Mahendra Chinubhai Patel vs Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation

Gujarat High Court

Mahendra Chinubhai Patel vs Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation on 20 April, 2026

                                                                                                                    NEUTRAL CITATION




                            C/SCA/13726/2019                                      JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026

                                                                                                                    undefined




                              IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                               R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13726 of 2019


                       FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


                       HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

                       =============================================
                                   Approved for Reporting                       Yes             No
                                                                                 √
                       =============================================
                                            MAHENDRA CHINUBHAI PATEL
                                                     Versus
                                         AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
                       =============================================
                       Appearance:
                       MR HEMAL K ACHARYA(6021) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
                       MR KIRIT PATEL FOR MR HS MUNSHAW(495) for Respondent(s) No. 1
                       =============================================

                        CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

                                                          Date : 20/04/2026
                                                            JUDGMENT

1. Heard Mr.Hemal Acharya, learned advocate for the petitioner and Mr.Patel, learned advocate for the respondents.

2. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr.Kirit Patel, learned advocate for Mr.H.S.Munshaw, learned advocate waives service of Rule on behalf of the respondents.

2.1 With the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter is taken up for hearing.

3. The present petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs:

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined "(A) Be pleased to admit this Sp. Civil Application.

(B) Be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and or order and/or direction given to the respondent corporation to quashed and set-aside the GDEST Circular No.2765, dated 08.02.1989 as it is illegal and against the principle of Natural Justice and against the terms and conditions of the notification issued by the Govt. of Gujarat dated 23.02.1986 and further be pleased to direct the resp.

Corporation to put the petitioner in the Pay-Scale of Rs.1600-2660 (Old) at the relevant time i.e.from the date of issuing GDEST and further be pleased to direct the resp. corporation to pay the arrears amount with all consequential benifits to the petitioner w.e.f. 08.02.1989 with interest.

(C) Be pleased to direct the respondent corporation to quashed and set-aside the circular dated 08.02.1989 and further be pleased to grant all the legal benifits to the petitioner including Pay-Scale and other benifits as given to him prior to circular dated 08.02.1989 and further be pleased to grant all the arrears to the petitioner with interest.

(D) Be pleased to condone the delay to file this Sp. Civil Application as the reasons given in the petition and as the facts that the case of the petitioner is pending before the Honble High Court till April-2019 in the interest of justice."

4. As can be seen from the bare reading of the prayers that by virtue of this petition filed in the year 2019, the petitioner is challenging the GDEST Circular No.2765 dated 08/02/1989 issued by the respondent - Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the "Corporation"), whereby the petitioner is praying for the pay-scale of Rs.1600-2660/-. There is a huge and inordinate delay of around 30 years on the part of the petitioner in making the aforesaid prayers as the cause of action arose in the year 1989, which can also be seen from the petitioner's letter dated 08/03/1989 (Annexure- E, Page 20), and the present petition is filed only in the year 2019.

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined

5. It is the case of the petitioner that he was put in the pay scale of Rs.1600-2660/- by the Corporation, and without any prior intimation, his pay was substituted to Rs.1400-2300/- in the year 1989. The petitioner was made aware of the aforesaid decision by the Corporation in the year 1989, as can be seen from the aforesaid letter dated 08/03/1989 issued by the petitioner to the Corporation. It is an undisputed fact that till the filing of this petition, in the past, the petitioner never challenged the impugned decision of the Corporation before any court of law.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER :

6. Mr. Acharya, learned advocate for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner was facing two departmental proceedings in the year 1989 and as such, he was suspended by the Corporation; due to the long-drawn litigations faced by the petitioner, first before the Civil Court and then before the Labour Court, reached up to this Court, the petitioner did not think it fit to challenge the impugned decision of the Corporation at that point of time. It is submitted that once the petitioner received retiral benefits from the Corporation in the year 2018, as the Corporation was defeated in its attempt in questioning the award passed by the Labour Court, the petitioner decided to challenge the impugned decision before this Court by filing this petition. It is further submitted that there is no intentional delay on the part of the petitioner in not challenging the impugned decision at relevant time.

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined 6.1 By making the above submissions, Mr.Acharya, learned advocate for the petitioner would urge this Court to allow the present petition.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS :

7. Per contra, Mr. Patel, learned advocate for the respondent-Corporation, would assiduously submit that the present petition is hopelessly barred by delay and laches; considering the fact that the petitioner, though knowing fully well in the year 1989 about the impugned decision of the Corporation, thought it fit not to challenge it before this Court or any other competent Court of law, the petitioner has thereby accepted the impugned decision.

