Gujarat High Court
Chandubhai Govindbhai Patel vs Dy Collector on 10 October, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025
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Reserved On : 09/07/2025
Pronounced On : 10/10/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1617 of 1993
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE Sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
No
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CHANDUBHAI GOVINDBHAI PATEL
Versus
DY COLLECTOR & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR RN SHAH(789) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS POOJA ASHAR AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2
RULE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 3,4,5
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE
CAV JUDGMENT
1. The present writ petition has been filed praying for the following reliefs:-
"(A) The Special Civil Application be admitted;
(B) Be pleased to call for the records and proceedings of the case and after perusing the legality and propriety of the orders passed at Exh.A, B & C, be pleased to quash and set aside the same by holding that the proceedings u/s.32(1)(b) is not tenable at law;
(C) Pending the hearing and final disposal of this Special Civil Application by this Honourable Court, be pleased to grant ad-interim stay of the operation and implementation of the order passed at Exh.A, B & C by directing the Mamlatdar & ALT, Himmatnagar not to iniaite any proceedings u/s 32(1)(b) & u/s. 84-C against the petitioner and not to operate the order passed at Exh. A, Page 1 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined B & C and be pleased to maintain the status-quo and not to dispossess the petitioner from the lands in question;"
2. The factual matrix in the present case is that on receiving the report from the Record of Rights Team, the Mamlatdar & ALT, Himatnagar, registered case under Sec.32 (IB) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ["Act" for short] and proceeded with the inquiry. That the notice dated 03.01.1993 was issued and the Mamlatdar & ALT by order dated 18.09.1984 decided that Bhambhi Ramabhai Devabhai was in possession of the land as mortgagee and that tenancy is not proved so closed the inquiry under sec.32 (IB) of the Act. That the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT was taken in revision under Section 76A of the Act by the Dy. Collector and by order dated 01.09.1986 in No.TNC/76A/Revision Case No.567, the Dy. Collector set aside the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT. Thereafter, the Mamlatdar & ALT proceeded with the Inquiry and by his order dated 19.11.1986 decided that the respondents herein are proved to be the tenant of the suit land as they were in possession of the land on 15.06.1955. It was also held that the respondent No.3 i.e. Kodarbhai Ramabhai Page 2 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined the heir of Ramabhai was entitled to purchase this land. That the Mamlatdar directed him to give undertaking for personal cultivation of the land and in case of his failure to do so, the land was ordered to be vested in the State. As the original occupant had sold this land to the present petitioner, the Mamlatdar decided to proceed separately under Section 84C of the Act.
Aggrieved by the order of the Mamlatdar, the petitioner filed appeal before the Dy. Collector being Tenancy Appeal No.21/86, which was dismissed by the Dy. Collector vide order dated 23.09.1987.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed Revision Application No.TEN/B.A.840/87 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which vide order dated 24.07.1992 confirmed the orders passed by the revenue authorities below and dismissed the revision application.
Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present Special Civil Application.
3. Learned advocate for the petitioner submits that the proceedings initiated under Section 32(1B) of the Page 3 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined Act holding the father of respondent No.3 as a tenant of the land in question, are illegal and contrary to law. He submits that the evidence on record clearly establishes that there was never any tenancy in existence in respect of the said land. He submits that after considering the evidence, the competent authority had earlier dropped the proceedings holding that there was no tenant. Hence, the Dy. Collector had no jurisdiction to suo motu revise the said order and remand the matter for fresh inquiry. Such action is arbitrary, beyond authority, and barred by limitation. He submits that the petitioner lawfully purchased the land by a registered sale deed dated 01.03.1982, which was duly mutated and sanctioned vide entry No.201. Since there is no record to show that the father of respondent No.3 was ever in possession as a tenant during 1951-1956, the proceedings under Section 32(1B) ought to have been dropped. He submits that the petitioner has been in lawful possession and personal cultivation since purchase and even availed an agricultural loan from the Co-operative Bank. That the respondent No.3 or his predecessor has never claimed any tenancy rights Page 4 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined or possession at any point and entry No.36 cancelling the name of the father of respondent No.3 from the tenant's column has attained finality. Thus, initiation of proceedings after a lapse of more than 25 years is unsustainable. He submits that the evidence of the petitioner, respondent No.3 and the Talati-cum-Mantri clearly proves that the father of respondent No.3 was not cultivating the land as a tenant, but was merely a mortgagee under an oral arrangement. The alleged tenancy entry of 1955 has no evidentiary value, particularly when the oral and documentary evidence show it to be incorrect. He submits that neither respondent No.3 nor his predecessor initiated any proceedings after the introduction of Section 32(1B) in 1973 nor expressed willingness to purchase the land under the Act. On the contrary, the respondent No.3 has admitted that his father never cultivated the land as a tenant.
