Gujarat High Court
The Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd vs Suthar Nathalal Jivram Since Died ... on 2 April, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 104 of 2011
With
R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 113 of 2011
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 2 of 2011
In R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 113 of 2011
With
R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 114 of 2011
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 2 of 2011
In R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 114 of 2011
With
R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 115 of 2011
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 2 of 2011
In R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 115 of 2011
With
R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 117 of 2011
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 2 of 2011
In R/APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 117 of 2011
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THE OIL & NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD
Versus
SUTHAR NATHALAL JIVRAM SINCE DIED THROUGH LHR & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR AJAY R MEHTA(453) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
DECEASED LITIGANT for the Respondent(s) No. 20,24.1
DECEASED LITIGANT THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS/ REPRESTENTATIVES
for the Respondent(s) No.
1,10,10.1,11,12,13,13.2,14,14.1,14.2,15,15.3,15.4,16,24,25,26,27,27.1,27.5,2
9,35,38,39,40,40.2,40.3,40.4,41,42,43.1,6,8,9
MR AAKASH CHHAYA, ASST GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
Respondent(s) No. 46
MR JAL S. UNWALLA(1235) for the Respondent(s) No.
10.2,10.3,10.4,11.2,12,13.1,13.2,14.1,14.2.1,14.2.2,14.2.3,15.2,15.3,15.4,15.
5,16,21,24.2,24.3,26.1,3,32,33,34,36,38,39,40.2,40.3.2,40.3.3,40.3.4,40.4.2,4
1,42.5,42.6,43,5,8
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No.
10.1.1,10.1.2,10.1.3,10.1.4,10.2,10.4,11.1,11.2,13.1,14.2.1,14.2.2,14.2.3,15.1
,15.2,15.5,17,18,19,2,22,23,24.4,24.5,24.6,26.1,26.2,26.3,27.2,27.3,27.4,27.5
.1,27.5.2,27.5.3,28,30,31,37,4,40.3.1,40.3.2,40.3.3,40.3.4,40.4.1,40.4.2,40.4.
3,40.4.4,42.1,42.2,42.3,42.4,42.5,42.6,44,45,7
RULE UNSERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 43.2
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NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025
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UNSERVED EXPIRED (R) for the Respondent(s) No. 40.1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 02/04/2025
COMMON ORAL ORDER
1. All these appeals are filed under Order 43 Rule 1(w) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the judgment and order dated 26th May 2010, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Mehsana, in Civil Miscellaneous (Review) Application Nos. 7 to 11 of 2009.
2. Heard learned counsel Mr. Ajay Mehta for the appellant and learned counsel Mr. Farsheed Kavina for some of the respondents and learned assistant government pleader Mr. Aakash Chhaya for respondent - State.
3. Submissions of appellant:
3.1 Learned counsel Mr. Ajay Mehta for the appellant would submit that the impugned order is passed dehors the rule of procedure as well as contrary to the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court and requires to be interfered with Page 2 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined by this court.
3.2 Learned counsel Mr. Mehta would further submit that there are a number of reference cases filed in the matter by various farmers/land-owners, but surprisingly, a common review application is filed in the matter. He has provided a common chart to better understand his arguments, which reads as under
:
Review Ref. Ct. HC date SC date
Sr. AO Sec 4
App. LAR No. date and and and
No. No. Sec 6
No amount amount Amount
Civil
FA 4531 Appeal No.
209 of - 62 of 5711-34 of
23.7.97
104/20 8 of 1988 & 27.05.82 1997 2000
1 50/-p. sq.
