Gujarat High Court
Ishwarbhai Balubhai Patel vs Gujarat Revenue Tribunal on 7 January, 2025
Author: Nikhil S. Kariel
Bench: Nikhil S. Kariel
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025
undefined
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 977 of 2023
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
==========================================================
ISHWARBHAI BALUBHAI PATEL
Versus
GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR. NISHIT P GANDHI(6946) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
ADITYA R GUNDECHA(8869) for the Respondent(s) No. 4,5,6,7
MR JK SHAH, ASST. GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the Respondent(s) No.
2,3
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL
Date : 07/01/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Heard learned advocate Mr.K.B.Virvadia appearing for learned advocate Mr.Nishit Gandhi on behalf of the petitioner, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.J.K.Shah on behalf of the respondent - State and learned advocate Mr.Aditya Gundecha on behalf of respondents no. 4 to 7.
2. By way of this petition, the petitioner challenges an order dated 11.10.2022 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Page 1 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined Tribunal whereby delay in preferring revision application had not been condoned on the ground of sufficient cause not being made out.
3. Learned advocate Mr.Virvadia on behalf of the petitioner would submit that the petitioner was challenging an order passed by the Deputy Collector before the GRT and whereas, while the order passed by the Deputy Collector was dated 23.01.2019, the revision application had been preferred on 25.02.2022.
3.1. It is submitted that in the interregnum, the country was faced with the Covid-19 pandemic leading to lockdown from 25.03.2020 and whereas, it is submitted that while the period after 25.03.2020 would not be counted for calculating the total period which had taken place in filing the application for condoning the delay along with the revision application and whereas, while the delay of 365 days had taken place, the GRT had erred in not condoning the delay. Learned advocate would submit that the petitioner had preferred an application for condoning delay where sufficient reasons were made out and hence, the GRT had committed an error in rejecting the said application.
Page 2 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined 3.2. Learned advocate Mr.Virvadia would emphasize that the petitioner had originally approached the Mamlatdar under Section 70(B) of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act more particularly for being declared as a tenant and whereas, the said application had been allowed vide order dated 18.10.2017 and whereas, the said order had been challenged by the private respondents herein before the Deputy Collector, Pardi by preferring Appeal No.22/2017 which came to be allowed vide order dated 23.01.2019. 3.3. It is submitted by learned advocate Mr.Virvadia that a substantive right which had been recognized by the Mamlatdar and ALT, Umargam vide order dated 18.10.2017 had been set aside by the Deputy Collector vide the order impugned before the GRT and whereas, it is submitted that the GRT, not considering the application on merits and rejecting the application on the ground of delay, has trampled upon the substantive rights which has been recognized and therefore also, interference is called for.
4. On the other hand, the present petition is vehemently contested by learned advocate Mr.Gundecha on behalf of the Page 3 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined private respondents. Learned advocate tenders a copy of affidavit-in-reply which is directed to be taken on record. 4.1. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would submit that the application for condonation of delay does not raise any grounds whatsoever and whereas, the same had been rightly rejected by the learned Tribunal. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would submit that the petitioner, except for stating that he is a poor person, having very less knowledge of law and coming from the lowest strata of the society namely the Scheduled Tribes, has not made out any cause for condoning the delay.
4.2. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would submit that as such, while it was attempted to be submitted before the Tribunal that the petitioner did not know about the legal proceedings till some times near about when he had filed the revision application, yet, it is submitted that while on one hand the petitioner did not challenge the order of the Deputy Collector, on the other hand, the petitioner had somewhere in the year 2019 i.e. prior to June, 2019 preferred a Regular Civil Suit No.21/2019.
Page 4 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined 4.3. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would draw the attention of this Court to an application preferred by the private respondents, who are arraigned in the said civil suit as defendants, under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC more particularly learned advocate would emphasize on the date when the application had been filed i.e. on 15.07.2019. Learned advocate would further emphasize on a panchnama which is annexed with the present petition which is a site inspection report of the land in question in the civil suit and whereas, the site inspection had been drawn on 05.05.2019. 4.4. Learned advocate would submit that while the order passed by the Deputy Collector which was impugned before the GRT was dated 23.01.2019, while, it is the case of the petitioner that he was not aware about the further course of action and that he was a poor person, on the other hand, after the order had been passed by the Deputy Collector, the petitioner had preferred a civil suit before the competent Civil Court and whereas, the petitioner had also contested the same. Learned advocate would submit that thus, as far as the reasons stated in the application for condonation of delay, the same may not be countenanced.
Page 5 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined 4.5. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would further rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sagufa Ahmed vs. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2021) 2 SCC 317, whereby according to learned advocate, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a view that while the period of limitation, as per the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020 would stand extended during the period when the nation was afflicted with the Covid-19 virus, yet, in cases where the prescribed period had elapsed even before the pandemic period, then the party could not be permitted to take shelter under the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court extending the period of limitation on account of Covid-19 virus. Learned advocate Mr.Gundecha would also rely upon decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 (0) AIJEL-SC 74355 dated 29.11.2024 in support of his submissions.
