Gujarat High Court
Rameshkumar Rasiklal Vyas vs State Of Gujarat on 4 August, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/6438/2017 ORDER DATED: 04/08/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6438 of 2017
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RAMESHKUMAR RASIKLAL VYAS
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR SAMIR B GOHIL(5718) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS KRISHNA D DESAI, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
Date : 04/08/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. This petition is filed seeking for quashing of the letter dated 1.12.2016 whereby the request of the petitioner to grant him the first higher pay scale with effect from 1.6.1987 has been refused and for a further direction to pay all consequential benefits including the arrears of pay with 9% interest.
2. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had been appointed as an Assistant Teacher on 23.9.1976. It is also not in dispute that there were no promotional avenues to the petitioner despite the petitioner rendering long service to the department.
3. The State had issued Government Resolutions from time to time whereby the higher pay grades were extended to those employees whose chances for a promotion were very less or they had stagnated in the highest pay grade for a long period of time. Ultimately, on 16.8.1994, the Government reviewed all such resolutions and passed a comprehensive resolution. Under this Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994 (as per the Page 1 of 10 Uploaded by OMKAR C. MAHAWAR(HC00201) on Fri Aug 08 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Aug 09 00:12:39 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6438/2017 ORDER DATED: 04/08/2025 undefined translated copy which is furnished), the State had resolved to revise and give the benefits of higher pay to the employees keeping in mind the following objectives:
"3: Revised Higher Pay Scheme :
The Government has implemented the present Higher Pay Scheme vide the above referred resolutions at Sr. No. 1 to 22. The Government was, and is, intended to give benefits of Higher Pay to the employees who do not have any opportunity of promotion during their government service or who have stagnated at the highest pay-level of respective cadre. However, in view of the situation described in the Preamble, reconsidering the prevailing orders has become necessary. After a due consideration in this regard, the Government replaces, ab initio, the provisions under the above read resolutions with this scheme and resolves hereby that the teachers shall be entitled to the First, the Second and the Third Higher Pay when they complete 9, 20 and 31 years in their respective cadre and pay scale. The present orders as to the Second and the Third Higher Pay on 18 th and 27th year, respectively, are revised ab initio with effect from 01-06-1987. The differential amount as per the previous orders, which is credited against the General Provident Fund account of the respective teacher, shall be transferred to the exchequer. Separate orders are being issued in this regard.
In the instances of the teachers who have retired before 1 st August 1994, no recovery or re-fixation of their pay under these orders is required. For the teachers retired till 31 st July 1994 whose Higher Pay is not sanctioned due to administrative reasons, the pay entitled to them before issuing these orders may be sanctioned and their pension may be fixed on that basis. The recovery of the amount of the Second and the Third Higher Pay sanctioned to such teachers and the amount of pension sanctioned accordingly are being forgone."
4. As could be seen from the objective stated in the said resolution, the Government had resolved that the teachers should be entitled to the first, second and third higher pay grades as and when they complete 9, 20 and 31 years of service Page 2 of 10 Uploaded by OMKAR C. MAHAWAR(HC00201) on Fri Aug 08 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Aug 09 00:12:39 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6438/2017 ORDER DATED: 04/08/2025 undefined in their respective cadre and pay scale. This would mean that the petitioner, on completion of 9 years of service, would be entitled to the first higher pay grade. In other words, since the petitioner had completed 9 years on 23.9.1985, he would be entitled to the first higher pay grade with effect from that particular date on which he completed 9 years of service.
5. However, the Government Resolution also imposed certain conditions regarding the extension of this revised pay scale. So far as the petitioner is concerned, Clause 3(7) would be relevant, which reads as follows:-
"3(7) In the instances where an employee has completed 9 years or more or twenty years or thirty one years of service in the same cadre and on the same pay scale as on 1st June 1987, he shall be entitled to only the First Higher Pay on 1st June 1987, on eligibility basis. The Second Higher Pay shall be entitled to him on eligibility basis only when he completes another eleven years in the First Higher Pay. Likewise, the Third Higher Pay shall be admissible on eligibility basis only when he completes another eleven years in the Second Higher Pay."
6. As could be seen from the above, if an employee had completed 9 years of service prior to 1.6.1987, he would to be entitled for higher higher grade with effect from 1.6.1987 even though he had completed 9 years prior to the said date. Since the petitioner had completed 9 years in 1985, notwithstanding the said fact, he would be entitled to first higher grade only from 1.6.1987. It is, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that he was to be extended the first higher pay grade with effect from 1.6.1987.
