Gujarat High Court
Rajendra Ramnikbhai Pandya vs Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation on 26 September, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 11765 of 2017
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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RAJENDRA RAMNIKBHAI PANDYA
Versus
BHAVNAGAR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
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Appearance:
MR SHALIN MEHTA, SENIOR ADVOCATE with
ADITI S RAOL(8128) for the Petitioner
MR HS MUNSHAW, ADVOCATE for the Respondent - Bhavnagar Municipal
Corporation
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
Date : 26/09/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The present petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed by the petitioner with the following main prayers.
"19(A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, declaring the impugned order dated 28.10.2010 passed Page 1 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined by the respondent Corporation and the consequent recovery as bad in law, capricious, arbitrary, violative of the principles of natural justice and quashing and setting aside the same;
(B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order of direction, directing or commanding the respondent Corporation to refix the pay of the petitioner in the pay scale of Rs.8000- 13500 with effect from 01.08.2005 and grant all other consequential benefits with interest at the rate of 9% per annum;
(C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the present petition, Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the respondent Corporation to consider the case of the petitioner in light of the CAV judgment dated 16.08.2016 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Special Civil Application No.14370 of 2011;"
2. Heard learned senior advocate Mr.Shalin Mehta with learned advocate Ms. Aditi Raol for the petitioner and Page 2 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined learned advocate Mr.H.S. Munshaw for the respondent - Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation ('the Corporation' for short).
3. The brief facts, as stated by the petitioner, are epitomized as under.
3.1 The petitioner was initially appointed as Sub Auditor on an ad-hoc basis on 22.05.1989. He was made permanent on 01.04.1996.
3.2 He was promoted as Senior Auditor on 18.01.1997 in pay-scale of Rs.5500-9000 (old pay-scale was Rs.1640-2000) w.e.f. 01.08.1996.
3.3 The respondent - Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation has granted the benefits of higher pay scale to the petitioner under the Government Resolution dated 16.08.1994. Accordingly, the petitioner was granted the pay-scale of Rs.8000-13500, which is a pay-scale for the post of Deputy Chief Auditor, which is a next promotional post of Senior Auditor.
3.4 It has come to the notice of the respondent - Corporation, after about three years, that there is an error while granting the benefits to the petitioner under the G.R. Page 3 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined dated 16.08.1994. There is another Government Resolution dated 14.081998, modifying / clarifying the Government Resolution dated 16.08.1994, which has not been taken into consideration by the respondent - Corporation at the relevant time.
3.5 Accordingly, the respondent - Corporation has re- fixed the higher pay-scale vide impugned order dated 28.10.2010 and placed the petitioner in the pay-scale of Rs.6500-10500. The respondent - Corporation has also recovered the excess amount paid to the petitioner upto December, 2016.
3.6 It is this order impugned of the year 2010, which is challenged by the petitioner in this petition, that too in the year 2017.
