. It has further been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Hon'ble Apex Court while enlarging the petitioner on bail in SLP (Crl.) No. 5416 of 2024 has categorically observed in paragraph 43 that moreover, there is no material placed on record to show as to on what basis it is claimed that the beneficial interest in M/s Jamini Enterprises lies with the appellant. Hence, the statements relied upon do not prima facie make out a case of money laundering against the appellant.
18. Therefore, submission has been made that since the Hon'ble Apex Court has already observed that no prima facie case of money laundering against the appellant is made out as such the prayer for discharge of the petitioner is fit to be allowed.
19. It has been submitted that in order to make out an offence under the provisions of the PML Act, 2002, it is obligatory upon the prosecution to produce material which should show that an accused has in any manner dealt with 'proceeds of crime' generated from the commission of the scheduled offence and in absence of any material showing that the petitioner had illegally gained property as a result of any criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence the petitioner is liable to be discharged.
20. It has been contended that the learned Court below has failed to consider the broad probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the basic infirmities appearing in the case at the time of 11 2025:JHHC:27891 considering the discharge application and there is no cogent far less any legally admissible evidence against the petitioner and even if the entire evidence is taken on its face value the same does not give rise to even suspicion far less grave suspicion to proceed against the petitioner.
21. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, a fit case where the impugned orders need to be interfered with.
Arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondent:
22. It is submitted that the instant prosecution complaint dated 01.09.2023 filed against the Petitioner as well as nine other co-accused persons is backed by cogent evidence gathered during the course of investigation and not solely based on statements of the Petitioner as well as his accomplices. Further, there are ample pieces of evidence that prove that the Petitioner is involved in the offence of money laundering, which are further corroborated by the statements of witnesses and accused persons of the instant case. Hence, the averments that the Petitioner has no connection with illegal activities of the instant case are unfounded and liable to be dismissed.
23. It is further submitted that the learned Special Court, PMLA, Ranchi after considering the active role of the petitioner in knowingly assisting his co-accused persons namely Bishnu Agarwal, Afshar Ali and others in illegally acquiring landed property admeasuring 1 acre situated at Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi, rejected the discharge application of the petitioner vide order dated 08.08.2024, which is just and proper. Hence, 12 2025:JHHC:27891 the averments of the petitioner are baseless and liable to be rejected. Further, charges have already been framed against the Petitioner on 04.02.2025.
24. The petitioner is knowingly a party with the co-accused persons namely Afshar Ali Afsu Khan, Rajesh Rai, Lakhan Singh, Imtiaz Ahmed, Bharat Prasad, Punit Bhargava, Chhavi Ranjan and Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in acquisition of proceeds of crime in form of landed property admeasuring 1 acre situated at Plot no. 28, Khata no. 37, Village Gari, Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi initially in the name of his accomplice Punit Bhargava and later assisting the accused person Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in its ultimate acquisition by fraudulent means. The petitioner, being an accomplice of Bishnu Kumar Agarwal, assisted him in acquiring the said one-acre property by hatching a conspiracy and initially making Punit Bhargava the owner of the said land. Later, this land was acquired by Bishnu Kumar Agarwal, who is the ultimate beneficiary of the said land. Hence, the petitioner Prem Prakash is involved in the activities connected with the acquisition, possession, and concealment of the proceeds of crime and claiming and projecting the proceeds of crime as untainted property. Thus, the petitioner cannot be absolved from the offence of money laundering as defined under section 3 of PMLA, 2002 therefore, the averments of the petitioner are wrong and liable to be set aside.
25. It has been submitted that Bishnu Kumar Agarwal paid Rs. 1,78,20,000/-to the accused Punit Bhargava in favour of his firm Shiva Fabcons in account No. 52580200000085 of Bank of Baroda, out 13 2025:JHHC:27891 of which an amount of Rs.1,01,57,400/- was transferred to the bank account of Jamini Enterprises, a firm whose beneficial owner is the petitioner Prem Prakash.
26. Further, the petitioner, being an accomplice of Bishnu Kumar Agarwal, assisted him in acquiring the said one-acre property by hatching a conspiracy and initially making Punit Bhargava the owner of the land admeasuring 1 acre at Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi, which is a government land. Later, this land was acquired by Bishnu Kumar Agarwal who is the ultimate beneficiary of the said land. Hence, the averments of the petitioner that he is not related to any property directly or indirectly are wrong and denied.
27. So far as the averments of the petitioner of not being named in any of the scheduled offence is concerned, it is stated that in Pavana Dibbur vs. Directorate of Enforcement Criminal Appeal No. 2779/20223, it is held that it is not necessary that the accused for the offence of money laundering to be made accused of schedule offences and it is also pertinent to mention that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence. Hence, the averments of the petitioner are baseless.
28. It is humbly submitted that the offence of money laundering is a separate and independent offence as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v.UOI, 2022 SCC Online 729. Hence, it is not necessary that the accused of a predicate offence can only commit offence of money laundering, the set of accused in offence under PMLA 14 2025:JHHC:27891 could be different and which depends on activity or process such person is involved in pertaining to proceeds of crime.
29. It is reiterated that the petitioner is knowingly a party with the co-accused persons namely Afshar Ali @ Afsu Khan, Rajesh Rai, Lakhan Singh, Imtiaz Ahmed, Bharat Prasad, Punit Bhargava, Chhavi Ranjan and Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in acquisition of proceeds of crime in form of government property admeasuring 1 acre situated at Plot no. 28, Khata no. 37, Village Gari, Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi initially in the name of his accomplice Punit Bhargava and later assisting the accused person Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in its ultimate acquisition by fraudulent means. The petitioner being an accomplice of Bishnu Kumar Agarwal assisted him in acquiring the said one acre property by hatching a conspiracy and initially making Punit Bhargava as the owner of the said land. Later, this land was acquired by Bishnu Kumar Agarwal who is the ultimate beneficiary of the said land. Hence, Petitioner is involved in the activities connected with the acquisition, possession, and concealment of the proceeds of crime and claiming and projecting the proceeds of crime as untainted property, and the petitioner Prem Prakash is guilty of the offence of money laundering as defined under section 3 of PMLA, 2002. Thus, the petitioner is liable to be punished under section 4 of PMLA, 2002.
