* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 3rd January, 2014.
+ RFA 94/1991
DALBIR SINGH ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Raman Kapur, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
V.B. Arya & Mr. Amit Kochar, Advs.
Versus
NIRMAL SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS ..Respondent
Through: Mr. Abhinav Vashisht, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Rajat Arora & Mr. Ajay Khanna,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. The appeal impugns the judgment and decree (dated 15th December, 1990 of the Court of the Additional District Judge, Delhi in Suit No.326/1981 filed by the deceased respondent/plaintiff against the appellant/defendant) of specific performance of the Agreement dated 28 th July, 1962 of sale by the appellant/defendant of land admeasuring 41 bighas and 16 biswas situated at Village Chattarpur, Delhi to the deceased respondent/plaintiff.
2. Notice of the appeal was issued and vide ex-parte ad-interim order dated 21st February, 1991, the execution of the Sale Deed in pursuance to RFA No.94/1991 Page 1 of 26 the decree was stayed. Vide order dated 12th March, 1991, the Trial Court records were requisitioned. One of the legal heirs of deceased respondent/plaintiff namely Smt. Hanso Devi died during the pendency of the appeal and her name was deleted from the array of respondents. On 2 nd February, 1995, the appeal was admitted for hearing and the earlier interim order was made absolute till the decision of the appeal. On 19 th November, 2008, when the appeal came up for hearing, the same was dismissed in default. However, on application made by the appellant/defendant, the same was vide order dated 25th February, 2009 restored to its original position. Another legal heir of the deceased respondent/plaintiff namely Smt. Savitri Devi also died during the pendency of the appeal and her legal heirs were substituted vide order dated 30th July, 2010. The parties were vide order dated 24th January, 2011 referred to mediation which though remained pending till 22nd October, 2013, failed. The counsels for the parties have been heard.
3. The deceased respondent/plaintiff, on 23rd October, 1963, instituted the suit from which this appeal arises, pleading:
(i) that the appellant/defendant being a displaced person was „permanently allotted‟ land bearing Khasra Nos.1657, 1658, 1659, RFA No.94/1991 Page 2 of 26 1666, 1672 to 1675 and 1116 total admeasuring 41 bighas and 16 biswas at Village Chattarpur, Delhi;
(ii) that a Sanad/Certificate in respect of the transfer and allotment of the said land was to be issued by the Ministry of Rehabilitation on payment of Rs.2100/-;
(iii) that the appellant/defendant vide Agreement to Sell dated 28th July, 1962 agreed to sell the entire land to the deceased respondent/plaintiff at the rate of Rs.2500/- per acre;
(iv) that it was agreed that the appellant/defendant shall execute the Sale Deed within one month from the date of receipt of obtaining the Sanad from the Ministry;
(v) that the said Sanad was not issued as the amount of Rs.2100/- was not deposited by the appellant/defendant, even though the appellant/defendant at the time of execution of the Agreement to Sell had received a sum of Rs.2500/- from the deceased respondent/plaintiff as earnest money;
(vi) that the appellant/defendant had further agreed that in case he failed to get the Sanad executed or execute the Sale Deed in favour of RFA No.94/1991 Page 3 of 26 the deceased respondent/plaintiff, the deceased respondent/plaintiff shall be at liberty to get the Sale Deed executed through the Court of Law at the cost of the appellant/defendant;
(vii) that the appellant/defendant thereafter deposited the amount due to the department but still did not obtain the Sanad or execute the Sale Deed in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff and on the contrary started dealing with other persons for sale of the land for a higher price;
(viii) that the deceased respondent/plaintiff thus filed a suit for injunction to restrain the appellant/defendant from doing so;
(ix) that the appellant/defendant in the said suit for injunction stated that he had not been granted the Sanad and he will not commit any breach of the contract; on his said statement, the suit for injunction was withdrawn;
(x) that however the appellant/defendant again threatened to commit breach of contract and though was bound to take delivery of the Sanad from the department of Rehabilitation and to execute the Sale Deed in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff but was not RFA No.94/1991 Page 4 of 26 doing so inspite of the fact that the necessary orders for issuing the Sanad had already been passed by the Department and the Sanad was ready to be delivered to the appellant/defendant;
(xi) that the deceased respondent/plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and to pay the balance sale consideration at the time of registration of the Sale Deed and had already purchased the necessary and requisite stamp papers in this regard.
