Gujarat High Court
Rajan Prints vs Commissioner Of Central Excise & ... on 23 January, 2025
Author: Bhargav D. Karia
Bench: Bhargav D. Karia
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025
undefined
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/TAX APPEAL NO. 1524 of 2011
==========================================================
RAJAN PRINTS
Versus
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS - SURAT - I
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR. PARTH RACHCHH, ADVOCATE FOR MR PARESH M DAVE(260) for
the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR. DEEPAK N KHANCHANDANI(7781) for the Opponent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.N.RAY
Date : 23/01/2025
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA)
1. This appeal is filed under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, being aggrieved by the order dated 16.09.2011 passed by the Customs Excises and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal West Zonal Bench, Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as the 'CESTAT' for short) in Application No.E/COD/ 1015/11 to condone the delay of 178 days in filing application for rectification of mistake against the order dated 01.02.2008 passed by the CESTAT in Appeal No.E/936-937/2007.
2. The appeal is admitted by the order dated 22.02.2012 on the following substantial questions of law :
"Whether the Tribunal below committed substantial error of law in rejecting the application for rectification on the ground of limitation Page 1 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined by not following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of SUNITADEVI SINGHANIA HOSPITAL TRUST v/s UNION OF INDIA reported in 2009 (233) ELT 295 (SC)."
3. Brief facts of the case are as under : -
3.1 The appellant is a partnership firm engaged in undertaking various processes on textile fabrics at the relevant time. During the period from 01.09.1998 to 14.10.1998, under the Compounded Levy Scheme, as per Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, excise duty was to be paid on the basis of number of chambers installed in a machine called a Hot AIR Stenter, whereas excise duties were not to be paid on the actual production of goods or on the value of the goods at the rate of 1,50,000/- per chamber per month at the relevant time.
3.2 During the course of search and survey by the Central Excise Officers at the factory premises of the appellant on 14.10.1998, certain documents like 11 kachcha grey reports, a pocket diary etc., were seized under a pachnama and statements of various persons were recorded. Thereafter, show-
cause notice dated 12.04.1999 was issued on the ground that total quantity of 12,74,625 Lac Meters of man-made fabrics was processed and cleared without payment of excise duties for the aforesaid period, and demand was quantified at Rs.31,01,851/-.
3.3 The appellant filed reply on 18.05.1999 and thereafter Page 2 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined order in original dated 31.03.2000 was passed confirming the demand proposed in the show-cause notice.
3.4 Being aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by order dated 03.04.2006 remanded the case to the Adjudicating Authority for proper quantification of the amount of duty and also penalty depending upon the duty found to be liable to be paid.
3.5 In the remand proceedings, the Commissioner passed an order in original dated 30.04.2007 confirming the demand with penalty of equal amount against the appellant firm and a personal penalty of Rs.5,00,000/- was also imposed on the partner of the appellant firm.
3.6 Being aggrieved, the appeal was filed before the CESTAT, who by the order dated 01.02.2008, disposed of the appeals filed by the appellants upholding the order passed by the Commissioner as regards the demand of the duty as well as penalty on the appellant firm and deleting the personal penalty imposed upon the partner of the appellant firm. The Tribunal also quashed and set aside the confiscation of various quantities of fabrics and also the properties like land, building, plant, machinery etc., 3.7 Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred Tax Appeal No.1644 of 2009 before this Court within the prescribed period Page 3 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined of limitation. The appellant, thereafter, sought the permission to withdraw the appeal for moving appropriate application seeking rectification of mistake before the Tribunal, which was granted by order dated 22.07.2010.
3.8 The appellant, thereafter, filed application for rectification of mistake on 08.03.2011. As there was a delay in preferring such application, the appellant also filed an application to condone the delay of 178 days considering from the date of order passed by this Court from 22.07.2010 till 08.03.2011.
3.9 The Tribunal by impugned order dated 16.09.2011, rejected the application to condone the delay in view of the provision of Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The appellant relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust v/s Union Of India reported in 2009 (233) ELT 295 (SC), so as to persuade the Tribunal to condone the delay and contended that CESTAT has inherent powers to recall the order, if sufficient cause is shown. The Tribunal, however, considering the provision of Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, passed following order rejecting the application to condone the delay : -
"5. It can be seen from the above reproduced provisions that there is a time limit fixed by the statute for filing of application for rectification of mistake apparent from the record. In this case before us, there is undisputedly a delay of 178 days in filing of application before the bench. On careful Page 4 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined perusal of the provisions of Section 35C of Central Excise Act, 1944, we find that we do not have powers to condone the delay in filing application for rectification of mistake.
