Arvind Tarachand Rajput vs Ravishankar Barelal Koshti

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 6415 Guj
Judgement Date : 9 September, 2025

Gujarat High Court

Arvind Tarachand Rajput vs Ravishankar Barelal Koshti on 9 September, 2025

                                                                                                              NEUTRAL CITATION




                            C/SCA/13546/2019                                    ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025

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                                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                                    R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13546 of 2019

                      ==========================================================
                                               ARVIND TARACHAND RAJPUT
                                                         Versus
                                           RAVISHANKAR BARELAL KOSHTI & ORS.
                      ==========================================================
                      Appearance:
                      MR JF MEHTA(461) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
                      NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4,5,6,7
                      ==========================================================

                         CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT

                                                       Date : 09/09/2025

                                                        ORAL ORDER

1. Heard learned advocate Mr.Dhruma Vyas for learned advocate Mr.J.F.Mehta for the petitioner. Though served, none appears for the respondents, who happens to be legal heirs of original defendant - tenant.

2. The present writ application is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs:-

"a. Your Lordships will be pleased to admit the petition.
b. Your Lordships will be pleased to quash and set aside the order passed by the Hon'ble Small Causes Court in HRP Suit no. 1322 of 2010 below Ex. 32 rejecting the application to bring the legal heirs on record.
c. Your Lordships will be pleased allow this petition.
d. Any other relief deem fit and proper in nature of justice may pleased be granted.
e. Cost of the petition may pleased be awarded."
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3. The parties will be referred to as per their position before the Trial Court.

4. The petitioner herein happens to be plaintiff - landlord who filed HRP Suit No.1322 of 2010 against the predecessor of respondents herein, who happens to be original tenant.

5. It is reported to the Rent Court by advocate of original defendant on 17.01.2018 that his client died on 18.03.2017. Having came to know about the death of original opponent, albeit, no details of legal heirs are disclosed in the purshish filed before the Rent Court, an impugned application came to be filed below Exh.32 by plaintiff, whereby, requested the Rent Court to substitute the legal heirs of deceased - sole defendant.

6. After hearing, the Rent Court vide its order dated 03.10.2018 rejected the impugned application solely on the ground that considering the fact the defendant died on 18.03.2017, and the impugned application came to be filed only on 16.03.2018, i.e., after the expiry of the period of 90 days and so also, 60 days thereafter, whereby there was an abatement of the suit and as such, having not filed any Page 2 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined separate application for setting aside abatement, the application came to be rejected. Hence, the present writ application.

7. Learned advocate Ms. Vyas would submit that the approach of the Rent Court is erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the settled legal position of law and requires to be interfered with by this court while exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

7.1. Learned advocate Ms. Vyas would further submit that there was no delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the impugned application inasmuch as having come to know about the death of the original opponent on 17.01.2018, sometime was taken to get the details of his legal heirs and immediately thereafter, filed the impugned application on 16.03.2018. 7.2. It is submitted that the Rent Court could have exercised its discretion in favor of the petitioner and allowed the application as prayed for, whereby it would be presumed in law that the Rent Court has quashed and set aside the abatement in filing such an application and so also any delay in filing impugned application.

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NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined 7.3. Learned advocate Ms. Vyas would further submit that procedure is the handmaid of justice and the trial court not expected to take any hyper-technical approach. It is submitted that even if the Court concerned feels so that a separate application is required to be filed for setting aside the abatement as per Order 22 Rule 9 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "CPC"), reasonable time could have been granted in favor of the petitioner to cure such defect, if any, but straight away it could not have rejected the application.

7.4. Lastly, Ms. Vyas would submit that no prejudice would be caused to the respondents being legal heirs of the original defendant, if they are brought on record and such, they need to be substituted in the suit filed by the petitioner. 7.5. To buttress his argument, learned advocate Ms. Vyas would rely upon the decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (Now ... vs Satish Chandra (Now Deceased) reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 291 : (2025) INSC 183 and Binod Pathak & Ors Versus Page 4 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined Shankar Choudhary & Ors, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1411.

7.6. Making the above submissions, learned advocate Ms. Vyas would request this Court to allow the present application.

8. No other and further submissions are made.

9. The issue germane in the present application is squarely covered by the following two decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court:-, which are also cited wherein observed and laid down the law thus:-

9.1. In the decision of Om Prakash Gupta (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:-
"9. The principles to guide courts while considering applications for setting aside abatement and application for condonation of delay in filing the former application are laid down by this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma. An instructive passage from such decision reads as follows:
"13. The principles applicable in considering applications for setting aside abatement may thus be summarised as follows:
(i) The words 'sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation' should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, Page 5 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.
(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement.
(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation.
(iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case.