In the circumstances, the suit for the relief of specific performance by directing the appellant/defendant to obtain, procure and receive the Sanad from the Department of Rehabilitation and to get the Sale Deed executed and registered in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff and in the alternative for the relief of recovery of damages of Rs.30,000/- for breach of contract, was filed.
4. The appellant/defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement raising various preliminary objections and pleading that as per the case of the deceased respondent/plaintiff himself, the Sale Deed in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff was to be executed within one month of RFA No.94/1991 Page 5 of 26 the grant of the Sanad and since no Sanad of the land had been granted to the appellant/defendant till then, the suit was premature and liable to be dismissed. It was further pleaded that though the appellant/defendant had deposited the required money in the Ministry of Rehabilitation but inspite of best efforts on his part, the Sanad had not been granted to him.
5. On the aforesaid pleadings of the appellant/defendant, following preliminary issues were framed in the suit on 31st March, 1964:
"1. Whether the suit is premature? If so what is its effect?
2. Whether the plaintiff has complied with the orders of Shri Tirlochan Singh, Sub Judge, Delhi for depositing cost? OPP"
6. The Court before which the suit was then pending found that the cost had been paid and thus decided the second of the aforesaid preliminary issues in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff. However, the first preliminary issue aforesaid was decided in favour of the appellant/defendant and the suit was held to be premature and was accordingly dismissed vide judgment and order dated 31st March, 1964.
7. The deceased respondent/plaintiff preferred RFA No.146-D/1964 to this Court and which was allowed vide judgment dated 21 st May, 1974. It RFA No.94/1991 Page 6 of 26 was held, that the first of the aforesaid two issues should not have been decided in isolation and that in order to determine this issue, it was necessary to frame another issue, as to whether the delay in obtaining the Sanad from the Ministry of Rehabilitation was on the part of the appellant/defendant and if it was so, the appellant/defendant could be directed to obtain the Sanad which he had not obtained. It was yet further held that the deceased respondent/plaintiff had in alternative to the claim for specific performance also made a claim for recovery of damages of Rs.30,000/- and on proof that it was the contractual obligation of the appellant/defendant to obtain the Sanad and that the appellant/defendant had committed a breach thereof, the claim for damages, if not for specific performance, would still survive. The suit was accordingly remanded back to the Trial Court for framing proper issues and to decide the first of the aforesaid issues along with the other issues.
8. It appears that on remand, the appellant/defendant filed a fresh written statement and contested the suit on the following grounds:
(a) that the deceased respondent/plaintiff having earlier instituted a suit for injunction and which was permitted to be withdrawn subject to payment of Rs.20/- as costs and which costs had not been RFA No.94/1991 Page 7 of 26 deposited/paid, was not entitled to maintain the subsequent suit for specific performance;
(b) that the appellant/defendant was not the owner of the property; the title of the property in suit even then vested in the Ministry of Rehabilitation till the certificate was not granted to the appellant/defendant; he was thus not vested with the ownership right of the property and the suit for specific performance against him was not maintainable;
(c) that it was on the same objection of the appellant/defendant that the deceased respondent/plaintiff had withdrawn the previous suit for injunction with liberty to bring fresh one in due course of time when the appellant/defendant would acquire ownership from the Government of India; such ownership had not been acquired by the appellant/defendant till then;
(d) that Notification dated 25th November, 1980 under Section 4 had been issued for acquisition of the said land and as per which Notification, the land could not be sold and the suit was not maintainable for the said reason also;
RFA No.94/1991 Page 8 of 26
(e) that the deceased respondent/plaintiff in collusion with the Patwari of the Halka and his two associates has misrepresented and practiced a fraud on the appellant/defendant and got some agreement executed in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff; the terms and conditions of the said agreement were not read over to the appellant/defendant who was an illiterate person and the said agreement was void for want of consideration;
(f) that the deceased respondent/plaintiff at the time of settlement of bargain, misrepresented certain facts to the appellant/defendant and assured him that the deceased respondent/plaintiff himself would deposit the money which the appellant/defendant had to pay to the Ministry of Rehabilitation but the deceased respondent/plaintiff had not done so and was thus himself in violation of the agreement and not entitled to specific performance thereof;
(g) that though the appellant/defendant had deposited the requisite money with the Ministry of Rehabilitation but inspite of best efforts of the appellant/defendant, the Sanad had not been granted to him;
(h) that though the deceased respondent/plaintiff was to pay earnest RFA No.94/1991 Page 9 of 26 money of Rs.2500/- to the appellant/defendant but had paid only a sum of Rs.500/- stating that the balance Rs.2000/- will be deposited with the Ministry of Rehabilitation and which had not been done;
(i) that since the appellant/defendant was not the owner of the property, he could not be directed to convey a title therein to the deceased respondent/plaintiff.