30. It is further submitted that Section 3 of the PMLA, clearly states that whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its 15 2025:JHHC:27891 concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. Hence, in light of the above, the case of the Petitioner is based upon cogent evidence to show his involvement, and then during the stage of framing of charges, only a prima facie case is considered.
31. The learned Special Court, PMLA, Ranchi after considering the active role of the petitioner in knowingly assisting his co-accused persons namely Bishnu Agarwal, Afshar Ali and others in illegally acquiring landed property admeasuring 1 acre situated at Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi, which is backed by cogent evidences relied upon in the prosecution Complaint dated 01.09.2023, rejected the discharge application of the petitioner vide order dated 08.08.2024 and charges are framed on 04.02.2025, which is just and proper. Hence, the averments of the petitioner are baseless and liable to be rejected.
32. It is stated that in Pavana Dibbur vs. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No. 2779/20223, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is not necessary that the accused for the offence of money laundering to be made accused of schedule offences and it is also pertinent to mention that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence. It is not necessary that the offender of money laundering necessarily need to be made accused or charge-sheeted in predicate offence. The offence of money laundering is a separate and independent offence. Hence, the averments of the petitioner are baseless.
33. Further, it is submitted that the Petitioner is a beneficiary of the proceeds of crime, and the Petitioner was aware of the forgery and even 16 2025:JHHC:27891 intentionally purchased the property through Puneet Bharghav and sold in a short span of time.The role of the petitioner cropped up and on having reasons to believe that he is guilty of the offence of money laundering, he was arrested on 11.08.2023.
34. Further, the ECIR is a preliminary document, recorded on initiation of investigation and not on completion of investigation under PMLA. Hence, as the active role of the petitioner cropped up in the instant case, he was arrested under section 19 of PMLA, 2002 for further investigation under PMLA. Further, the petitioner was arrested before the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arvind Kejriwal vs Directorate of Enforcement dated 12.07.2024, before which the reasons to believe recorded for arresting the accused was sent to the Ld. Adjudicating Authority in a sealed envelope. Hence, the averments of the petitioner are wrong and liable to be set aside.
35. It has been contended that the observation so made by the Supreme Court at the time of consideration of bail of the present appellant is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the issue reason being that the Supreme Court itself has clarified that whatever observation has been made, that is for the purpose of consideration of the bail within the parameter of Section 45 of the Act, 2002 and the same shall not influence the trial, as such, submission has been made that the observation so made by the Supreme Court at the time of consideration of the issue of regular bail will not be applicable herein.
36. It is submitted that the question of whether the accused being guilty or non-guilty is a matter of trial, and the same is to be seen 17 2025:JHHC:27891 through the evidence produced on record before the Special Court PMLA. While arresting an accused, the primary assumption that is to be made is whether there are sufficient reasons to believe that the person is guilty of the offence under section 3 punishable under Section 4 of PMLA 2002. Therefore, in the light of facts and circumstances of the present case, there were cogent reasons to believe that the Petitioner is guilty of offence under Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of PMLA. The averments of the petitioner appear to be an attempt to portray himself as innocent and dissociate himself from his co-accused in order to aloof himself from the illegal activities for facilitating the illegal acquisition of government land. Thus, the averments of the petitioner are unfounded and liable to be dismissed. Reliance is placed upon decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 held that Confessional statements can be considered if they implicate the maker substantially in the same extent as the other accused against whom it is sought to be taken into consideration. Thus, the learned Special Court, PMLA, Ranchi has rightfully rejected the petitioner's discharge application vide order dated 08.08.2024 and consequently the charges under relevant Section have been framed against the petitioner.
37. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-ED, on the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the impugned orders to be interfered with.
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2025:JHHC:27891 Analysis:
38. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and has also gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the impugned order as also the case diary.
39. It is evident from record that an ECIR bearing no. RNZO / 10 / 2023 was recorded on 07.03.2023 and investigation under the provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) was initiated on the basis of FIR being Sadar P.S. Case no. 399 of 2022 registered for offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 447, 504, 506, 341, 323 & 34 of the Indian Penal Code.The said FIR being Sadar P.S. Case No. 399 of 2022 was registered on the directions of the Ld. Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi in Complaint Case No. 3111 of 2021 passed vide order dated 28.06.2022. A complaint case was filed by Umesh Kumar Gope against Rajesh Rai, Imtiaz Ahmad, Bharat Prasad, Lakhan Singh, Punit Bhargav and Bishnu Kumar Agarwal for fraudulently acquiring one acre of land situated at Cheshire Home Road, Plot No 28, Khata No. 37, Mouza Gari, Ranchi, Jharkhand.
40. As per the said FIR it has been alleged that Rajesh Rai illegally and fraudulently made a Power of Attorney in the name of Imtiaz Ahmad and Bharat Prasad on the strength of the said Power of Attorney they prepared a forged sale deed and sold the above-mentioned parcel of land admeasuring 1 acre to Punit Bhargav for an amount of Rs.1,78,55,800/- and Puneet Bhargav further sold the said land to Bishnu Kumar Agarwal through two Sale Deeds for a total amount of Rs.1,80,00,000/- (Two Sale deeds dated 01.04.2021 for an amount Rs.1,02,60,000/- and Rs.77,40,000/-).
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41. Further during the investigation, Surveys were conducted on 09.02.2023 and 15.02.2023 at the Circle Office, Bargain, Ranchi, and office of Registrar of assurances Kolkata respectively and original register II/volumes containing the above entry were inspected falsification of the original records were identified and the custody of original registers were taken. After obtaining new permission the original registers were sent for examination by an expert to Directorate of Forensic Science, Handwriting and Forensic Bureau, Gandhinagar which confirmed the forgery and tampering in the above stated registers.
42. Based on the above, the Directorate of Enforcement registered ECIR Case No. 05 of 2023 in ECIR / RNZO / 10 / 2023 dated 07.03.2023 and the Prosecution Complaint was filed on 01.09.2023, by the Directorate of Enforcement in which the petitioner was arrayed as accused no. 8 and thereafter the learned court vide order dated 04.09.2023 took cognizance of offence under Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of the PML Act, 2002 against the petitioner and other accused persons.
43. In the said prosecution complaint, the role of petitioner has been mentioned, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid prosecution complaint is being quoted as under:
Brief summary of result of investigation under PMLA 9.1 The investigations under the provisions of PMLA, 2002 in FIR no.
