Gujarat High Court
Jakir Musa Jamadar vs State Of Gujarat on 3 July, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/SCR.A/1608/2017 ORDER DATED: 03/07/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION (QUASHING) NO. 1608 of 2017
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JAKIR MUSA JAMADAR & ANR.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR ABHIRAJ R TRIVEDI(5576) for the Applicant(s) No. 1,2
MR CHINTAN DAVE, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED THRU CONCERNED POLICE STATION for the
Respondent(s) No. 2,3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 03/07/2025
ORAL ORDER
At the outset, it is required to be noted that, present petitioners have not pressed for this application insofar as the offence punishable under the IPC. Thus, this application is confined to the offence punishable under the Atrocities Act.
2. By way of this petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioners have prayed for quashment of the FIR being C.R. No. II - 29 of 2017 registered with Karjan Police Station against the petitioners for the offences punishable under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes And The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
3. Heard learned advocate for the petitioners and learned APP for the respondent - State.
4. Though served, none appears for the respondent No.2.
5. Learned Advocate for the petitioners taking to the FIR Page 1 of 8 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Jul 03 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 04 01:13:23 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1608/2017 ORDER DATED: 03/07/2025 undefined would submit that general allegations are made against the petitioners and no such ingredients of the alleged offence is attracted if the FIR is read at its face value. In regards to the allegations made under the Atrocities Act, learned advocate for the petitioners would submit that FIR does not disclose the fact that any derogatory words was used by the petitioner to lower the caste of the first informant. Learned advocate for the petitioner would submit that if the FIR is read as it is no such ingredients of the alleged offence is found prima facie to have been attracted qua the petitioner and therefore by making above submissions, he would submit to allow this petition and to quash the FIR.
6. Learned APP taking this Court through the statement made in the FIR submitted that offence alleged to have been made out against the petitioners as the petitioners have used derogatory words to lower the caste of the complainant and therefore prima-facie material is made out which constitute the offence as alleged in the FIR. He would therefore submit to dismiss the present petition.
7. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and examining the FIR as it is, it appears that allegations are made to the effect that petitioners used derogatory words about the caste of the complainant and even the petitioners threatened the complainant by giving life threat.
8. Prima facie, reading of the FIR does not disclose any offence as alleged under the Atrocities Act in the FIR. It could be noticed that offence under under the provisions of the Atrocities Page 2 of 8 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Jul 03 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 04 01:13:23 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1608/2017 ORDER DATED: 03/07/2025 undefined Act is alleged; however none of the averments made in the FIR attracts the said provision. What could be noticed that at no where it is stated in the FIR that accused belongs to general caste and first informant belongs to schedule caste and by using such derogatory remarks he had insulted his caste in public place. Even, which kind of the words are used to derogate the caste of the complainant is not coming out from the FIR. Baring allegations nothing is coming from the FIR to satisfy the ingredient of the offence alleged against the petitioners. To be noted that presence of third party in whose presence if such derogatory remarks are made is also missing in the present case and therefore also necessary ingredients to satisfy the offence under the Atrocities Act are missing.
9. In Karuppudayar vs State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy and Others [2025 SCC OnLine SC 215], the Apex Court examined the terms public view and has held in paragraph 10 to 11 as under:
"9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal that for constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be established that the accused intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, it will be necessary that the accused abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.
10. The term "any place within public view" initially came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel2. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand3 referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal position as Page 3 of 8 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Jul 03 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 04 01:13:23 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1608/2017 ORDER DATED: 03/07/2025 undefined under:
"14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:"Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view."]. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) "28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an Page 4 of 8 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Jul 03 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 04 01:13:23 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1608/2017 ORDER DATED: 03/07/2025 undefined offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies."
(emphasis in original)"
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place 'within public view', the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view."
10. Thus, the ingredients alleged under the Atrocities Act are missing from the FIR. None of the allegations made in the FIR would attract the offence under the Atrocities Act.
11. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Hutu Ansari @ Futu Ansari Vs. State of Jharkhand rendered in SLP No.6763 of 2023, held as under:-
"7. Admittedly all the prosecution witnesses are related and the specific case of the accused was that due to the enmity, on account of the land dispute, the accused were framed under the SC & ST Act alleging house trespass. Section 3 of the Act charged against the accused is not attracted for reason of the allegations of derogatory terms being used against the complainants, if at all true, was not in a public place nor in the presence of any member of the public. However, we see from the order of the Trial Court that the specific allegation levelled was of wrongful occupation or cultivation in any land owned by or in the possession, allotted to or notified by any competent authority to be allotted to a member of a Page 5 of 8 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Jul 03 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 04 01:13:23 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1608/2017 ORDER DATED: 03/07/2025 undefined Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe as coming out in sub-clause (f) of Section 3(1) of the SC & ST Act. We cannot but notice that there is also an allegation of derogatory terms having been used in the presence of villagers, in the complaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate, which brings in clause (s) of Section 3(1) dealing with abusing any member of a Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe by caste name in a place within public view and clause (r) relating to intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate a member of SC & ST in any place within public view.
11. We cannot but find that there are gross inconsistencies insofar as the complaint and the oral evidence led by way of deposition before the Court. The place of occurrence was stated to be the house, in the complaint, while all the witnesses spoke of the alleged incident having occurred in the field, which was the disputed land. In any event, there is no scope for finding either clause (r) or (s) of Section 3(1) of the SC & ST Act since PW-1 has categorically stated that there was no member of the public present at the time the incident occurred. Insofar as the allegation under clause (f) of Section 3(1) there is nothing to indicate that the complainant and her family were forcefully evicted from the disputed land or that the accused occupied it illegally after delivery was effected on 25.04.2005. As far as the house trespass is concerned, the oral evidence does not support it. On the above reasoning we find absolutely no reason to sustain the conviction as entered into by the Magistrate's Court confirmed by the High Court. We set aside the order of the Magistrate as confirmed by the High Court and acquit the appellants herein."
12. At this juncture, I may refer to the relevant observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335].
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of Page 6 of 8 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Jul 03 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 04 01:13:23 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1608/2017 ORDER DATED: 03/07/2025 undefined decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.Page 7 of 8 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Jul 03 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 04 01:13:23 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION R/SCR.A/1608/2017 ORDER DATED: 03/07/2025 undefined (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
12.1. In view of above, allowing FIR further into trial would be abuse of process of law. Criminal proceedings started is found to be initiated by giving color of criminality. The petition deserves consideration.
13. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed. FIR being C.R. No. II - 29 of 2017 registered with KarjanPolice Station as well as consequential proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof qua present petitioners for the offences punishable under the provisions of Scheduled Castes And The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is quashed and set aside.
14. FIR in question and subsequent proceedings arising there- from in respect of the offence punishable under the IPC stands continued; without being influenced by any observations made in this order.
15. The request of Learned APP to recover the amount of compensation granted to the complainant, if any, is acceded to.
Direct service is permitted.
(J. C. DOSHI,J) SHEKHAR P. BARVE Page 8 of 8 Uploaded by SHEKHAR P. BARVE(HC00200) on Thu Jul 03 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jul 04 01:13:23 IST 2025