11 2009 Ors. 32 02.06.83 04.5.98
mtr.
matters 42/- p.
sq. mtr. 38 psm
27.9.2000
FA 5112
to 5116
524 of 27.11.97
113/20 10 of 05.01.84 of 1998
2 1988 & 4 40/- per
11 2009 13.09.84 Dismiss
ors. sq. mtr.
on
17.7.01
3 114/20 9 of 464 of 22.10.81 27.11.97 CA
11 2009 1988 & 27.05.82 40/- per 10882 to
Ors. 19 sq. mtr. 10900 of
matters 1998 FA
5162 -
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NEUTRAL CITATION
C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025
undefined
Review Ref. Ct. HC date SC date
Sr. AO Sec 4
App. LAR No. date and and and
No. No. Sec 6
No amount amount Amount
5180 of
1998
Dismiss
on
08.1.02
333 of
12.3.98
115/20 11 of 1991 & 09.07.81
4 35/- per
11 2009 Ors. 8 16.06.83
sq. mtr.
matters
FA 942 -
476 of 988 of
27.11.97
117/20 7 of 1988 & 24.12.81 1999
5 40/- per
11 2009 Ors. 47 05.08.83 03.4.01
sq. mtr.
matters 38/- p
sq. mtr.
3.3 Learned counsel Mr. Mehta would further submit that a common review application is not at all maintainable and only on this count the same was required to be rejected by the reviewing court. He would further submit that the order passed by the reference court is required to be set aside by this court.
3.4 Learned counsel Mr. Mehta would further submit that the order passed by the reference court in the year 1997 was modified by this court and ultimately the Honourable Apex Court has decided all these reference cases by fixing the Page 4 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined market price.
3.5 Learned counsel Mr. Mehta would further submit that, as per the law, review before the reference Court itself is misconceived as the decree passed by the reference court was eventually merged in the orders passed by the Apex Court.
3.6 Learned counsel Mr. Mehta would further submit that the impugned order is passed contrary to the provisions of Section 114 read with Order 47 of CPC.
3.7 Learned counsel Mr. Mehta would further submit that there was no discussion by the reviewing court while passing the impugned order, so far as any error; rather, a clarification has been given in the impugned order, which is unknown to review jurisdiction.
3.8 Learned counsel Mr. Mehta would further submit that while passing final judgment and decree by the reference court and/or High Court, no interest on the solatium amount has been ordered. Under the guise of review, the reviewing court Page 5 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined could not modify such judgement and decree which has been ultimately merged in the order passed by the Apex Court.
Learned counsel Mr. Mehta would rely upon the following decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court:
(1) Sundar vs. Union of India reported in 2001 (7) SCC 211 : AIR 2001 SC 3516 (2) Gurupreet Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2005) 8 SCC 457 (3) ONGC Ltd. Vs. Bhliben Lal Ratanji & Anr. Passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Special Civil Application No.5341 of 2010 an allied matters.
3.9 Thus, learned counsel Mr. Mehta requested this court to allow the appeal.
4. Submissions of respondents:
4.1 Per contra, learned counsel Mr. Farsheed Kavina appearing for private respondents opposed the present appeals contending interalia that there is no error committed by the reviewing court while entertaining the review application filed by the Page 6 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined original applicant and so, it has been correctly allowed. 4.2 Learned counsel Mr. Kavina would submit that when interest on the solatium is not expressly denied either by the High Court or by the Supreme Court, the reviewing court in the review jurisdiction is entitled to clarify that applicants are entitled to interest on the solatium.
4.3 Learned counsel Mr. Kavina would further submit that it is true that a common review application is filed by all farmers/land-owners instead of individual ones, but considering the fact that granting of interest on solatium is based on benevolent provisions, such hyper-technical approach may not be accepted by this court.
4.4 Learned counsel Mr. Kavina would submit that when there is no express denial of interest on solatium in the earlier round of litigation, applicants are entitled to interest on solatium, which is now the settled legal position of law. 4.5 In support of his submissions, he is relying upon a decision Page 7 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined in the case of Tamil Nadu Housing Board vs. Abdul Salam Sarkar & Ors. repoted in (2021) 17 SCC 823. 4.6 Thus, making the above submissions, he requested this court to dismiss the present appeal.
No other and further submissions are made.
5. Analysis:
5.1 Heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.
At the outset, it is required to be observed that the reviewing court, while passing the impugned order, has completely lost sight of one fact - that the original judgment and decree passed by the reference court first merges in the judgment and decree passed by this court, when it partly allowed the appeal of the present appellant in the year 1998. The judgment and decree passed by this court also merged in the judgment and order passed by the Honourable Apex Court in the year 2000. 5.2 Thus, eventually the original decree passed by the reference court merges in the judgment and order passed by Page 8 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined the Supreme Court, as leave was already granted by the Honourable Apex Court before passing the order. Law on the doctrine of merger is well settled need not further requires to be discussed herein after.
