Gujarat High Court
Mahendra Kantilal Panchal vs The Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad ... on 20 April, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8997 of 2021
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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MAHENDRA KANTILAL PANCHAL
Versus
THE MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER, AHMEDABAD MUNCIPAL
CORPORATION & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR C S MOHANAN(6814) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR HAMESH C NAIDU(5335) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 20/04/2026
JUDGMENT
1. At the outset, Mr. Naidu, learned advocate would state under the instruction that during the pendency of this petition, the amount of Rs. 79,050/-, a balance P.F. amount, is already paid to the petitioner. The said fact is confirmed by Mr. Mohanan, learned advocate. Accordingly, learned advocate for the petitioner, request this Court to adjudicate and grant the prayer - A made in para - 25 of the petition.
2. Heard Mr. C.S. Mohanan, learned advocate for the Page 1 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined petitioner and Mr. Hamesh C. Naidu, learned advocate for the respondent, at length.
3. Rule returnable forthwith. Mr. Hamesh Naidu, learned advocate waives service of rule on behalf of the respondent. With the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the matter was taken up for hearing.
4. The present petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs:
"(A) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus holding and declaring that the order dated 27-3-
2019 at Annexure-A, passed by respondent No.2, to the extent it denies arrears of difference of pay, arrears of increments and other benefits accrued to the petitioner during the period of suspension from 2-7-1998 to 19-3-2002 and for the period of dismissal from service from 25-3- 2003 to 30-6-2007 which period has been treated as period spent on duty and as in continuous service, by counting the said period notionally, is arbitrary, discriminatory and in violation of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India;
(B) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to pay the arrears of difference of pay and increments for the period of suspension from 2-7-1998 to 19-3-2002 and for the period of dismissal from service from 25-3- 2003 to 30-6-2007, which period has been treated as period spent on duty and as in continuous service, be paid to the petitioner forthwith with interest; and be further pleased to Page 2 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined direct the respondent authorities to pay the balance amount of Rs.79,050/- standing to the credit of the petitioner in his provident fund account; and also the amount of leave encashment for the remaining 60 days, with interest;
(C) Pending hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the respondent authority to pay to the petitioner the arrears of difference of pay and increments and other allowances for the period of suspension from 2-7-1998 to 19-3-2002 and for the period of dismissal from service from 25-3- 2003 to 30-6-2007 which period has been treated as period spent on duty and as in continuous service; and to pay the balance amount of Rs.79,050/- standing to the credit of the petitioner in his provident fund account and also the amount of leave encashment for the remaining 60 days;
(D) Be pleased to pass such other and further orders as may be deemed just and proper in the nature and circumstances of the case; and (E) Be pleased to allow this petition with costs."
SHORT FACTS:
5. The petitioner was appointed as a Sanitary Inspector with Sardarnagar Nagar Palika on 08.08.1974. The said Nagarpalika was merged with respondent - Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation") in the year 1986. The petitioner was promoted to the post of Sanitation Superintendent.
5.1. On 04.06.1998, the petitioner was booked under Page 3 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined offence under Sections 7, 12, 13(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Corruption Act"). The Corporation suspended the petitioner vide order dated 02.07.1998 which came to be reviewed on 19.03.2002, whereby the petitioner came to be reinstated in service.
5.2. The learned Special Judge found the petitioner guilty of the aforesaid offences, whereby the petitioner was convicted vide judgment and order dated 19.09.2002. The Corporation appears to have issued a final show-cause notice before termination of the petitioner and finally terminated his service vide its order dated 25.02.2003. At the relevant time, the petitioner unsuccessfully challenged his dismissal before the concerned Labour Court, Ahmedabad as his reference being LCA No. 758/2003 was dismissed by Labour Court vide its award dated 31.10.2012.
