Gujarat High Court
M/S Basic Style Pvt. Ltd vs Harshad Harishchandra Mahuvagara on 1 August, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10699 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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M/S BASIC STYLE PVT. LTD. & ORS.
Versus
HARSHAD HARISHCHANDRA MAHUVAGARA & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR. MH SHEKHAWAT(7194) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2,3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 01/08/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Heard Mr. Sunil More, learned advocate for Mr. M.H.Shekhawat, learned advocate for the petitioners.
2. Mr. Prem D. Dave, learned advocate has instructions to appear on behalf of respondent No.1 and seeks permission of this Court to file Vakalatnama on behalf of respondent No.1. 2.1. Permission, as sought for, is granted. The Registry shall accept his Vakalatnama for respondent No.1.
3. Mr. Sunil More, learned advocate for the petitioners has tendered a draft amendment, whereby, seeking permission to delete respondent No.2, who is inadvertently joined in the array of the respondents.
3.1. Permission, as sought for, is granted. The draft Page 1 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined amendment is allowed. Amendment to be carried out accordingly. Respondent No.2 is permitted to be deleted from the array of the respondents of the present writ application.
4. The present writ application is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs:
"8. A) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the impugned Order dated 21.06.2025 passed by the Appellate Court 18th Additional District Judge at Surat, Gujarat in Civil Misc. Application (Delay) No.26 of 2024 in Civil Appeal filed by Petitioners therein at ANNEXURE-A, whereby dismissed the said application on the ground of delay of about 4 years, 7 months and 11 days i.e. 1618 days in filing the said Appeal and thereby condoned the said delay and remand back to the Appellate Court to hear afresh and whereby allow the Petitioners to proceed the said Appeal before Appellate Court; after condoning the said delay in the said matter therein;
B) This Hon'ble Court may further be pleased to grant stay or statuquo pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition and thereby stay the execution taken out by Respondent No.1 vide Darkhast (Execution Application) No.119 of 2023, of Respondent No.1 (original Plaintiff) against the Petitioners before the 2nd Judge City Civil Court at Dindoshi, Mumbai, and / or thereby the further proceedings also in the said Darkhast (Execution Application) No.119 of 2023, pending before the 2nd Judge City Civil Court at Dindoshi, Mumbai, for Orders be stayed or statusquo may be granted in the interest of Justice; till the said Appeal be finally decided by the Appellate Court thereof ;
That in the alternative;
C) That this Hon'ble Court be further pleased to quash and set aside the impugned Order dated 15.07.2019, passed by the Ld. 9th Addl. Senior Civil Court, at Surat, Gujarat, in Summary Suit Case No.26 of 2018, in favour of Respondent No.1 (Original Plaintiff) and against the Petitioners vide impugned Order dated 15.07.2019 at ANNEXURE-B;
D) ......xxxxx.....xxxxx...xxxx"Page 2 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined
5. At the outset, it is required to be noted that during the course of arguments, Mr. Sunil More, learned advocate submitted that petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are husband and wife. This fact was neither pleaded nor pressed into service before the Appellate Court concerned.
5.1. When this Court confronted Mr. More, learned advocate about any proof of marriage between the petitioner Nos.2 and 3, he has produced a copy of "Nikah Nama"
showing that they are husband and wife.
5.2. When this Court has gone through such "Nikah Nama", it appears that it was dated 11.08.2020, which is undoubtedly post judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court on 15.07.2019. The addresses, which are at Nos.2 and 3 provided in the cause-title of the present writ application as well as in appeal filed before the Trial Court, would indicate that petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are residing at different addresses. Further, bare reading of name of petitioner No.3 would indicate that he is not belonged to Muslim community.
5.3. Be that as it may, prima facie, it appears that to divert the attention of this Court, a false plea has been taken by the petitioners under the guise that daughter of petitioner No.2 suffering from some illness and to contend that petitioner No.3 happens to be father of daughter, such plea of marriage has been pressed into service before this Court.Page 3 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined 5.4. It is very deplorable and disgraceful conduct on the part of the petitioners to use the medical condition of a child not born out of the wedlock of petitioner Nos.2 and 3, even if it is believed that they got married on 11.08.2020.
5.5. Mr. More, learned advocate would not be in a position to dispute the aforesaid factum of execution of "Nikah Nama"
placed it before this Court. This Court is not at all accept such kind of mischief played by the present petitioners just to get out of inordinate delay in filing their appeal before the Appellate Court. As such, this Court is going to impose exemplary costs upon the petitioners to mislead and misguide this Court in the aforesaid aspect.
6. THE BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 6.1. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, it appears that petitioners herein are original defendants of Summary Suit No.26 of 2018 filed by the respondent herein wherein on service of summons, petitioners have appeared through their lawyer and sought time to file leave to defend on service of summons of judgment upon him.
6.2. The impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court indicates that despite granted sufficient opportunity, no such leave to defend was filed. Consequently, as per Order 37 of Civil Procedure Code, a decree of Rs.28,01,894/- was passed Page 4 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined by the Trial Court on 15.07.2019. The petitioners did nothing for years together having not questioned such decree.