9. On the pleadings aforesaid of the parties, the following issues were framed in the suit in November, 1975:
"1. Whether the suit is premature?
2. Whether the defendant entered into with the agreement to sell under misrepresentation and fraud is so, what effect?
3. Whether agreement is void for want of consideration?
4. Whether the plaintiff committed breach in the matter of deposit of money with the Government, if so, its effect?
5. Whether it was obligation of the defendant to obtain Sanad from the Ministry of Rehabilitation?
6. In case Issue No.5 is answered in the affirmative, whether the defendant can be directed to obtain Sanad?
7. Whether the defendant has committed breach of the obligation, if proved Issue No.5?
8. Whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract?
9. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement?
10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs.30,000/- as RFA No.94/1991 Page 10 of 26 damages, if not, specific performance is ordered, if not, how much damages if any is the plaintiff entitled?" The following additional issue was framed on 16th July, 1981: "Issue No.10A: What is the effect of notification No.F-9 (16/80 L&B dated 25th November, 1980) issued by Union of India on the suit filed by the plaintiff?"
10. The learned ADJ, on the basis of the evidence led before him, has in the impugned judgment found/observed/held:
(I) that at the time of execution of the Agreement to Sell dated 28 th July, 1962, there was only an allotment, of the land aforesaid, in the name of the appellant/defendant by virtue of the appellant/defendant being one of the members of Bharat Kishan Society and the letter of allotment was issued only on 23rd October, 1962; (II) that the appellant/defendant during his deposition had admitted that he had got the Sanad with respect to the said land in the year 1968;
(III) that the specific plea in the plaint that the allotment of the land in the year 1962 in favour of the appellant/defendant was permanent, was not controverted in the written statement; RFA No.94/1991 Page 11 of 26 (IV) that issuance of a Sanad/Certificate was only a mere formality which was to be undertaken by the Department of the Regional Settlement Commissioner;
(V) that the basis of the Agreement to Sell dated 28 th July, 1962 was the allotment, though for legal purposes title to the land was to be vested in the appellant/defendant only by virtue of Sanad; (VI) that on the date of institution of the suit on 23 rd October, 1963, the certificate of allotment dated 23rd October, 1962 had already been issued in the name of the appellant/defendant; (VII) that the suit thus could not be said to be premature: (VIII) that as per the Agreement to Sell, it was the obligation of the appellant/defendant as vendor to obtain the Sanad after depositing the amount and the appellant/defendant had in the Agreement to Sell further undertaken that after obtaining the Sanad, he will inform the deceased respondent/plaintiff in writing and shall execute the Sale Deed;
(IX) that accordingly, Issues No.1, 5 & 6 were decided in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff and against the appellant/defendant; RFA No.94/1991 Page 12 of 26 (X) that though the appellant/defendant, in the written statement, had taken a plea of collusion between the deceased respondent/plaintiff and Halka Patwari and fraud and misrepresentation had also been pleaded but no particulars of any fraud or misrepresentation were given and the pleas of fraud and misrepresentation thus could not be looked into; (XI) that though the appellant/defendant had pleaded that the deceased respondent/plaintiff had misrepresented "certain facts to him" but it was nowhere mentioned in the written statement, as to what were those facts;
(XII) that though it was the plea of the appellant/defendant in the written statement that the deceased respondent/plaintiff had assured the appellant/defendant that the deceased respondent/plaintiff will himself deposit the requisite money in the Ministry of Rehabilitation and had not done so and was thus himself in breach of the Agreement to Sell but the appellant/defendant, while appearing in the witness box, denied having entered into any transaction with the deceased respondent/plaintiff or the deceased respondent/plaintiff having paid any money to the appellant/defendant and deposed of one Shri Kishan RFA No.94/1991 Page 13 of 26 Chand Gupta having got signatures of the appellant/defendant on some papers, representing that the same were required for accounting regarding amount paid by the said Shri Kishan Chand Gupta to the appellant/defendant;
(XIII) that thus the evidence led by the appellant/defendant was contrary to his pleading;