Hence, declaring him a deemed purchaser is wholly unjustified. He submits that there is no material to suggest any contravention of the provisions of the Act by the original owner or the petitioner. He submits that the direction of the authorities to Page 5 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined initiate proceedings under Section 84C on the ground of alleged contravention is, therefore, illegal and without jurisdiction. He submits that the findings of the authorities below are perverse, contrary to the evidence on record and unsustainable in law. The orders impugned are thus liable to be quashed and set aside and the petition be allowed.
4. Ms. Pooja Ashar, learned Assistant Government Pleader appeared for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 and opposed the writ petition. She, however, could not dispute the facts as well as the legal position.
5. Though served, the respondent Nos.3 to 5 have chosen not to appear through advocate as well as in person.
6. Heard learned counsels for the parties, considered the submissions and perused the documents on record.
7. The Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal Nos.1825 of 2019 and other connected matters decided on 14.10.2024 in case of State of Gujarat v. Hussainbhai Satarbhai Meman while dealing Page 6 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined with the issue of exercise of suo-motu revision proceedings under the Ordinance, 1949 has held as under:-
"104. Moreover, the proceedings for eviction had been initiated after a long lapse of time, which would raise a question with regard to the validity of the action taken by the Collector for summary eviction of the transferees, who are in settled possession of the lands-in-question for a sufficient long time. The question before us is as to whether it was reasonable on the part of the Collector to initiate proceedings for summary eviction of the transferees, who are the holders of the lands in the area for considerably long period of time and who are admittedly carrying on agricultural operations. There is a categorical submission of the petitioners in the bunch of the writ petitions that the lands-in-question have been put to agricultural use since after the date of transfer and are also in agricultural use till date. The status or nature of the lands has not been changed by the transferees, who may not fall within the meaning of agriculturists under Section 2(c) of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Ordinance, 1949. The vehement submission of the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners is that the notices issued by the office of the Collector/Deputy Collector are ex facie barred by delay.
105. This issues has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. [(2016) 2 GLH 1021] wherein dispute was pertaining to the provisions of Section 54 and 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Ordinance' 1949. In the said case, the first transfer was of the year 1970, mutation of which was entered in the year 1973. The land had exchanged many hands and no dispute was raised by the executant of the original sale deeds. However, a private respondent, thereafter, had intervened by filing a separate writ petition inter alia praying for a direction to complete the inquiry. In the proceedings initiated under the Ordinance, show cause notice was challenged by the occupants of the land on the ground that after 37 years from the date of revenue entry, the proceedings initiated under the Ordinance were ex facie barred by delays. The Division Bench of this Court examined three aspects of the matter; firstly the question of reasonable period for initiation of action of issuance of the show cause notice under the Ordinance; the second was as to whether initiation of action is without jurisdiction and the third aspect was about the locus of the respondent therein whose father had executed sale deed and received Page 7 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined consideration and by his volition parted with the possession, seeking for invalidation of transfer after death of his father, who did not raise any grievance during his life time.
106. On the question of reasonable period, the Division Bench has considered the decision of the Apex Court in Patel Raghav Natha1 which pertains to the revisional powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, to note that the revisional powers must be exercised in a reasonable time and the length of reasonable time must be determined on the facts of the said case and the nature of the order which is being refused.