399/2022 dated 08.09.2022 revealed that there is organized group of persons who are habitually involved in making fake deeds and falsifying original land records at Circle Offices and Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata and with the help of said fake deeds, acquire and dispose properties in fraudulent manner.
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2025:JHHC:27891 9.2 Investigation reveals that such forgery is widespread and certain government officials are part of the said conspiracy. Various influential persons like Bishnu Kumar Agarwal, Prem Prakash and others in connivance with senior government officials like Chhavi Ranjan are involved in acquisition of landed properties in Ranchi. 9.3 Investigation has revealed that Bishnu Kumar Agarwal has been assisted by Prem Prakash, Chhavi Ranjan and others in acquiring proceeds ofcrime in the form of landed properties the details of which are given below-
9.4 The FIR alleged that Rajesh Rai, S/o Jagdish Rai, illegally and fraudulently made a power of attorney in the name of Imtiyaz Ahmed and Bharat Prasad. On the strength of the said power of attorney, they prepared a forged sale deed and sold the above-mentioned parcel of land measuring 1 acres to Punit Bhargav for an amount of Rs. 1,78,55,800/-. Punit Bhargava further sold the said land to Bishnu Kumar Agarwal, vide two sale deeds for the total amount of Rs. 1,80,00,000/-. (Vide two sale deeds, both dated 01.04.2021, for an amount of Rs. 1,02,60,000/- and Rs. 77,40,000/-). 9.5 Thus, the FIR stated that the land admeasuring 1 acres, situated at Gari, Cheshire Home Road, PS Sadar, Ranchi was acquired in a fraudulent manner by the above persons who indulged in fabricating documents and forging records, on the basis of which a power of attorney was fraudulently executed and subsequently the land was transferred to Punit Bhargava, who Immediately sold this land to Bishnu Agarwal, a businessman having interests in several avenues including real estate business.
9.6 Investigation reveals that Rajesh Rai in connivance with Bharat Prasad, Md. Saddam Hussain,Afshar Ali, Imtiaz Ahmed and others prepared one forged deed of 1948 was prepared by the accused persons and on the basis of that a power of attorney was given in favour of Imtiaz Ahmed and Bharat Prasad. The other accomplice namely Lakhan Singh became the confirming party in the deed and they executed sale deed dated 06.02.2021 in favour of Punit Bhargava for an amount of Rs. 1,78,55,800/- which was registered as document no. 2021/RAN/1016/BK1/906 in book no. BK1, Vol. no. 112 from page no. 369 to 506 at the office of SRO, Ranchi.
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2025:JHHC:27891 9.7 Punit Bhargava further sold the said land to Bishnu Kumar Agarwal vide two sale deeds, both dated 01.04.2021, registered as document no. 2021/RAN/2784/BK1/2483 in book no. BK1, Vol. no. 316 from page no. 405 to 532 at the office of SRO, Ranchi (for an amount of Rs. 1,02,60,000/-) and document no.
2021/RAN/2783/BK1/2482 in book no. BK1, Vol. no. 316 from page no. 261 to 404 at the office of SRO, Ranchi (for an amount of Rs. 77,40,000).
9.8 Investigation further reveals that though the consideration amount in the deed between Imtiaz Ahmed and Bharat Prasad and Punit Bhargava is shown as Rs. 1,78,55,800/-, but only an amount of Rs. 25 lacs have been paid from the Bank of Baroda account of Shiva Fabcons, (account no.52580200000085) one of theproprietorship firms of Punit Bhargava into the SBI Account no. 31180122501 of Rajesh Rai on 12.02.2021. Further Investigation reveals that out of the said amount of Rs. 25 lacs, an amount of Rs. 18 lacs were immediately transferred to the bank account of Green Traders, a partnership firm under the control of Md. Saddam Hussain (one of the accused arrested by this office on 14.04.2023 and presently languishing in Judicial Custody).
9.9 During investigation, surveys were conducted on 09.02.2023 (RUD No. 06) at the Circle office, Bargai, Ranchi and on 15.02.2023 (RUD No. 07) at the office of Registrar of Assurances (Records), Kolkata under section 16 of PMLA, 2002 and the original register II/volumes, containing the above entry were inspected and falsification of the original records were identified in the above documents. The custody of the original registers was taken from the Circle Office as well as from the Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata after the permission of Hon'ble PMIA Court Ranchi under section 91 of Cr.PC. After obtaining due permission, the said original register was sent for by an expert to Directorate of Forensic Science, Handwriting and Forensic Bureau, Gandhinagar. The Directorate of Forensic Science has confirmed the forgery and tempering in the above stated registers.
9.10 During further investigation, it revealed that the accused persons namely Afshar All, Md. Saddam Hussain, Imtiaz Ahmed, Bishnu Kumar Agarwal, Chhavi Ranjan, Prem Prakash, Rajesh Rai, Lakhan 22 2025:JHHC:27891 Singh and Bharat Prasad are habitual offenders and they are involved in mass forgery. It is also established that Bishnu Kumar Agarwal has acquired other lands in frivolous manner with the help of government officials. 9.11 As stated above, investigation has established that the property situated at Khata no. 93, Plot no. 543, 544, 546 and 547, total area 9.30 acres acquired by Bishnu Kumar Agarwal was a government property (Khasmahal Land). And the said property has been acquired by the accused Bishnu Kumar Agarwal by influencing the government officials including the Ex-DC Chhavi Ranjan who helped him by suppressing and shelving all the official records and documents which established that the above property acquired by Bishnu Kumar Agarwal was a government property (Khasmahal Land). Further, this property has been in possession of Nazarat Hussain & his families without any grounds and has been in their occupation. Later, this land was taken onlease by Ramchandra Mukherjee effective from the year 1985 and expired in the year 2014 after which, the lease of the above-stated was not renewed in name of any person. However, Bishnu Kumar Agarwal by concealing and suppressing the facts and by assistance of the accused Chhavi Ranjan and others purchased this Khasmahal land in illegal manner. 14 Specific Roles of the Accused persons in commission of offence of Money laundering 14.8 Prem Prakash, S/o Pramod Kumar Sinha (Accused no. 8) - The accused person was a party with the accused persons namely Afshar Ali @ Afsu Khan, Rajesh Rai, Lakhan Singh, Imtiaz Ahmed, Bharat Prasad, Punit Bhargava, Chhavi Ranjan and Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in acquisition of proceeds of crime in form of landed property admeasuring 1 acre situated at Plot no. 28, Khata no. 37, Village Gari, Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi initially in the name of Punit Bhargava and later assisting the accused person Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in its ultimate acquisition by fraudulent means. The accused being an accomplice of Bishnu Kumar Agarwal assisted him in acquiring the said one acre property by hatching a conspiracy and initially making Punit Bhargava as the owner of the said land. Later, this land was acquired by Bishnu Kumar Agarwal who is the ultimate beneficiary of the said land. Investigation reveals that Bishnu Kumar Agarwal paid Rs. 1,78,20,000/- to the accused Punit Bhargava in his firm Shiva Fabcons. The amount was paid into Bank of Baroda 23 2025:JHHC:27891 account 52580200000085 out of which, an amount of Rs. 1,01,57,400/- was transferred to the bank account of Jamini Enterprises, a firm whose beneficial owner is Prem Prakash. Hence, the accused person Prem Prakash is involved in the activities connected with the acquisition, possession, concealment, of the proceeds of crime and claiming and projecting the proceeds of crime as untainted property. Thus, the accused person Prem Prakash has committed the offence of money laundering as defined under section 3 of PMLA, 2002 and is accordingly liable to punished under section 4 of MLA, 2002,."