(XIV) that the evidence beyond pleadings could not be looked at; (XV) that though the said Shri Kishan Chand Gupta was examined as a witness but no such question or case was put to him; (XVI) that vague pleadings of misrepresentation and fraud were of no avail; reliance in this regard was placed on Varanasaya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya Vs. Rajkishore Tripathi (1977) 1 SCC 279; (XVII) that none of the witness of the deceased respondent/plaintiff had been cross-examined by the counsel for the appellant/defendant with regard to fraud, collusion or misrepresentation; (XVIII) that the plea taken by the appellant/defendant of the deceased respondent/plaintiff having assured the appellant/defendant that the deceased respondent/plaintiff will deposit the money with the RFA No.94/1991 Page 14 of 26 Department of Rehabilitation was not sustainable in view of the Agreement to Sell and the Receipt vide which earnest money and advance amount was paid on 28th July, 1962 which shows payment of Rs.2500/- by the deceased respondent/plaintiff to the appellant/defendant;
(XIX) that moreover the appellant/defendant in his own testimony nowhere deposed that the deceased respondent/plaintiff had ever assured him so;
(XX) that the deceased respondent/plaintiff had examined the writer of the Agreement to Sell and the Receipt and which two documents were admitted by the appellant/defendant; the said writer of the documents had testified that the documents were read over and explained to the parties; that the appellant/defendant in cross- examination did not controvert the said witness on the said aspect; (XXI) that similarly PW-3 being the attesting witness of the Agreement to Sell and the Receipt was also not cross-examined on the aspect of fraud and misrepresentation; the only cross-examination was of payment of Rs.500/- only instead of Rs.2500/- as recorded in the said document;
RFA No.94/1991 Page 15 of 26 (XXII) that accordingly, Issues No.2, 3 & 4 were decided in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff and against the appellant/defendant; (XXIII) that since the Sanad had already been delivered to the appellant/defendant in the year 1968, there was no need for giving any direction therefor as was sought in the suit; (XXIV) that as per the Agreement to Sell, the obligation to obtain the Sanad after depositing the requisite amount was of the appellant/defendant;
(XXV) that there was thus a breach of obligation on behalf of the appellant/defendant himself;
(XXVI) that there was no denial in the written statement of the appellant/defendant to the specific plea in the plaint of the deceased respondent/plaintiff being always ready and willing to perform his part of the Agreement to Sell;
(XXVII) that the deceased respondent/plaintiff had also not been cross-examined to the effect that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the Agreement to Sell;
(XXVIII) that accordingly Issues No.7 & 8 were decided in favour of RFA No.94/1991 Page 16 of 26 the deceased respondent/plaintiff and against the appellant/defendant; (XXIX) that Issues No.9 & 10 were decided in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff and against the deceased appellant/defendant, relying on Prakash Chandra Vs. Angadlal (1979) 4 SCC 393 holding that ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted and that it ought to be denied only when equitable considerations for its refusal are shown and which had not been done;
(XXX) that the only contention of the appellant/defendant was that at the time of the Agreement to Sell, there was no title or right in favour of the appellant/defendant in the property; however, under Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, a future right in property could also be transferred; further Section 13(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 also permits such a transaction;
(XXXI) that it was also not in dispute that the land had already been allotted to the appellant/defendant prior to the date of the Agreement to Sell thereof in favour of the deceased respondent/plaintiff; (XXXII) that no case had been made out by the appellant/defendant for denial of the relief of specific performance; RFA No.94/1991 Page 17 of 26 (XXXIII) that there was no legal infirmity found for grant of the relief of specific performance;
(XXXIV) that accordingly under Issues No.9 & 10, it was held that the deceased respondent/plaintiff was entitled to the relief of specific performance;
(XXXV) that the Notification of the acquisition of the land had been quashed by this Court vide judgment in B.R. Gupta Vs. Union of India 38 (1989) DLT 243;
(XXXVI) that even otherwise, till taking over of possession of the land, the right of the owner thereof could not be said to be extinguished;
(XXXVII) that accordingly the suit was decreed for the relief of specific performance, giving a direction to the deceased respondent/plaintiff to deposit the balance sale consideration and where after the appellant/defendant was directed to execute the Sale Deed.
