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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision : January 07, 2013.
+ W.P.(C) 7371/2000
PURAN SINGH ..... Petitioner
Represented by: Mr.Rajeev Sharma, Advocate and
Mr.Uddyam Mukherjee, Advocate.
versus
DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF
PRINTING & ORS ..... Respondents
Represented by: Mr.Rajat Soni, Advocate for Ms.Sonia
Mathur, Advocate with Mr.Sandeep Palaria, LDC.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE VEENA BIRBAL
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. (Oral)
CM No.2108/2012 & CM No.2109/2012
1. The writ petition was disposed of on August 11, 2011 granting partial relief to the writ petitioner. On said date nobody appeared for the respondents as recorded in the memo of parties.
2. Vide CM No.2108/2012 it is prayed that the order dated August 11, 2011 be recalled and vide CM No.2109/2012 it is prayed that 142 days‟ delay in seeking recall of the order dated August 11, 2011 be condoned.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the applications may be allowed provided the respondents argue the writ petition today itself inasmuch as the writ petition relates to the year 2000.
4. Learned counsel for the respondents concedes as above. Therefore, CM No.2108/2012 and 2109/2012 are allowed. Order dated August 11, 2011 is recalled.
5. Writ petition is restored for hearing on merits.
WP(C) 7371/2000 Page 1 of 4WP(C) No.7371/2000
1. Relevant facts are that on June 05, 1985 the petitioner was suspended by the Disciplinary Authority informing that the disciplinary proceedings were contemplated against him with reference to an alleged act of misbehaviour with Shri R.S.Bankatachalam; the Deputy Manager of the respondent No.1.
2. On June 18, 1985 the necessary memorandum serving the charge- sheet, statement of imputation, list of witnesses and list of documents was issued and served upon the petitioner to which he replied on June 22, 1985 denying the charges.
3. Considering the reply filed, the Disciplinary Authority decided to hold an inquiry and appointed respondent No.3 as the Inquiry Officer who entered upon the inquiry on August 11, 1985.
4. Ignoring irrelevant facts and straight on reaching the relevant, on May 19, 1986, the Inquiry Officer intimated to the petitioner that he would be recording evidence on May 21, 1986 at 2:30 PM. The petitioner did not appear on the said date. Inquiry Officer proceeded ex-parte and concluded the inquiry. The petitioner appeared before the Inquiry Officer on May 22, 1986 i.e. the next day and informed him that he could not appear at the inquiry the previous day at 2:30 PM since the local police had apprehended him at 12:30 PM in connection with the complaint lodged by respondent No.1 with respect to the same gravamen qua which the charge-sheet was issued. He requested of being given an opportunity but the Inquiry Officer refused stating that he had already concluded the inquiry.
5. The inquiry report indicted the petitioner which resulted in order being passed removing the petitioner from service.
6. Departmental appellate remedies having failed, the petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal vide OA No.205/1988 WP(C) 7371/2000 Page 2 of 4 resulting in the Tribunal quashing the penalty imposed and remanding the matter to the Appellate Authority to re-decide the appeal.
7. The Appellate Authority rejected the appeal once again on April 27, 1995, holding that as per the arrest memo the petitioner was arrested at 4:30 PM on May 21, 1986 and thus opined that the writ petitioner could have appeared before the Inquiry Officer at 2:30 PM. The Appellate Authority opined that the claim of the petitioner that he was arrested at 12:30 PM was contrary to the time recorded on the arrest memo.
8. Suffice would it be for us to note that it is common practice adopted by the police to apprehend a person and after completing formalities draw up the memo of arrest much later. That the memo of arrest records the time at 4:30 PM would not mean that the petitioner was not apprehended at 12:30 PM as claimed by him.
9. We would simply highlight that the report of the arresting officer recording arrest of the petitioner reads as under:-
"Time 4.30 H.C. came back alongwith constable after making investigation on the basis of the written report No.9 of S.K.Sen, Manager, Government Press, Faridabad. I have come back arresting the accused Puran Singh, s/o Motu Ram Jat Jogi PS Satnali under Section 107/151 of Cr.P.C. and he has been detained in the lock up. He shall be produced in the court tomorrow. The information in this respect shall be conveyed."
10. It is apparent that the time 4:30 PM recorded is when the Head Constable along with the Constable returned after making investigations and arresting the writ petitioner. This was the time when the Head Constable, Constable and the petitioner reached the police station, and not the time when petitioner was apprehended.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent would urge that even in the past, the petitioner had the habit of not reaching on the date or the time fixed by WP(C) 7371/2000 Page 3 of 4 the Inquiry Officer to participate in the inquiry.
12. It is settled law that if a person has a good cause for non appearance on a particular date, past conduct has to be ignored. Thus, the inevitable conclusion has to be that the report of the Inquiry Officer is vitiated inasmuch as the inquiry has been concluded post haste and the petitioner was prevented from a cause beyond his control to appear before the Inquiry Officer.
13. Now, the ordinary course which should be chartered is to put the train back on the rails at the spot where the derailment took place. But, when the time elapses and inquiries become stale, Courts have chartered a midway course.
14. As noted by us herein above, the incident relates to January 04, 1985. Charge-sheet was issued on June 18, 1985. We are in the year 2013. Ends of justice would therefore not be met by directing the respondents to recommence the inquiry from the stage it was derailed; and as a consequence impugned order removing petitioner from service is set aside requiring petitioner to be reinstated but to be paid only 50% of the back wages. The intervening period would be treated as „in service‟, for purposes of pension and no more.
15. Ordered accordingly.
16. The writ petition stands disposed of.
17. No costs.
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG) JUDGE (VEENA BIRBAL) JUDGE JANUARY 07, 2013 dkb WP(C) 7371/2000 Page 4 of 4