6.3. It further appears that having faced with the execution proceedings initiated by the respondent, they thought it to file Regular Appeal under Section 96 read with Order 41 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "C.P.C.") before the Appellate Court, which appears to have been filed on 26.02.2024. So, there was a delay of 4 years, 7 months and 11 days in filing such appeal.
6.4. This Court is not having copy of delay application submitted by petitioners along with their appeal but to place on record the copy of impugned judgment which has incorporated most of the facts which are narrated in the delay application.
6.5. The main ground set out by the petitioners for such inordinate delay was, having not been informed by the lawyer engaged by them and another ground set out is illness of petitioner No.2's daughter. The lame excuse also given by the petitioners that due to Covid-19 situation, appeal could not be filed in time.
6.6. After hearing the parties, the Appellate Court has not found any sufficient cause made out by the petitioners, whereby, rejected impugned delay application vide its order Page 5 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined dated 21.06.2025.
7. Having dissatisfied with the aforesaid order passed by the Appellate Court, the petitioners happen to be the original appellants - defendants have preferred the present writ application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
8. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS - DEFENDANTS.
8.1. Mr. Sunil More, learned advocate would submit that due to Covid-19 situation and due to medical condition of petitioner No.2's daughter, appeal could not be filed in time, which ought to have been considered as a sufficient cause in not filing an appeal in time.
8.2. Mr. More, learned advocate would further submit that petitioners were not made aware about passing of ex-parte decree inasmuch as lawyer engaged by the petitioners have never communicated this fact to the petitioners. It is submitted that sufficient cause may be construed liberally and hyper technical approach may be avoided to advance justice to the parties.
8.3. Mr. More, learned advocate would further submit that petitioners have no malafide intention not to file an appeal in time but due to facts, which are set out in the delay application and constitutes sufficient cause, requires to have been considered by the Appellate Court and having not done Page 6 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined so, committed serious errors of law, which may be corrected by this Court while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
8.4. Mr. More, learned advocate would further submit that as such, petitioners have a good case on merits and according to him, Summary Suit itself was not maintainable, thereby, one opportunity may be given to the petitioners to present their case on merit.
8.5. Lastly, Mr. More, learned advocate would submit that this Court may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in the present case and may condone the delay in filing the appeal by imposing any reasonable cost which can compensate otherside.
8.6. To buttress his arguments, Mr. More, learned advocate would rely upon the following four decisions, which are as under:
i. Nainesh Girishkumar Panchal V/s. Chirag Girishkumar Panchal (decided by the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in CA NO.134 of 2021 in F/Appeal from Order No.26865 of 2020 [on 08th March, 2021]);
ii. Decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. V/s Standard Casting Pvt. Ltd., (decided on 13.05.2022);
iii. Jyotsna K. Valia V/s. T.S.Parekh and Co., (decided on 26.04.2007) and Page 7 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined iv. Decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Corporation Bank Vs. Bhukya Ramesh in Suit No.197/ 2013 (decided on 10.12.2013).
8.7. Making the aforesaid submissions, Mr. More, learned advocate requests this Court to allow the present writ application.
9. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT - PLAINTIFF.
9.1. Mr. Pradip D. Dave, learned advocate would submit that as such, there is no error much less any gross error of law committed by the Appellate Court while rejecting the impugned delay application.
9.2. Mr. Dave, learned advocate would further submit that the Appellate Court has examined the delay application on its merit and considered each and every aspects of the case and having come to definite conclusion that there is no sufficient cause made out by the petitioners.
9.3. Mr. Dave, learned advocate would further submit that the petitioners were served with the summons of Summary Suit wherein they have appeared through lawyer, to whom, copy of summons for judgment was served and then after, learned advocate for the petitioners sought time to file leave to defend which never filed on record. It is submitted that when no leave to defend application came to be filed by the petitioners, as per provisions of Order 37 of C.P.C., decree is required to Page 8 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined be passed by the Trial Court and accordingly, such decree was passed on 15.07.2019.
9.4. Mr. Dave, learned advocate would further submit that there was long, inordinate and unexplained delay of 4 years, 7 months and 11 days in filing Regular Appeal, challenging such judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and as such, till date, respondent has not received any amount under decree and in that view of the matter, this Court may not exercise its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioners.
9.5. It is respectfully submitted that wherever there is a long, inordinate and huge delay on the part of the applicant/s in legal proceedings, if it is found that there is a gross negligence on the part of the applicant/s, such delay should not be condoned in a routine manner.
9.6. So, making the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Dave, learned advocate requests this Court to reject this writ application.
10. POINT FOR DETERMINATION 10.1. The short question falls for my consideration as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, any gross error committed by the Appellate Court while rejecting the delay application filed by the present petitioners.