11. The senior counsel for the appellant/defendant has argued:
(A) that the Agreement to Sell dated 28th July, 1962 is of 8 acres RFA No.94/1991 Page 18 of 26 (equivalent to 40 bighas and 16 biswas) of land at Chatarpur, Delhi for a total sale consideration of rs.25,000/- out of which Rs.2500/- have been paid and the balance was to be paid within one month of the grant of the Sanad in favour of the appellant/defendant; (B) that the appellant/defendant in the year 1991 sold the said land and the suit by the appellant/defendant against the said purchaser has been dismissed and the possession of the land is with the Station House Officer;
(C) reliance is placed on Satya Jain Vs. Anis Ahmed Rushdie (2013) 8 SCC 131, to contend that owing to the long passage of time since the Agreement to Sell and the drastic change in values of the property agreed to be sold, specific performance ought not to be granted.
(D) that since the appellant/defendant on the date of the Agreement to Sell was not the owner of the land, the Agreement to Sell was void;
12. Per contra, the senior counsel for the deceased respondent/plaintiff has argued:
(i) that vide interim order dated 21st February, 1991 in this appeal, the deceased respondent/plaintiff was restrained from selling the RFA No.94/1991 Page 19 of 26 property;
(ii) that any dealing by the appellant/defendant with the property after the decree will not affect the decree;
(iii) that the judgment in Satya Jain supra has been clarified in review thereagainst reported in (2013) 8 SCC 147, as being in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and not laying down any law of general application while issuing the direction for execution of the Sale Deed at the market price of the land;
(iv) that price escalation, in P.S. Ranakrishna Reddy Vs. M.K. Bhagyalakshmi (2007) 10 SCC 231 has been held to be not a ground for refusal of a right of specific performance of an Agreement to Sell;
(v) that the conduct of the appellant/defendant in the present case is tainted; the appellant/defendant took a false plea of the agreement being fabricated and which plea has not even been pressed in this appeal; attention is invited to S.V.R. Mudaliar Vs. Mrs. Rajabu F. Buhari (1995) 4 SCC 15 laying down that where the seller departed from truth to bolster his case, the rise in prices cannot be a ground for denying the relief of specific performance;
(vi) attention is also invited to Narinderjit Singh Vs. North Star RFA No.94/1991 Page 20 of 26 Estate Promoters Limited (2012) 5 SCC 712 also laying down that in the absence of any pleading of hardship or evidence to show that it will be inequitable to order specific performance of the agreement, the relief of specific performance cannot be denied merely on the ground of escalation in price.
13. The senior counsel for the appellant/defendant in rejoinder has contended that the Supreme Court in Satya Jain supra had declined specific performance on the ground of price increase itself and this case has parity with the facts of the case in Satya Jain and has further contended that it is for this reason that the parties were referred to mediation which though remained unsuccessful.
14. As would be apparent from the aforesaid, the senior counsel for the appellant has raised only two contentions before this Court i.e. firstly of the decree for specific performance being liable to be set aside for the reason of the long passage of time for which the appeal remained pending in this Court and the huge escalation in prices during the said interregnum and secondly, of the agreement being not specifically enforceable for the reason of the appellant/defendant on the date of execution thereof being not the owner of the property agreed to be sold.
RFA No.94/1991 Page 21 of 26
15. In view of the senior counsel for the appellant/defendant having confined the argument to the said two aspects only, there is no need to go into the other findings of the learned ADJ, though having gone through the entire Trial Court record, I may mention that I agree therewith and the same are found to be on correct appreciation of the evidence led before the learned ADJ.