44. It is evident from the prosecution complaint that the petitioner Prem Prakash exerted his influence in order to assist his accomplice Bishnu Kumar Agarwal in acquisition of the land situated at Cheshire Home Road measuring one acre.Record transpires that the accused petitioner was a party with the other co-accused persons namely Afsar Ali @ Afsu Khan and others in acquisition of proceeds of crime in form of landed property admeasuring 1 acre situated at Plot no. 28. Khata no. 37, village Gari Chesire Home Road, Ranchi in the name of Punit Bhargav and Investigation reveals that Bishnu Kumar Agrawal has paid Rs. 1,78,20,000/- to the accused Punit Bhargav in his firm Shiva Fabcons. The amount was paid into the Bank of Baroda account no. 52580200000085 out of which as amount of Rs. 1,01,57,400/- was transferred to the Bank account of Jamini Enterprises, whose beneficial owner is petitioner Prem Prakash.
45. It has come in the complaint that present petitioner Prem Prakash and Punit Bhargav knowingly acquired the proceeds of crime and their knowledge about the forgery committed with respect to acquiring the above said property is evident from the fact that they 24 2025:JHHC:27891 acquired the property at a throw away price and that too without paying the consideration amount which was mentioned in the deed.
46. It is further evident from record that petitioner had preferred an application for discharge on 20.07.2024in connection with said ECIR Case No. 05 of 2023 in ECIR/RNZO/10/2023 registered for commission offence u/s 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 to discharge him from this case on the ground that the material brought on record by the prosecution against this applicant even if taken in their entirety, do not fulfill the necessary ingredients of the offences as alleged by the prosecution and in such view of the matter, there is not a single ground to proceed and frame charges against the applicant.
47. Per Contra thelearned State counsel vehemently opposed the prayer of the petitioner on the ground that, at the stage of framing charge only prima-facie material has to be ascertained and there are sufficient prima-facie clinching material was available on the record,as such charge has been framed against the petitioner.
48. The Spl. Judge PML Act while appreciating the rival contention has rejected the aforesaid discharge application of petitioner vide order dated 08.08.2024 on the ground that after going through these materials it transpires that accused/petitioner was a party with other accused persons in acquiring properties in fraudulent manner and selling those properties illegally to acquire proceeds of crime.
49. The aforesaid order dated 08.08.2024 has been assailed before this Court by way of filing the petition being Cr. Revision 1226 of 2024. 25
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50. During pendency of the said Criminal Revision, the charges have been framed against the petitioner vide order dated 04.02.2025 passed by the Spl. Judge PML Act. The said order dated 04.02.2025 has also been challenged herein by filing the petition being Cr. Revision 333 of 2025.
51. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues which require consideration are--
(i) Whether the orders dated 08.08.2024 and 04.02.2025 by which the application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed and charges have been framed respectively, can be said to suffer from an error?
(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not?
52. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are taken up together.
53. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties deems it fit and proper to discuss herein some of the provisions of law as contained under the Act, 2002 with its object and intent.
54. The Act 2002 was enacted to address the urgent need to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof including vesting of it in the Central Government, setting up of agencies and mechanisms for coordinating measures for combating money- 26
2025:JHHC:27891 laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.
55. It is, thus, evident that Act 2002 was enacted in order to answer the urgent requirement to have a comprehensive legislation inter alia for preventing money-laundering, attachment of proceeds of crime, adjudication and confiscation thereof for combating money-laundering and also to prosecute the persons indulging in the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime.
56. It needs to refer herein the definition of "proceeds of crime" as provided under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, 2002 which reads as under:
"2 (1) (u) "proceeds of crime" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property 3[or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country] 4[or abroad]; [Explanation.--For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence;]"
57. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that "proceeds of crime" means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country, then the property equivalent in value held within the country or abroad.
58. In the explanation it has been referred that for removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that "proceeds of crime" include property 27 2025:JHHC:27891 not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. The aforesaid explanation has been inserted in the statute book by way of Act 23 of 2019.
59. It is, thus, evident that the reason for giving explanation under Section 2(1)(u) is by way of clarification to the effect that whether as per the substantive provision of Section 2(1)(u), the property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property or where such property is taken or held outside the country but by way of explanation the proceeds of crime has been given broader implication by including property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.
60. The "property" has been defined under Section 2(1)(v) which means any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible and includes deeds and instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such property or assets, wherever located.
61. The schedule has been defined under Section 2(1)(x) which means schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The "scheduled offence" has been defined under Section 2(1)(y) which reads as under:
28
2025:JHHC:27891 "2(y) "scheduled offence" means-- (i) the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or (ii) the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or (iii) the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule."
62. It is evident that the "scheduled offence" means the offences specified under Part A of the Schedule; or the offences specified under Part B of the Schedule if the total value involved in such offences is [one crore rupees] or more; or the offences specified under Part C of the Schedule.
63. The offence of money laundering has been defined under Section 3 of the Act, 2002 which reads as under:
"3. Offence of money-laundering.--Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering. [Explanation.-- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that,-- (i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering if such person is found to have directly or indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or more of the following processes or activities connected with proceeds of crime, namely:-- (a) concealment; or (b) possession; or (c) acquisition; or
(d) use; or (e) projecting as untainted property; or (f) claiming as untainted property, in any manner whatsoever; (ii) the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.]"
64. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that "offence of money-laundering" means whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually 29 2025:JHHC:27891 involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money- laundering.
65. It is further evident that the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted property or claiming it as untainted property in any manner whatsoever.
66. The punishment for money laundering has been provided under Section 4 of the Act, 2002.
67. The various provisions of the Act, 2002 alongwith interpretation of the definition of "proceeds of crime" has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2022) SCC OnLine SC 929 wherein the Bench comprising of three Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has decided the issue by taking into consideration the object and intent of the Act, 2002.
68. It is evident that the purposes and objects of the 2002 Act for which it has been enacted, is not limited to punishment for offence of money-laundering, but also to provide measures for prevention of money-laundering. It is also to provide for attachment of proceeds of crime, which are likely to be concealed, transferred or dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any proceeding relating to 30 2025:JHHC:27891 confiscation of such proceeds under the 2002 Act. This Act is also to compel the banking companies, financial institutions and intermediaries to maintain records of the transactions, to furnish information of such transactions within the prescribed time in terms of Chapter IV of the 2002 Act.
69. The predicate offence has been considered in the aforesaid judgment wherein by taking into consideration the explanation as inserted by way of Act 23 of 2019 under the definition of the "proceeds of crime" as contained under Section 2(1)(u), whereby and whereunder, it has been clarified for the purpose of removal of doubts that, the "proceeds of crime" include property not only derived or obtained from the scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence, meaning thereby, the words "any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence" will come under the fold of the proceeds of crime.
70. In the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) as under paragraph 284, it has been held that the Authority under the 2002 Act, is to prosecute a person for offence of money-laundering only if it has reason to believe, which is required to be recorded in writing that the person is in possession of "proceeds of crime". Only if that belief is further supported by tangible and credible evidence indicative of involvement of the person concerned in any process or activity 31 2025:JHHC:27891 connected with the proceeds of crime, action under the Act can be taken forward for attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and until vesting thereof in the Central Government, such process initiated would be a standalone process.
71. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is proceeding to discuss the principle of discharge and framing of charge.
72. Now, after having discussed the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue of various provisions of the Act, 2002, this Court, is proceeding to discuss the principle of discharge.
73. It is well settled that at the time of framing of charge meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner.
74. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge, the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the 32 2025:JHHC:27891 prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge and at the stage of framing of charge minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made and even on a very strong suspicion charges can be framed.
75. Further it is settled position of law that at the stage of framing the charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material.
76. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, wherein at paragraphs no. 29, 32.4, 33 and 34 the Hon'ble Apex Court has been observed as under:--
"29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge.33
2025:JHHC:27891 It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.
32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. Ponmudi, (2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for rectification.
33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously.
34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid observations.34
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77. It has been further held in the case of Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148, that mini trial is not expected by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph no. 18 of the said judgment as under:--
"18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record."
78. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191. For ready reference Paragraph no. 11 of the said judgment are quoted below:--
"11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to. 11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the 35 2025:JHHC:27891 time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.
11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under :
(SCC p. 526) "25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court.
It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) 36 2025:JHHC:27891 '29. ... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.'"
79. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as under:--
"11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.
12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised.37
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14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7) "7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused."
80. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh v. Balvinder Singh, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of time.
81. Further it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course.Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it.There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High 38 2025:JHHC:27891 Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.
82. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, in the following words:--
"17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case"
and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.
30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression "there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence". This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of 39 2025:JHHC:27891 the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word "presume" while relying upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean "to believe or accept upon probable evidence"; "to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming". In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence.
83. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by the Court while considering an application for discharge of the accused personthe Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. However, while framing charges, the Court is not required to form a definite opinion that the accused is guilty of committing an offence. The truth of the matter will come out when evidence is led during the trial. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exist, the court would presume that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly and the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution.
84. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. 40
2025:JHHC:27891 The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as under:
"21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel 41 2025:JHHC:27891 truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."
85. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768, the above principles have been reiterated in para 17, 18, 28 to 31 and the Hon'ble supreme court has explained as to how the matters of grave suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs are quoted as under:
"17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following principles:
17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.
17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.
17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court.
17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, "cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial".
17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.
42
2025:JHHC:27891 17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.
17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. 17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.
18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, "the record of the case", used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).
28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the trial court to discharge the accused.
29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him.
30. However, what is the meaning of the expression "materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of the court's", which is not explained away? Can the accused explain away the material only with reference to the materials produced by the 43 2025:JHHC:27891 prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage?
31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him."
86. In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (supra), it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the words 'not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused' clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex-facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.
87. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held in paragraph 27 which reads as under:
44
2025:JHHC:27891 "27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge 14 and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution.
The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution."
88. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge.
89. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other 45 2025:JHHC:27891 words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the prosecution or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused.
90. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.
91. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and / or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.
92. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not?
93. It is evident from the prosecution complaint that the accused petitioner was a party with the other co-accused persons namely Afsar 46 2025:JHHC:27891 Ali @ Afsu Khan and others in acquisition of proceeds of crime in form of landed property admeasuring 1 acre situated at Plot no. 28. Khata no. 37, village Gari Chesire Home Road, Ranchi in the name of Punit Bhargav and Investigation reveals that Bishnu Kumar Agrawal has paid Rs. 1,78,20,000/- to the accused Punit Bhargav in his firm Shiva Fabcons. The amount was paid into the Bank of Baroda account no. 52580200000085 out of which as amount of Rs. 1,01,57,400/- was transferred to the Bank account of Jamini Enterprises, whose beneficial owner is petitioner Prem Prakash.
94. It has come in the complaint that accused persons Afsar Ali and Saddam Hussain connived with Prem Prakash for fraudulent acquisition/registration of this property. Prem Prakash then registered this property in the name of his very close accomplice and confidant namely Punit Bhargava, co-accused persons. The sale deed dated 06.02.2021 was executed in favour of Punit Bhargava for an amount of Rs. 1,78,55,800/- which was registered as document no. 2021/RAN/1016/BK1/906 in book no. BK1, Vol. no. 112 from page no. 369 to 506 the office of SRO, Ranchi.