4.1 Learned senior advocate Mr.Shalin Mehta with learned advocate Ms.Aditi Raol for the petitioner has submitted that the scheme of granting the benefit of higher pay scales introduced by the Government in its Resolution dated 16.08.1994, as adopted by the respondent - Corporation for its employees, is a 'safety net' to deal with the problem of stagnation on the same post and the resultant hardships faced by the employees due to lack of adequate promotional Page 4 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined avenues; and that financial upgradation under the scheme is given to the next higher promotional grade in accordance with the existing hierarchy of posts; and that the G.R. dated 16.08.1994 clearly stipulates that on completion of the stipulated period of 9, 18 or 27 years on a post, the holder of the post is to be given the pay scale of the next higher promotional post in the regular line of promotion, since the benefit of higher pay scale is given in lieu of promotion; and that granting of higher pay scale is linked to the next higher promotional post in the hierarchy of posts and not to the next higher pay scale in the standard structure of scales of pay; and that the posts which are part of a well defined cadre with promotional posts should be given the benefits of the scheme conforming to the existing hierarchical structure only; and that this Hon'ble Court by its CAV judgment dated 16.08.2016 passed in Special Civil Application No.14370 of 2016 upheld that the Government Resolution dated 16.08.1994 envisages grant of pay scale of the next promotional post of Deputy Chief Auditor, viz., Rs.8000-13500 to a person stagnating on the post of Senior Auditor; and that the said decision has decided the question of law and hence, the judgment in rem with the intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not; and that the impugned order dated 28.10.2010 passed by the respondent - Corporation ordering that the petitioner Page 5 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined is entitled to the benefit of next higher pay scale of Rs.6500- 10500 instead of the pay scale of his next higher promotional post of Deputy Chief Auditor, namely Rs.8000-13500, is contrary to the scheme of the State Government, as adopted by the respondent - Corporation for its employees, and thus, is illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside; and that three departments viz., Commissionerate, Audit and Secretariat are totally distinct and separate than the other set up of the respondent - Corporation; and that the petitioner was granted higher pay scale by order dated 05.04.2007 with retrospective effect from 01.08.2005 and the impugned order of re-fixing the higher pay scale is passed on 28.10.2010, therefore, the respondent - Corporation cannot take any action at this belated stage since it has become time barred; and that the respondent - Corporation cannot and should not recover the supposed overpayment made to the petitioner due to inadvertence on the part of the respondent - Corporation; and that for no fault of petitioner's, he cannot be penalized by way of recovery of what has been paid to him rightly by way of order dated 05.04.2007; and that the impugned order dated 28.10.2010 is without issuing any show cause notice or hearing the petitioner, therefore, it entails adverse civil consequences. He has submitted that this petition may be allowed. Page 6 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined 4.2 In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak versus Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 641 and State of Punjab versus Rafiq Masih (White Washer) reported in (2015) 4 SCC 334.
5.1 Per contra, learned advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw for the respondent - Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation has vehemently opposed this petition. He has drawn the attention of this Court towards the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent - Corporation and has submitted that at a very belated stage i.e. after about more than seven years of passing of the impugned order, the present petition is filed by the petitioner, which is not permissible; and that the petitioner is a fence sitter, watching the litigation filed by the other employees before this Court in the year 2011, waiting for the result and filed this petition, therefore, such action and/or approach of the petitioner may not be approved, that too at this belated stage; and that the order impugned was of the year 2011 in that petition which was challenged by the other persons in the year 2011 itself; and that the petitioner was fully aware about the error committed by the respondent - Corporation; and that the petitioner has rightly allowed a recovery; and that the petitioner has never objected Page 7 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined till the total recovery is made upto December, 2016; and that the petitioner has not challenged that action of the respondent - Corporation before any forum before 2017; and that the excess payment is recovered in the interest of public exchequer; and that the respondent - Corporation has rightly considered the G.R. dated 14.08.1998; and that the said G.R. dated 14.08.1998 was issued after implementation of the th recommendations of 5 Pay Commission w.e.f. 01.01.1996; and th that even G.R. dated 16.08.1994 passed on pay-scale of 4 Pay Commission provided that the first higher pay scale would be Rs.2000-3500 against the pay scale of Rs.1640-2990; and that as soon as the error came to the notice of the respondent - Corporation, the issue was examined thoroughly and it was decided to re-fix the pay scale of the petitioner and accordingly, the impugned order dated 28.10.2010 is passed; and that the petitioner has preferred Reference (IT) No.132 of 1999 before the learned Industrial Tribunal for promotion to the post of Deputy Chief Auditor carrying the pay scale of Rs.8000-13500, which was dismissed by the learned Tribunal on 06.09.2017 vide reasoned order, which the petitioner did not challenge before any higher forum till date; and that the respondent - Corporation is an autonomous body and all the departments have different work which is given by the respondent - Corporation for its smooth functioning, therefore, it cannot be said that the Page 8 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined Auditor, Commissionerate and Secretariat departments are different than the others and they are different entities. He has submitted that this petition may be dismissed. 5.2 In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of High Court of Punjab and Haryana versus Jagdev Singh reported in (2016) 4 SCC 267 as well as Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak versus Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 641.
6. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties. I have also considered the documents available on record. The picture which has emerged before this Court is as under. 6.1 Initially, the petitioner was appointed as Sub Auditor on ad-hoc basis on 22.05.1989. Thereafter, he was made permanent on 01.04.1996, pursuant to the order passed by this Court in the case of the petitioner and other similarly situated persons. He was promoted as Senior Auditor on 18.01.1997 in pay-scale of Rs.5500-9000 (old pay- scale was Rs.1640-2000) w.e.f. 01.08.1996. The respondent - Corporation has resolved to implement the Government Resolution dated 16.08.1994 with regard to higher pay scales w.e.f. 01.01.2000. Accordingly, the same was to be Page 9 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined implemented initially w.e.f. 01.01.2000 to 31.12.2005 and actual benefits were to be given w.e.f. 01.01.2006 as there was deliberation with the Unions in this regard. Accordingly, the respondent - Corporation has granted the benefits of higher pay scale to the petitioner. The petitioner was granted the pay-scale of Rs.8000-13500, which is a pay-scale for the post of Deputy Chief Auditor, which is a next promotional post of Senior Auditor. At the time of granting said higher pay scale, the petitioner gave an undertaking that he would abide by all the subsequent and relevant Government Resolutions / Notifications issued from time to time. 6.2 Later on, it came to the knowledge of the respondent - Corporation that an employee in the pay scale of Rs.5500-9000 was, as such, entitled to Rs.6500-10500 as the first higher pay scale as per the Government Resolution dated 14.08.1998. The said G.R. dated 14.08.1998 is issued th after the implementation of the recommendations of the 5 Pay Commission w.e.f. 01.01.1996. Therefore, as soon as this error came to the notice of the respondent - Corporation, the issue was examined thoroughly and it was decided to re-fix the pay scale of the petitioner and accordingly, the petitioner is placed in the pay scale of Rs.6500-10500 instead of Rs.8000-13500. Consequently, the respondent - Corporation has recovered the excess amount paid to the petitioner in Page 10 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined installments from 2010 to 2016.
6.3 The said action of the respondent - Corporation of the year 2010 was not challenged by the petitioner before any higher forum and/or authority till 2017 i.e. till filing of this petition, indisputably.
6.4 Instead, the petitioner has approached the learned Industrial Tribunal for getting promotion to the post of Deputy Chief Auditor by preferring Reference (IT) No.132 of 1999. The learned Industrial Tribunal has, after hearing the respective parties, vide its reasoned order dated 06.09.2017, dismissed the said Reference proceedings, on merit. Be that as it may. However, it is a matter of record that the petitioner did not challenge the impugned order of 2010 before any forum till 2017.
6.5 It is pertinent to note that the respondent - Corporation has also passed an order re-fixing the higher pay scale in the case of other persons in the year 2011. The said persons have approached this Court in the year 2011 itself by filing a petition being Special Civil Application No.14370 of 2011 and this Court has stayed the recovery in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rafiq Masih (supra) as well as the impugned order passed in their Page 11 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined case has been set aside vide judgment dated 16.08.2016. 6.6 The petitioner was a fence-sitter. He was watching the litigation filed by other persons noted above. It transpires that soon after that decision has come, the petitioner has approached this Court in the year 2017. Therefore, about seven years have been passed, that too without any explanation of delay.
6.7 Now, the petitioner is making hue and cry at this stage, that too after about seven years and more particularly, when the other persons, who are vigilant for their rights, have succeeded.
6.8 In this background, this Court is deciding this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with such averments as well as with such factual position. 7.1 At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh versus Arvind Kumar Srivastava reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 = 2014(0) AIJEL-SC 55837, more particularly paras : 23 and 24 thereof, which read as under.
