Gujarat High Court
Shaileshkumar Kantilal Rathod vs Shilpaben Mafatlal Makwana on 18 November, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/2153/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 2153 of
2025
In F/SECOND APPEAL NO. 6834 of 2025
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SHAILESHKUMAR KANTILAL RATHOD
Versus
SHILPABEN MAFATLAL MAKWANA
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Appearance:
MR PIYUSH B TRIVEDI(12401) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
NOTICE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 18/11/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. The present application, invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeks condonation of an inordinate delay of 2541 days in preferring the Second Appeal directed against the judgment and decree rendered in Regular Civil Appeal No.34 of 2017, instituted under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. By the said judgment, the learned District Judge, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad, declined to interfere with and thereby affirmed the judgment and decree passed in HMP No.59 of 2015 by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Dholka.
2. Shorn of non-essential details, the relevant factual matrix of the case are thus: The applicant, original petitioner in Hindu Marriage Petition No.59 of 2015, had invoked Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking dissolution of marriage, whereas the respondent preferred an application under Section 9 of the said Act for restitution of conjugal rights. The learned Principal Civil Judge, Dholka, vide judgment dated 14.03.2017, rejected the applicant's Page 1 of 4 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 03:03:44 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2153/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 undefined prayer for divorce and, ergo, allowed the respondent's petition under Section 9. The applicant's Regular Civil Appeal No.33 of 2017 met with the same fate, having been dismissed by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, on 16.12.2017. The applicant has, heretofore, approached this Court by way of the present Second Appeal, albeit accompanied by a delay of 2541 days, sought to be explained on grounds of ignorance of legal remedies, demise of both parents within a span of nine months, the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, and unsuccessful attempts at amicable settlement. However, prima facie, none of the proffered reasons appear sufficient to satisfactorily account for the inordinate delay sought to be condoned.
3. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is as under:-
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-- Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
4. The petitioner was obliged to satisfactorily demonstrate and explicate the colossal delay and to convince the Court that sufficient cause existed for not preferring the appeal or moving the requisite application within the statutorily prescribed period. Ordinarily, the Courts adopt a liberal approach while considering applications for Page 2 of 4 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 03:03:44 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2153/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 undefined condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, provided that the delay is duly attributable to sufficient cause. Delay cannot be condoned by a mere invocation of "liberal approach,"
"justice-oriented approach," or "substantial justice." These oft- quoted expressions cannot be deployed to jettison or emasculate the substantive law of limitation (see: Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRs. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 363).
5. In Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its aureate enunciation, has held thus:-
"259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is abundantly clear that the High Court has erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the respondent no. 1 against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court. We have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being "sufficient cause" as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by Page 3 of 4 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 03:03:44 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2153/2025 ORDER DATED: 18/11/2025 undefined the High Court."
6. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and upon a meticulous application of the ratio decidendi adverted to hereinabove, this Court finds that, in absence whereof, the very foundation of the allegations crumbles, there is no cogent or credible explanation forthcoming for the inordinate and colossal delay of 2541 days. The application, being sans merits, inexorably merits dismissal and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
6.1. Consequently, the prayer for registration of the Second Appeal also stands rejected.
(J. C. DOSHI,J) MANISH MISHRA Page 4 of 4 Uploaded by MANISH MISHRA(HC01776) on Tue Nov 18 2025 Downloaded on : Wed Nov 19 03:03:44 IST 2025