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7. However, it is the case of the State that the petitioner would be entitled for this higher pay scale only if he had passed the prescribed examination. Reliance is sought to be placed on Clause 3(9) and Clause 3(13) of the resolution, which read as under:
"3(9) The appointing authority of the post of Higher Pay shall be deemed competent to sanction Higher Pay to the eligible teachers. However, a teacher should be eligible to promotion on the basis of overall performance, qualifications and passing of prescribed examination, wherever prescribed. However, while sanctioning Higher Pay, the prevailing Inquiry Procedure/ Selection Method shall be applicable.
In an instance of a teacher becoming eligible to Higher Pay before 05-07-1991, candidates first found eligible as per the Confidential Reports (CRs) for past nine years and thereafter, as per the Confidential Reports for past five years shall be taken into consideration.
Higher Pay cannot be sanctioned to a teacher who, on the date of eligibility, is under suspension or has been given a Charge-Sheet under Rule-9 or 10 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules and the Higher Pay can be sanctioned to the teacher, on eligibility basis, only when he is exonerated in the Departmental Inquiry and taken back on duty. In an instance of withholding of increment, with or without effect in future, Higher Pay can be sanctioned, on eligibility basis, only after completion of nine increments.
A teacher who has completed 45 years of age, as on 05-07- 1991 or before, shall be deemed to be exempted from passing the Departmental Exam from that date and whenever he completes nine years, from 01-06-1987 or thereafter, he shall be entitled to the First Higher Pay. Despite that, where a teacher is to be promoted to a higher post, actually, he is required to pass the prescribed Departmental Exam. A teacher who has completed 45 years of age after 05-07-1991 shall not be deemed exempted from passing the prescribed Departmental Exam.
3(13) For the purpose of promotion, where a teacher passes the Page 4 of 10 Uploaded by OMKAR C. MAHAWAR(HC00201) on Fri Aug 08 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Aug 09 00:12:39 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6438/2017 ORDER DATED: 04/08/2025 undefined Departmental Exam after completing nine years in his cadre, Higher Pay shall be sanctioned, on eligibility basis, on the date of passing such examination."
8. As could be seen from Clause 3(9), the appointing authority is deemed to be competent to sanction the higher pay to the eligible teachers. This Clause also goes on to state that the teacher should be eligible to promotion on the basis of overall performance, qualifications and passing of prescribed examination, wherever prescribed. The State, therefore, contends that the passing of prescribed examination would be the relevant date to extend the higher pay grade and not the date of completion of 9 years of service. In other words, the State seeks to contend that the extension of higher pay grade amounts to a promotion and in order to be eligible for promotion, the candidate should have not only completed 9 years of service but should have also passed the prescribed examination.
9. This argument of the State cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the extension of higher pay grade to an Assistant teacher on completion of 9 years can never be construed or considered as a promotion. An Assistant Teacher who completes 9 years of service is merely given a higher pay grade and significantly he continues in the cadre of Assistant Teacher and is not entrusted with any additional or higher responsibility, which is the hallmark of a higher cadre. If a person remains in the same cadre but is granted a higher pay grade as he has stagnated in that cadre or has no chance of Page 5 of 10 Uploaded by OMKAR C. MAHAWAR(HC00201) on Fri Aug 08 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Aug 09 00:12:39 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6438/2017 ORDER DATED: 04/08/2025 undefined promotion, the grant of a higher pay grade cannot be construed or equated with a promotion.
10. Clause 3(9) would basically come into operation when a prescribed examination is necessary for a promotion. Since there is no promotion granted to the petitioner and the petitioner continued in the cadre of Assistant Teacher till he attained the age of superannuation, the question of applying Clause 3(9) would not arise.
11. Similarly, the reliance placed on Clause 3(13) would also not be attracted. It is wrong on the part of the State to contend that higher pay grade should be sanctioned only from the date of passing of a prescribed examination. Admittedly, the petitioner had been appointed as an Assistant Teacher, and consequently there was no doubt of his eligibility to be appointed as an Assistant Teacher and it is also not the requirement of any Rule which required him to pass any examination for being confirmed as an Assistant Teacher. It is obvious that the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher and had rendered 9 years of service, thereby meaning that there was never any doubt about his eligibility to be an Assistant Teacher. Admittedly, there is no requirement that the petitioner should have passed any examination to continue as an Assistant Teacher. It is, therefore, clear that the reliance placed on Clause 3(13) would also be of no consequence.