"23. State of Karnataka & Ors. V/s. S.M. Page 12 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined Kotrayya & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 267 is, on the other hand, a service matter. Here, the respondents, while working as teachers in the Department of Education, availed of Leave Travel Concession (LTC) during the year 1981-82. But later it was found that they had never utilised the benefit of LTC but had drawn the amount and used it. Consequently, recovery was made in the year 1984-86. Some persons in similar cases challenged the recovery before the Administrative Tribunal which allowed their Applications in August 1989. On coming to know of the said decision, the respondents filed Applications in August 1989 before the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay and allowed the OAs. Appeal against the said order was allowed by this Court holding that there was unexplained delay in approaching the Tribunal. The Court relied upon the Constitution Bench case in S.S. Rathore V/s. State of M.P., (1989) 4 SCC 582, which deals with the manner in which limitation is to be counted while approaching the Administrate Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. Here again, on the ground of delay, the Court refused to extend the benefit of judgment passed in respect of other similarly situated employees.Page 13 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025
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24. Both these judgments, along with some other judgments, were take note of in U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. V/s. Jaswant Singh & Anr., (2006) 11 SCC
464. That was a case where the issue pertained to entitlement of the employees of U.P. Jal Nigam to continue in service up to the age of 60 years. In Harwindra Kumar V/s. Chief Engineer, Karmik, (2005) 13 SCC 300, this Court had earlier held that these employees were in fact entitled to continue in service up to the age of 60 years.
After the aforesaid decision, a spat of writ petitions came to be filed in the High Court by those who had retired long back. The question that arose for consideration was as to whether the employees who did not wake up to challenge their retirement orders, and accepted the same, and had collected their post retirement benefits as well, could be given relief in the light of the decision delivered in Harwindra Kumar (supra). The Court refused to extend the benefit applying the principle of delay and laches. It was held that an important factor in exercise of discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is laches and delay. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces into the situation, his writ petition cannot be heard after a couple of Page 14 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined years on the ground that the same relief should be granted to him as was granted to the persons similarly situated who were vigilant about their rights and challenged their retirement. In para 7, the Court quoted from M/s. Rup Diamonds & Ors. (supra). In para 8, S.M. Kotrayya (supra) was taken note of. Some other judgments on the same principle of laches and delays are taken note of in paras 9 to 11 which are as follows:
"9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal V/s. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538, this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows:
"The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Union of India V/s. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (195) 6 SCC 684. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage."Page 15 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025
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10. In Union of India V/s. C.K. Dharagupta, (1997) 3 SCC 395, it was observed as follows:
"9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi V/s. Union of India, OA No. 497 of 1986 decided on 17-3-1987, gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case. In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3- 1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief."
11. In Govt. of W.B. V/s. Tarun K. Roy, (1997) 3 SCC 395, their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows:
"34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 Page 16 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in State of W.B. V/s. Debdas Kumar, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138. The plea of delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law."
7.2 Under the circumstances, it would be relevant to fruitful to keep in mind the doctrine of laches. Derived from the Latin maxim "vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt", the doctrine operates to ensure fairness and justice by preventing individuals from taking undue advantage Page 17 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined of delays in litigation. Laches refers to the neglect or unreasonable delay in pursuing a legal remedy or claim. It is not merely about the passage of time but about the inequitable consequences that arise from such delay. The doctrine of laches aims to promote fairness by protecting defendants from stale claims. The doctrine of laches is an equitable principle rooted in the idea that, equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. It essentially bars a claimant from seeking legal relief if they have unreasonably delayed in asserting their rights. The maxim clearly defines that the law would only help the Court in the fast delivery of justice and not those who forget to claim their rights at the right time. The elements of the doctrine of laches have been satisfied by the petitioner that : (i) delay must be unreasonable at the time of bringing the matter, (ii) negligence in asserting a claim or right and (iii) knowledge of a claim by the petitioners in advance. 7.3 At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and Another versus Mamta Mohanty reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436, more particularly para : 54 thereof, which reads as under.
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention Page 18 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similary cas as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable time."
Under the circumstances, the petitioner has to give a reasonable explanation for the delay, which is not found in the present case.
7.4 It would also be fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak (supra), on which the petitioner is relied upon, more particularly para : 17 thereof, which reads as under.
