*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 19th November, 2014
+ W.P.(C) No.7969/2014 & CM No.18678/2014 (for stay)
DHARMAPRACHAR SABHA & ANR. ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. M.N. Krishnamani, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. Manjula Gupta, Mr. Kanak
Tyagi, Mr. Nikhil Sharma & Mr.
Rahul Bhandari, Advs.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Abhay Prakash Sahay with Mr. Deepak Gupta, Mr. Amit Kishore Sinha, Ms. Indu Prabha & Ms. Sonya Rathore, Advs.
Mr. K. Raghavacharyulu & Ms. Arunima Pal, Advs. for R-3.
CORAM:-
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J
1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, filed as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL), seeks i) revocation of the Certificate issued by the respondent No.2 Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) to the Hindi film „Singham Returns‟ on the ground that the same on the one hand shows one religion and its religious and spiritual practices, places and leaders in negative, demeaning and derogatory light and on the other hand W.P.(C) No.7969/2014 Page 1 of 9 glorifies another religion and its religious and spiritual practices, places and leaders; ii) a CBI inquiry into the grant of Certificate for public exhibition to the said film; iii) a general direction to the respondent No.2 CBFC to refuse issue of certificates to films wherein the image of religious and spiritual places is maligned or is shown in negative light; and, iv) a direction to the Union of India (UOI) to provide for a forum for redressal of public grievances regarding wrong certification of films.
2. We have heard the senior counsel for the appellant at length but do not find any case for entertaining the petition in public interest to be made out. The portions of the film to which exception is taken, are described in detail in Annexure-P1 to the petition. We have minutely perused the same. We are of the view that the petitioners are confusing religion with „Godmen‟. The allegedly offending portions of the film pertain to a character in the film of a „Godman‟ and not to any religion. The Guidelines for Certification of Films for Public Exhibition (Annexure-P2 to the petition) require the CBFC to ensure that visuals or words in the film are not contemptuous of racial, religious or other groups and not to „Godmen‟. There is no challenge to the said Guidelines. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the visuals or words in the film are contemptuous of any W.P.(C) No.7969/2014 Page 2 of 9 prominent leader / proponent of any religion for it to be said that affront to him / her is affront to the said religion.
3. The settled principle in this regard is that the effect of the allegedly offending words / visuals is to be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. We, recently, in Nandini Tewari Vs. Union of India MANU/DE/2157/2014 while dealing with a Public Interest Litigation seeking direction, inter alia, to the respondent of deletion of the word „fanny‟ in the film „Finding Fanny‟ from everywhere it appears in the film on the ground that it will hurt the feelings of citizens of India, have inter alia held that if any such restrictions were imposed the same could affect the constitutional right of the film maker and our society is a very mature society and the petitioners therein should not be so sensitive about such a thing. The Supreme Court in K.A. Abbas Vs. Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 780 held that the standards that we set for our censors must make a substantial allowance in favour of freedom thus leaving a vast area for creative art to interpret life and society with some of its follies along with what is good; we must not look upon such human relationships as banned in W.P.(C) No.7969/2014 Page 3 of 9 toto and forever from human thought and must give scope for talent to put them before society; the requirements of art and literature include within themselves a comprehensive view of social life and not only in its ideal form and line is to be drawn where the average moral man begins to feel embarrassed or disgusted at a naked portrayal of life without the redeeming touch of art or genius or social value. Similarly in Bobby Art International Vs. Om Pal Singh Hoon (1996) 4 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that a film that illustrates consequences of a social evil necessarily must show that social evil.
4. We may record that the senior counsel for the petitioners himself prefaced his arguments by stating that we should not allow our minds to be coloured by the plethora of recent incidents of such „Godmen‟ being involved in all kinds of not only illegal but immoral activities. Once the counsel himself admits that such „Godmen‟ as are depicted in the subject film exist in today‟s society, we are of the view that a film that carries the message that the social evil is evil cannot be made impermissible on the ground that it depicts the social evil. Only if the film extols the social evils or encourage it, the same can be held to be not entitled to certification for public viewing. That is not the case here.
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5. There is another aspect of the matter. The Supreme Court in Raj Kapoor Vs. State (1980) 1 SCC 43 held that a certificate by a high powered Board of Censors with specialised composition and statutory mandate is not a piece of utter inconsequence; it is relevant material, important in its impact, though not infallible in its verdict; though the Courts are not barred from trying the case because the certificate is not conclusive but the same is to be not brushed aside. It was held that an act of recognition of moral worthiness by a statutory agency is not opinion evidence but an instance or transaction where the fact in issue has been asserted, recognised or affirmed.