107. The Division bench judgment of this Court in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya2 was noted, wherein the question was of delay in initiation of the action under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The relevant observations in paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 whereof are noted hereinunder :-
12. Indisputably, the land in question is a new tenure land, to which the provisions of Section 43 of the Act are applicable. It is also well settled that if a person wants to get the land converted from new tenure to old tenure, then as per the Government Resolutions passed from time to time and other provisions of the Act, the Collector has to determine the amount of premium due and payable by the person who seeks conversion and as per the guidelines laid down such amount determined by the Collector if is paid, then necessary orders are being passed by the authorities converting the land from new tenure to old tenure thereby lifting the restrictions as imposed under Section 43 of the Act.
It is also well settled that question is if the land is transferred in violation of the provisions of Section 43 of the Act, then such transactions could definitely be termed as void transactions. However, the question is whether such void transactions could be annulled at any point of time and whether the authorities could be justified in taking over the possession of the land for the purpose of vesting in the Government at any point of time.
13. In our opinion, it is well settled that even though void transaction if is allowed to remain effective for considerable long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. It can remain effective and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its existence is allowed for a considerable period and by a passage creating Page 8 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined valuable rights in favour of a considerable section of people, like the appellants in the present case, it is difficult to accept the proposition that despite the change the competent authority under the Act would be entitled to exercise powers under Section 84(C) of the Act at any point of time.
108. What would be the reasonable time as explained by the Apex Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation v. C.C. Santhakumar, (2007) 1 SCC 584 was taken note of in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya2 in the following manner in paragraph No. 16 as under :-
16. In the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation v. C.C. Santhakumar reported in 2007(1) SCC 584 , the Supreme Court has elaborately explained this principle of action to be taken within a reasonable period of time. It would be appropriate for us to quote paragraph Nos.35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40.
35. A "reasonable period" would depend upon the factual circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine that question. The court/authority considering the question whether the period is reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question.
36. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (1969 (2) SCC 187 it was observed that when even no period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to be exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically kept in view by the Division Bench. Additionally, the points relating to applicability of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, and even if it is held that the Act was applicable, the reasonableness of the time during which action should have been initiated were also not considered.
It would be hard to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of a child's toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by authority, the decision of the Judge usually determines what is "reasonable" in each particular case; but frequently Page 9 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined reasonableness "belongs to the knowledge of the law, and therefore to be decided by the courts". It was illuminatingly stated by a learned author that an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is trying to count what is not a number and measure what is not space. It means prima facie in law reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. (See: Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar (1987 (4) SCC 497 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. (1989 (1) SCC
532). As observed by Lord Romilly, M.R. in Labouchere v. Dawson (41 LJ Ch 472) it is impossible a priori to state what is reasonable as such in all cases. You must have the particular facts of each case established before you can ascertain what is reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable, being a relative term is essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
37. These aspects were highlighted in Collector and Others v. P.Mangamma and Others (2003 (4) SCC 488).
38. As observed in Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal (2002 (1) SCC 134 , it is "looking at all the circumstances of the case; a "reasonable time" under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than 'directly'; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea".
39. According to Advanced law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar 3rd Edition, 2005 reasonable time means as follows:
"That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer.
"Reasonable Time" is defined to be so much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case.
If it is proper to attempt any definition of the Page 10 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined words "reasonable time", as applied to completion of a contract, the distinction given by Chief Baron Pollock may be suggested, namely, that a "reasonable time" means as soon as circumstances will permit. In determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage or trade or business, if any, with respect to such instrument, and the fact of the particular case.
The reasonable time which a passenger is entitled to alighting from a train is such time as is usually required by passengers in getting off and on the train in safety at the particular station in question. A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case; a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract requires should be done; some more protracted space than "directly" such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these convey more or less the same idea. Reasonable time always depends on the circumstances of the case. (Kinney) It is unreasonable for a person who has borrowed ornaments for use in a ceremony to detain them after the ceremony has been completed and the owner has demanded their return. (AIR 1930 Oudh 395).