"17. We are also inclined to grant interest to the appellants on the arrears at the rate of 7% per annum, which would be payable with effect from 1st September 2017. We have fixed the said date for grant of interest as the respondent-Corporation has accepted the interpretation of the Scheme rendered on 16th August 2016 in the Writ Petition preferred by Mukeshbhai Jaswantrai Joshi.Page 19 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined Normally, and as a model employer, on accepting the said decision, the respondent-Corporation should have uniformly applied and granted the benefit to all its similarly situated employees affected by the order dated 28th October 2010. This would have avoided unnecessary litigation before the courts, as was held in State of Uttar Pradesh and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others, (2015) 1 SCC 347:
"22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.Page 20 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to Page 21 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject- matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." "
8. Further, consequent to the impugned order, the respondent - Corporation has made a recovery of the excess amount inadvertently paid to the petitioner. The respondent - Corporation has recovered the said excess amount from the year 2010 to 2016 in the installments. The petitioner did not challenge the said action of the respondent - Corporation, Page 22 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined though fully aware, for seven years, indisputably and now, he approached this Court with a prayer to set aside the said impugned order of the year 2010, consequently, a recovery order. At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of High Court of Punjab and Haryana versus Jagdev Singh reported in 2016 (0) AIJEL-SC 58951 = (2016) 4 SCC 267, more particularly, paras : 8, 9, 11 and 12 thereof, which read as under.
"8. The order of the High Court has been challenged in these proceedings. From the record of the proceedings, it is evident that when the Respondent opted for the revised pay scale, he furnished an undertaking to the effect that he would be liable to refund any excess payment made to him. In the counter affidavit which has been filed by the Respondent in these proceedings, this position has been specifically admitted. Subsequently, when the rules were revised and notified on 7 May 2003 it was found that a payment in excess had been made to the Respondent. On 18 February 2004, the excess payment was sought to be recovered in terms of the undertaking.Page 23 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025
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9. The submission of the Respondent, which found favour with the High Court, was that a payment which has been made in excess cannot be recovered from an employee who has retired from the service of the state. This, in our view, will have no application to a situation such as the present where an undertaking was specifically furnished by the officer at the time when his pay was initially revised accepting that any payment found to have been made in excess would be liable to be adjusted. While opting for the benefit of the revised pay scale, the Respondent was clearly on notice of the fact that a future re-fixation or revision may warrant an adjustment of the excess payment, if any, made.
11. The principle enunciated in proposition
(ii) above cannot apply to a situation such as in the present case. In the present case, the officer to whom the payment was made in the first instance was clearly placed on notice that any payment found to have been made in excess would be required to be refunded. The officer furnished an undertaking while opting for the revised pay Page 24 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined scale. He is bound by the undertaking.
12. For these reasons, the judgment of the High Court which set aside the action for recovery is unsustainable. However, we are of the view that the recovery should be made in reasonable installments. We direct that the recovery be made in equated monthly installments spread over a period of two years."
9. Further, the petitioner was granted higher pay scale by the respondent Corporation considering the G.R. dated 16.08.1994. In the said G.R., the provisions for extending benefit of higher pay scale is there and the respondent - Corporation has extended the same to the petitioner. From the affidavit in reply, it transpires that the respondent - Corporation has inadvertently extended the said higher pay scale and the G.R. dated 14.08.1998 was not considered at the relevant point of time. The G.R. dated th 14.08.1998 is subsequent to the effect of the 5 Pay Commission i.e. 01.01.1996.
10. Further, at this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the schedule attached to the G.R. dated 14.08.1998, for more clarity, which is as under.
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NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined Sr. Revised Pay Scale Receivable Higher Pay No. w.e.f. 01.01.1996 (Rs.) Scale w.e.f. 01.01.1996 (Rs.)