5.3 Be that as it may, to make things more clear, observations made by the Division Bench while partly allowing the Special Civil Application No. 5341 of 2010 and allied matters need to be considered, whereby it can be so clear that the judgment and decree passed by the reference court was substantially modified by this court (see page 45).
5.4 The reviewing court, without noticing the full background of merger and the orders passed by this court and the Apex Court, only relying upon the decree passed by the reference court, which no longer existed, clarified such decree by passing the impugned order. Such approach on the part of the reviewing court is deplorable, exceeding its jurisdiction so vested in it, highly improper and requires to be deprecated. Page 9 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined 5.5 So far as filing of a common review application for all land-owners/farmers is concerned, when there are different references filed by different landlords, there would be a separate judgment and decree drawn by the reference court, this court and as the case may be, Honourable Apex Court. In such a situation, a common review application could not have been allowed. Surprisingly, such an application filed in a casual manner and accordingly, it were entertained by the reviewing court. According to me, the common review application filed in all these reference cases is required to be rejected on such technical issue and could not have been entertained by the reviewing court.
5.6 So far as the decision of Honourable Apex Court delivered in the case of Sundar (supra) is concerned, its applicability is subsequently clarified by the Honourable Apex Court in the case of Gurpreet Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2006) 8 SCC 457, wherein in para-44 the Apex Court observed and held as under:
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NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined " 44. One other question also was sought to be raised and answered by this Bench though not referred to it.
Considering that the question arises in various cases pending in Courts all over the country, we permitted counsel to address us on that question. That question is whether in the light of the decision in Sunder (supra), the awardee/decree holder would be entitled to claim interest on solatium in execution though it is not specifically granted by the decree. It is well settled that an execution court cannot go behind the decree. If, therefore, the claim for interest on solatium had been made and the same has been negatived either expressly or by necessary implication by the judgment or decree of the reference court or of the appellate court, the execution court will have necessarily to reject the claim for interest on solatium based on Sunder (supra) on the ground that the execution court cannot go behind the decree. But if the award of the reference court or that of the appellate court does not specifically refer to the question of interest on solatium or in cases where claim had not been made and rejected either expressly or impliedly by the reference court or the appellate court, and merely interest on compensation is awarded, then it would be open to the execution court to apply the ratio of Sunder (supra) and say that the compensation awarded includes solatium and in such an event interest on the amount could be directed to be deposited in execution. Otherwise, not. We also clarify that such interest on solatium can be claimed only Page 11 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined in pending executions and not in closed executions and the execution court will be entitled to permit its recovery from the date of the judgment in Sunder (September 19, 2001) and not for any prior period. We also clarify that this will not entail any re-appropriation or fresh appropriation by the decree-holder. This we have indicated by way of clarification also in exercise of our power under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India with a view to avoid multiplicity of litigation on this question. "
(emphasis supplied) 5.7 So, the ratio of Gurpreet Singh (supra) would clarify that in a case where interest on solatium had been made but negated by the judgment and decree of the appellate court, the executing court - relying on the decision in Sundar (supra) cannot go beyond the decree. Nonetheless, in a situation where the decree is silent on the aspect of interest on solatium, the executing court, in a pending execution application, may consider granting interest on solatium, not otherwise. 5.8 Admittedly, after passing of the decree and final order passed by Honourable Supreme Court in the present matters, Page 12 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined no execution was ever filed or was pending. For reasons best known to the applicants, a review application came to be filed. In the case of Abdul (supra) cited by learned counsel Mr. Kavina, it would not be applicable to the facts of the present case, as in that case it appears that the question of applicability of the Sundar's judgment was kept open by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, which is not the case here.
5.9 It is required to be observed that when the Honourable Supreme Court has decided other appeals filed by the appellant in the year 2000, admittedly, no execution was either pending or filed thereafter. The decision of Sundar (supra) came on 19th September 2001, after about one year, the impugned review application filed by the applicant, it would not be permissible in law, as there was no error apparent on the face of the record, the review application ought not to have been filed before the reviewing court, and in any case, it ought not to have been allowed by reviewing court for the aforesaid Page 13 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined reasons.
