Gujarat High Court
Dy. Collector And Special Land ... vs Patel Prahladbhai Shankardas on 27 November, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 4893 of
2024
In F/CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 26323 of 2024
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DY. COLLECTOR AND SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
(NARMADA PROJECT) & ANR.
Versus
PATEL PRAHLADBHAI SHANKARDAS
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Appearance:
MS NIDHI VYAS, AGP for the Applicants
RAHUL S SHAH(9701) for the Respondent
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 27/11/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. The present application, invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeks condonation of an inordinate delay of 5525 days in preferring the captioned CRA.
2. Factual matrix of the case are as under:-
2.1 That on 22.09.2005, Respondent has filed executive Application being regular Execution Application No. 284 of 2005 in LAR NO. 805 of 1998 and filed execution application as per under section 28 aggregate amount of Rs. 3,50,000/-
including additional compensation, 30% Solatium, 12% amount of price increase.
Page 1 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined 2.2 That on 11.05.2007, the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge has allowed Execution Petition directing Applicant State to pay a sum of Rs. 3,50,056/-. Said order has never been office of Applicants. Even, no legal opinion has forwarded vide office of Deponent till 14.02.2022.
2.3 That on 24.09.2013, the same was answered to Civil Court, Kadi. On 29.11.2023 learned District Government Pleader has forwarded the summons issued in regular Execution No. 13 of 2013 issued by Civil Court, Kadi.
2.4 That on 14.02.2022, the learned Civil Court, Kadi has passed impugned order directing Applicant State to deposit the amount of Rs. 3,50,056/- and Application was filed was certified copy of Execution Petition as well as order passed where under.
2.5 That on 10.03.2022, the certified copies were received. That on 11.03.2022, proposal was forwarded to Narmada Water Resources Water Supply and Kalpsar Department, State of Gujarat. On 01.04.2022 Narmada Water Resources Water Supply and Kalpsar Department, State of Gujarat sought for further details. On 22.04.2022, legal opinion of learned District Government Pleader was sought. The same was forwarded to the Department on 25.04.2022. That on 30.04.2022, certain quarry raised by the Narmada Water Resources Water Supply and Kalpsar Department. The query was replied by Office of Department on 11.05.2022. On 27.05.2022 the proposal was forwarded to the Legal Department. On 01.09.2022 legal Department granted Page 2 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined permission to file Revision Application. The same was forwarded to the office of Deponent on 03.09.2022.
2.6 The office of the Government Pleader, High Court of Gujarat assigned the drafting of CRA to the concerned Assistant Government Pleader, who in turn called the officers for discussion and after discussing the same drafted the CRA alongwith application of condonation of delay.
2.7 Hence, present application for condonation of delay.
3. Learned AGP Ms. Nidhi Vyas appearing for the applicants in line of the ground stated in the application submitted that the file has travelled different tables and which ultimately, comes to the table of the office of the Government Pleader in the High Court of Gujarat. It is explained in the petition and therefore, it is submitted that since sufficient cause has been explained by the State Government and therefore, delay may be condoned. She would further submit that 6% interest was charged upon the interest by the learned Executing Court while executing the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal under the Land Acquisition Act. She would further submit that charging of 6% interest upon the interest already granted by the learned Tribunal under land reference proceedings is an issue, which is raised in the CRA intended to be filed. However, delay of 5525 days has been caused. She would further submit that the learned Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree and charge interest upon the interest.
Page 3 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined 3.1 Merely upon above submission, learned AGP prays to allow this application by condoning he delay and to register the CRA.
4. Learned advocate Mr.Shah appearing for the respondent did not appear despite last chance was granted by previous order.
5. The factual assertion, which is stated in the foregoing paras are the main reasons stated to condone huge and colossal delay of 5525 days.
6. As far as delay has been sought to be condoned, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, let refer section 5 as under:-
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
7. The applicants were obliged to satisfactorily demonstrate and explicate the colossal delay and to convince Page 4 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined the Court that sufficient cause existed for not preferring the appeal / application or moving the requisite application within the statutorily prescribed period. Ordinarily, the Courts adopt a liberal approach while considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, provided that the delay is duly attributable to sufficient cause. Delay cannot be condoned by a mere invocation of "liberal approach," "justice-oriented approach," or "substantial justice." These oft-quoted expressions cannot be deployed to jettison or emasculate the substantive law of limitation.