5.3. The petitioner appears to have challenged his conviction before this Court by way of filing an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 817 of 2002 which came to be allowed by learned Single judge of this Court vide its order and judgment dated 24.01.2017, whereby this Court has quashed and set aside the order of conviction. Since the petitioner's service was terminated by Corporation due to this conviction and as such, without Page 4 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined holding any inquiry, upon his acquittal from the aforesaid offence, the Corporation vide its order dated 27.03.2019 treated the period of suspension, i.e., 2.07.1988 to 19.03.2002 as well as date of his termination until his superannuation, i.e., 25.03.2003 to 30.06.2007, as spent on duty, thereby granted benefit of continuity of service. Nonetheless, the said period is considered notional to grant the benefits. Accordingly, the petitioner is paid retiral benefits like gratuity, pension, commuted pension, etc. 5.4. Thus, by way of this petition, the petitioner has questioned the aforesaid order as the period of his suspension as well as period from his dismissal until superannuation is considered as notional.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER:
6. Mr. Mohanan, learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that Corporation has committed gross illegality in considering the period of suspension as well as from dismissal till superannuation as notional. It is submitted that the petitioner is entitled to receive actual service benefit including pay and increments for the said period.
Page 5 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined 6.1. Mr. Mohanan, would further submit that issue germane in the matter is squarely covered by the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel & Ors. V/s. Municipal Commissioner, AMC dated 03.03.2017 passed in Special Civil Application No. 10548 of 2011 and allied matters.
6.2. Mr. Mohanan, learned advocate would further submit that during the suspension period, the petitioner was not allowed to resume duty and for no fault of the petitioner, he was remained under suspension for a long period of time which ought to have been reviewed by the Corporation at regular intervals. It is submitted that once the petitioner is acquitted by this Court from the aforesaid offence, the petitioner is entitled to receive all benefits during the period of suspension as well as after dismissal till his superannuation.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:
7. Per contra, Mr. Naidu, learned advocate for the Corporation has vehemently opposed this petition and relied upon the reply filed by the Corporation in this matter. It is submitted that Corporation has correctly considered the period of suspension as well as the period Page 6 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined from dismissal to the superannuation of the petitioner as notional because of the fact that the petitioner was facing serious charge of corruption and found guilty by the Special Court.
7.1. It is submitted that due to charge of corruption levelled against the petitioner being a Sanitary Inspector, the petitioner was required to be suspended and accordingly suspended by the Corporation. It is further submitted that the Corporation vide its order dated 19.03.2002 along with other similarly situated person reviewed the decision of suspension of the petitioner and accordingly reinstated him in the service and for the period of suspension, as per Rules, the subsistence allowance was also paid to the petitioner.
7.2. Mr. Naidu, learned advocate would further submit that there is no absolute proposition of law that in a case of acquittal by this Court, the petitioner would automatically entitle to receive the backwages, including full pay during the suspension period and other periods, as the case may be. It is submitted that whatever retiral benefits are available to the petitioner, all such benefits have been paid to the petitioner by the Corporation and as such, the claim of the petitioner is nothing but an afterthought as the impugned order was passed in the year 2019 and the present petition is filed in the year Page 7 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined 2021.
7.3. To buttress his argument, he would rely upon the following judgments:
(i) Banshidhar vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2007) 1 SCC 324.
(ii)Dr. Lalchand N. Jumani vs. Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai, dated 25.03.2026 passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 1137/2014.
(iii)Rajnikant Motibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, dated 13.03.2023 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 14507/2021.
POINT FOR DETERMINATION:
8. Having heard learned counsels for the respective parties and upon perusal of the pleadings, the following question is germane to my consideration:
(i) Whether, in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the
impugned order dated 27.03.2019 passed by Page 8 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined the Corporation, whereby notional benefits were granted for the period of suspension of the petitioner from 02.07.1998 to 19.03.2002 as well as for the period from the date of petitioner's dismissal from 25.03.2003 until his superannuation on 13.06.2007, is sustainable in law.
ANALYSIS:
9. The facts which are observed herein above are not in dispute. The petitioner during the course of service with Corporation came to be suspended on 02.07.1998 as he was booked for the offence under Corruption Act as aforesaid. The Corporation appears to have reviewed its decision of suspending the petitioner vide its order dated 19.03.2002, whereby petitioner was reinstated in service. But the petitioner having found guilty of the aforesaid offence, the Special Court convicted him vide its judgment and order dated 19.09.2002. Thus, service of the petitioner came to be terminated by Corporation on 25.02.2003 after following due process of law. The petitioner challenged his conviction before this Court by the Criminal Appeal No. 817 of 2002 which came to be allowed in his favour as the order of conviction passed by Special Court was quashed and set aside by the Coordinate Bench of this Court vide its order and Page 9 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined judgment dated 24.01.2017. Before passing the aforesaid order of acquittal, the petitioner reached the age of superannuation on 13.06.2007. Pursuance to the aforesaid development, the Corporation passed impugned order whereby it has decided to grant notional benefit for the period of suspension as well as from date of dismissal till superannuation of the petitioner.