16. Taking up the second of the aforesaid two contentions of the senior counsel for the appellant/defendant first, though the same has also been dealt with properly in the impugned judgment but I may add that the principle behind Sections 41 & 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 can also be beneficially applied to negate such argument of the counsel for the appellant/defendant. Section 41 provides that where an ostensible owner of property transfers the same for consideration, the transfer shall not be voidable on the ground that the transferor was not authorised to make it. Section 43 provides that where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immoveable property and professes to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer RFA No.94/1991 Page 22 of 26 subsists. It is not as if the appellant/defendant on the date of the Agreement to Sell i.e. on 28th July, 1962 was without any right whatsoever in the property. The appellant/defendant in his examination-in-chief stated that the subject land was allotted to him in the year 1954 and the Pakka allotment was made to him in the year 1968. There is also on the record a document titled Sanad of Permanent Allotment of Acquired Evacuee property in rural areas issued by the Ministry of Rehabilitation dated 23rd October, 1962 and which also records that the subject land stood transferred to the appellant/defendant for the purposes of the compensation payable to him under the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1954. Section 13(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act referred by the learned ADJ also provides that where a person contracts to sell certain immovable property having no title or only an imperfect title thereto, and if subsequently acquires any interest in the property, the purchaser may compel such person to make good the contract out of such interest. The Supreme Court in Silla Chandra Sekharam Vs. Ramchandra Sahu AIR 1964 SC 1789 held that the equivalent of Section 13(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 applies to executory contract; Undoubtedly, the appellant/defendant had agreed to sell to the deceased respondent/plaintiff the land already allotted to him and RFA No.94/1991 Page 23 of 26 possessed by him, after getting the Sanad with respect thereof in his favour. Similarly, in Laxman Tatyaba Kankate Vs. Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak (2010) 7 SCC 71 it was held that where a property is agreed to be sold with an imperfect title and is encumbered, the purchaser has a right to compel the seller to redeem the mortgage and obtain a valid discharge and then specifically perform the contract.
17. The senior counsel for the appellant/defendant, except for raising the argument, has not been able to justify the same by any provision of law or precedent.
18. As far as the only other contention of price rise is concerned, though undoubtedly the Agreement to Sell is over half a century old but I find the appellant/defendant himself to blame therefor. When the deceased respondent/plaintiff immediately after the Agreement to Sell filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the appellant/defendant from selling the property to others, the appellant/defendant at that time did not take any of the defences as taken to the suit for specific performance subsequently filed but assured that after getting the Sanad he will transfer the property to the deceased respondent/plaintiff. He however did not do so. Thereafter, when the suit for specific performance was filed, the appellant/defendant took the RFA No.94/1991 Page 24 of 26 specious plea of the same being still premature and which plea in fact succeeded, compelling the deceased respondent/plaintiff to approach this Court by way of a RFA and which was allowed and which whole process consumed more than 10 years. A perusal of the order sheet of the suit after remand also shows the appellant/defendant to have dragged the proceeding at each and every stage. The last nail in the coffin is the plea now taken of the disposal of the property even after the decree of the specific performance had been passed. Even in the appeal, the appellant/defendant did not show any expediency and has rather been compelled to argue the same. The appellant/defendant being himself guilty of the long delay, cannot be allowed to benefit therefrom. The sole reliance placed on Satya Jain, is misconceived as the same, in review, has been clarified as having no precedentiary value. Else, the law is clear. A party to a litigation cannot benefit from its own wrongs/defaults and the delays if any in disposal of lis owing to the courts being overburdened cannot harm anyone. The appellant/defendant did not show any anxiety to have the appeal disposed off. Though this Court is now hearing appeals of the year 2005 and in the category of cases of senior citizens of the year 2008, the appellant/defendant not once applied for early hearing and rather allowed the appeal to languish. RFA No.94/1991 Page 25 of 26 The appellant/defendant after so keeping the appeal pending cannot be heard to contend that owing to such long pendency of appeal, he has become entitled to have the same allowed. If the same were to be permitted, it will give impetus to the practise to have the appeals pending for long.
19. No merit is thus found in the only two contentions raised by the senior counsel for the appellant/defendant. The appeal is resultantly dismissed with costs. The counsel fee is assessed at Rs.25,000/-.
Decree sheet be drawn up.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
JANUARY 03, 2014 „bs‟..
RFA No.94/1991 Page 26 of 26