For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in refiling the appeal after rectification of defects. (v.) Want of 'diligence' or 'inaction' can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal."

(emphasis supplied in original)

17. The second circumstance is whether the counsel for the deceased respondent or the legal representative of the deceased respondent notified the court about the death and whether the court gave notice of such death to the appellant. Rule 10-A of Order 22 casts a duty on the counsel for the respondent to inform the court about the death of such respondent whenever he comes to know about it. When the death is reported and recorded in the order-sheet/proceedings and the appellant is Page 6 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined notified, the appellant has knowledge of the death and there is a duty on the part of the appellant to take steps to bring the legal representative of the deceased on record, in place of the deceased. The need for diligence commences from the date of such knowledge. If the appellant pleads ignorance even after the court notifies him about the death of the respondent that may be an indication of negligence or want of diligence.

18. The third circumstance is whether there is any material to contradict the claim of the appellant, if he categorically states that he was unaware of the death of the respondent. In the absence of any material, the court would accept his claim that he was not aware of the death.

19. Thus it can safely be concluded that if the following three conditions exist, the courts will usually condone the delay, and set aside the abatement (even though the period of delay is considerable and a valuable right might have accrued to the opposite party--LRs of the deceased--on account of the abatement):

(i) The respondent had died during the period when the appeal had been pending without any hearing dates being fixed;
(ii) Neither the counsel for the deceased respondent nor the legal representatives of the deceased respondent had reported the death of the respondent to the court and the court has not given notice of such death to the appellant;
(iii) The appellant avers that he was unaware of the death of the respondent and there is no material to doubt or contradict his claim.

(emphasis supplied)

23. We find it difficult to agree with such reasoning. When an application praying for substitution had been made, then, even assuming that it does not have an explicit prayer for setting aside the abatement, such prayer could be read as inherent in the prayer for substitution in the interest of justice. We draw inspiration for such a conclusion, having read the decision in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini, 2003 10 SCC 691. This Court reiterated the need for a justice-oriented approach in such matters. Inter alia, it was held that prayer to bring on record heir(s)/legal representative(s) can also be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement. The relevant passage reads as under:

"8. Inasmuch as the abatement results in denial of hearing on Page 7 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined the merits of the case, the provision of abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer for setting aside an abatement and the dismissal consequent upon an abatement, have to be considered liberally. A simple prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record without specifically praying for setting aside of an abatement may in substance be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement. So also a prayer for setting aside abatement as regards one of the plaintiffs can be construed as a prayer for setting aside the abatement of the suit in its entirety. Abatement of suit for failure to move an application for bringing the legal representatives on record within the prescribed period of limitation is automatic and a specific order dismissing the suit as abated is not called for. Once the suit has abated as a matter of law, though there may not have been passed on record a specific order dismissing the suit as abated, yet the legal representatives proposing to be brought on record or any other applicant proposing to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on record would seek the setting aside of an abatement. A prayer for bringing the legal representatives on record, if allowed, would have the effect of setting aside the abatement as the relief of setting aside abatement though not asked for in so many words is in effect being actually asked for and is necessarily implied. Too technical or pedantic an approach in such cases is not called for.
9. The courts have to adopt a justice-oriented approach dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking the indulgence of the court. The opinion of the trial Judge allowing a prayer for setting aside abatement and his finding on the question of availability of 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of Order 22 and of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deserves to be given weight, and once arrived at would not normally be interfered with by superior jurisdiction.
10. In the present case, such an approach adopted by the Division Bench verges on too fine a technicality and results in injustice being done. There was no order in writing passed by Page 8 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined the court dismissing the entire suit as having abated. The suit has been treated by the Division Bench to have abated in its entirety by operation of law. For a period of ninety days from the date of death of any party the suit remains in a state of suspended animation. And then it abates. The converse would also logically follow.
Once the prayer made by the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff for setting aside the abatement as regards the deceased plaintiff was allowed, and the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff came on record, the constitution of the suit was rendered good; it revived and the abatement of the suit would be deemed to have been set aside in its entirety even though there was no specific prayer made and no specific order of the court passed in that behalf."