7.1 It is submitted that as per the additional affidavit filed by the Corporation dated 09/03/2026, filed on 11/03/2024, the Corporation has explained in detail as to how the petitioner was not entitled to receive the pay scale of Rs.1600-2660/- and the appropriate pay scale which was available to the petitioner was Rs.1400-2300/- and accordingly, all dues paid to the petitioner.

7.2 It is further submitted that while fixing the pay scale, an undertaking was also given by the petitioner agreeing with the aforesaid pay scale and as such, he never questioned the decision of the respondent Corporation before any court including not complained of getting less subsistence allowance during suspension period.

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined 7.3 Mr. Patel, learned advocate, would further submit that the petitioner was initially engaged by Naroda Nagar Panchayat in the year 1968 and the same Nagar Panchayat was merged with the respondent Corporation; accordingly, the petitioner was placed in the employment of the Corporation. At that point of time, the petitioner was serving as a Shop Inspector with the said Nagar Panchayat and when put in the services of the Corporation, he was appointed as Head Clerk, drawing the same pay-scale/salary as drawn by a Shop Inspector.

7.4 It is submitted that there is no illegality committed by the Corporation in reducing the pay-scale of the petitioner as, at the relevant point of time, it was wrongly fixed. In view of the undertaking given by the petitioner, the belated claim of the petitioner to receive higher pay-scale than considered by the Corporation is nothing but an afterthought.

7.5 Making the above submissions, Mr. Patel, for the respondents, would urge this Court to dismiss the present petition.

8. No other and further submissions have been advanced by the learned advocates for the respective parties.

ANALYSIS :

9. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and upon perusal of their pleadings and documents, it is an undisputed fact that the petitioner's pay was reduced by Page 5 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined the Corporation in the year 1989 and he was made aware of the impugned decision of the Corporation in the year 1989 itself, as can be seen from the letter dated 08/03/1989 issued by the petitioner to the Corporation. It may be true that the petitioner was suspended during that period of time in the year 1989 as he faced a departmental inquiry, and might have approached the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad and later on the Labour Court concerned, but it was well within the knowledge of the petitioner that his pay scale was reduced in the year 1989 itself. The present petition is filed in the year 2019 questioning the decision of the Corporation of the year 1989.

10. Ex-facie the present petition challenging the impugned decision is barred by delay and laches. The explanation forthcoming from the side of the petitioner is not conceivable, inasmuch as the petitioner, during the course of his suspension, must have received subsistence allowance on the basis of the pay scale which was substituted. Had the petitioner really aggrieved by the impugned decision of the Corporation, then he would have surely approached this Court at that point of time. If according to the petitioner, the pay- scale granted to him by substituting, was lower than the eligible one, the petitioner could not have waited for about 30 years. Nonetheless, the petitioner not thought it fit to question the same at the relevant point of time and sat tight till he was superannuated in the year 2016; and upon receipt of the entire service/retirement benefits in the year 2018, he thought it fit to challenge the impugned decision dated 08/02/1989 by way of this petition filed on 07/08/2019.

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined

11. It may be true that there is no period of limitation prescribed to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. At the same time, the law of limitation cannot be brushed aside by this Court and the discretionary relief which the petitioner seeks from this Court cannot be granted in favour of an indolent litigant who remained silent for years together for no valid reason.

12. At this stage, it would be apt to rely upon the decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Orissa and Ors. Vs. Laxmi Narayan Das (Dead) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. - (2023) 15 SCC 273, wherein, after noticing the previous case law, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed thus:

"23. Before applying the principles laid down by this Court on delay and laches. We deem it appropriate to refer the legal position.

24. In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152, it was laid down that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers Under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time, but it should be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers Under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for the relief.

25. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. - (2007) 9 SCC 278, this Court has opined that though there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. In the said case the Respondents had filed the writ petition after seventeen years and the court, as stated Page 7 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined earlier, took note of the delay and laches as relevant factors and set aside the order passed by the High Court which had exercised the discretionary jurisdiction.

26. In State of Uttaranchal and Anr. v. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and Ors. - (2013) 12 SCC 179, this Court, while considering the issue regarding delay and laches observed that even if there is no period prescribed for filing the writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet it should be filed within a reasonable time. Relief to a person, who puts forward a stale claim can certainly be refused relief on account of delay and laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights is bound to suffer.

27. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Ors. v. T.T. Murali Babu - (2014) 4 SCC 108, this Court opined as under: (SCC pp.115-17, paras 13 & 15-17) "13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and Ors. - AIR 1969 SC 329, the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp, (1874) LR 5 PC 221, which is as follows: (Balwant Regular Motor Service case -1968 SCC Online SC 54, Scc Online SC para 11)

11. ... "Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party Page 8 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."(Lindsay Petroleum Co. case, PC pp.239-40)' *** *** ***

15. In State of M.P. and Ors. etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors. etc. etc. AIR 1987 SC 251, the Court observed that :(SCC p.594 para 24) '24. ... it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ Under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.