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11. ANALYSIS
12. The facts, which are stated hereinabove, are not in dispute. As such, the delay of more than 4 years, 7 months and 11 days in filing Regular Civil Appeal by petitioners is neither satisfactorily explained nor any sufficient cause made out by them. It is remained undisputed as observed by the Appellate Court in para-7 that summons for judgment was served upon advocate of petitioners, who did not file any leave to defend on behalf of the petitioners.
13. So, in that situation, no fault can be found with the Trial Court when it passed decree as per provisions of Order 37 of C.P.C. Such decree was passed on 15.07.2019 and undisputedly, as judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Covid-19 situation was not in existence at that point of time. The petitioners have tried to take undue advantage of Covid-19 situation which erupted in India only in the month of March 2020 onwards which was lasted till mid of 2022.
14. Be that as it may, post Covid-19 situation, there was ample opportunity and time available with the petitioners to file appeal, which they did not do for more than one and half years as appeal was filed only on 26.02.2024. The non- communication of judgment and decree by lawyer engaged by petitioners would not be a ground and it did not constitute sufficient cause inasmuch as it was duty of petitioners to take Page 10 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined update of the case instituted against them.
15. It appears that petitioner No.1 is a limited company and it cannot play ignorance of law as affairs of private limited company would be handled by not an illiterate person.
16. Likewise, medical condition of daughter of petitioner No.2, which was pressed into service before the Appellate Court, is also not found satisfactory reason for seeking condonation of delay by petitioner No.1 happens to be the company / jury's person.
17. It has been specifically observed by Appellate Court in para-8 of its impugned judgment that no evidence has been submitted to show that daughter of petitioner No.2 was continuously hospitalized during entire period i.e. between 15.07.2019 till appeal came to be filed on 26.02.2024.
18. It is correctly observed by the Appellate Court that assuming for the timing that petitioner No.2 might be occupying herself with medical illness of her daughter but such condition was not prohibiting petitioner Nos.1 and 3 in prosecuting any affairs of the company, thereby, they could have easily filed the appeal. I am in complete agreement with the view taken by the Appellate Court on this regard.
19. Having so observed in the earlier part of this judgment, how condition of child has been pressed into service by the Page 11 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined petitioners just to get undue advantage of such situation and to get condoned such huge delay of more than 4 years in filing the appeal. This Court cannot allow such dilatory tactics used by the petitioners, which is deprecated.
20. At this stage, it would be apt to refer and rely upon the recent past decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India delivered on 08-01-2025 in a case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased By Lrs. reported in Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2025 reported as 2025 INSC 53, wherein held as under:
"[13] We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation.
[14] We are constrained to observe that the High Court has exhibited complete absence of judicial conscience and restraints, which a judge is expected to maintain while adjudicating a lis between the parties.
[15] The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.
[16] The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering Page 12 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
[17] We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time."
(emphasis supplied) 20.1. In the case of Rajneesh Kumar & Anr V/S Ved Prakash reported in 2024 (14) SCALE 406, wherein held as under;
"[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.
[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-
"The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also Page 13 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims."
(emphasis supplied) 20.2. It is also apposite to refer and rely upon the decision in the case of K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., reported in 2024 (4) Scale 759, wherein, after revisiting the law on the aspect of condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
"10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is apparent that the words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81). The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and are reproduced as under:
"21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
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21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation."
(emphasis supplied) 20.3. Last but not least, it is also profitable to refer to and rely upon ratio laid down by recent past decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India in a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 INSC 286 : 2024 (4) SCR 241 :
2024 (4) Scale 846, wherein after referring to its previous decisions, summarized the case law on the issue of limitation vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of "sufficient cause". It has been held thus:-Page 15 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined "[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
(emphasis supplied) 20.4. It is also profitable to rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of case of Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81, wherein it is held as under:-
Page 16 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined "15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
21. The judgments, which are cited by Mr. More, learned advocate for the petitioners, in support of his submissions are not going to help in light of the aforesaid clear pronouncement of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, which is binding to this Court. So, this Court not thought it fit to deal with any of such decisions cited by learned advocate for the petitioners.
22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case and having applied the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, in the above referred decisions, I am of the view that there is neither any gross error of law nor any jurisdictional error committed by the Appellate Court while rejecting the impugned delay application, rather, I am in complete agreement with the view taken by the Appellate Court while rejecting the delay Page 17 of 18 Uploaded by LALJI AMRUTBHAI DESAI(HC01558) on Mon Aug 04 2025 Downloaded on : Mon Aug 04 21:58:04 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025 undefined application.
23. CONCLUSION.
23.1. In view of the aforesaid, there is no merit in the present writ application inasmuch as no sufficient cause made out by the petitioners in their delay application filed before the Appellate Court. Having come to this, the present writ application is bereft of any merit, requires to be rejected, which is hereby REJECTED.
23.2. This Court would not have burdened the petitioners by imposing a cost while rejecting the present writ application but having considered the conduct of the petitioners, which is recorded in the first part of this judgment, this Court deems it fit to impose a costs of Rs.25,000/-, to be deposited by the petitioners before District Legal Services Authority, Surat within a period of two weeks from today. Compliance of this part of order be taken care by the Trial Court / Executing Court.
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