The expression "reasonable time" means so much time as is necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case". [See: Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew (2005(7) SCC 667)]
40. In all these cases at hand the factual aspects have not been examined, because the grievance appears to have been focused on the applicability of Section 77 (1A)(b).
109.In paragraph No. '19' in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya2 , it was concluded that:-
19. It must be fairly said that if the statute does not prescribe time limit for exercise of revisional powers, it does not mean that such powers can be exercised at any point of time even if there is a breach of Section 43 of the Act, which is a provision which relates to a new tenure land, rather it should be exercised within a reasonable period of time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of Page 11 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined time. It is clear from various judgments of the Supreme Court that where a statutory provision for exercise of any suo motu powers of revision does not prescribe any limitation, the powers must be exercised within a reasonable period of time even in the case of transaction which would be termed as void transaction.
110. Taking note of the law discussed in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya2 , the Division Bench of this Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda25 has further proceeded to note another Division Bench judgment in Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar45 , which also pertains to Section 54 of the Ordinance, 1949 and the question wherein was of reasonable time to initiate action under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949 for summary eviction of the occupant, transfer in whose favour was alleged to be invalid. While dealing with various contentions about the validity of the transaction and the effect of the same due to the delay, it was noted therein that at the time when the transaction was executed and the entry was mutated in the revenue record, the petitioner had merely submitted a certificate issued by the Talati of village certifying that the petitioner was preparing agri-tools. However, at that stage, the authority did not demand any other details or clarification from the petitioner and/or did not initiate any action. The State authorities allowed the transaction to operate for 17 years. Subsequently, when the action to annul the transaction came to be initiated after 17 years, the petitioner raised objection on the ground that the action was unsustainable because of the inordinate delay and that since the time when the transaction was entered into, he had put the land-in question to the agricultural use only, and further the status and the nature of the agricultural land had been retained and maintained by the transferee. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of that case, considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter specifically that the transferee had not changed the nature or status of the land and also has incurred expenditure to improve the quality of soil, it was held therein that the aforesaid factors would be relevant and would deserve due consideration. It was, thus, observed in paragraph No. 20 as under :-
20. Even if the concept that the void action cannot be validated on the ground of belated action is applied in present case, then also, in view of the special facts and circumstances of present case it would be appropriate to take into account the peculiar facts of present case which emerge from the record viz:-Page 12 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025
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(a) during the entire period of 17 years the vendor has not taken out any action in law against the transaction and any suit or proceeding for declaration or for any other relief does not appear to have been filed by the vendor.
(b) the petitioner was an agricultural labourer at the time when the transaction was executed and was tiling and cultivating various agricultural lands.
(c)The petitioner was also artisan i.e. engaged in the activity of preparing agri-tools.
(d) more important is the fact that even after purchasing the land in question the petitioner has, as claimed by him, continued to use the land for agricultural purpose and the status or nature of the land in question as agricultural land is not changed and it continues to be agricultural land (said factual assertion by the petitioner has not been disputed by the respondents and any contrary evidence is not placed on record)
(e) the petitioner has also claimed that he has incurred substantial expenditure in improving quality of soil.
(f) another important factor which, in the facts of present case, has emerged is that in view of the orders of the authorities it is only the vendor who will stand to gain/benefit since the land, even after the orders, will not vest in the government in absence of any provision providing for such consequential.
111. While holding so, though it was found by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda25 that the decision of the competent authority in holding the transaction-in-question as void is in consonance with the provisions of the Ordinance and cannot be faulted, but it was concluded that in the interest of justice and equity, it cannot be overlooked that the impugned action in exercise of powers under Section 75 of the Ordinance to summarily evict the petitioner after having allowed the transaction to remain alive for 17 years, cannot be justified. It was held that the eviction order completely overlooked that the petitioner has continued to put the land to use for agricultural purposes and has not changed the status and the nature of the land, rather he has invested further amounts for betterment of the agricultural land. The reasons for delay of 17 years has remained unexplained and unjustified and the only defence was that the transaction is statutorily void.