5. Learned advocate Mr.Virvadia in rejoinder would submit that since a substantive right has been recognized by the Mamlatdar which has been set aside by the Deputy Collector, a sympathetic and lenient view may be taken. Learned Page 6 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined advocate would further submit that insofar as the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sagufa Ahmed (supra) that the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was with regard to an application filed after the limitation period before the Tribunal which did not have the power to condone the delay beyond a period of 45 days, i.e. before the NCLAT and whereas, learned advocate would submit that since the facts are different, the said decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. Thus submitting, learned advocate would request this Court to allow the present writ petition.
6. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties and perused the documents on record. The only issue which arises for consideration of this Court is whether the present petitioner had made out sufficient cause for condonation of delay before the GRT and whereas, whether the order of the GRT requires any interference whatsoever. 6.1. To this Court, it would appear that the GRT had rightly come to a conclusion that sufficient cause was not made out and had refused to condone the delay. The reasons for coming to the above conclusion being that a perusal of the application for condonation of delay which is preferred along with the Page 7 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined revision application would reveal that the main reason, as stated for condonation of delay, is an averment that the petitioner was an illiterate person who had no knowledge about law more particularly he did not know as to whether the revision application was to be filed within a particular time period and also a submission that the petitioner belongs to the Tribal Community and resides at one of the farthest places of the State. It is also averred that when the petitioner had come to Ahmedabad for some social function, he had met a learned advocate who had advised him to file a revision application and thus, the revision application had been immediately filed. 6.2. To this Court, it would appear that the reasons made out in the application are not sufficient at all. While it would appear that the GRT having perused the reasons had come to a conclusion that per-se the reasons were not sufficient, to this Court, it would appear that the reasons may not show a sufficient cause on account of a different intervening fact all together. It would appear, as noticed hereinabove, that the order of the Deputy Collector which was impugned before the GRT was dated 23.01.2019. The petitioner, as per the reply filed by the private respondents, had preferred Regular Civil Page 8 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined Suit No.21/2019 on 26.04.2019. It would appear that a panchnama had been drawn in the civil suit on 05.05.2019. It would also appear that the private respondents had preferred an application under Order 7 Rule 11 on 15.07.2019 and ultimately, vide an order dated 23.09.2023, it would appear that the suit had been rejected on the ground of not disclosing a cause of action.
6.3. Again, it would be relevant to refer to the observations of the learned Civil Court at para-6.1 of the order whereby the plant which had been rejected more particularly whereby the Civil Court also observers that the petitioner, after order dated 23.01.2019 passed by the Deputy Collector, never approached the GRT and whereas, that would raise a question as to why the said option was left unexplored in spite of the same being obvious. While it is true that by the time the order in the civil suit had been passed by the learned Civil Court, the petitioner had already preferred the revision application before the Tribunal, yet, the fact of a revision application being available to the present petitioner to challenge order dated 23.01.2019 was also noticed by the learned Civil Court. 6.4. Be that as it may, the crucial aspect being that the Page 9 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined petitioner was legally aware and literate enough to have preferred a civil suit after the order of the Deputy Collector without challenging the same before the GRT and whereas, the circumstance of the civil suit having been preferred would go against the present petitioner inasmuch as the present petitioner would not be able to claim benefit of an illiterate person or even a person belonging to the lowest strata of society or a person not having proper knowledge of law. The petitioner being so much vigilant that he had filed a civil suit when the order of the Deputy Collector was staring at his face, could not be permitted to contend that he was not aware about the legal process and thus, to this Court, it would appear that sufficient cause, as pleaded in the application for condoning delay, cannot be countenanced. 6.5. Furthermore, it would appear that the petitioner, in the application for condonation of delay, has counted the period of delay as thirty days from the date of order till the date of filing i.e. 23.02.2022 and whereas, while the Tribunal has felt it appropriate not to condone the delay of 365 days, to this Court, it would appear that the submission made on behalf of the private respondents that the decision of the Hon'ble Page 10 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined Supreme Court extending the prescribed period on account of Covid-19 virus would not be available to the petitioner. 6.6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in decision of the Sagufa Ahmed (supra) has inter alia observed that if any proceedings were to be instituted after the prescribed period of limitation, then the litigant would not be entitled to claim benefit of order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.03/2020 more particularly whereby the period of limitation had been extended by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on account of Covid- 19 pandemic. Paragraphs No.19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the said decision being relevant for the present purpose, are quoted hereinbelow for benefit:-
"19. But we do not think that the appellants can take refuge under the above order. What was extended by the above order of this Court was only "the period of limitation" and not the period upto which delay can be condoned in exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. The above order passed by this Court was intended to benefit vigilant litigants who were prevented due to the pandemic and the lockdown, from initiating proceedings within the period of limitation prescribed by general or special law. It is needless to point out that the law of limitation finds its root in two latin maxims, one of which is Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt which means that the law will assist only those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who Page 11 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined sleep over them.