(emphasis supplied)

10. In the second case, i.e., in the case of Binod Pathak (Supra), the Supreme Court has held thus:-

"58. In the case on hand, the respondents or the original defendants have pleaded for the abatement of the suit due to non- substitution of legal heirs therein by the plaintiff, within the statutorily prescribed period of time. Abatement of suit is not a right that accrues to a party when the other party has failed to substitute legal heirs within the specified period of limitation. Abatement may be disallowed by the court if it has sufficient cause for condoning the delay of the party that ought to have filed for the substitution of legal heirs. In fact, Rule 10A was enacted for the purpose to allow for mitigation of the legal effects of delay and can be used to request for condonation of delay.
59.The question of allowing abatement of suit is one of discretion and therefore, an advantage. Under Rule 10A of Order XXII, the duty of a pleader to apprise the court as well as the other parties to the suit or appeal of the death of his client is a duty of candour and propriety as a responsible officer of the court. The failure of a party to perform the duty under Rule 10A constitutes a wrongful act and such party must not be allowed to avail the benefit arising therefrom in the form of abatement of suit.
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60. Rule 10A of Order XXII, as inserted by the Amendment Act, 1976 imposes an obligation on the pleader appearing for the party to intimate death of his client to the court. But there is difference of opinion as to whether the duty imposed on the pleader is confined to factum of death of a party or also to furnish names and particulars of legal representatives.
61. According to one view, there is no obligation on the pleader appearing on behalf of the deceased party to furnish or supply list of legal representatives of the deceased.
62. According to the other view, however, the pleader has not only to inform the court as to death of the party but he must also furnish particulars of legal representatives.
63. However, we are of the view that providing merely an information with regard to the fact of death is not sufficient compliance of the Rule 10A of the CPC. unless and until the counsel furnishes the information with regard to the details of the persons on whom and against whom the right to sue survives and the information under Rule 10A of the CPC. and the object behind it would remain incomplete as the parties would still be labouring to inquire who are the legal representatives and find out as to upon whom and against whom the right to sue survives.
64. This Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Perinadu Village v. Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by Lrs., (2008) 8 SCC 321 has explained the principles applicable in considering applications for setting aside the abatement and as summarised such principles as under:--
"12. In State of M.P. v. S.S. Akolkar [(1996) 2 SCC 568] this Court held : (SCC pp. 569-70, paras 6-7) "6. [...] Under Order 22 Rule 10-A, it is the duty of the counsel, on coming to know of the death of a party, to inform it to the court and the court shall give notice to the other party of the death. By necessary implication delay for substitution of legal representatives begins to run from the date of knowledge. [...]
7. It is settled law that the consideration for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and setting aside of the abatement under Order 22 are entirely distinct and different. The court always liberally considers the latter, though in some case, the court may refuse to condone the delay under Section 5 in filing the appeals. After the appeal has been filed and is pending, the Government is not expected to keep watch whether the contesting respondent is alive or Page 10 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined has passed away. After the matter was brought to the notice of the counsel for the State, steps were taken even thereafter; after due verification belated application came to be filed. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and delay is required to be explained. The delay in official business requires its broach and approach from public justice perspective."

(i) The words "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.

(ii) In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, the courts are more liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement.

(iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation.

(iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For example, courts view delays in making applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer's lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant's lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in refiling the appeal after rectification of defects.

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(v) Want of "diligence" or "inaction" can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to ascertain the position nor keep checking whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal."

(Emphasis supplied)

65. The High Court in its impugned judgment and order has with a great air of conviction observed that Order XXII Rule 10A of the CPC is not mandatory and would not override the mandatory provisions relating to abatement as contained in Order XXII Rule 4 of the CPC. We are afraid, the understanding of the High Court is not correct.

66. The legislative intention of casting a burden on the advocate of a party to give intimation of the death of the party represented by him and for this limited purpose to introduce a deeming fiction of the contract being kept subsisting between the advocate and the deceased party was that the other party may not be taken unaware at the time of hearing of the appeal by springing surprise on it that the respondent is dead and appeal has abated. In order to avoid procedural justice scoring a march over substantial justice the Rule 10A was introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act of 1976 which came into force on February 1st, 1977. Unfortunately, the High Court took no notice of the wholesome provision and fell back on the earlier legal position which automatically stands modified by the new provision and reached an unsustainable conclusion.