1. 2550-3200 2610-3540
2. 2610-3540 2650-4000
3. 2650-4000 3050-4590
4. 2750-4400 3200-4900
5. 3050-4500 4000-6000
6. 3200-4900 4000-6000
7. 3050-4590 4000-6000
8. 4000-6000 4500-7000
9. 4500-7000 5000-8000
10. 5000-8000 5500-9000
11. 5500-9000 6500-10500
12. 5655-9155 6500-10500
13. 6500-10500 8000-13500 From above, it transpires that there is no higher pay scale fixed by the Government in the revised G.R. dated 14.08.1998 from 5500-9000 to 8000-13500. We cannot read the G.R. dated 16.08.1994 in isolation. Since the Government, after appropriate deliberation, issued another G.R. dated 14.08.1998 which is in consonance with the G.R. dated 16.08.1994 and modifying the G.R. dated 16.08.1994, we Page 26 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined should read both the Government Resolutions i.e. 16.08.1994 and 14.08.1998 conjointly.
11. Further, while accepting the higher pay scale of Rs.8000-13500, the petitioner has given Undertaking before the respondent - Corporation that all the subsequent Government Resolutions, Notifications, Instructions of the Government shall be followed by him. In the present case, initially, the respondent - Corporation has given the benefits of the higher pay scale of Rs.8000-13500 as per G.R. dated 16.08.1994. The respondent has come to the knowledge about the inadvertent error and therefore, as per the G.R. dated 14.08.1998, the higher pay scale of the petitioner has been re-fixed and excess amount paid to the petitioner has been ordered to be recovered by the respondent - Corporation vide impugned order dated 28.10.2010. The Government has issued the said G.R. dated 14.08.1998 to clarify or to modify the errors of the G.R. dated 16.08.1994. The respondent - Corporation has to follow the said G.R. dated 14.08.1998 scrupulously. Therefore, soon after coming to the knowledge about the inadvertent error, the respondent - Corporation has corrected the said inadvertent error and re-fixed the pay scale of the petitioner.
12.1 At this stage, the doctrine of approbate and Page 27 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined reprobate needs to be kept in mind. This doctrine is based on the maxim 'quod approbo non reprobo', which means that, 'which I approve, I cannot disapprove' or it can also be inferred as 'one cannot eat a cake and have it too'. In other words, one cannot blow hot and cold by both; accepting and rejecting the same. In the present case, the petitioner has received the benefits of higher pay scale as per G.R. dated 16.08.1994 and on the other hand, when the Government has modified and/or amended the said G.R. dated 16.08.1994 vide its another G.R. dated 14.08.1998 and the Corporation has given the effect of the subsequent G.R., which is in fact second part of the first G.R., the petitioner started hue and cry. At the time of receiving the benefits of higher pay scale, the petitioner has given Undertaking that the subsequent G.Rs., Notifications, Instructions of the Government in this regard will be binding to him.
12.2 At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf versus M/s. Badam Balakrishna Hotel Pvt. Ltd., & Others reported in 2023 INSC 949, more particularly para : 15 thereof, which reads as under :
"15. The conduct of a party assumes significance. If a party is likely to have an Page 28 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined undue advantage, despite the availability of an opportunity to raise a plea of lack of jurisdiction at an earlier point of time, it should not be permitted to do so during the execution proceedings. In other words, a plaintiff shall not be made to suffer by the passive act of the defendant in submitting to the jurisdiction. One has to see the consequence while taking note of the huge pendency of the cases before various Courts in the country. There is no gainsaying that but for the adverse decree suffered, a judgment-debtor would not have ventured to raise such a plea. It is clearly a case of an afterthought to suit his convenience. He cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate. Though we are conscious about the earlier precedents dealing with the stage at which such a plea can be raised, much water has flown under the bridge in terms of the ground reality. Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25, "Approbate and reprobate
26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the Page 29 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally.Page 30 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined
27. We would like to quote the following judgments for better appreciation and understanding of the said principle:
27.1. Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [ Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, 1956 SCR 451 : AIR 1956 SC 593 ] : (AIR pp.