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112. Taking note of the above decisions in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya2 and Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar45, it was, however, observed by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda25 in paragraph No. 10 as under:-
In our view, the above referred well considered two decisions of this Court makes the position abundantly clear that if the action is to be initiated for setting aside of a transaction under the Ordinance by invoking section 54 read with section 75 of the Ordinance, it has to be within reasonable period. The above referred two decisions are in respect of the cases wherein the powers were exercised and proceedings were initiated after 5 years and 17 years respectively, whereas in the present case, it is after more than 35 years. Hence, we find that the initiation of the action itself can be said as beyond reasonable period and the bar of delay and laches could operate against the authority in initiation of the action. The aforesaid aspect is coupled with two additional circumstances, one is that the land has changed hands further during the period of delay and the ownership is transferred by the purchaser to the another person and the second is that the revenue entries were mutated. Thereafter, they were also certified by the competent authority and in spite of that, no action was taken for cancellation of such entry or otherwise or even for declaration of the transaction as invalid within reasonable period. If during the period of delay, the rights of the parties in the properties are altered, the delay would operate as a bar with more gravity and when the ownership is changed during the period of delay, the bar for not taking action within reasonable period would also operate with more gravity against the authority in initiation of the action.
113. The Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda25 has further taken note of the procedure of certification of the entries as per the scheme of the Land Revenue Rules, 1972 namely the Rule 11 of the Rules and noted that as per the Bombay Land Revenue Code read with the Rules, before any entry is mutated in the revenue records, the notice under Section 35D is required to be served to the original owner. Further if the notice is served and the entry is signed as pakka entry in the revenue record, the same shall remain as it is until it is certified by the Circle Inspector. It is the duty of the Circle Inspector to verify the relevant records and then to certify. Thus, after the Circle Inspector finding Page 14 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined that the proper procedure has been followed, he would certify the entry. After certification of the entries as per the scheme of the Land Revenue Rules, statements are required to be submitted. As per Rule 11 of the Land Revenue Rules, whenever index of the land is prepared and completed, the same is required to be placed before the Collector or the Sub-Divisional Officer for inspection. On receipt of the said material, the Collector or the Sub- Divisional Officer shall fix a date for its inspection and shall cause the notice thereof to be given calling upon all the persons interested to appear on such date on a specified place or in the immediately vicinity of the village concerned, notifying that any such persons may before such date inspect the index on application. Thereafter, the Collector or the Sub Divisional Officer is required to compare the new copy of the old index and the diary of mutation and has power to make necessary corrections, if it is so required. After such process is undertaken, new index is to be prepared which will show the duly tested entries found correct.
114. Taking note of the above observations in paragraph No. 13 of Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda25, we may record that the provisions contained in Chapter XV pertaining to Record of Rights and Mutations under the Land Revenue Rules, 1979 contemplate verification of entries made in the revenue records of village at various levels upto the level of the officers such as Collector or Sub-Divisional Officer, as the case may be. The mutation entries at the various levels are certified, inspected and corrected by the officers of the State upto the level of the office of the Collector.
115. It is sought to be submitted by the learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State respondents that the factum of the sale deeds being in breach of Section 54 of the Ordinance 1949 came into light of the State authorities on an RTS inspection made on 29.12.2003. It is, thus, admitted case of the State authority that the factum of the sale deed being hit by Section 54 on the premise that the transferee being a non agriculturist, was not noted by the revenue authorities at the time of certification of mutation entry. It is admitted that such error was not found during the course of investigation under Rule 111 of the Land Revenue Rules at the relevant point of time. The mutation entries were certified and tested and found to be corrected at the relevant point of time. What was tested and what has been skipped by the competent authority is not the question, which would be required to be examined by us. The result is that if during the course of inspection under Rule 111, the so called alleged discrepancy in the transaction was not found and the registration of the entries were Page 15 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined not modified or disturbed under the Rule 111, it is difficult to accept that this discrepancy was found by the authority in the year 2003 in the RTS inspection conducted after a long delay. At least this fact proves that the proceedings under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949 had been initiated much after certification of the revenue entries in accordance with the provisions of the Land Revenue Rules, 1972, i.e. after a long lapse of time. From this angle and in view of the judgment of the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda25, in the facts of the present case, the proceedings cannot be said to have been initiated within a reasonable time.