20. It may be useful in this regard to make a reference to Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which reads as follows:
"10. Computation of time - (1) Where, by any 19 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period, then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), applies.
(2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts] and, Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887."
21. The principle forming the basis of Section 10(1) of the General Clauses Act, also finds a place in Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as follows: - "4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.-- Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens.
Explanation.-- A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day."
Page 12 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined
22. The words "prescribed period" appear in several Sections of the Limitation Act, 1963. Though these words "prescribed period" are not defined in Section 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the expression is used throughout, only to denote the period of limitation. We may see a few examples:
(i) Section 3(1) makes every proceeding filed after the prescribed period, liable to be dismissed, subject however to the provisions in Sections 4 to 24.
(ii) Section 5 enables the admission of any appeal or application after the prescribed period.
(iii) Section 6 uses the expression prescribed period in relation to proceedings to be initiated by persons under legal disability.
23. Therefore, the expression "prescribed period"
appearing in Section 4 cannot be construed to mean anything other than the period of limitation. Any period beyond the prescribed period, during which the Court or Tribunal has the discretion to allow a person to institute the proceedings, cannot be taken to be "prescribed period".
24. In Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board Versus Subash Projects and Marketing Limited 1, this Court dealt with the meaning of the words "prescribed period" in paragraphs 13 and 14 as follows:(2012) 2 SCC 624 "13. The crucial words in Section 4 of the 1963 Act are "prescribed period". What is the meaning of these words?
14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines" "2(j) 'period of limitation' which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and 'prescribed Page 13 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined period' means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso that follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the 'period of limitation' and, therefore, not 'prescribed period' for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the 'period of limitation' or, in other words, 'prescribed period', in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case."
25. Therefore, the appellants cannot claim the benefit of the order passed by this Court on 23.03.2020, for enlarging, even the period up to which delay can be condoned. The second contention is thus untenable. Hence the appeals are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, they are dismissed."
6.7. While learned advocate Mr.Virvadia had attempted to contend that the said judgment would not be applicable on the facts since the Tribunal where the application was preferred after the period of limitation was not empowered to condone the delay, yet, to this Court, it would appear more particularly from the quoted portion above that the aspect of the Appellate Tribunal not being empowered to condone the delay was not the ground on which the Hon'ble Supreme Court had come to Page 14 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined a conclusion that a party who has preferred a litigation after the prescribed period, would not be entitled to take benefit of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020. Thus, for such reasons, the petitioner not being entitled to claim benefit of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 23.03.2020, as rightly pointed out by learned advocate Mr.Gundecha, the delay would not be 365 days, rather the delay would be approximately more than 1100 days which is all the more reason for not entertaining the petition challenging the order of the GRT refusing to condone the delay.
6.8. Furthermore, insofar as the decision of the Ramkumar Choudhary (supra) by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as relied upon by learned advocate Mr.Gundecha, it would appear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has inter alia after relying upon the earlier decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that when a case had been presented in the Court beyond the period of limitation, then the petitioner has to explain the cause which had prevented the party to approach the Court within the limitation and it is further observed that even though limitation may hardly affect the right of the Page 15 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined party, the same has to be applied with all its rigours as prescribed by the statute. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously, based on the facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. Paragraphs no.4, 5 and 5.1 of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court above is quoted hereinbelow for benefit:-
"4. Evidently, there was enormous delay occurred at every stage i.e., from the date of receipt of the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court to till the date of filing the second appeal by the State. The judgement was passed by the First Appellate Court on 21.08.2014 and the same was communicated by the Government Advocate representing the State to the Collector, only on 25.08.2015 i.e., after a delay of one year. Causing 3 months' delay, by letter dated 10.12.2015, the Collector informed to the Principal Secretary, Revenue Department, about the passing of the judgment against the State and preferring a second appeal against the same. Thereafter, the Law Department took three years' time and gave permission for filing appeal on 26.10.2018, which was sent to the Collector on 31.10.2018. Based on the said opinion, after preparation of the appeal papers, the State filed the second appeal only on 18.10.2019.
5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and Page 16 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi4 , it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram (2023 SCC Online SC 92) wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant."
Page 17 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir (2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489) , wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.Page 18 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.Page 19 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/977/2023 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2025 undefined
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold."
7. Having regard to the discussion as hereinabove and the observations and conclusions based thereupon, to this Court, it would appear that the GRT having not committed any error in condoning the delay, the present petition does not require any interference and is hereby rejected.
(NIKHIL S. KARIEL,J) Bhoomi Page 20 of 20 Uploaded by BHOOMI YOGESHKUMAR MISTRY(HC01557) on Fri Jan 10 2025 Downloaded on : Fri Jan 10 23:05:54 IST 2025