12. Learned Assistant Government Pleader lastly highlighted Page 6 of 10 Uploaded by OMKAR C. MAHAWAR(HC00201) on Fri Aug 08 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Aug 09 00:12:39 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6438/2017 ORDER DATED: 04/08/2025 undefined the fact that the petitioner had attained the age of superannuation in the year 2010 and had filed the writ petition 7 years thereafter in 2017. She also highlighted the fact that the petitioner had accepted the revision of higher pay grade with effect from 1993 in 1996 when this benefit was extended after the promulgation of the GR on 16.08.1994 and had approached the Court nearly 20 years thereafter. She, therefore, contended that the petitioner's petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches.
13. It is no-doubt true that the petitioner had approached this Court nearly 7 years after he attained the age of superannuation and more than 20 years after the Government Resolution dated 16.8.1994 was promulgated. It is also to be stated that the benefit of higher pay grade was extended to the petitioner only in the year 1996, which would, therefore, mean that he had approached this Court seeking the benefit of higher pay grade nearly after 21 years.
14. In my view, though the petitioner had approached this Court 20 years after he was denied the benefit of higher pay grade with effect from 1987, the fact remains that it was a policy decision of the State to extend the benefits of higher pay grade to all those employees who had no prospect of being promoted and were stagnating in a particular cadre endlessly. In the light of such a policy which sought to extend benefits which rewarded a long tenure of service to a whole bunch of employees the State should not put forth the plea of delay and Page 7 of 10 Uploaded by OMKAR C. MAHAWAR(HC00201) on Fri Aug 08 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Aug 09 00:12:39 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6438/2017 ORDER DATED: 04/08/2025 undefined laches. If a beneficial policy decision is sought to be made inapplicable to an employee on the ground of delay and laches, that would be a travesty of justice and would be an unfair act on the part of the State, which is required to be a model employer.
15. I am therefore of the view that the interest of justice would be served if a direction is issued to extend the first higher pay grade to the petitioner with effect from 1.6.1987 by revising his salary. Since the petitioner has retired, on the basis of the refixation of his pay with effect from 1987, the petitioner would be entitled to a revised pension on the basis of his revised pay grade with from 27.3.2017 i.e. the date on which he filed this writ petition. It is however made clear that the petitioner would not be entitled for any arrears of salary on account of revision of pay scale or arrears of pension and he would only be entitled to a revision of his pension and payment of revised pension with effect from 27.3.2017, i.e. the date on which the petitioner filed this writ petition.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak V. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation reported in (2022) 18 SCC 144 to contend that the delay should not be held against him. He placed reliance on paragraph-8 of the said order, which reads as follows:
"8. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed. 4 Page 8 of 10 Uploaded by OMKAR C. MAHAWAR(HC00201) on Fri Aug 08 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Aug 09 00:12:39 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6438/2017 ORDER DATED: 04/08/2025 undefined The courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely,
(a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them;
(b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disapprove a stale claim; and
(c) that persons with good causes of action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with reasonable diligence.
Equally, change in de facto position or character, creation of third party rights over a period of time, waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions, albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury, quicken diligence, and prevent oppression. Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties."
17. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the very same judgment has held as follows:
"Therefore, some decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief. However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan during which a person must approach the court for their remedy. Otherwise, Page 9 of 10 Uploaded by OMKAR C. MAHAWAR(HC00201) on Fri Aug 08 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Aug 09 00:12:39 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/6438/2017 ORDER DATED: 04/08/2025 undefined there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and obligations of the parties. (Paras 8 and 9)"
18. As could be seen from the above, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has made it clear that the question of delay and laches could be looked upon where there was some ineptness on the part of the petitioner to approach the Courts. In my view, though the general proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be doubted at all, the fact remains that the petitioner did accept the denial of pay revision to him, way back in 1986 and waited till 2017 to approach this Court. In the context of this undeniable fact, it would be just and proper to restrict the benefit only from the date on which the petitioner approached this Court i.e., from 27.3.2017.
19. In the light of the above, the State shall re-fix the pension as directed above and compute the arrears with effect from 27.3.2017 and make it over to the petitioner within a period of THREE MONTHS from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. The present petition is ALLOWED to the aforesaid extent.
Sd/-
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