71. This Court observed that although the arguments were attractive, yet one must keep in mind Order XXII Rule 10-A of the CPC This Court observed that it is obligatory on the pleader of the deceased to inform the court and the other side about the factum of the death of a party. This Court observed thus:--

"4. Though the arguments are attractive one must also keep in mind Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is obligatory on the pleader of a deceased to inform the court and the other side about the factum of death of a party. In this case we find that no intimation was given to the court or to the other side that the first respondent had died. On the contrary a counsel appeared Page 12 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined on behalf of the deceased person and argued the matter. It is clear that the attempt was to see whether a favourable order could be obtained. It is clear that the intention was that if the order went against them, then thereafter this would be made a ground for having that order set aside. This is in effect an attempt to take not just the other side but also the court for a ride. These sort of tactics must not be permitted to prevail. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere. The appeal stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs."

(emphasis supplied)

11. Now, adverting to the facts of present case, which are stated hereinabove, are not in dispute. Having so observed hereinabove, that disclosure of the factum of death of the original sole defendant by his lawyer came on record only on 17.01.2018 and within two months thereafter, the impugned application came to be filed by the petitioner to substitute his legal heirs on record.

12. It is true that as per Articles 120 and 121 of the Indian Limitation Act, the application for seeking condonation of delay and setting aside abatement required to be filed by the plaintiff. At the same time, considering the averments made in the application and so also the prayer made in the impugned application, if the trial court could have considered it in proper perspective and allowed the impugned application Page 13 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined whereby, the legal heirs of the original defendant substituted on the record of the case, in view of the aforesaid decisions, it is presumed to have condoned the delay as well as set aside the abatement.

13. It is now well-settled legal position of law that the procedural envisaged under Order 22 of CPC is not penal in nature but it is a handmaid of justice wherein a hyper- technical approach is required to be avoided by the trial court while advancing justice to the party. [See - Banwarilal vs. Balbir Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 607 - para - 8 to 10].

14. At this stage, it would also be apt to refer to and rely upon the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Sugandhi (DEAD) By Lrs & Anr V/S P Rajkumar Rep By His Power Agent Imam Oli reported in (2020) 10 SCC 706 wherein held as under, "[9] It is often said that procedure is the handmaid of justice. Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of the court while doing substantial justice. If the procedural violation does not seriously cause prejudice to the adversary party, courts must lean towards doing substantial justice rather than relying upon procedural and technical violation. We should not forget the fact that litigation is nothing but a journey towards truth which is the Page 14 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined foundation of justice and the court is required to take appropriate steps to thrash out the underlying truth in every dispute....."

(emphasis supplied) 14.1. It is expected that the principles of natural justice be observed while deciding any request made by a party, ensuring that no serious prejudice is caused to any party when such a prayer made by any party is accepted.

15. In light of what is stated hereinabove and in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is a fit case wherein this Court should exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, whereby it requires to interfere with the impugned order.

16. In view of the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 04.09.2010 passed by the Small Causes Court below Exhibit 32 in HRP Suit No.1322 of 2010 is hereby quashed and set aside and accordingly, the impugned application filed below Exhibit 32 in the aforesaid suit is hereby allowed.

17. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, respondents herein, who happen to be legal heirs of the original defendants/tenant, are Page 15 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined brought on record of H.R.P. Suit No. 1322 of 2010 as legal heirs of original defendant.

18. The petitioner, who happens to be the plaintiff of aforesaid suit, is hereby directed to submit an amendment plaint within 15 days from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.

19. Thereafter, the Trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit in accordance with law.

20. Before parting with this order, this Court would like to observe that whenever the trial court feels that a separate application, be it seeking condonation of delay while filing any application under Order 22 Rule 3 or 4 of C.P.C. requires, and likewise an application for setting aside abatement under Order 22 Rule 9 of C.P.C. requires to be separately filed by the plaintiff, if not filed separately by submitting an application either under Order 22 Rule 3 or Rule 4 of C.P.C., to cure such defect, and if so required, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the Trial Court should either direct Page 16 of 17 Uploaded by MOHD MONIS(HC01900) on Wed Sep 10 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Sep 11 00:39:55 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/13546/2019 ORDER DATED: 09/09/2025 undefined the plaintiff/applicant or pass necessary order in that regard, whereby such technicality can be avoided. The defect remains at the institution of application/proceeding if curable than the Court should allow the party to cure such defect. [See - State of M.P. and another V/s. Pradeep Kumar and another, (2000) 7 SCC 372 - para - 10 to 12, 19 ].

21. In view of forgoing conclusion, the present writ application is hereby allowed to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.

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