Gujarat High Court
Shanti Business School (Managed By ... vs State Of Gujarat on 15 September, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/2442/2024 ORDER DATED: 15/09/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 2442 of
2024
In F/MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 14519 of 2024
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SHANTI BUSINESS SCHOOL (MANAGED BY CHIRIPAL CHARITABLE
TRUST)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR DHAVAL DAVE, SR. COUNSEL with MR SHAIVAL M PATEL(9950) for
the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR MAYANK CHAVDA AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR AUM M KOTWAL(7320) for the Respondent(s) No. 10,11,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE
Date : 15/09/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. The applicant most humbly and respectfully prays as under:-
"(A) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 584 days in filing an application for recalling the order dated 25/08/2022 passed in Special Civil Application No. 12275 of 2016.
(B) Such other and further relief/s may be granted in the interest of justice."
2. The applicant herein (Original Petitioner) had filed Special Civil Application No.12275 of 2016 before this Court for quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 04/05/2016 passed by the opponent No.1 (Original Respondent No.1 herein) imposing penalty upon the applicant of refunding 1.5 times fees collected from the students pursuing their studies for BBA Program offered by the Applicant as a study center of Dr. C. V. Raman University.
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3. The applicant states that in Special Civil Application No. 12275 of 2016, this Court issued notice on 21.07.2016 and subsequently, Civil Application No.8485 of 2016 filed by Opponent Nos.3 to 11 for joining them as party Respondents came to be allowed by order dated 14.09.2016. Thereafter, Rule was issued on 27.11.2019. It is further stated that after issuance of Rule, the Advocate for the Applicant was elevated to the Bench of this Court and, accordingly, notice dated 24.11.2021 was served upon the Applicant to engage another Advocate. However, no steps could be taken to appoint a new Advocate, and consequently, by the order of this Court, the petition came to be dismissed for non-prosecution on 25.08.2022. The lapse came to the knowledge of the Applicant only when order dated 26.03.2024 in Special Civil Application No.4896 of 2024 (preferred by Opponent Nos.6 to 9 for compliance of the Impugned Order dated 04.05.2016) was served upon the Applicant.
4. Ld. Senior counsel Mr. Dhaval Dave with Mr. Shaival Patel appearing for petitioner stated that the delay caused in filing the present Miscellaneous Civil Application is not intentional. The said delay was not attributable to the Applicant. The delay caused in filing the present Miscellaneous Civil Application would cause serious prejudice to the Applicant, if the same is not condoned and the Applicant would suffer irreparable loss and injury. He, therefore, prays to condone the delay caused in filing the present Application.
5. Per contra, Ld. Counsel Mr. Aum Kotwal appearing for respondents Nos.3 to 11 stated that the delay condonation application is not having sufficient cause and citing mere excuse of administrative lapse may not help the present applicant and filing of this application is a mere afterthought being subsequent to filing of Page 2 of 12 Uploaded by CHANDRASHEKHAR MEHESHKUMAR KOSHTI(HC01066) on Tue Sep 16 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Sep 17 01:01:15 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2442/2024 ORDER DATED: 15/09/2025 undefined the Special Civil Application No.4896 of 2024 preferred by the answering respondents. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the applicant has taken time of about one and a half year i.e. 584 days without having any plausible explanation. Therefore, the conduct of the applicant does not entitle it for the relief claimed.
6. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties and perused the documents on record.
7. From perusal of the record, it appears that the Applicant had preferred Special Civil Application No.12275 of 2016 before this Court seeking setting aside of the Impugned Order dated 04.05.2016 passed by Opponent No.1. In the said Special Civil Application, Rule came to be issued vide order dated 27.11.2019. Subsequently, the learned Advocate appearing for the Applicant was elevated to the Bench of this Court and, accordingly, a fresh notice was issued to the Applicant to engage another Advocate. Though duly served, no steps were thereafter taken by the Applicant to enter appearance through Advocate or appear in person. This Court, by order dated 25.08.2022, dismissed the Special Civil Application No.12275 of 2016 for non-prosecution. The application for restoration came to be filed on 30.04.2024 after a delay of 584 days.
8. The explanation for condonation of delay given in the application is that after the advocate notice was duly served, due to inadvertence in the setup of the applicant, there was an administrative lapse in respect of the said notice, and thus, no steps could be taken to engage a new Advocate. The delay in filing the present Miscellaneous Civil Application is neither deliberate, nor attributable to the Applicant.
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9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Delhi Development Authority vs. Tejpal and others (2024) 7 SCC 433 has held that: -
"22. Since the issue in this batch of appeals concerns the condonation of delay, it would be worthwhile to briefly allude to the law of limitation. The Limitation Act, 1963 ("the Limitation Act") is a statute of repose founded on considerations of public policy and expediency. The dominant objective underlying the law of limitation is that the title to property, and matters of rights in general, cannot be kept in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt or suspense. Public interest requires that finality should be put to litigation. The Limitation Act, thus, prescribes the specific points of time from which the period of limitation begins to run for the institution of actions. On expiry of such period, no action can be initiated save and except where the court condones the delay for a sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the value of civil remedies, and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is denied the ability to enforce even an otherwise rightful claim. This position is reflected in the Latin maxim, vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt i.e. the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights.
23. The Bombay High Court in Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M. Mody aptly exposited the philosophical pillars supporting the concept of limitation: (i) the sword of prosecution ought not to be hanging over an individual for an indeterminate period; (ii) those who have been lethargic in safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to come to their rescue; and (iii) a defendant ought not to suffer for lost evidence owing to the passage of time.