8. Rule of limitation is based upon principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. Indeed expression 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. This proposition comes into picture when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to party seeking condonation of delay. Whether explanation furnished would constitute 'sufficient cause' or not will depend on facts of each case and there cannot be straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for delay caused in taking steps. While considering the matter, the Court is also required to consider all the fact that why party has not taken steps within time prescribed. The Court should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed time, valuable right has accrued to other party which should not lightly be defeated by condoning delay in routine like manner.
9. Theory of liberal approach should be adjudicated on Page 5 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined theory of due diligence. In the present case, length of delay is 5525 days. It is quite long delay and on going through application as well as arguments, it remains unexplained. They are propelled by the applicants, it does not seem to be germane one and none of the reasons prevented the applicants from filing CRA within time period. It is to be remembered that pleadings and reasons are not backed out by any documentary evidence.
10. According to this Court, the applicants have failed to establish any sufficient reasons which has prevented him to file CRA within stipulated time period.
11. In Lanka Venkateswarlu v/s. State of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 2011 SC 1199], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :-
"Generally the Courts including Supreme Court adopt a liberty approach in considering application for condonation of delay on ground of sufficient cause under section 5 of the Act. However, the concept such as "liberal approach", justice oriented approach, "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation."
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v/s. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy [2024 (2) GLH 217], after surveying earlier judgments in para 33 and 35 has held as under :-
"33. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v/s. Managing committee of Raghunathpur Nagar Academy (2013) Page 6 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined 12 SCC 649, this Court made the following observations :-
21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go Page 7 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning Page 8 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined the delay is not satisfied in this case."
13. Recently, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its aureate enunciation, has held thus:-
"257. We also wish to highlight that the High Court applied the legal position incorrectly in the impugned order and performed an exercise of 'merithunting'. It gave a prima facie relevance to the argument of the respondent no. 1 on the grounds that the suit of the appellant was not at all maintainable in the first place. In paragraph 13 of the impugned order, the High Court recorded that a semblance of right in favour of respondent no. 1 swayed its mind to allow the condonation of delay, and it accepted the same as a 'sufficient cause'. We hold such observations to be erroneous and ex facie bad in law. Similar contentions were rejected by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654 , wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay of 663 days. This Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases of this Court wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:
3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...] Page 9 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined xxx xxx xxx
5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.
6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as 'certificate cases'. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered Page 10 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined from the officers responsible.' (Emphasis supplied)
258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is abundantly clear that the High Court has erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in Page 11 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined the case of the respondent no. 1 against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court. We have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being "sufficient cause" as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court.
261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants Page 12 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice."
14. Thus in the facts and in circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that applicants were not diligent in availing remedy of appeal / application. The averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay in filing application do not inspire any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to exercise discretion in its favour.
15. Another submission that the learned Executing Court has erroneously charged 6% interest u/s 23(1)(A) of the Land Acquisition Act despite the learned Tribunal in reference proceedings, did not pass any such order, has been addressed Page 13 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined by this Court in group of revisions being CRA No.373 of 2022 and allied matters. The observations made by the Coordinate Bench of this Court reads as under:-
"Heard Mr. Manraj Barot, learned AGP for the applicants AND Mr.K.M. Sheth, learned advocate for the respondents.
In the present applications, the challenge is to the order passed by the learned Executing Court awarding compensation under Section 23-1A of the Land Acquisition Act along with interest thereon to which the claimants were entitled as per the Land Reference Case orders. No error has been committed by the Executing Court since it is a clear case of the claimants that the 12% increase as contemplated under Section 23-1A of the Land Acquisition Act was not calculated and paid to them. This position could not be disputed by the learned AGP in executing court as well as in this Court. By the impugned order, the learned Executing Court has only calculated and awarded the said amount along with the interest entitled on it. No case is made out for interference. Present Civil Revision Applications stand dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs."
16. The aforesaid order is also confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Diary) No.13798 of 2024.
17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and upon a meticulous application of the ratio decidendi adverted to hereinabove, this Court finds that, in absence whereof, the very foundation of the allegations crumbles, there is no cogent or credible explanation forthcoming for the inordinate and colossal delay of 5525 days. The application, being sans merits, inexorably merits dismissal and is, accordingly, Page 14 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/4893/2024 ORDER DATED: 27/11/2025 undefined DISMISSED.
18. Consequently, the prayer for registration of the CRA also stands rejected.
(J. C. DOSHI,J) SHEKHAR P. BARVE Page 15 of 15 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Nov 27 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Nov 27 21:57:14 IST 2025