It has been further stated therein that: (Nandlal Jaiswal case, SCC p.594, para 24) '24. ... If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.' Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.

16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay Page 9 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant "a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

17. ... A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons- who compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold."

28. In State of Jammu & Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri and Ors. - (2015) 15 SCC 602, this Court considered the issue regarding delay and laches while initiating a dispute before the Court. It was opined that the issue sought to be raised by the Petitioners therein was not required to be addressed on merits on account of delay and laches. The relevant paras thereof are extracted below:(SCC p.612, paras 27-

28) "27. The grievance agitated by the Respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim "Deo gratias - thanks to God".

28. Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ Petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserves to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ Petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present."

29. The aforesaid view was followed by this Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Chaman Rana, - (2018) 5 SCC 798. Page 10 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined

30. Subsequently, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India Ltd. and Ors. v. Shree Lal Meena, - (2019) 4 SCC 479, considering the principle of delay and laches, opined as under: (SCC p.498, paras 37-38) "37.We may also find that the Appellant remained silent for years together and that this Court, taking a particular view subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India Assurance Co. Limited, MANU/SC/0865/2011 : (2011)12 SCC 197 would not entitle stale claims to be raised on this behalf, like that of the Appellant. In fact the Appellant slept over the matter for almost a little over two years even after the pronouncement of the judgment.

38. Thus, the endeavour of the Appellant, to approach this Court seeking the relief, as prayed for, is clearly a misadventure, which is liable to be rejected, and the appeal is dismissed."

31. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. and Ors. v. Shyam Kishore Singh - (2020) 3 SCC 411, the issue regarding the delay and laches was considered by this Court while dismissing the petition filed belatedly, seeking change in the date of birth in the service record.

32. The issue of delay and laches was considered by this Court in Union of India and Ors. v. N. Murugesan and Ors. - (2022) 2 SCC 25. Therein it was observed that a neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires must stand in his way for getting the relief or remedy. The Court laid down two essential factors i.e. first, the length of the delay and second, the developments during the intervening period. Delay in availing the remedy would amount to waiver of such right. Relevant paras 20 to 22 of the above mentioned case are extracted below: (SCC pp.37-38) "20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches.

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy."

33. Finally, in paras 37 and 38, it was observed as under: (Union of India and others vs. N. Murugesan and others, - (2022) 2 SC 25), (SCC pp.51-52) "37. We have already dealt with the principles of law that may have a bearing on this case. ... there was an unexplained and studied reluctance to raise the issue.

38. ...Hence, on the principle governing delay, laches ... Respondent No. 1 ought not to have been granted any relief by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India."

(Emphasis supplied) Page 12 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined 12.1 It would be also apt to rely upon another decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others - (2024) 15 SCC 215, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:

"[11] For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and others, 2009 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:

"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.

57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, 1964 AIR(SC) 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261, Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Page 13 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined Court, 1967 AIR(SC) 1450 and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, 1992 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR

969). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, 1969 1 SCC 110, Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, 1969 1 SCC 185 and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, 1970 1 SCC 84).

58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose."

[12] It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. and another v. K. Thangappan and another, 2006 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder:

"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, 1969 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, 1874 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492 (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, 1967 AIR(SC) 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1969 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329. Sir Barnes had stated:

'Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by Page 14 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.'

8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, 1970 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470 that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-

makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.

9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, 1986 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction."

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined [13] Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu, 2014 4 SCC 108 has held:

"16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant--a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis."

(Emphasis supplied)

13. Having regard to the aforesaid dictum and its application to the facts of the present case, I am of the considered opinion that this petition is barred by delay and laches and therefore needs to be dismissed on this ground. This Court is of the firm view that no discretion can be exercised in favour of the petitioner, who remained silent for three decades and woke up as a Rip Van Winkle.

14. Apart from the said aspect, this Court has also gone through the additional affidavit filed by the Corporation in this petition on 11/03/2026 and service record of the petitioner including the undertaking given by the petitioner when he Page 16 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined received the benefit of the pay scale (Page 155). The relevant portion of the aforesaid additional affidavit needs to be referred, which reads thus:

"2. The Respondent most respectfully submits that the Hon'ble Court heard the proceedings of present Special Civil Application No.13726 of 2019 and passed an order dated 05.02.2026 and a copy of the order is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-A. It is humbly submitted that the petitioner herein was an employee of Naroda Nagar Panchaya, w.e.f. 01.12.1968. It is stated that the petitioner was employed by Naroda Nagar Panchayat and he worked there in different capacities. It is stated that the area of Naroda Nagar Panchayat was brought within the territorial limits of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation pursuant to a Notification issued by Government of Gujarat in its Urban Development and Urban Housing Department. It is stated that accordingly, the petitioner and others were taken up in employment of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation w.e.f. 01.03.1986. It is stated that the petitioner was taken up in employment as Head Clerk in Central Office. It is stated that an order dated 17.03.1986 passed by Deputy Municipal Commissioner (Administration) refers to his name as well as post of Head Clerk and a copy of the order is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-B. It is submitted that the petitioner was placed in the pay scale of Rs.1400-2300 meant for the cadre of Head Clerk of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and a copy of the order dated 08.02.1989 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-C. In other words, the petitioner was not caused any injustice qua pay scale and was treated at par with other employees of the cadre of Head Clerk of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.

3. The respondent craves leave to annex herewith photocopy of entire Service Book of the petitioner duly maintained by Naroda Nagar Panchayat as well as Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation as Annexure-D. The Respondent craves leave to pray that, if necessary, original Service Book may be permitted to be produced during the course of hearing in the interest of justice.

4. From a kind perusal of the Service Book, it would be clear that the petitioner was once given the charge of the post of Secretary, Naroda Nagar Panchayat and given a pay scale of Rs.700 - 40 - 1020 - 1200 - 50 - 1300 - 50 - 1500 w.e.f. 01.07.1982. It is stated that however later on the promotion was withdrawn by Naroda Nagar Panchayat pursuant to a resolution passed by General Body in its meeting dated 30.03.1983 with a Page 17 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined specific noting that the petitioner would be placed in the pay scale of Shop Inspector w.e.f. 01.04.1983 and the petitioner continued to discharge additional duty of Secretary. In other words, the petitioner was placed in the pay scale of Shop Inspector by Naroda Nagar Panchayat.

5. The Respondent most respectfully submits that the pay scale for the employees of the cadre of Shop Inspector and Head Clerk are same in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and therefore, as the petitioner was a Shop Inspector in Naroda Nagar Panchayat was taken up as Head Clerk in establishment of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and fixed in the pay scale of Rs.1400-2300, which was available to the employees of the cadre of Shop Inspector and Head Clerk. The Respondent craves leave to rely upon the orders passed by the respondent authority referred to herein above during the course of hearing. It is stated that accordingly the Service Book prepared and maintained by Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation referred to the entries of the pay scale of Rs.1600- 2660 and thereafter Rs.1400-2300 meant for the cadre of Head Clerk. In other words, the petitioner is not put to in any loss after he was taken up in employment of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. It is submitted that the petitioner was well aware about his status and pay scale and had never objected to it at the relevant point of time. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner has even signed the undertaking agreeing to the pay scale of Rs.1400-50-2300. It is submitted that however no decision was taken at that point of time.

6] It is stated that even the issue of pay scale and increments was also examined at length and copies of noting section as well as pay fixation of Rs.1400-40-1800-EB-50-2300 are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-E & F respectively. It is submitted that the pay scales of the petitioner were revised from time to time thereafter on that basis on implementation of the recommendations of the Pay Commissions. It is submitted that the petitioner who had accepted his pay scale had even referred to it while applying for leave and a copy of such Leave Application indicating his original pay scale of Rs.475-800 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-G. It is submitted that the said application dated 13.05.1986 refers to pay scale of Rs.475-800 and his designation as Head Clerk at Central Office. It is further stated that even the Form revising pay scale from Rs.1400-2300 to Rs.4500-7000 on implementation of recommendations of 5th Pay Commission is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-H."

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13726/2019 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined

15. After going through the service records submitted with the said affidavit by the Corporation, including the petitioner's undertaking, whereby he had given authority to the Corporation to correct pay scale and allowed the Corporation to recover excess payment made if any, the impugned decision cannot be found fault with. Moreover, the department note of the Corporation placed on record would suggest that there was some wrong fixation of pay of the petitioner by erstwhile Nagar Panchayat, which was corrected by the Corporation. Even as stated in said affidavit, while applying for leave in past, the petitioner had shown his pay scale Rs. 475-800/-, corresponding to the revised pay scale of Rs. 1400-2300/- as finalized by the Corporation as per impugned decision. Thus, in view of the aforesaid facts, the impugned decision does not call for any interference of this Court after so many years.

16. In view of the foregoing reasons, and considering the huge and inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in questioning the impugned decision dated 08/02/1989 of the Corporation, I am of the considered view that no relief can be granted in favour of the petitioner after so many years. Accordingly, the present petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as well as on merits.

17. In view of the foregoing conclusions, the present petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.

(MAULIK J. SHELAT, J) GAURAV J THAKER Page 19 of 19 Uploaded by GAURAV J THAKER(HC00951) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:21 IST 2026