25. As is clear from a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, there are exceptions to this general rule. The statute allows for admitting an action provided "sufficient cause" is shown. This vests courts with the discretion to extend the period of limitation if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or application within the prescribed period. Section 5 requires analysis of two ingredients: first, an examination of whether "sufficient cause" has been made out; and second, whether such cause has been shown for not filing the appeal/application "within the prescribed period".Page 4 of 12 Uploaded by CHANDRASHEKHAR MEHESHKUMAR KOSHTI(HC01066) on Tue Sep 16 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Sep 17 01:01:15 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2442/2024 ORDER DATED: 15/09/2025 undefined
26. As regards the first ingredient, the Limitation Act itself does not provide more guidance on what its constituent elements ought to be. Instead, Section 5 leaves the task of determining appropriate reasons for seeking condonation of delay to judicial interpretation and exercise of discretion upon the facts and individual circumstances of each case.
27. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of judicial application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause is not sufficient enough to turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by delay. The court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise, being circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the applicant. 28 Although the actual period of delay might be instructive, it is the explanation for the delay which would be the decisive factor.
28. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with the bathwater. A justice-oriented approach must be prioritised over technicalities, as one motivation underlying such rules is to prevent parties from using dilatory tactics or abusing the judicial process. Pragmatism over pedanticism is therefore sometimes necessary despite it appearing liberal or magnanimous. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.
29. In addition to "sufficient cause", Section 5 also requires that such cause must be shown within the prescribed period. To satisfy the latter condition, the applicant must show sufficient cause for not filing the appeal/application on the last day of the prescribed period and explain the delay made thereafter. Causes arising after the culmination of the limitation period, despite being sufficient in substance, would not suffice for condonation given this second prong of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the applicant shall not be required to prove each day's delay till the date of filing such appeal/application."
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) By L.Rs. and Others Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 has held that:-
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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay, and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Thirunagalingam Vs. Lingeswaran and Another 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093 has held Page 6 of 12 Uploaded by CHANDRASHEKHAR MEHESHKUMAR KOSHTI(HC01066) on Tue Sep 16 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Sep 17 01:01:15 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2442/2024 ORDER DATED: 15/09/2025 undefined that :-
"28. Since the Respondents assigned the very same reasons in I.A. No. 1 of 2022 in Unnumbered A.S. No... of 2022 as raised in I.A. Nos. 462 of 2018 and 119 of 2019 that had already been dismissed by this Court vide S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, the application for condonation of delay of 1116 days cannot be sustained. This Court in S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2054 & 2055 of 2022, after going through the evidence placed on record, rightly held that the delay has not been properly explained. The relevant portion of the order is reproduced hereunder:
"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained, and even there are no merits. in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delav has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Popat Bahiru Goverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
5.1 In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, in paragraph 14, it is observed and held as under:
"The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the Page 7 of 12 Uploaded by CHANDRASHEKHAR MEHESHKUMAR KOSHTI(HC01066) on Tue Sep 16 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Sep 17 01:01:15 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2442/2024 ORDER DATED: 15/09/2025 undefined parties but to ensure that they approach the court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the legislature. At the same time, the courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation."
31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity. The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement for condoning the delay remains unmet."
12. In a recent judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shivamma (dead) by Lrs. vs. Karnataka Housing Board and ors. in Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025 decided on 12.09.2025, it has been held thus :-
"124. The burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon the party seeking condonation, and the court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona fide, and free of negligence. Sufficiency of cause is to be determined contextually, on the totality of circumstances, with due regard to the conduct of the applicant and the prejudice caused to the opposite party. The inquiry is not mechanical but principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona fides and diligence.
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126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.
xxx xxx xxx
129. Delay by itself is not inherently indicative of negligence. In certain cases, unavoidable circumstances such as illness, fraud, miscommunication, or bona fide mistake may stretch over long periods, yet remain excusable if they are explained with candour and supported by material. Conversely, an unexplained delay of even a few days may reveal inaction or deliberate disregard of statutory timelines, and therefore disentitle the party to indulgence.
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131. The decisive factor is the adequacy of the cause shown, not the length of delay. What is critical is whether the party seeking condonation acted with reasonable diligence during the prescribed period and whether the reasons advanced demonstrate a genuine inability to file within time. Thus, the test is qualitative rather than quantitative.
132. This is not to say that the length of delay is irrelevant. A long delay naturally casts a heavier burden on the applicant to furnish cogent, credible, and convincing explanations. The proof required becomes stricter in proportion to the delay. The longer the time elapsed, the stronger the justification that must be put forth. Hence, length is instructive in determining the degree of scrutiny, but it is not determinative of the outcome.
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140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay.
141. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain.
142. Another practical reason why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation is that it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting.
143. The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly across cases, regardless of the intrinsic strength or weakness of the claims involved. To import merits into condonation proceedings would effectively dilute this uniformity.
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258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
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261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude."
13. In the present case, it is admitted that the advocate notice was duly served upon the applicant and due to bona fide inadvertence in the setup of the applicant, there was an administrative lapse in pursuing the matter further in reference to Page 11 of 12 Uploaded by CHANDRASHEKHAR MEHESHKUMAR KOSHTI(HC01066) on Tue Sep 16 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Sep 17 01:01:15 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2442/2024 ORDER DATED: 15/09/2025 undefined the aforesaid notice. Resultantly, no Advocate was engaged to prosecute the Special Civil Application further. No material facts have been placed on record in support of this contention. The averments in the Delay Condonation Application show that the applicant was not diligent in prosecuting the matter and there appears total negligence on behalf of the applicant. It is only after the affected students filed the Special Civil Application in this Court for a direction to implement and execute the order impugned that the applicant has initiated the action by filing this application. The delay in the present case cannot be condoned on such frivolous and superfluous ground when no case for sufficient cause is made out, or else, it would amount to giving premium to the laxity and negligence shown by the applicant herein.
14. In view of above observations and reasons, the present Civil Application for condonation of delay is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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