116. There is one more aspect of the matter. In the instant case, the Collector while passing the order of eviction, issued notice to the petitioners to show cause as to why the transaction be not invalidated under Section 54 of the Ordinance, while contemplating eviction of the petitioner under Section 75 of the Ordinance directing for resumption of the land by the State Government by entering the name of the State as shri sarkar. Once the statute does not provide for power to the authority to resume back any private land and vesting thereof in the State Government, such notices, subject matter of challenge herein, being contrary to the provisions of Section 75 of the Ordinance would be without jurisdiction.
117. It may be noted from the law discussed above pertaining to the reasonable time for exercise of suo motu action, that the legislature in its wisdom did not fix the time limit for exercise of summary eviction, however, it does not mean that the legislature intended to leave the action under the Act for an indefinite period of time, inasmuch as, it would have an effect of rendering title of the land holders/transferees in a state of perpetual uncertainty. The Court has to construe the statutory provisions in a way which makes the provision workable advancing the purpose and object of the enactment of the statute (reference be made to paragraph No. 28 of the decision of the Apex Court in Sulochana Chandrakant Galande27.
118. In the aforesaid case while considering the provisions of Section 34 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, which provides for revisional power of the State either on application or suo motu, but does not prescribe any limitation, the decision in Patil Raghav Natha1 was referred and relied upon.
119. We may also refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District21 pertaining to the proceedings of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Page 16 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined Records of- Rights in Land Regulations, it was observed that the legal position is fairly well settled by long line of decisions of the Apex court which have laid down that even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of any power, the revisional power or otherwise such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. The absence of stipulated period of limitation makes little or no difference insofar as the exercise of powers is concerned, which ought to be permissible only when the power is invoked within a reasonable period. It was noted in paragraph No. 31 as under :-
31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.
120. Paragraph Nos. 12 (12.1 to 12.3) of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District21 is also relevant to be noted hereinunder,
12. In support of their submissions reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondent on the following decisions of this Court.
12.1 In the decision in State of Gujarat vs. Patil Raghav Natha and others[(1969) 2 SCC 187] this Court while adverting to Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 held that though there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211 to revise an order made under Section 65 of the Act, the said power must be exercised in reasonable time and on the facts of the case in which the decision arose, the power came to be exercised more than one year after the order and that was held to be too Page 17 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined late.
12.2 In the decision in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim (1997) 6 SCC 71 this Court while dealing with Section 84-C of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 held that though the said Section does not prescribe for any time limit for initiation of proceeding such power should be exercised within a reasonable time and on the facts of the case, the suo motu enquiry initiated under the said Section after a period of nine months was held to be beyond reasonable time.
12.3 In the decision in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and others vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and others (2009) 9 SCC 352 this Court while dealing with the power of revision under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 held as follows :
"11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein.