9.1. The entire emphasis of the petitioner to receive actual monetary benefit for the period of suspension and from the date of dismissal till his superannuation is rest upon the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court passed in the case of Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel (supra).
9.2. Whereas, according to the respondent, the petitioner is not entitled to receive the full pay during period of sus- pension as well as from the date of his dismissal till su- perannuation. The Corporation has placed strong reliance upon the decision of Coordinate Bench passed in the case of Rajnikant Motibhai Patel (supra). It is true that prayers made by the petitioner before the Coordinate Bench in the said cited case is similar to the prayer made in this petition. It can be seen that decision in the case of Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel (supra) was also cited by the concerned petitioner in said case. Nonetheless, the Coor- dinate Bench has only placed reliance upon the decision Page 10 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined of another Coordinate Bench of this Court passed in the case of Meenaben Kantilal Shrimali, Wd/o. Kantilal Vashrambhai Shrimali vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in Special Civil Application No. 12740 of 2016, dated 31.07.2018, thus, the prayers made in that petition came to be turned down. Yet, the facts and the issue in the case of Meenaben Kantilal Shrimali (supra) is not as similar as in the present case.
9.3 Be that as it may, I have minutely gone through the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Sureshchandra Lalbhai Patel (supra). It appears that the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Banshidhar (supra) and other decisions refer to herein after were not brought to the notice of the Coordinate Bench of this Court and in that circumstance, the Coordinate Bench appears to have directed the Corporation to release all the benefits which could have been released to the petitioners, had they remained on duty. The law germane to the matter is by now well settled and will be discussed hereinafter.
10. Before further adverting to the issue, I would first like to observe that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Banshidhar (supra) has categorically held that there can be no hard and fast rule laid down in regard to grant of back wages. It is categorically held that each case has to Page 11 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined be determined on its own facts. It is observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in said decision that in the case of conviction, the delinquent is legally disabled to render his service to the institution and in such circumstances, if there is a refusal of back wages by the employer concerned and same is approved by the High Court, no error can be found. The relevant observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decision needs to be referred herein below, which read thus:
"[8] It may be true that the reason for long pendency of the trial or the criminal appeal filed by him may not be attributed to his acts of omission and commission but the fact remains that the entire period between 13.7.1976 and the date when he reached his age of superannuation he did not work. He was placed under order of suspension validly from 1976 to 2.10.1987. Legality of the order of dismissal on the basis of the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 25.2.1985 has also not been questioned. It is true that his services were dispensed with as he had been convicted in a criminal case involving grave misconduct. On his acquittal, he was to be reinstated in service. He has been directed to be paid his pensionary benefits. The entire period during which he remained under suspension, thus, would be considered for calculating his pensionary benefits. Continuity of his service has also not been denied to him. The only question which arises for consideration, as noticed hereinbefore, is as to whether in a situation of this nature back wages should have been granted to him.
[9] No hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to grant to back wages. Each case has to be determined on its own facts. A grave charge of criminal misconduct was alleged against him. He was also found guilty of the charges levelled against him by the Special Judge. The High Court while delivering its judgment dated 16.01.2001 in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 68 of 1985 inter alia held that the prosecution has not been able to prove that any demand had been made by him.
[10] It is now a trite law that judgment of acquittal itself would not have exonerated him of the charges levelled against him. He could have been proceeded against in a departmental Page 12 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined proceeding. [See Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore v. S. Mani and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 100 and Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 265] [11] Departmental proceedings, however, could not be held as on the date of passing of the judgment of acquittal, he had already reached his age of superannuation. The learned counsel may be right that the decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore involved the respective appellants therein on charge of murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, but, as noticed, it has also been laid down that each case has to be considered on its own facts. The High Court refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction having regard to the aforementioned decision of this Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra). We do not see any reason to take a different view. Grant of back wages, it is well settled, is not automatic. Even in cases where principles of natural justice have been held to have not been complied with, while issuing a direction of reinstatement, this Court had directed placing of the delinquent employee under suspension."