95. The investigation further reveals that though the consideration amount in the deed between Imtiyaz Ahmed and Bharat Prasad and Punit Bhargava was shown as Rs. 1,78,55,800/-, but only an amount of Ra. 25 lacs was paid into the SBI Account no. 31100122501 of the dummy owner/accused Rajesh Rai on 12.02.2021.
96. It has come in the investigation on the instructions of the accused petitioner Prem Prakash, his accomplice Punit Bhargava further 47 2025:JHHC:27891 sold the said land to Bishnu Kumar Agarwal vide two sale deeds, both dated 01.04.2021, registered as document no.
2021/RAN/2784/BK1/2483 in book no. BK1, Vol. no. 316 from page no. 405 to 532 at the office of SRO, Ranchi for an amount of Rs. 1,02,60,000/-) and document no. 2021/RAN/2783/BK1/2482 in book no. BK1, Vol. no. 316 from page no. 261 to 404 at the office of SRO, Ranchi (for an amount of Rs. 77,40,000)
97. Thus, prima facie it appears that the present petitioner Prem Prakash and Punit Bhargav knowingly acquired the proceeds of crime and their knowledge about the forgery committed with respect to acquiring the above said property is evident from the fact that they acquired the property at a throw away price and that too without paying the consideration amount which was mentioned in the deed.
98. The said Punit Bhargav assisted by Prem Prakash and acquired the property in his name on instructions of Prem Prakash. The accused Prem Prakash mediated directly with the accused persons namely Afsar Ali, Md. Saddam Hussain and others and acquired property in the name of Punit Bhargav, out of an amount of Rs. 1.78 crores only 25 lacs were paid.
99. Thus, it would be evident from the material collected that the Prem Prakash and his associate Punit Bhargav both the persons are party to the activities connected with the proceeds of crime in formof immoveable property Cheshire Home Road, Ranchi having deed value of Rs 1.80 crores including its acquisition, possession, concealment used and projecting and claiming the proceeds of crime as untainted property. 48
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100. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that prima facie- material is available against the present petitioners, as such charges have rightly been framed under the Section 3 of the Act 2002 against the petitioner.
101. The learned counsel for petitioner has contended that petitioner is nowhere related to the alleged scheduled offence and further the petitioner has no knowledge of the documents that were allegedly forged.
102. In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in PavnaDibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement (Criminal Appeal No. 2779/2023) held that the who could commit an offence under the PMLA maybe not be named in the scheduled offence.
103. Further the offence of money laundering as contemplated in Section 3 of the PMLA has been elaborately dealt with by the three Judge Bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), in which it has been observed that Section 3 has a wider reach. The offence as defined captures every process and activity in dealing with the proceeds of crime, directly or indirectly, and is not limited to the happening of the final act of integration of tainted property in the formal economy to constitute an act of money laundering. Of course, the authority of the Authorised Officer under the Act to prosecute any person for the offence of money laundering gets triggered only if there exist proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the Act and further it is involved in any process or activity. Not even in case of existence of undisclosed income and irrespective of its volume, the definition of "Proceeds of Crime"
under Section 2(1)(u) will get attracted, unless the property has been 49 2025:JHHC:27891 derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The property must qualify the definition of "Proceeds of Crime"
under Section 2(1)(u) of the Act. As observed, in all or whole of the crime property linked to scheduled offence need not be regarded as proceeds of crime, but all properties qualifying the definition of "Proceeds of Crime" under Section 2(1)(u) will necessarily be the crime properties.
104. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pavana Dibbur vs. The Directorate of Enforcement (supra) has considered the effect of the appellant not being shown as an accused in the predicate offence by taking into consideration Section 3 of the Act, 2002.
105. Based upon the definition Clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Act 2002 which defines "proceeds of crime", the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe that clause (v) of sub- section (1) of Section 2 of PMLA defines "property" to mean any property or assets of every description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible.
106. To constitute any property as proceeds of crime, it must be derived or obtained directly or indirectly by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The explanation clarifies that the proceeds of crime include property, not only derived or obtained from scheduled offence but also any property which may directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence. Clause (u) also clarifies that even the value of any such property will also be the proceeds of crime. 50
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107. It has further been observed by referring the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors.(supra) that the condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of crime is the existence of a scheduled offence. At paragraph-15 the finding has been given therein that on plain reading of Section 3 of the Act, 2002, an offence under Section 3 can be committed after a scheduled offence is committed. By giving an example, it has been clarified that if a person who is unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime, in that case, he can be held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA. Therefore, it is not necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence. For ready reference relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:
15. The condition precedent for the existence of proceeds of crime is the existence of a scheduled offence. On this aspect, it is necessary to refer to the decision of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] . In para 109 of the said decision [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 166) "109. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence that can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. For, the expression "derived or obtained" is indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already 51 2025:JHHC:27891 accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a court of competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against him/her, there can be no action for money laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express language of definition clause "proceeds of crime", as it obtains as of now." (emphasis in original and supplied)
16. In paras 134 and 135, this Court held thus : (Vijay Madanlal Choudhary case [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] , SCC p. 182) "134. From the bare language of Section 3 of the 2002 Act, it is amply clear that the offence of money laundering is an independent offence regarding the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime which had been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to or in relation to a scheduled offence. The process or activity can be in any form -- be it one of concealment, possession, acquisition, use of proceeds of crime as much as projecting it as untainted property or claiming it to be so. Thus, involvement in any one of such process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime would constitute offence of money laundering. This offence otherwise has nothing to do with the criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence -- except the proceeds of crime derived or obtained as a result of that crime.