601-02, para 23) "23. But it is argued by Sri Krishnaswami Ayyangar that as the proceedings in OS. No. 92 of 1938-39 are relied on as barring the plea that the decree and sale in OS. No. 100 of 1919-20 are not collusive, not on the ground of res judicata or estoppel but on the principle that a person cannot both approbate and reprobate. It is immaterial that the present appellants were not parties thereto, and the decision in Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co.
Ltd. [(1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)] , and in particular, the observations of Scrutton, LJ., at p. 611 were quoted in support of this position. There, the facts were Page 31 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined that an agent delivered goods to the customer contrary to the instructions of the principal, who thereafter filed a suit against the purchaser for price of goods and obtained a decree.
Not having obtained satisfaction, the principal next filed a suit against the agent for damages on the ground of negligence and breach of duty. It was held that such an action was barred.
The ground of the decision is that when on the same facts, a person has the right to claim one of two reliefs and with full knowledge he elects to claim one and obtains it, it is not open to him thereafter to go back on his election and claim the alternative relief. The principle was thus stated by Bankes, L.J. : (Verschures Creameries Ltd. case [(1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)] , KB p. 611) ... Having elected to treat the delivery to him as an authorised delivery they cannot treat the same act as a misdelivery. To do so would be to Page 32 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined approbate and reprobate the same act. The observations of Scrutton, L.J. on which the appellants rely are as follows :
(Verschures Creameries Ltd. case [(1921) 2 KB 608 (CA)], KB pp. 611-12) ... A plaintiff is not permitted to "approbate and reprobate". The phrase is apparently borrowed from the Scotch law, where it is used to express the principle embodied in our doctrine of election - namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument :
Ker v. Wauchope [(1819) 1 Bligh PC 1 at p. 21 : 4 ER 1 at p. 8] : Douglas- Menzies v. Umphelby [1908 AC 224 at p. 232 (PC)]. The doctrine of election is not however confined to instruments. A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. That is to approbate and reprobate the transaction.Page 33 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined It is clear from the above observations that the maxim that a person cannot "approbate and reprobate" is only one application of the doctrine of election, and that its operation must be confined to reliefs claimed in respect of the same transaction and to the persons who are parties thereto. The law is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XIII, p. 464, para 512 :
On the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate, a species of estoppel has arisen which seems to be intermediate between estoppel by record and estoppel in pais, and may conveniently be referred to here. Thus a party cannot, after taking advantage under an order (e.g. payment of costs), be heard to say that it is invalid and ask to set it aside, or to set up to the prejudice of persons who have relied upon it a case inconsistent with that upon which it was founded; nor will he be allowed to go behind an order made in ignorance of the true facts to the prejudice of third parties Page 34 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined who have acted on it.
27.2. State of Punjab v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu [(2014) 15 SCC 144] : (SCC pp.
15354, paras 22-23 & 25-26) "22. The doctrine of "approbate and reprobate" is only a species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute. (Vide CIT v. MR. P. Firm Muar [AIR 1965 SC 1216].)
23. It is settled proposition of law that once an order has been passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party and derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on any ground. (Vide Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [AIR 1969 SC 329] ). In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir [(1992) 4 SCC 683] this Court has observed as under :
( R.N. Gosain case [(1992) 4 SCC
683], SCC pp. 687-88, para 10)
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NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025
undefined
'10. Law does not permit a
person to both approbate and
reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage.' ***
25. The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. [(2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153], made an observation that a party cannot be permitted to "blow hot and cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or Page 36 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience.
26. It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel, the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when he has to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had."
27.3. Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v.
Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. [(2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153] : (SCC pp. 480-81, paras 15-16) Page 37 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined "I. Approbate and reprobate
15. A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot-blow cold", "fast and loose"
or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the binding effect of such contract, or conveyance, or order upon himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the principles of what is right and of good conscience. [Vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [1956 SCR 451 : AIR 1956 SC 593], CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar [ AIR 1965 SC 1216], Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement [(2008) 14 SCC 58 :
(2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 706], Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD [(2011) 5 SCC 270 :
(2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 712], Cauvery
Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources
(International) Co. Ltd. [(2011) 10 SCC 420 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 685] and V. Page 38 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer [(2012) 12 SCC 133 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 136 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 587 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 416].