6. Though the senior counsel for the petitioners, while drawing attention to the news reports of investigation against the Censor Board Chief including for having certified the subject film, for consideration, has argued that the certification thus has to be held to be not bona fide but not only is there no basis for the said news item but also there is nothing to show that the consideration even if paid for obtaining the certification was to get over the objection as is raised in this petition or any other objection, of the subject film violating any other guideline for film certification.
7. A film is a work of fiction and is exhibited for commercial purposes. Most films contain a warning / disclaimer that "none of the characters W.P.(C) No.7969/2014 Page 5 of 9 therein is based on any living or dead person and the resemblance if any is unintentional". It is not the case of the petitioners that it is not so in the subject film. Dissenters of speech and expression have no censorial right in respect of the intellectual, moral, religious, dogmatic or other choices of all mankind and the Constitution of India does not confer or tolerate such individualized, hyper-sensitive private censorial intrusion into and regulation of the guaranteed freedom of others.
8. The Constitution protects the right of the artist to portray social reality in all its forms. Some of that portrayal may take the form of questioning values and mores that are prevalent in society. The Supreme Court in S. Rangarajan Vs. P. Jagjivan Ram 1989 (2) SCC 574 has held that films are the legitimate and important medium for the treatment of issues of general concern and it is open to a producer to project his own message even if it is not approached of by others and that the State cannot prevent open discussion and open expression, however, hateful it may be to its policies.
9. The senior counsel for the petitioners has cited para 10 of Raj Kapoor Vs. Laxman (1980) 2 SCC 175 and paras 10 & 21 of S. Rangarajan (supra). While the former is on the need for stamping out corruption in Board of Censors and the criteria to be followed while censoring, the latter, taking W.P.(C) No.7969/2014 Page 6 of 9 note of the huge impact of the medium of films also lays down the standards to be applied by Censor Board while judging a film.
10. We have however, applying the same standards and criteria to the excerpts of the film to which objection is taken by the petitioners, not found any error in the decision of the Censor Board of granting certificate for public viewing to the subject film. As far as the need for stamping out corruption is concerned, there can be no two opinions. However as per petitioners themselves, action has been initiated.
11. The senior counsel at the fag end states that the petition also seeks general directions for future, as contained in prayer paragraphs (iii) & (iv) (supra).
12. As far as relief (iii) (supra) claimed in the petition is concerned, we find the same to be covered by the Guidelines (supra) and there is thus no need to issue any such direction.
13. The relief (iv) (supra) claimed in the petition is pressed clearly in ignorance of the provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, under Section 3 of which the Board of Film Certification is constituted. Section 5C of the said Act provides for appeals against the order of the Board to the Appellate W.P.(C) No.7969/2014 Page 7 of 9 Tribunal constituted vide Section 5D of the Act. Though the language of Section 5C suggests that the appeal thereunder can be preferred only by a person who had applied for a certificate in respect of a film but the possibility of the same being interpreted to include others as well cannot be ruled out. However we are not venturing into the said aspect. Suffice it to state that such a direction cannot be given. The Supreme Court in The Secretary Sh. A.P.D. Jain Pathshala Vs. Shivaji Bhagwat More (2011) 13 SCC 99 was seized of the question whether the High Court can direct the State Government to create a quasi judicial forum and whether the High Court could by a judicial order exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain any suit. It was held that neither the constitution nor any statute empowers a High Court to create or constitute a quasi judicial Tribunal for adjudicating disputes and the High Court neither has any legislative powers nor can it direct the Executive to create or constitute quasi judicial Tribunals otherwise than by legislative statute. It was yet further held that in the absence of any bar, the Civil Courts have the jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature and the High Court cannot issue a direction that Civil Court shall not entertain any suit in regard to any particular type of dispute nor create exclusive jurisdiction in another forum. We may notice that it is always W.P.(C) No.7969/2014 Page 8 of 9 open to a person aggrieved from certification by the CBFC, to approach either the Civil Court or even the High Court as has been done in the present case and the relief claimed for constituting an appellate forum is misconceived.
14. The matter may be looked at from another angle. Appeal is a creature of the statute and if there is no provision in the statute providing for an appeal, the Court cannot create one. We find an interesting discussion on this aspect in a judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Committee of Management, Tagore Uchchattar Madhyamic Vidyalaya Vs. District Inspector of Schools MANU/UP/0726/1997.
15. We accordingly do not find any merit in the petition and dismiss the same.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE NOVEMBER 19, 2014 gsr W.P.(C) No.7969/2014 Page 9 of 9