135.Needless to mention that such process or activity can be indulged in only after the property is derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity (a scheduled offence). It would be an offence of money-
laundering to indulge in or to assist or being party to the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and such process or activity in a given fact situation may be a continuing offence, irrespective of the date and time of commission of the scheduled offence. In other words, the criminal activity may have been committed before the same had been notified as scheduled offence for the purpose of the 2002 Act, but if a person has indulged in or continues to indulge directly or indirectly in dealing with proceeds of 52 2025:JHHC:27891 crime, derived or obtained from such criminal activity even after it has been notified as scheduled offence, may be liable to be prosecuted for offence of money laundering under the 2002 Act -- for continuing to possess or conceal the proceeds of crime (fully or in part) or retaining possession thereof or uses it in trenches until fully exhausted. The offence of money-laundering is not dependent on or linked to the date on which the scheduled offence, or if we may say so, the predicate offence has been committed. The relevant date is the date on which the person indulges in the process or activity connected with such proceeds of crime. These ingredients are intrinsic in the original provision (Section 3, as amended until 2013 and were in force till 31- 7-2019); and the same has been merely explained and clarified by way of Explanation vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019. Thus understood, inclusion of clause (ii) in Explanation inserted in 2019 is of no consequence as it does not alter or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all." (emphasis supplied)
17. Coming back to Section 3 PMLA, on its plain reading, an offence under Section 3 can be committed after a scheduled offence is committed. For example, let us take the case of a person who is unconnected with the scheduled offence, knowingly assists the concealment of the proceeds of crime or knowingly assists the use of proceeds of crime. In that case, he can be held guilty of committing an offence under Section 3 PMLA. To give a concrete example, the offences under Sections 384 to 389IPC relating to "extortion" are scheduled offences included in Para 1 of the Schedule to PMLA. An accused may commit a crime of extortion covered by Sections 384 to 389IPC and extort money. Subsequently, a person unconnected with the offence of extortion may assist the said accused in the concealment of the proceeds of extortion. In such a case, the person who assists the accused in the scheduled offence for concealing the proceeds of the crime of extortion can be guilty of the offence of money-laundering. Therefore, it is not necessary that a person against whom the offence under Section 3 PMLA is alleged must have been shown as the accused in the scheduled offence. What is held in para 135 of the decision of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1] supports the above conclusion. The conditions precedent for attracting the offence under Section 3 PMLA are that there must be a scheduled offence and that there must be 53 2025:JHHC:27891 proceeds of crime in relation to the scheduled offence as defined in clause (u) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 PMLA..
108. It has further been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent ED has heavily relied upon the statement of the Co-accused which has been recorded under Section 50 of the Act 2002 but it is the settled position of law which has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court that such type of evidence cannot be the sole basis in order to fix the culpability of the accused person.
109. It has further been contended that even the said view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the SLP Crl. No. 5416 of 2024 which has been preferred by the present petitioner against the order dated 22.03.2024passed by this Court by which the bail petition of the petitioner has been rejected.
110. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein that there is no dispute regarding the settled proposition of law that the statements recorded which are merely confessional in nature ought to be ignored while adjudicating upon a case as confessional statement of co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence and such statements can only be pressed into service when the Hon'ble Courts are inclined to accept other evidences. Thus, instead of placing reliance solely upon the statements of the petitioner and the other co-accused persons recorded under Section 50 of PMLA, the opposite party ought to have collected and relied upon other evidence in order to prosecute the petitioner.
111. Further herein it is evident from the prosecution complaint dated 01.09.2023, filed against the petitioner and other nine co-accused persons, is supported by substantial evidence gathered during the 54 2025:JHHC:27891 investigation and is not based upon solely on the statements of the petitioner and his accomplices. Furthermore, primafaciethere is ample evidence establishing the petitioner's involvement in the offence of money laundering, which is further corroborated by statements of witnesses in the instant case. Further, the petitioner's role has already been discussed herein in detailin the preceding paragraphs, therefore, the averments of the petitioner are unfounded and liable to be dismissed.
112. The learned Counsel has emphatically contended that the Hon'ble Apex Court while enlarging the petitioner on bail in SLP (Crl.) No. 5416 of 2024 has categorically observed in paragraph 43 that there is no material placed on record to show as to on what basis it is claimed that the beneficial interest in M/s Jamini Enterprises lies with the appellant. Hence, the statements relied upon do not prima facie make out a case of money laundering against the appellant.
113. Therefore, submission has been made that since the Hon'ble Apex has already observed that no prima facie case of money laundering against the appellant is made out as such the prayer for discharge of the petitioner is fit to be allowed.
114. Per contra the learned counsel for ED has submitted thatthe observation so made by the Supreme Court at the time of consideration of bail of the present applicant/petitioner is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present issue reason being that the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself has clarified that whatever observation has been made, that is for the purpose of consideration of the bail and the same shall not influence the trial, as such, submission has been made that the 55 2025:JHHC:27891 observation so made by the Supreme Court at the time of consideration of the issue of regular bail will not be applicable herein.
115. This Court in order to appreciate the rival contention has gone through the said order dated 28.10.2024 passed in SLP (Crl.) No. 5416 of 2024by the Hon'ble Apex Court. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the said order/judgment upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the parties are being quoted as under:
43. Moreover, there is no material placed on record to show as to on what basis it is claimed that the beneficial interest in M/s Jamini Enterprises lies with the appellant. Hence, the statements relied upon do not prima facie make out a case of money laundering against the appellant.
48. For the reasons stated above, while allowing the appeal, we set aside the judgment dated 22-3-2024 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Prem Prakash v. Union of India [Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLineJhar 745] . We clarify that the observations made in this judgment are only for the purpose of disposing of the bail application and they shall not influence the trial court, which would proceed in accordance with law and on the basis of the evidence on record.
116. From the perusal of the aforesaid paragraph it is evident that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clarified the issue that whatever observation has been made that is with respect to consideration of the issue of bail and observation so made will only be applicable for the purpose of consideration of the issue of regular bail in the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and that is the reason the issue has been clarified that the same will not affect the trial.
117. Further, it is evident that the observation which has been made by the Hon'bleSupreme Court since is with respect to consideration of bail within the parameter of consideration as per the provision of Section 56 2025:JHHC:27891 45 of the Act 2002 which contains the twin conditions for granting of the bail and has got no nexus with the subject-matter of the discharge. It needs to refer herein that the issue of dischargeis to be adjudicated with different yard-stick which has already been discussed by this Court at length in the preceding paragraphs, as such, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not fit to be considered at this stage.
118. So far as the issue of mens rea is concerned which is a state of mind and under criminal law, mens rea is considered as the guilty intention and unless it is found that the accused had the guilty intention to commit the crime, he cannot be held guilty for committing the crime, but the same cannot be assessed at this stage by this Court because same can only be adjudicated on appreciation of the facts, evidence and the documents which can only be appreciated in course of trial when the evidence will be led in this regard.This Court has found substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent as the issue of mens rea can only be assessed by appreciating the evidence either documentary or oral and therefore, we are of the view that the issue of mens rea, will not be proper to be looked herein.