16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel-the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had." (emphasis supplied)"
13. Further, it is required to be noted here that the decision of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No.14370 of 2011, on which, the petitioner relies upon and harps on it, would not be applicable to the petitioner, since there is no reference regarding G.R. dated 14.08.1998. In the present case, the respondent - Corporation has, on the basis of the said G.R. dated 14.08.1998, by which the Government Page 39 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined has modified that G.R. dated 16.04.1998, passed the impugned order. At this stage, it would be fruitful to refer to the averments taken by the respondent - Corporation in the affidavit in reply, more particularly paras : 5 to 7 thereof, which read as under.
"5. The respondent humbly submits that at a later point of time it came to light that an employee in the pay scale of Rs.5500- 9000 was as such entitled to Rs.6500-10500 as first higher pay scale as per the G.R. dated 14.08.1998 and copies of Resolution as well as Annexure / Schedule are annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-B collectively. It is pertinent to note that the same were issued after implementation of the recommendation of 5th Pay Commission with effect from 01.01.1996. The respondent craves leave to add that even Resolution dated 16.08.1994 passed on pay scale of 4 th Pay Commission provided that the first higher pay scale would be Rs.2000-3500 against the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 and a copy of Schedule is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-C.
6. The respondent humbly submits that Page 40 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined as soon as this error came to the notice of the authority in the case of present petitioner as well as other employees, the issue was examined thoroughly and it was decided to re-fix the pay scale of the petitioner and others and accordingly through order dated 28.10.2010 (sic. 28.10.2017) the petitioner is placed in the pay scale of Rs.6500-10500 instead of Rs.8000-13500 and a copy of the order is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-D. The respondent submits that a recovery of excess payment was also ordered from the arrears payable to the concerned employees on implementation of 6th Pay Commission recommendation and a copy of order is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-E.
7. The respondent submits that said order was implemented immediately and a recovery of Rs.1,39,625/- was made from the arrears payable to the petitioner on revision of pay as per the recommendation of 6 th Pay Commission. It is stated that the petitioner herein is rightly allowed the authority to recover the said amount at the relevant point of time and never objected till the Page 41 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined total recovery is made upto December, 2016. In other words, the petitioner who was fully aware about the error committed by the authority rightly allowed a recovery."
14. It is noted that there is no doubt that the petitioner is not entitled to the first higher pay scale in the post of Senior Auditor. Therefore, the respondent - Corporation has rightly granted the first higher pay scale to the petitioner and that too as per the Government Resolutions dated 16.08.1994 and 14.08.1998. Therefore, this Court finds that there is no ambiguity in the impugned order passed by the respondent - Corporation.
15. Further, it is noted that this Court has, while admitting the matter vide order dated 23.06.2017, not granted any interim relief qua the recovery as well as qua the re- fixation of higher pay scale of Rs.8000-13500 to the petitioner.
16. There cannot be any dispute with regard to the law enunciated in the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as of this Court relied upon by the learned advocate for the petitioner, however, it cannot be helpful to the petitioner any further in view of the facts and circumstances of the Page 42 of 43 Uploaded by M.H. DAVE(HC00193) on Tue Sep 30 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Sep 30 22:32:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/11765/2017 JUDGMENT DATED: 26/09/2025 undefined present case. The present case does not fall within the purview of these decisions with such facts. Therefore, the present petitioner deserves to be dismissed as meritless.
17. In view of above and under the circumstances, the action of the respondent - Corporation is just and proper. There is no illegality committed by the respondent - Corporation in passing the impugned order. No fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India have been violated by the respondent - Corporation. The respondent - Corporation has consequently rightly recovered the amount paid in excess to the petitioner inadvertently, which is even otherwise a public exchequer. There is no merit in the present petition. This petition, therefore, needs to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as well as on merit also.
18. For the reasons recorded above, the present petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated.
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