121. Similar view has been taken by the learned single Judge of this Court in State of Gujarat vs. Amrutlal Hansrajbhai.
122. In Rameshbhai Ambalal Shah, it was held in paragraph No. 17 as under :-
17. It is clear from the various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where a statute provides any suo motu power of revision without prescribing any period of limitation, the power must be exercised within a reasonable time and what is 'reasonable time' has to be determined on the facts of each case. While exercising such power, several factors need to be kept in mind such as effect on rights of the third parties over the immovable property due to passage of considerable time, change of hands by subsequent bonafide transfers, the orders attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts (such as Land Ceiling Act) etc. Even the two Page 18 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined judgments of the Supreme Court which have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants explain the same principles of law that a reasonable period would be taken upon the factual circumstances of the concerned case. There cannot be any empirical formula to determine the question. The Court/authority considered the question whether the period is reasonable or not as to take into account surrounding circumstances and the relevant factors to decide that question. In the present case, we find that the original owner i.e. the appellants very consciously entered into a transaction way back in the year 1970 and sold land to respondent No.1. It is not their case that at the relevant point of time they were mislead by respondent No.1 herein in any manner or that any fraud was played upon them by respondent No.1 in entering into the transaction and on their own free will and volition they executed the sale deed in favour of the respondent No.1 and accepted the sale consideration. No steps were taken by them for a period of almost 15 years and it is only when the Mamlatdar and ALT, Gandhinagar thought fit to take transaction in suo-motu review that all of a sudden a thought came in the mind of the appellants to say that the transaction was illegal or invalid and now the land should be restored to them as it is.
123. The said case arose out of the proceedings initiated under Section 84C of the Tenancy Act, 1948 on the premise that the sale transactions of the year 1970 was hit by the provisions of Section 63 of the said Act. The appeal filed by the transferor, i.e. the original owner seeking for a declaration of transaction of the year 1970 as invalid and restoration of possession of the property in his favour was dismissed by the Division Bench noticing that legality and the validity of the transaction cannot be looked as power in suo motu review was exercised after unreasonable period of time.
124.In view of the above-discussed settled legal position pertaining to the transactions supposedly hit by Section 54 of the Ordinance, 1949 considering that the proceedings were conducted after a long gap of time, we do not find any substance in the submissions of the learned Additional Advocate General that the result of the order passed by the learned single Judge would be to attach validity to invalid transaction. The said submission, in our considered, opinion is only a hypothetical assumption, inasmuch as, in many of the cases, even the original transferors/transferees are not alive and the question as to whether the transferees were not agriculturists within the meaning of Section 2(c) of Page 19 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined the Ordinance' 1949 of the time of transfer, would require a full fledged inquiry, which can not be permitted after a considerable long period of time in the present bunch of cases. The mutation entries admittedly of all the sale deeds subject matter of consideration herein were certified at the relevant points of time and the summary eviction proceedings were not initiated within a reasonable period of time. The plea that the factum of invalid transfer came to the knowledge of the revenue authorities during the RTS inquiry is not worthy of credence.
125. Lastly, the issue as to whether the decision of the learned single Judge in quashing the show cause notice would result in making an invalid transaction valid, suffice it to note that no presumption as to invalidity to the transactions can be made. To hold the transaction invalid even as per the provisions under the Ordinance 1949, with the amendment brought into force in the year 2015 for insertion of Section 75A, a full fledged inquiry by giving notice to the parties would be necessary.
Moreover, no such inquiry was conducted even during pendency of the Writ petitions before this Court. In such a situation, the transaction remains valid and effective in reality till date.
126. As noted by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda25 the settled position cannot be unsettled in a belated action taken by the revenue authorities. The notices issued to the petitioners to show cause for invalidating the transactions under Section 54 of the Ordinance and the action for eviction as contemplated under Section 75, having been initiated after a long lapse of time and in most cases after the death of both the original transferees and even the original transferor, cannot be said to be justified from any angle."
8. In the present case, the suo-motu proceedings have been initiated after a period of more than 25 years by the Mamlatdar. By any stretch of imagination, the same cannot be said to be initiated within a reasonable period of time. In view of well settled legal position, the suo-motu proceedings have to be initiated within a reasonable period of time.
Page 20 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/1617/1993 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 10/10/2025 undefined The impugned orders are quashed and set aside as being hit by delay and laches and barred by limitation having being initiated beyond the reasonable period of time. The present Special Civil Application is accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
(ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J.) KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN Page 21 of 21 Uploaded by KAUSHIK D. CHAUHAN(HC00197) on Tue Oct 14 2025 Downloaded on : Tue Oct 14 23:59:43 IST 2025