(Emphasis supplied) 10.1.Similarly, in the case of Lalchand N. Jumani (supra), the Division Bench of Bombay High Court has also felt that upon acquittal of a suspended employee, he may not be entitled to receive full salary as a matter of course. It is held that in the cases where the arrest and detention results in suspension in bribery cases, the employer cannot be saddled with financial burden of full salary and allowance since the suspended employee embroils himself in the prosecution. The pertinent observation in the aforesaid decision reads thus:
"15. Upon acquittal of a suspended employee, though reinstatement is guaranteed, payment of full salary cannot be an automatic consequence. It depends on facts and circumstances of each case. In cases involving criminal prosecution in respect of private affairs of the employee, who is arrested and was required to be suspended, his acquittal Page 13 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined cannot entail financial burden for the employer to pay him full salary and allowances during period of suspension. Also, in cases where the arrest and detention results in suspension in bribery cases, the employer cannot be saddled with the financial burden of paying full salary and allowances since the suspended employee embroils himself in the prosecution. On the other hand, in cases where the prosecution is lodged by the employer, say for offenses of fabrication of official records or for misappropriation of public funds, and the employee is kept under suspension, the acquittal in such case may entitle the employee to receive full salary and allowances since the employer is responsible for his prosecution. Thus, entitlement of a suspended employee to receive full salary during period of suspension upon acquittal depends on facts and circumstances of each case."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, the petitioner was booked under the offences registered under the Corruption Act and upon his arrest, as per Rule 5(2)(a) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules, 1971"), he was suspended by the Corporation on 02.07.1998. The sub-rule 2A of Rule 5 of the Rules, 1971 is inserted on 12.07.2007, thus, at the relevant point of time, it was not incumbent upon the Corporation to review its decision in regard to the petitioner's suspension within 90 days from the date of suspension. At the same time, the petitioner did not endeavor as not requested the Corporation to revoke his suspension. Nonetheless, it was felt by the Corporation to review the petitioner's suspension along with others, accordingly, the same was reviewed on 19.03.2002 and he was Page 14 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined reinstated in service. Once the Special Court found the petitioner guilty of the aforesaid offences, he was convicted on 19.09.2002. Therefore, it is discernable from the record of the case that suspension and dismissal of the petitioner was inevitable and not dehors the Rules, 1971. In fact, the petitioner did not challenge his suspension and as such, he failed in his attempt when challenged his dismissal before the concerned Labour Court, Ahmedabad as his reference being LCA No. 758/2003 was dismissed by Labour Court vide its award dated 31.10.2012.
12. At this juncture, it is apt to refer to the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein issue germane to this matter has been clarified.
12.1. In the case of Rajnarain v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2019) 5 SCC, it has been held thus:
"6. The decision of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore was followed by this Court in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh to refuse back wages to an employee who was initially convicted for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and later acquitted by the High Court in a criminal appeal. While refusing to grant relief to the petitioner therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal would not entitle an employee to seek back wages. However, this Court was of the opinion that if the prosecution is launched at the behest of the department and the employee is acquitted, different considerations may arise. The learned counsel for the appellant endeavoured to distinguish the prosecution launched by the police for involvement of an employee in a criminal case and the criminal proceedings initiated at the behest of the employer. The observation made in the Page 15 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined judgment in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh has to be understood in a manner in which the department would become liable for back wages in the event of a finding that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala fide or with vexatious intent. In all other cases, we do not see any difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings by the department vis-à-vis a criminal case lodged by the police. For example, if an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious."
(Emphasis supplied) 12.2. Likewise, in the case of Gurpal Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan reported in (2012) 13 SCC, wherein it has been observed and held thus:
"29. The only issue that needs to be resolved at this stage is as to whether the petitioner would be entitled only to the subsistence allowance as already paid to him or full salary and allowances, in view of his acquittal in the criminal case and the exoneration in departmental proceedings. Related to the aforesaid issue would be a consequential issue of notional promotion from the date an officer junior to him was promoted in the Rajasthan Judicial Service and the consequential entitlement to the emoluments on the promotional post, which in turn would determine the amount of suspension allowance and the retiral benefits.