119. Be it noted that the legal presumption under Section 24(a) of the Act 2002, would apply when the person is charged with the offence of money-laundering and his direct or indirect involvement in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime, is established. The existence of proceeds of crime is, therefore, a foundational fact, to be established by the prosecution, including the involvement of the person in any process or activity connected therewith. Once these 57 2025:JHHC:27891 foundational facts are established by the prosecution, the onus must then shift on the person facing charge of offence of money- laundering to rebut the legal presumption that the proceeds of crime are not involved in money-laundering, by producing evidence which is within his personal knowledge of the accused.
120. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma Versus Directorate of Enforcement and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 560 has observed that as established in multiple judicial pronouncements, cases involving economic offences necessitate a thorough trial to unearth the complete chain of events, financial transactions, and culpability of the accused, therefore the material submitted by the respondent, coupled with the broad legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the necessity of allowing the trial to proceed and not discharging the appellant at the nascent stage of charge framing and discharging the appellant at this stage would be premature and contrary to the principles governing the prosecution in money laundering cases, for ready reference the relevant paragraphs are being quoted as under:
"30. The PMLA was enacted with the primary objective of preventing money laundering and confiscating the proceeds of crime, thereby ensuring that such illicit funds do not undermine the financial system. Money laundering has far-reaching consequences, not only in terms of individual acts of corruption but also in causing significant loss to the public exchequer. The laundering of proceeds of crime results in a significant loss to the economy, disrupts lawful financial transactions, and erodes public trust in the system. The alleged offences in the present case have a direct bearing on the economy, as illicit financial transactions deprive the state of legitimate revenue, distort market integrity, and contribute to economic instability. Such acts, when committed by persons in positions of power, erode public confidence 58 2025:JHHC:27891 in governance and lead to systemic vulnerabilities within financial institutions.
31. The illegal diversion and layering of funds have a cascading effect, leading to revenue losses for the state and depriving legitimate sectors of investment and financial resources. It is settled law that in cases involving serious economic offences, judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised with caution, and proceedings should not be quashed in the absence of compelling legal grounds. The respondent has rightly argued that in cases involving allegations of such magnitude, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and to ensure accountability.
32. The PMLA was enacted to combat the menace of money laundering and to curb the use of proceeds of crime in the formal economy. Given the evolving complexity of financial crimes, courts must adopt a strict approach in matters concerning economic offences to ensure that perpetrators do not exploit procedural loopholes to evade justice.
33. The present case involves grave and serious allegations of financial misconduct, misuse of position, and involvement in transactions constituting money laundering. The appellant seeks an end to the proceedings at a preliminary stage, effectively preventing the full adjudication of facts and evidence before the competent forum. However, as established in multiple judicial pronouncements, cases involving economic offences necessitate a thorough trial to unearth the complete chain of events, financial transactions, and culpability of the accused.
34. The material submitted by the respondent, coupled with the broad legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the necessity of allowing the trial to proceed and not discharging the appellant at the nascent stage of charge framing. The argument that the proceedings are unwarranted is devoid of substance in light of the statutory objectives, the continuing nature of the offence, and the significant financial implications arising from the alleged acts. Discharging the appellant at this stage would be premature and contrary to the principles governing the prosecution in money laundering cases.
121. From perusal of case record, statements of witnesses, materials available on record and in view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that prima-facie sufficient materials are available on the record for framing of charge against the present petitioner.
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122. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 9 SCC 631 has observed that the revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.
123. Thus, it is evident that the revisional power can only be exercised to correct patent error of law or procedure which would occasion unfairness, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be compared with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.
124. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299 has held that interference in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is 60 2025:JHHC:27891 called for in the rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction.
125. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. R. Soundirarasu,(supra) has held in paragraph 81 to 83 as under:
"81. The High Court has acted completely beyond the settled parameters, as discussed above, which govern the power to discharge the accused from the prosecution. The High Court could be said to have donned the role of a chartered accountant. This is exactly what this Court observed in Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi [CBI v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi, (2021) 18 SCC 135]. The High Court has completely ignored that it was not at the stage of trial or considering an appeal against a verdict in a trial. The High Court has enquired into the materials produced by the accused persons, compared with the information compiled by the investigating agency and pronounced a verdict saying that the explanation offered by the accused persons deserves to be accepted applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability. This entire exercise has been justified on account of the investigating officer not taking into consideration the explanation offered by the public servant and also not taking into consideration the lawful acquired assets of the wife of the public servant i.e. Respondent 2 herein.
82. By accepting the entire evidence put forward by the accused persons applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability, the case put up by the prosecution cannot be termed as "groundless". As observed by this Court in C.S.D. Swami [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] that the accused might have made statements before the investigating officer as to his alleged sources of income, but the same, strictly, would not be evidence in the case.
83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a departure from the principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden will always lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offences charged and never shifts on the accused to disprove the charge framed against him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is that it is for the prosecution to establish that the accused was in possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources of income but the term "known 61 2025:JHHC:27891 sources of income" would mean the sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for the accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his hands. The onus in this regard is on the accused to give satisfactory explanation. The accused cannot make an attempt to discharge this onus upon him at the stage of Section 239CrPC. At the stage of Section 239CrPC, the court has to only look into the prima facie case and decide whether the case put up by the prosecution is groundless."
126. It requires to refer herein that the ambit and scope of exercise of power of discharge, are fairly well settled which has been elaborately discussed in the preceding paragraph and as per settled proposition of law no comprehensive assessment of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences need to be undertaken at this stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be undertaken at this stage. The only deliberation at the stage of discharge is as to whether prima facie case was made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not.
127. Further, it is well settled that the revisional power cannot be parallelled with appellate power. The Revisional Court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as is undertaken by the Trial Court or the Appellate Court.
128. Hence, on the basis of discussion made herein above, this court is of the considered view that, there is no illegality in the impugned orders dated 08.08.2024 and 04.02.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge, PMLA Ranchi in connection with ECIR Case No.05 of 2023 in ECIR/ RNZO/10/2023.
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129. Accordingly, this Court do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned orders dated 08.08.2024 and 04.02.2025, consequently, these criminal revision petitionsare hereby dismissed.
130. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Jharkhand High Court Dated:_10/09/2025 KNR/AFR 63