5.10 The scope of review is well defined by numerous decisions of Honourable Supreme Court but it is apt to refer and rely upon following decisions which may be appropriately applied to the facts germen from the matter.
(1) In a case of Lily Thomas Vs. Union Of India reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224 it is held as under:
"52. The dictionary meaning of the word "review" is "the act of looking, offer something again with a view to correction or improvement. It cannot be denied that the review is the creation of a statute. This Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 held that the power of review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. The review is also not an appeal in disguise. It cannot be denied that justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers and the rules or procedures or technicalities of law cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. Law has to bend before justice. If the Court finds that the error pointed out in the review petition was under a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice nothing would preclude the Court from rectifying the error. This Court in Page 14 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595 held :
"Review literally and even judicially means re- examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the Courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest Court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the Courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai, AIR 1941 FC 1 the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh (1836) 1 Moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court has final and could not be altered.
". . . . . . . .nevertheless, if by misprison in embodying the judgments, by errors have been introduced, these Courts possess, by Common Law, the same power which the Courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. . . . . The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords Page 15 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined have however gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.' Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under :
It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevaling to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.' Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Art. 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferrred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Art. 137 of the Constitution. And Cl. (c) of Art. 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under Page 16 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest in justice or to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The Court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice."
The mere fact that two views on the same subject are possible is no ground to review the earlier judgment passed by a Bench of the same strength.
56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment."
(emphasis supplied) Page 17 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined (2) So also in a case of Sanjay Kumar Agarwal vs. State Tax Officer and Anr. Reported in (2024) 2 SCC 362 , it has been so held by Honourable Supreme Court that subsequent decisions of Apex Court declaring and or clarifying law would not ipso facto become ground to review the decision which is already decided by Court and accepted by parties to lis unless its pending before higher court. It has been held thus:
"15. It is very pertinent to note that recently the Constitution Berich in Beghar Foundation v. K.5. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar Review-5 J., held that even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of coordinate Bench or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.
16. The gist of the aforestated decisions is that:
16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.
16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be Page 18 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.
16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected".
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". 16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided. 16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
16.8. Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review." (emphasis supplied) Thus, view it from any stand point of view, order impugned in the appeal is not only erroneous one, perverse but bad in law having passed by trial Court exceeding its jurisdiction so vested Page 19 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined in it.
5.11 Furthermore, I am also of the view that the review application could not have been presented by all claimants in a composite manner when there were separate references and separate judgments passed by the courts. The clarification which has been given in the impugned order is also not required, because as per the doctrine of merger, the decree passed by the trial court is merged with the decree of this court and ultimately with the Apex Court.
6. Conclusion:
6.1 Thus, in view of the aforesaid observations, discussions and reasons, the impugned order dated 26th May 2010 challenged by way of the present appeal requires to be interfered with by this court while exercising powers under Order 43 Rule 1(w) of the CPC, as it is not only passed exceeded to its jurisdiction but has not appropriately exercised the jurisdiction so vested in it and as such the impugned order is passed beyond the ambit, scope and preview of Order 47 of the CPC thereby it is held Page 20 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/AO/104/2011 ORDER DATED: 02/04/2025 undefined be erroneous and perverse.
6.2 All these factors lead to only one conclusion - that the impugned order dated 26.05.2010 passed in Civil Misc.
(Review) Application No. 7 to 11 of 2009 by the learned Additional District Judge and Presiding Officer, 1st Fast Track Court, Mahesana, is bad in law, passed by exceeding its jurisdiction thereby, requires to be quashed and set aside and accordingly the same is hereby quashed and set aside. All appeals are allowed accordingly.
6.3 In view of disposal of main appeals, civil applications are also disposed of accordingly.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J) DRASHTI K. SHUKLA Page 21 of 21 Uploaded by DRASHTI K. SHUKLA(HC00354) on Mon Apr 21 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Apr 26 02:16:19 IST 2025