35. We have examined the entire issue keeping the aforesaid principles in mind. In order to determine the issue relating to the entitlement of the petitioner to the salary and other allowance(s) upon reinstatement, the matter needs to be examined at the different stages/point of time. The first stage commenced at the time when the petitioner was initially suspended on 22-12-1985 w.e.f. 20-12-1985. The petitioner, in our opinion, cannot legitimately protest against his suspension, at the initial stage, when he had remained in police custody for more than forty-eight hours, though unfortunately for circumstances for which he was not responsible. This suspension was naturally continued when he was facing the trial for murder.Page 16 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined
39. As noticed above, Mr. Calla has submitted that the suspension of the petitioner should have been revoked at this stage. It will not be possible to accept the proposition that as soon as the trial court had acquitted the petitioner, the Rajasthan High Court was required to forthwith revoke the order of suspension. Undoubtedly, the petitioner could have been given a non-sensitive posting, not involving judicial functions. But, it was not imperative for the High Court to revoke the suspension, at that stage. It is a matter of record, that the prosecuting agency decided to file an appeal against the judgment and order passed by the trial court, acquitting the petitioner. The appeal filed by CBI was admitted by the Delhi High Court and remained pending till it was decided on 27-9-2005. Therefore, the conclusions recorded by the trial court, were not final. They were liable to be reversed in appeal by the High Court. Thus, during the said period/stage, it cannot be said that the continuance of the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified. Merely because the High Court could have revoked the suspension, would not render the decision to continue the suspension, wholly unjustified.
52. We, therefore, partly allow the writ petition. We reject the submissions of Mr Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was rendered wholly unjustified upon acquittal by the trial court. We also reject the submissions of Mr Calla that the suspension of the petitioner was wholly unjustified during the pendency of the appeal before the High Court. We, however, hold that the continued suspension of the petitioner during the pendency of the departmental proceedings was wholly unjustified. The petitioner is, therefore, held entitled to full pay and allowances from 27-9-2005 i.e. the date of the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court onwards. We further hold that the petitioner was entitled to be considered for promotion notionally from the date when an officer junior to him was promoted. We, therefore, direct the High Court to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion (if he otherwise satisfies the requirements as per the Rules) from the date when a person junior to him was considered and promoted to the next higher post. Let such a decision be taken by the High Court within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order."
(Emphasis supplied) Page 17 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined 12.3. It is thus evident from the ratio of the above referred decision that if an employee is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by the Court, unless it is found that that the prosecution is malicious. Similarly, in the second decision referred to, it was held that although the petitioner was found to be entirely innocent, the period of suspension during the trial was justified, as his suspensions was inevitable following his arrest in the criminal case. Accordingly, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the petitioner concerned is not entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of suspension.
13. Keeping in mind the authoritative pronouncement of law by the Hon'ble Apex Court cited supra, and having adjudged the claim of the petitioner, it is evident that his mere acquittal would not ipso facto entitle him to receive full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. It is not a case of the petitioner that launching of the prosecution against him in the Corruption Act, was at behest of the Corporation in any manner or malicious; rather, it appears that the petitioner faced such prosecution due to his own conduct while discharging his duty as public servant. In these set of facts and circumstances, I am of the considered view that the Corporation being employer cannot be mulcted with Page 18 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/8997/2021 JUDGMENT DATED: 20/04/2026 undefined liability to pay entire pay & allowances to the petitioner for the suspension period. Similarly, for the period from his dismissal until his superannuation also, the petitioner is not entitled to receive full pay and allowances, as he was legally disabled from rendering the service on account of his conviction for the said period. Resultantly, the arguments of Mr. Mohanan, learned advocate, cannot be sustained; rather, it must be rejected.
CONCLUSION:
14. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussions and applying the legal principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court cited supra to the facts of this case, I am of the considered view that the impugned order dated 27.03.2019 passed by the Corporation, whereby notional benefits were granted for the period of suspension as well as for the period from the date of the petitioner's dismissal until his superannuation, is sustainable in law.
15. In view of the foregoing reasons and having found that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality, this Court can reach only one conclusion; the petitioner is not entitled to receive full pay and allowances during the period of his suspension, nor for the period from his dismissal until superannuation.
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16. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J) SYED SHAHANAZ Page 20 of 20 Uploaded by SYED SHAHANAZ(HC02353) on Tue Apr 21 2026 Downloaded on : Tue Apr 21 23:24:31 IST 2026