Gujarat High Court
Velaji Pratapji Thakore vs Special Secretary Revenue Department ... on 29 September, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/4119/2025 ORDER DATED: 29/09/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 4119 of
2025
In F/MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 24074 of 2025
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VELAJI PRATAPJI THAKORE
Versus
SPECIAL SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT (APPEALS) & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR.DIPEN F CHAUDHARI(6740) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS NIDHI VYAS AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2
MR MC BAROT(144) for the Respondent(s) No. 3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE
Date : 29/09/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. By the present Civil Application for condonation of delay, the applicant herein seeks condonation of 10,399 days delay in filing the application for restoration. The application for restoration prays for recall of the order dated 07.01.1997 passed in Special Civil Application No.6827 of 1985, which came to be dismissed for non-prosecution on 07.01.1997.
2. Learned advocate for the applicant submits that the applicant was always under an impression that his writ petition was pending and he was not aware about the status of the matter. After coming to know about the dismissal of the writ petition, he immediately approached the advocate appearing for him and collected the relevant documents after which Misc. Civil Application along with present Civil Application for condonation of delay has been filed.
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3. Vide order dated 15.09.2025, the applicant was directed to file additional affidavit explaining the gross delay of more than 28 years. Accordingly, additional affidavit dated 22.09.2025 has been filed. It is stated in the additional affidavit that the petitioner was in constant touch with his advocate and it was informed to him in the year 2004 that the petition is pending for final hearing. That thereafter in February 2016, the petitioner again approached his advocate and it was again informed that the petition is pending. That thereafter in April 2025, the petitioner approached another advocate and he came to know that his writ petition has been dismissed for default/non- prosecution on 07.01.1997. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the application for restoration on 28.07.2025.
4. A perusal of the record shows that the revenue authorities have passed the order against the father of the petitioner in respect of the purchase of the land on the ground that it is in violation of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. The revenue authorities imposed penalty of Rs.50/- and directed that the land be restored back to the original owner. Aggrieved, the petitioner herein had filed revision before the Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department, which came to be dismissed on the ground of delay since the revision had been preferred after a delay of 2 years and 9 months vide order dated 25.09.1985. Aggrieved, the petitioner had filed Special Civil Application No.6827 of 1987 against the said order. This Court issued Rule on 19.12.1985. By order dated 07.01.1997, the writ petition came to be dismissed on the ground of delay since none appeared for the petitioner in the 1st and 2nd round in the first session and in the 3rd round in Page 2 of 5 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Mon Sep 29 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 29 23:15:07 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4119/2025 ORDER DATED: 29/09/2025 undefined the second session. The applicant has thereafter filed the restoration application along with the application for condonation of delay only on 28.07.2025.
5. In a recent judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shivamma (dead) by Lrs. vs. Karnataka Housing Board and ors. in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 decided on 12.09.2025, it has been held thus :-
"124. The burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon the party seeking condonation, and the court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona fide, and free of negligence. Sufficiency of cause is to be determined contextually, on the totality of circumstances, with due regard to the conduct of the applicant and the prejudice caused to the opposite party. The inquiry is not mechanical but principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona fides and diligence.
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126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.
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129. Delay by itself is not inherently indicative of negligence. In certain cases, unavoidable circumstances such as illness, fraud, miscommunication, or bona fide mistake may stretch over long periods, yet remain excusable if they are explained with candour and supported by material. Conversely, an unexplained delay of even a few days may reveal inaction or deliberate disregard of statutory timelines, and therefore disentitle the party to indulgence.
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131. The decisive factor is the adequacy of the cause shown, not the length of delay. What is critical is whether the party seeking condonation acted with reasonable diligence during the prescribed period and whether the reasons advanced demonstrate a genuine inability to file within time. Thus, the test is qualitative rather than quantitative.
132. This is not to say that the length of delay is irrelevant. A long delay naturally casts a heavier burden on the applicant to furnish cogent, credible, and convincing explanations. The proof required becomes stricter in proportion to the delay. The longer the time elapsed, the stronger the justification that must be put forth. Hence, length is Page 3 of 5 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Mon Sep 29 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 29 23:15:07 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4119/2025 ORDER DATED: 29/09/2025 undefined instructive in determining the degree of scrutiny, but it is not determinative of the outcome.
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140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay.
141. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain.
142. Another practical reason why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation is that it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting.
143. The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly across cases, regardless of the intrinsic strength or weakness of the claims involved. To import merits into condonation proceedings would effectively dilute this uniformity.
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258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the Page 4 of 5 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Mon Sep 29 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 29 23:15:07 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4119/2025 ORDER DATED: 29/09/2025 undefined substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
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6. In the present case, the only averment made in the condonation of delay application as well as additional affidavit is that the petitioner had once inquired with his advocate in the year 2004 after 7 years and thereafter he has inquired again in February 2016, i.e. after a period of 12 years and thereafter the petitioner has made inquires through another advocate in April 2025, i.e. again after a period of 9 years when he came to know that his writ petition has been dismissed for default on 07.01.1997. The conduct of the petitioner shows that he was not at all diligent in prosecuting his case. The same is not substantiated and are only bare averments. No sufficient cause is made out to entertain the present Civil Application for condonation of delay of more than 28 years.
The present Civil Application is, accordingly, dismissed.
(ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J.) KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN Page 5 of 5 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Mon Sep 29 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Sep 29 23:15:07 IST 2025