6. As regards the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel, in the case of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust we, with 'respect would like to reproduce Para 30 wherein their lordships have held:
"30. For the reasons aforementioned, we in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India set aside the impugned judgment with a direction to the Tribunal to hear out the appellants afresh on merit on the said application.
It can be seen from the above reproduced paragraph that the Apex Court has exercised their extra ordinary jurisdiction under the Article 142 of the Constitution of India to set-aside the Tribunal's judgment and has not laid down any specific law on condonation of delay in filing application for rectification of mistake. In our considered-view, the Apex Court judgment in the case of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust is only in respect of civil appeal filed by the said petitioner before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
7. In view of the foregoing, we do not find any merits in the application filed by the applicant for condonation of delay and the same is rejected. Consequently, the application filed for rectification of mistake also stands dismissed."
3.10 Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred this appeal, which is admitted for consideration of the aforesaid substantial question of law.
4. Learned advocate Mr. Parth Rachchh appearing for the appellant referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust (supra), to submit that the Tribunal ought to have exercised its inherent powers beyond the prescribed period of 180 days and the Page 5 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined Tribunal was required to consider prima facie case of the appellant in the application for rectification of mistake, which is described in paragraph No.2 of the application for rectification of mistake to apply the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court relied upon by the appellant, instead of observing that the said decision was passed while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to set aside the judgment of the Tribunal. It was submitted that in the said decision, relied upon by the appellant, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the specific law vis-a-vis for condonation of delay and the inherent powers of the Tribunal.
4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Rachchh referred to and relied upon the following observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust (supra), in support of his submissions : -
"16. Indisputably, the Tribunal considered the appeals preferred by the appellants along with the appeals preferred by two others. It has been contended before us that Dr. Balabhai Nanavati Hospital had filed Customs Appeal Nos. 61 and 62 of 2006 there against before the High Court which had been allowed by an order dated 11.1.2007.
17. From the Tribunal which is the final Court of fact, an assessee is entitled to obtain a judgment wherein all its contentions have been considered. If what has been contended before us by the appellants, namely, it indeed had complied with all the conditions laid down in the Notification are correct and, thus, was not liable to pay any redemption fine or penalty, the Tribunal was bound to consider the said contention.Page 6 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined
18. Apparently, learned Tribunal only considered the factual matrix involved in the case of M/s Miraj Medical Centre W. Hospital and not the factual aspect of the matter involving factual matrix. Appellants' case had purported to have been determined on the question of law without taking into consideration the question whether the law so laid down by the Tribunal is applicable to the fact of the appellants' case or not.
19. It is true that the period of limitation specified in terms of Sub-Section (2) of Section 129(B) of the Customs Act is required to be observed but the Tribunal failed to notice that it has inherent power of recalling its own order if sufficient cause is shown therefor. The principles of natural justice, which in a case of this nature, in our opinion, envisage that a mistake committed by the Tribunal in not noticing the facts involved in the appeal which would attract the ancillary and/or incidental power of the Tribunal necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties, were required to be complied with.
20. While the judges' records are considered to be final, it is now a trite law that when certain questions are raised before the Court of law or Tribunal but not considered by it, and when it is brought to its notice, it is the only appropriate authority to consider the question as to whether the said contentions are correct or not.
21. For the aforementioned purpose the provisions of limitation specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 129 B of the Customs Act would not be attracted. We, however, do not mean to lay down a law that such an application can be filed at any time. If such an application is filed within a reasonable time and if the Court or Tribunal finds that the contention raised before it by the applicant is prima-facie correct, in order to do justice, which is being above law, nothing fetters the judges hands from considering the matter on merit.
22. We may notice that this Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. - 1980(Suppl) SCC 420, held that Industrial Tribunal has an inherent power to set aside an ex-parte award subject of Page 7 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined course to the condition that the same has not been published in the Gazette.
23. Grindlays Bank Ltd.[supra] has been followed by this Court in Sangham Tape Co. v. Hans Raj [(2005)9 SCC 331], stating:
"8. The said decision is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that while an Industrial Court will have jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte award, but having regard to the provision contained in Section 17-A of the Act, an application therefor must be filed before the expiry of 30 days from the publication thereof. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication, and only up to that date, it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute.
9. It is not in dispute that in the instant case, the High Court found as of fact that the application for setting aside the award was filed before the Labour Court after one month of the publication of the award.
10. In view of this Court's decision in Grindlays Bank such jurisdiction could be exercised by the Labour Court within a limited time frame, namely, within thirty days from the date of publication of the award. Once an award becomes enforceable in terms of Section 17-A of the Act, the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, does not retain any jurisdiction in relation to setting aside of an award passed by it. In other words, upon the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award in the gazette, the same having become enforceable, the Labour Court would become functus officio".
24. Yet again in Rabindra Singh v. Financial Commissioner, Cooperation, Punjab & Ors. [2008(8)SCALE 242], this Court held:
"17. What matters for exercise of jurisdiction is the source of power and not the failure to mention the correct provisions of law. Even in the absence of any express provision having regard to the principles of natural justice in such a proceeding, the courts will have ample jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte decree, subject of course to the statutory interdict."Page 8 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined
25. This Court, however, in a slightly different context in Jet Ply Wood (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. Madhukar Nowlakha & Ors [(2006) 3 SCC 699] opined that even an order permitting withdrawal of a suit can be allowed to be recalled by a civil court in exercise of its inherent power.
26. It is only from that point of view this Court passed the aforementioned order dated 13.4.2007.
27. It may be true, as has been contended by Mr. Abhichandani, learned senior counsel that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will have no application in view of the fact that provisions governing limitation are contained in the Customs Act. It is so for in a matter of this nature the Tribunal was required to consider the application filed by he appellant which was filed within a reasonable time. It should have also considered that the appellant had been bonafide pursuing its remedies before this Court."
4.2 Referring to the above observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it was submitted that the Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay as in the order passed in the appeal proceedings, the Tribunal failed to take into consideration the specific submission for non-supply of the relevant documents made by the appellant being lot register and R.G.-I register, which were never provided to the appellant, which had prevented the appellant from proving its case as per the directions issued by the Tribunal while remanding the matter back.
4.3 He, therefore, submitted that as the Tribunal has not followed the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust (supra), Page 9 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside and the matter be remanded back to the Tribunal.
5. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Deepak N. Khanchandani appearing for the respondent submitted that the Tribunal has considered the provisions of Section 25C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and admittedly, the appellant has not filed the application for rectification of mistake within the period of six months and as such, the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay beyond the period of six months. It was further submitted that the appellant has also failed to explain the delay of 178 days from the date of the order dated 22.07.2010 passed by this Court permitting the appellant to withdraw the appeal to file application for rectification of mistake.
5.1 It was further submitted that the Tribunal was bound by the statutory provisions and has no power to condone the delay beyond the time limit prescribed therein. It was submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust (supra), exercised the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do the justice and the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court were required to be appreciated in the facts of the case before it, more particularly, when there is no mistake committed by the Tribunal in not noticing the facts involved in the appeal, which would attract the ancillary and incidental powers of the Tribunal necessary to discharge its function effectively for the purpose of Page 10 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined doing justice between the parties. It was submitted that the Tribunal has considered the decision of the Commissioner while upholding the same, and the Commissioner in turn has considered the aspect of supply of the relied upon documents, which is referred in the order of the Tribunal. It was submitted that even otherwise, prima facie, there is no error apparent on record in the order sought to be rectified by the appellant.
6. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and considering the facts of the case, it is true that the Tribunal has referred to the provisions of Section 35C(2), which provides that the Tribunal may, at any time, within six months from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent on record, amend any order passed by it. In the facts of the case, the appellant challenged the order passed by the Tribunal in the Appeal No. 936 of 2007 before this Court, within the prescribed time limit under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which was withdrawn on 22.07.2010. Thereafter, the appellant preferred an application for rectification of mistake after 178 days beyond the period of six months without explaining the same and there is delay of 178 days, and therefore, the Tribunal has rightly held that it has no power to condone the delay in filing the application for rectification of mistake as the order dated 01.02.2008 was sought to be rectified in 2011. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant at no place, in the application to condone the delay, has even prayed for exclusion of the time spent before Page 11 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined this Court and as such, has prayed for time spent before this Court from 09.09.2008 to 22.07.2010. The reliance placed on behalf of the appellant on the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust (supra), would not be applicable in the facts of the case as the appellant has failed to point out any mistake committed by the Tribunal apparent on the face of the record as we have perused the order passed by the Tribunal in the appeal, wherein the Tribunal after recording the facts has reproduced the observations of the Commissioner with regard to the grievance raised by the appellant for non-supply of the relied upon documents like lot register and R.G.-I register and after considering the same, the Tribunal has passed the order in appeal, whereby the order passed by the Commissioner was upheld. Thus, there are concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the Tribunal and as such, the appellant sought to withdraw the appeal in absence of any substantial question of law arising from the order passed by the Tribunal in appeal being Tax Appeal No. 936 of 2007 so as to file the rectification application.
7. Inspite of these facts, the appellant filed rectification application after more than 7 months and 14 days without there being any explanation showing or providing cause for such delay assuming for a while that the time spent by the appellant from 09.09.2008 till 22.07.2010 is excluded.
8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Page 12 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined Customs and Central Excise versus Hongo India Private Limited and another reported in (2009) 5 SCC 791, while interpreting the provisions of Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35 H of the Central Excise Act, 1944, held that the language used in the provisions was clear that the Legislature intended the Appellate Authority to entertain appeal by condoning delay up to 30 days and as per unamended provision of Section 35H, sufficient time of 180 days was prescribed for filing an appeal and revision, and therefore, it was held that the Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 excluded in absence of laws condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after prescribed period. It was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under : -
"32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.
33. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central Government, the legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days respectively, on the other hand, for filing an appeal and reference to the High Court larger period of 180 days has been provided with to enable the Commissioner and the other party to avail the same. We are of the view that the legislature provided sufficient time, namely, Page 13 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined 180 days for filing reference to the High Court which is more than the period prescribed for an appeal and revision.
34. Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted what we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly excluded in the case of reference to High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law here in this case is Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete Code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.
36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 support the conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to High Court is absolute and unextendable by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act.
37. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the "reference application" filed by the Commissioner under Page 14 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined unamended Section 35H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period of 180 days and rightly dismissed the reference on the ground of limitation."
9. Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, reads thus : -
"(2) The Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within [six months] from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1) and shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by the [Principal Commissioner of Central Excise or Commissioner of Central Excise] or the other party to the appeal:
Provided that an amendment which has the effect of enhancing an assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the other party, shall not be made under this sub-section, unless the Appellate Tribunal has given notice to him of its intention to do so and has allowed him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
(2A) The Appellate Tribunal shall, where it is possible to do so, hear and decide every appeal within a period of three years from the date on which such appeal is filed"
10. There is no clause permitting the Tribunal to condone the delay. It is pertinent to note that Section 35C(2) has been amended with effect from 11.05.2002 vide Section 140(i) of Act of 20 of 2002 to reduce the time limit from four years to six months for rectification of the mistake in the order of the Appellate Tribunal. Thus, the Legislature in his wisdom has fixed the time period of six months to rectify any mistake apparent on record in the order of the Tribunal within a period of six months only, and as such the Tribunal has no power to Page 15 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/TAXAP/1524/2011 ORDER DATED: 23/01/2025 undefined extend the period prescribed beyond six months to entertain any application for rectification of mistake. Therefore, respectfully following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hongo India Private Limited (supra), which is a Larger Bench of Hon'ble three Judges and later decision dated 27.03.2009 as to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of the Sunitadevi Singhania Hospital Trust (supra), dated 17.11.2008 rendered by the Bench strength of the Hon'ble Two Judges, we are of the opinion that though the reasoning given by the Tribunal in paragraph No. 6 may not be sufficient, however, the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is in accordance with law, and therefore, we answer the question in negative i.e. in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The appeal, therefore stands DISMISSED. No order as to costs.
sd/-
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J) sd/-
(D.N.RAY,J) AMAR SINGH Page 16 of 16 Uploaded by AMAR SINGH(HC01081) on Wed Jan 29 2025 Downloaded on : Thu Jan 30 21:18:34 IST 2025